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Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

Letter to the President
December 8, 2021
Dear Mr. President:
The Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States established by your
Executive Order 14023 respectfully submits its Report. At its public meeting on December 7,
2021, the Commission voted unanimously to approve this submission upon concluding that
it had met its charge to provide an account of the current debate over the “role and operation
of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system” and an “analysis of the principal arguments
in the contemporary public debate for and against Supreme Court reform, including an
appraisal of the merits and legality of particular reform proposals.”
The Commission was immensely assisted in its work by the diversity of perspectives and
expertise among the Commissioners, written and oral testimony provided by experts and
organizations in connection with the Commission’s hearings, the public’s engagement in the
Commission’s work through the submission of comments, and excellent support from the
staff at the General Services Administration.
We are honored to have had the opportunity to examine and then present to you an analysis
of these complex and often controversial issues.
Respectfully,

Bob Bauer
Co-Chair

Cristina Rodríguez
Co-Chair

Kate Andrias
Rapporteur
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Preface
Executive Order 14023 established this Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Order directed the Commission to provide an account of the current
debate over the “role and operation of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system” and an
“analysis of the principal arguments in the contemporary public debate for and against
Supreme Court reform, including an appraisal of the merits and legality of particular reform
proposals.”
Consistent with the Executive Order, the Report identifies prominent proposals for reform
and provides a critical evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposals. This
appraisal includes consideration of whether specific proposals could reasonably be expected
to achieve the objectives that their proponents desire. It also identifies other potential
consequences that might result from the reforms, including whether and how they might affect:
the critical role of the Court in our system of government, including as a guardian of the rule
of law; the protection of constitutional rights, principles, or structures; the processes by which
Justices are nominated and confirmed to the Court; and public opinion and perceptions of the
Court.
The Report also analyzes the constitutional and other legal requirements that would have
to be met or resolved to implement the reforms.
The President made plain in public statements and in his Executive Order that he was
seeking a Report reflecting bipartisan, diverse perspectives from Commissioners “having
experience with and knowledge of the Federal judiciary and the Supreme Court of the United
States.” As would be expected, the Commissioners appointed by the President hold various
and sometimes opposing views on the legal and policy issues raised in the Court reform debate,
and disagreements are noted at various points in the analysis. The Executive Order does not
call for the Commission to issue recommendations, but the Report does provide a critical
appraisal of arguments in the reform debate.
Given the size and nature of the Commission and the complexity of the issues addressed,
individual members of the Commission would have written the Report with different
emphases and approaches. But the Commission submits this Report by unanimous vote, in the
belief that it represents a fair and constructive treatment of the complex and often highly
controversial issues it was charged with examining.
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Executive Summary
On April 9, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. issued Executive Order 14023
establishing this Commission, to consist of “individuals having experience with and
knowledge of the Federal judiciary and the Supreme Court of the United States.” The Order
charged the Commission with producing a report for the President that addresses three sets of
questions. First, the Report should include “[a]n account of the contemporary commentary and
debate about the role and operation of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system and
about the functioning of the constitutional process by which the President nominates and, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints Justices to the Supreme Court.”
Second, the Report should consider the “historical background of other periods in the Nation’s
history when the Supreme Court’s role and the nominations and advice-and-consent process
were subject to critical assessment and prompted proposals for reform.” Third, the Report
should provide an analysis of the principal arguments for and against particular proposals to
reform the Supreme Court, “including an appraisal of [their] merits and legality,” and should
be informed by “a broad spectrum of ideas.”
The Report begins by explaining the genesis of today’s Court reform debate, including by
identifying developments that gave rise to President Biden’s decision to issue the April 2021
Executive Order, particularly the debates surrounding the most recent nominations. This
Introduction emphasizes that the Court’s composition and jurisprudence long have been
subjects of public controversy and debate in the nation’s civic life: The Court serves as a
crucial guardian of the rule of law and also plays a central role in major social and political
conflicts. Its decisions have profound effects on the life of the nation. Though conflict
surrounding the processes by which the President nominates and the Senate confirms Justices
is not new, it has become more intensely partisan in recent years.
The Introduction also articulates three common and interrelated ideas frequently invoked
in reform debates and throughout the Chapters of the Report: the importance of protecting or
enhancing the Court’s legitimacy; the role of judicial independence in our system of
government; and the value of democracy and its relationship to the Supreme Court’s
decisionmaking. These important ideas can mean different things to different people. The
Introduction discusses the range of meanings ascribed to these terms, with the aim of clarifying
how they are deployed in arguments for and against reform.
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Chapter 1
Chapter 1 provides a history of efforts to reform the Supreme Court dating back to the
Founding. This history highlights how lawmakers and the public, throughout the Nation’s
history, have been attentive to and engaged in debate about the role the Court plays within the
constitutional system. Reform debates have reflected the institutional needs of an expanding
nation, and they have involved partisan conflict and philosophical struggle over substantive
constitutional values and the power of government to serve the needs of the people. We offer
this history not to attempt to resolve today’s debate according to a particular historical
standard, but rather to offer context for today’s discussions and to underscore that debates
about Court reform are part and parcel of U.S. constitutional history and the development of
the American political order.

Chapter 2
Chapter 2 examines proposals to expand or otherwise alter the current structure of the
Supreme Court. The Chapter begins by presenting a brief history of past efforts to alter the
size of the Court, dating back to the nineteenth century. It then proceeds to consider the legality
of Court expansion, concluding based on text, structure, and history that Congress has broad
authority to modify the Court’s size.
The Chapter then describes arguments made in the public debate both for and against
Court expansion. Supporters contend that Court expansion is necessary to address serious
violations of norms governing the confirmation process and troubling developments in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that they see as undermining the democratic system.
Opponents contend that expanding—or “packing”—the Court would significantly diminish its
independence and legitimacy and establish a dangerous precedent that could be used by any
future political force as a means of pressuring or intimidating the Court. The Commission
takes no position on the validity or strength of these claims. Mirroring the broader public
debate, there is profound disagreement among Commissioners on these issues. We present the
arguments in order to fulfill our charge to provide a complete account of the contemporary
Court reform debate.
The Chapter also considers other structural reforms to the Court, such as proposals to
provide for rotation between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, divide the
Supreme Court into panels, or ensure ideological balance on the Court. The Commission
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concludes that some of these proposals rest on sounder constitutional ground than others.
Nonetheless, most such proposals would require significant changes to our federal judicial
system and offer uncertain practical benefits.

Chapter 3
Chapter 3 considers proposals for establishing non-renewable term limits for Supreme
Court Justices. Proponents of term limits argue that they would help ensure that the Court’s
membership is broadly responsive to the outcome of elections over time; make appointments
to the Court more predictable and less arbitrary; reduce the chances that excess power might
be concentrated in any single Justice for extended periods of time; and enhance the Court’s
decisionmaking by ensuring regular rotation in decisionmakers, while maintaining judicial
independence by guaranteeing long terms and lifetime salaries. Opponents of term limits argue
that eliminating life tenure would weaken the Constitution’s express protection of judicial
independence, which could undermine the Court’s legitimacy; further politicize the selection
and confirmation process by requiring confirmations every two years; heighten the perception
that Justices are partisan or political actors; and destabilize Court doctrine. Opponents do not
agree that long fixed terms and lifetime salaries would solve these problems.
Without taking a position on the merits of term limits, the Chapter considers design
questions that would have to be addressed were term limits to be adopted. It begins by
considering how to draft a constitutional amendment to establish term limits and then proceeds
to consider whether a similar system could be adopted by statute. In this analysis, the Chapter
addresses key implementation questions, including the length of terms; the number of
appointments a President should be able to make in a four-year term; how to transition from
our current system of life tenure to a term-limited system; whether to impose constraints on
Justices’ post-tenure employment; and the challenge presented by potential impasses in the
Senate’s confirmation process. Opponents of term limits cite what they believe to be the
intractability of these implementation questions as reason not to pursue term limits.
Proponents emphasize that the benefits of term limits warrant grappling with what they believe
are difficult but soluble design questions.

Chapter 4
Chapter 4 explores proposals that would reduce the power of the Supreme Court or of the
judicial branch as a whole. Many proposals for reforming the Court accept the scope of its
power more or less as a given. By contrast, the proposals canvassed in this Chapter would curb
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the Justices’ capacity to invalidate legislation. They are designed to shift power to resolve
major social, political, and cultural issues from the Court to the political branches.
Without attempting to address all potential means of reducing the Court’s power, this
Chapter examines jurisdiction stripping; supermajority voting requirements for the
invalidation of congressional or other government action, as well as other rules that would
require courts to show greater deference to the political branches; and proposals for a
constitutional amendment to authorize Congress, through legislation, to override decisions of
the Supreme Court and other courts. The Chapter analyzes how such reforms might affect the
role of the Supreme Court or other courts in relation to the elected branches of government;
the potential benefits and costs of the proposals; and whether they would require constitutional
amendment.
The Chapter concludes that the efficacy of proposals targeting the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court or otherwise constraining its decisionmaking depend on the details of the
proposals, including whether they also affect lower court and state court decisionmaking. We
also conclude that the reforms that would most directly reduce the Supreme Court’s (and other
courts’) power over fundamental social questions are also ones that, absent constitutional
amendment, the Court would most likely find to be unconstitutional. However, the Chapter
highlights arguments regarding how Congress might engage in more robust constitutional
interpretation and enforcement even without constitutional amendment. Without taking a
position on the ultimate merits of such proposals, this Chapter aims to help inform further
debate about whether reforms would be worth pursuing.

Chapter 5
Chapter 5 addresses how the Supreme Court conducts its work and explains its decisions.
Although much of the public discussion about Court reform has been focused on structural
issues, the Court’s internal procedures and practices also have been a part of contemporary
debates about the Court’s role and operations. Accordingly, Chapter 5 focuses on three sets of
issues.
The first is the Court’s use of emergency orders, which are issued without the rounds of
briefing and oral argument that its merits cases receive, and often also without a written
explanatory opinion—even in cases that can generate intense public debate, involving issues
of national importance or great practical impact. The Chapter reviews recent controversies
relating to emergency orders and apparent changes in the Court’s approach to managing them.
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It notes that the Court may well benefit from continuing to adjust its explanatory practices in
important cases, with an eye toward providing insight into its reasoning, reinforcing
procedural consistency, and avoiding any possible appearance of arbitrariness or bias. The
Chapter also addresses issues presented by emergency orders in capital cases, where the Court
often has the final word on whether a state or federal execution will go forward.
The second set of issues concerns judicial ethics. The Chapter reviews potential benefits
and drawbacks of reforms that would impose on the Justices a code of conduct, a disciplinary
framework, or recusal review. The Chapter explores the potential difficulties presented by a
framework containing binding sanctions, but also notes that experience in other contexts
suggests that the adoption of an advisory code of conduct would be a positive step on
its own.
The third topic is public access to the Court’s proceedings through the audio or video
streaming of oral arguments and opinion announcements in real time. The Chapter
acknowledges that several Justices have expressed opposition to the use of cameras, but
suggests that the continuation of near-simultaneous audio would enable the media and
interested members of the bar and the public to better follow the work of the Court.
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Introduction: The Genesis of the Reform
Debate and the Commission’s Mission
On April 9, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. issued an executive order establishing
this Commission. The Order charged the Commission with producing a Report for the
President that addresses three sets of questions. First, the Report should include “[a]n account
of the contemporary commentary and debate about the role and operation of the Supreme
Court in our constitutional system and about the functioning of the constitutional process by
which the President nominates and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints
Justices to the Supreme Court.” 1 Second, the Report should consider the “historical
background of other periods in the Nation’s history when the Supreme Court’s role and the
nominations and advice-and-consent process were subject to critical assessment and prompted
proposals for reform.” 2 Third, the Report should provide an analysis of the principal arguments
for and against particular proposals to reform the Supreme Court, “including an appraisal of
[their] merits and legality.” 3
This Commission is the most recent of various committees and commissions established
over the last fifty years to explore judicial reform. These have addressed a wide range of issues,
such as caseload management and capacity, judicial disciplinary codes and administration, and
the organization of the lower federal courts. Consistent with this history, President Biden’s
Order charged this Commission to enlist experts, as well as the public, to “ensure that its work
is informed by a broad spectrum of ideas” on the question of Supreme Court reform. 4

The Genesis of Today’s Reform Debate
In October of 2020, then-presidential candidate Biden stated his intention, if elected, to
create a bipartisan Commission to examine Supreme Court reform. In response to a question
about whether he supported proposals to expand the number of Justices on the Court, Biden
responded that “it’s not about court packing” and observed that constitutional scholars have
debated a range of Court reform proposals. 5
The President’s comments and the Commission’s subsequent creation underscore that the
nation has been engaged for some time in an intense and ongoing debate about the Court’s
composition, the direction of its jurisprudence, and whether one political party or the other has
breached norms that guide the process of confirming new Justices. Political actors, lawmakers,
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and commentators have articulated sharply divergent accounts of why conflict over the Court
has escalated in recent years. And they disagree about whether these political struggles have
undermined the Court’s legitimacy. 6
The Commission does not purport to offer a consensus history of the last decades of
conflict over the Supreme Court, nor does it come to a conclusion about whether the Court has
suffered a loss or crisis of legitimacy. Commissioners hold very different views on these
matters. Without purporting to resolve any of those differences, this introductory Chapter
offers a set of observations that provide context for President Biden’s decision to issue the
April 2021 Executive Order and discusses a set of criteria by which the broader debate might
be appraised.

Conflict Over the Court
The role the Court plays in major political and social conflicts has long made its
composition and jurisprudence subjects of debate in the nation’s civic life. Throughout
American history, including in recent decades, conflict over the Court has played out with
varying degrees of intensity in the processes by which the President nominates and the Senate
confirms new Justices. In recent decades, both Democrats and Republicans have lamented that
nominees, prepared by the White House staff, have systematically sidestepped candid answers
to questions about their records and judicial philosophies, although many also agree that
nominees should not answer questions in ways that might be seen as pre-committing
themselves to particular outcomes in future cases.
Nominations to the Court have been fiercely opposed for a range of reasons. President
Woodrow Wilson’s nomination of Louis Brandeis generated aggressive opposition fueled by
antisemitism. 7 President Herbert Hoover’s nomination of John J. Parker was opposed by civil
rights groups and labor organizations, and was ultimately defeated at least in part because of
Parker’s expressed opposition, while a candidate for Governor of North Carolina, to the
participation of Black people in politics. 8 When President Lyndon Johnson nominated Judge
Thurgood Marshall—a trailblazing civil rights lawyer, former federal appellate judge, and, at
the time of his nomination, Solicitor General of the United States—to be the first Black
member of the Court, Marshall was confronted with hostile and racist questions from
segregationist Senators, and numerous Senators voted against his nomination or abstained
from voting. 9 The Senate later rejected two of President Richard Nixon’s nominees—G.
Harrold Carswell and Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.—for reasons including their prior support
for segregation, and also in each case because of other objections to their candidacies. 10
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Among the nomination contests still debated today is President Ronald Reagan’s failed
attempt to place Judge Robert Bork on the Supreme Court in 1987. Judge Bork’s supporters
contended that he was a highly qualified nominee who was subjected to deceptive and
inflammatory partisan criticism; his record and views, supporters claimed, were
mischaracterized by his opponents. Defenders of the Senate’s treatment of Judge Bork, by
contrast, argued that he received an extensive hearing at which he had an opportunity to
present and defend his views at length, and that his nomination failed by a bipartisan majority
vote after a floor debate because of fundamental and legitimate disagreements with his legal
views and judicial philosophy.
Three recent nominations have generated especially bitter partisan conflict. We explore
those nomination battles in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this Report but note them here
because of their role in the debates leading to the formation of this bipartisan Commission.
First, after Justice Antonin Scalia died in February 2016, the Republican majority in the Senate
refused to consider President Barack Obama’s March 2016 nomination of Chief Judge Merrick
Garland to fill that seat. The Republican Senate leadership argued that the nation was poised
in a matter of months to elect a new President, who should be able to appoint Justice Scalia’s
successor. It thus declined to take any formal action, such as a hearing or a vote, on the Garland
nomination. President Donald Trump later appointed Judge Neil Gorsuch to fill the vacant
seat. Next, in the summer of 2018, Justice Anthony Kennedy—widely viewed as occupying
the Court’s ideological center—announced his retirement. President Trump then nominated
Judge Brett Kavanaugh, whom the Senate confirmed in October 2018 after contentious
hearings and floor debate. Finally, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died in September 2020,
creating another election-year vacancy. Although the Senate’s Republican majority had
opposed the election-year confirmation of Judge Garland for nearly eight months before the
2016 election, this time it took up President Trump’s nomination of Judge Amy Coney Barrett
and confirmed her in one month, on October 26, after voting in the 2020 presidential election
had already commenced. Senate Democrats participated in the Judiciary Committee hearings
and final vote on Justice Barrett’s nomination, but most declined individual meetings with her,
and the Democrats on the Judiciary Committee boycotted the final committee vote to express
their objection to the timing of the nomination.
These events directly motivate some of the current calls for Supreme Court reform by
those who argue that the seats previously occupied by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg were
“stolen” by Republicans from Democrats. According to these critics, Republicans achieved
the current conservative dominance of the Court by disregarding the norms that should govern
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and have governed the appointments process in the past. 11 Critics of the treatment of the
Garland nomination in particular emphasize that the Senate majority’s refusal to take any
formal action at all on that nomination broke important new ground, departing from historical
practice dating back to the nineteenth century. In addition, according to critics, the fact that
Republicans were willing to act on Justice Barrett’s nomination just before the 2020 election
undermines their claim that their refusal to consider Judge Garland’s nomination was
motivated by the principle that Supreme Court vacancies ought not be filled in an election
year. In response, defenders of the Senate majority point out that Judge Garland was
nominated when the White House and the Senate were controlled by different political parties,
while Justice Barrett was nominated when both institutions were controlled by the same party.
More broadly, these defenders assert that the Senate majority’s actions during these two
periods did not violate any well-established norms or disrupt any consistent historical practice.
Over the course of American history, they note, Senate majorities periodically have declined
to take up nominations in election years or have used the filibuster to deny a sitting President
a confirmation, in order to reserve the choice for his successor.
Several witnesses who testified before or provided written submissions to the
Commission observed that partisan conflict over nominations has occurred throughout the
nation’s history, particularly in election years. 12 According to one witness, historically the
Senate has confirmed nearly ninety percent of Supreme Court nominees when the President’s
party is in power but “fewer than 60 percent of nominees under divided government.” 13
Similarly, the same witness observed that over eighty percent of nominees are confirmed when
nominated “in the first three years of a presidential term,” but “barely more than half” when
nominated “in the fourth (election) year.” 14 Nonetheless, most witnesses agreed that conflict
has intensified in recent years. One witness cited the history of confirmations since the Reagan
Administration as one of a “continuous cycle of escalation” of partisan conflict over
nominations to both lower courts and the Supreme Court. 15 This escalation originates in the
belief, held by both parties, that “the other side plays dirty and will manipulate the rules to its
own advantage,” conferring on the party in power “a significant incentive to violate the current
norms when it has the chance.” 16 The witness summarized the current state of affairs: “[E]ach
side . . . believ[es], probably rightly, that the other side would do the same as soon as it had
the chance. It’s a classic prisoner’s dilemma, and it operates according to its own logic.” 17
Another witness characterized this recent history as “decades of political circus.” 18
The Commission also received a survey of a bipartisan group of former Senate staffers,
including those who have served the current and former leadership of the Senate Judiciary
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Committee, documenting their views on the state of the confirmation process. The results
reflected broad bipartisan agreement that the confirmation process has come under severe
strain from partisan conflict, though Republican and Democratic staffers disagreed about the
causes of the strain. Democrats cited the controversies surrounding the nominations of Judge
Garland and Justice Barrett as evidence of Republican bad faith and disregard of longstanding
norms. Republicans cited the hearings on the nominations of Judge Bork, Justice Clarence
Thomas, and Justice Kavanaugh, and blamed Democrats for personal attacks on nominees
designed to derail nominations for partisan or ideological reasons. 19
The recent history of Senate confirmation votes supports witnesses’ accounts of escalating
partisanship. For seventy years until 1968, most Justices were confirmed by voice vote. Since
then, roll call voting has become the norm, and votes have divided increasingly along party
lines. 20 Justice Sonia Sotomayor received 68 votes (all Democrats and nine Republicans voting
to confirm); Justice Elena Kagan, 63 (all but one Democrat and only five Republicans voting
to confirm); Justice Gorsuch, 54 (all Republicans and only three Democrats voting to confirm);
Justice Kavanaugh, 50 (all Republicans and just one Democrat voting to confirm); and Justice
Barrett, 52 (all but one Republican and no Democrat voting to confirm).
To be sure, over the last fifty years, some nominees have received significant bipartisan
support. Some of those nominations—including Justice Scalia (confirmed in 1986 with 98
votes), Justice Ginsburg (confirmed in 1993 with 96 votes), and Justice Stephen Breyer
(confirmed in 1994 with 87 votes)—occurred when the Senate was controlled by the
President’s party. Others—including Justice Kennedy (confirmed unanimously in 1988, an
election year, after Judge Bork’s nomination was rejected) and Justice David Souter
(confirmed in 1990 with 90 votes)—occurred when the Senate majority was not aligned with
the President. Unmistakably, however, the trend over the last three decades has been toward
more partisan conflict, which has affected nominations to the lower courts as well as to the
Supreme Court.
The confirmation battles of recent years have given rise to multi-million dollar lobbying
campaigns seeking to mobilize public pressure for or against particular nominations. Millions
of dollars were spent for and against the nominations of Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett. 21
There is little reason to doubt that nominations will continue to trigger expensive campaigns
to shape public opinion and pressure undecided Senators to vote in a particular way. Indeed,
when vacancies arise, political and interest group allies now expect the President to thoroughly
vet nominees for their substantive views in an effort to ensure that the nominee will advance
the desired ideological outlook. Presidents are also expected to nominate individuals who, if
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confirmed, will be young enough to serve for many decades. In short, political actors now
perceive the stakes of each nomination to be exceedingly high, especially if confirmation is
seen as likely to lead to an immediate shift in the balance of power between Court “liberals”
and “conservatives.”
As witness testimony before the Commission suggested, the struggles over the
confirmation process appear likely to persist, if not intensify. One witness testified that the
partisan escalation of recent years may lead future Senate majorities to decline to take up any
nomination from a President of the opposing party at any time at all, not just in the last year
of the President’s term. 22 At various times and to different degrees, party leaders have
expressed a readiness to resort to these kinds of tactics as a matter of course. In 2021,
Republican Leader Mitch McConnell stated that if his party won a majority in the Senate in
the 2022 midterm elections, he would not commit to acting on any Supreme Court nomination
by President Biden in 2023 and indicated that it was “highly unlikely” he would agree to any
such consideration in the 2024 presidential election year. 23 In 2007, Senator Chuck Schumer,
then a member of the Senate Democratic leadership and now the Senate Majority Leader,
observed in a speech that, for the eighteen months remaining in George W. Bush’s presidency,
“[w]e should reverse the presumption of confirmation.” 24 He set the nomination of a
“moderate” as a condition of confirmation, asserting that “the Supreme Court is dangerously
out of balance” and that a Bush nomination should not be confirmed “except in extraordinary
circumstances.” 25 Defenders of recent Republican actions point to these statements as
evidence that both sides have engaged or have been prepared to engage in similar practices.
They therefore contend that Republicans cannot fairly be charged with breaching any
established norms. Critics of the Republicans’ approach see a distinction between Senator
McConnell’s and Senator Schumer’s respective statements. They view it as improper for the
Senate simply to refuse to consider a President’s nominees, but claim it is different, and
appropriate, for a Senate majority that is not aligned with the President to insist that the
President’s nominees be relatively moderate. Of course, what it means for a nominee to be
“moderate,” and whether any given nominee is accurately described as such, are often matters
of significant disagreement.

The Stakes of the Reform Debate
The Court reform debate is not merely a byproduct of recent partisan conflict. Rather, it
is a high-stakes debate because of the unique role and structure of the Supreme Court. The
Court’s decisions have extraordinary impact on the lives of Americans generally. The Court
also exercises enormous power within the U.S. system of government, as do the individual
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Justices themselves, who serve for life. The sharp polarization in contemporary American
politics only exacerbates the conflict over the Court.
The Court has long occupied a central and often contested role in shaping American
political and civic life. In the modern era, its decisions continue to have both immediate and
long-term effects on the welfare of individuals and communities throughout the country,
including by affecting the rights of people of the same sex to marry, the right to bear arms,
religious liberty, property ownership, women’s reproductive rights and freedoms, access to
health care, participation in the political process and voting, the structure of government and
the separation of powers, the operation of the criminal justice system, diversity in higher
education, and the regulation of workplaces and the right to organize. 26 The stakes of the
nomination process are so high precisely because they implicate matters of great public
concern. Indeed, at various moments throughout history, conservatives and progressives alike
have turned to the Court to protect the rights they most value and to define the authority of the
elected branches of the federal government and of the states in accord with their
understandings of the Constitution.
The controversies surrounding the Court are heightened by the combination of—as one
witness put it—a “very powerful Supreme Court” and “a nearly-impossible-to-amend
constitution.” 27 Consequently, when the Court generates “a firestorm of controversy, the only
practical avenue for overturning decisions of the Court has been through changing the judges
who sit on that Court.” 28 The fact that Justices have life tenure—and therefore often serve for
upwards of thirty years in the modern era—only heightens the stakes of who joins the Court.
Up until the late 1960s, the average term of service was fifteen years. It has now risen to
roughly twenty-six years, and a number of Justices have served three or more decades,
spanning numerous election cycles and presidential administrations. It is hardly a surprise,
then, that key segments of the American public are so heavily invested in making sure that the
“right” nominee is confirmed.
The highly polarized politics of the current era threaten to transform this already highstakes process into one that is badly broken. 29 Political scientists generally agree that “the
period since the 1980s has largely featured deepening dispute and standoff between the parties,
accompanied by intensifying political and social polarization.” 30 This polarization is not
simply a matter of partisan competition for its own sake, but also reflects a greater and more
stable ideological divide between the two major political parties. 31 As the parties become more
accurate proxies for deep ideological disagreements, the realistic potential for bipartisan
compromise and cooperation decreases. 32 The depth and stakes of partisan polarization

18 | December 2021

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

increase accordingly. 33 Indeed, contemporary politics generally have developed the
“distinctive character of high-stakes warfare” associated with the “breakdown of norms of
cooperation and civility across the aisle.” 34 According to Chief Justice John Roberts, this
extreme polarization has affected public perceptions of the Court: “When you live in a
polarized political environment, people tend to see everything in those terms.” 35
The Commission did not attempt to identify the sources of polarization or come to
conclusions about any role the Court may have played in it. These, too, are matters about
which individual Commissioners disagree. The Commission did hear testimony, however, that
acute polarization is likely to continue to affect the debate over the Court’s role in the
constitutional system, and to perpetuate partisan conflict over nominees to the Court. 36 On this
point, there is consensus among Commissioners. Any account of the origins of the present
debate about the role and operations of the Court, therefore, would be incomplete without
taking note of how the deeply divided nature of our polity affects debates over the Court.
***
Before we turn to discussing proposals for Court reform and how best to evaluate them,
two caveats to the above picture of partisan conflict are in order. First, even as the Court is at
the center of escalating partisanship, the Court’s rulings do not necessarily track the
ideological differences between parties. Justices appointed by Republicans do not always vote
in a predictably conservative fashion, and Justices appointed by Democrats do not always vote
in a consistently liberal one. What is more, a significant portion of the Court’s work is not
highly ideological. In these cases the Justices are often unanimous or aligned in ways that
cannot be predicted by the political party affiliation of the President who appointed them or
by the ideologies associated with that party. 37
Second, the extent to which extreme political polarization affects the public standing of
the Court is not clear. Historically, the Court has maintained levels of public confidence higher
than those accorded the other branches. 38 Though public opinion may shift in the wake of
particularly controversial decisions and nominations, commentators have argued that basic
trust in the Court as an institution has exhibited significant resilience. 39 At the same time, there
is some evidence that partisan differences shape judgments about the Court’s performance.
Court “approval” among Democrats dropped to forty percent after President Trump assumed
office and made his first appointment to the Court, while among Republicans it rose to nearly
sixty-five percent. 40 And whether public trust in the Court will continue to be durable remains
to be seen. One recent poll suggests the Court’s approval is waning, with forty-nine percent of
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Americans disapproving of its performance and only thirty-seven percent approving—an alltime low. 41

Proposals for Reform
The Commission’s Process and Scope of Analysis
In considering the current reform debate, the Commission held six public meetings; heard
oral testimony from forty-four witnesses; and received written statements from numerous
additional experts and organizations, as well as more than 7,000 submissions in the form of
public comment. The views expressed regarding the need for Court reform and evaluating
proposals for such reform were wide-ranging and diverse.
Informed by that material and the broader public debate, the Commission divided its work
into five parts: one devoted to providing a historical background and the other four devoted to
analyzing the major categories of reform proposals.
• The history of Supreme Court reform debates and proposals. Debates about whether
and how to adjust the size, role, and operation of the Supreme Court are as old as the
Court itself. To put the present reform debates in context, in Chapter 1 we provide a
historical overview of past efforts in favor of and opposed to Supreme Court reform.
• The size and composition of the Court. One prominent proposal would increase the
number of Justices who sit on the Court. Other proposals suggest reorganizing the
membership of the Court—for example, by having cases decided by panels instead of
the entire Court, or by periodically rotating other Article III judges onto the Supreme
Court. We address these proposals in Chapter 2.
• The Justices’ tenure. Justices currently serve “during good Behavior,” meaning for life,
unless they voluntarily leave the Court or are impeached and removed from office.
Another prominent proposal would limit the length of time that Justices serve on the
Court and, relatedly, would define the intervals at which Justices are appointed. We
consider these term-limits proposals in Chapter 3.
• The powers of the Court and its role in the constitutional system. Another set of
proposals seeks to disempower the Court in relation to the political branches,
particularly to limit the Court’s power to declare legislative acts unconstitutional. This
category includes modifying the Court’s jurisdiction, as well as changing the Court’s
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voting rules and the standards of review it uses when considering whether to invalidate
the actions of elected officials. Finally, it includes proposals to allow Congress to
override constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts. We analyze
this category of proposals in Chapter 4.
• Transparency and the Court’s internal processes. A final category of potential reforms
includes proposals that would address internal operations of the Court. These proposals
concern: the procedures and principles the Court applies to emergency applications;
judicial ethics and transparency with respect to recusals and conflicts; and making the
Court’s proceedings widely accessible in real time through audio or video transmission.
We take up this set of reforms in Chapter 5.
With regard to each of the four categories of Court reform, we consider relevant historical
background (in addition to the more general historical background provided in Chapter 1); we
evaluate the case for and against the reform as framed by proponents and critics; we explore
whether the proposed reforms promote the goals of their proponents and what the potential
consequences of the reforms might be; and we consider the legal requirements and obstacles
that must be met or overcome to implement the reforms.
We do not analyze at length the confirmation process or proposals for how the Senate
might reform it. The Commission recognizes that the processes by which individuals are
nominated to the Court by the President and considered by the Senate are central to today’s
debate. However, the Commission’s charge was to address proposals for reforming the Court
itself, not for reforming the confirmation process. At the same time, given the extensive and
bipartisan testimony we received concerning the intense conflict that now characterizes that
process, generating widespread concern that it has become dysfunctional, we have attached an
Appendix to this Report that discusses specific reform proposals presented to the
Commission—proposals we believe merit close attention and consideration. 42

Evaluating Reform Proposals
Before proceeding to analyze particular reform proposals in subsequent Chapters, we
consider the values and principles that might be brought to bear in evaluating whether reform
is needed and whether a particular reform might be worth pursuing or could be
counterproductive. Three common and interrelated themes are frequently invoked in
discussions about reform: the perceived need to protect, or enhance, the Court’s legitimacy;
concerns about preserving the independence of the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court in
particular; and the Court’s relationship to democracy. One challenge in defining these concepts
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is that they mean different things to different people. Thus, discussions cast in these terms
sometimes create terminological confusion.
We do not try to assign specific meanings to any of these ideas. But we do think it is
useful to articulate the values that underlie the ideas of legitimacy, judicial independence, and
democracy, as those ideas pertain to the Court, with the hope of clarifying the terms of the
debate and providing ways in which reform proposals might be evaluated.

Legitimacy
Nearly all of the matters now being debated—the size and composition of the Court, the
Justices’ tenure, the Court’s role in the constitutional system, the propriety and transparency
of the Court’s internal processes, and the way in which Justices are appointed and confirmed—
are said to implicate questions of legitimacy. There are, however, different ways to understand
the idea of legitimacy as it is used in reform debates. Legitimacy might refer to the general
level of support that the Court has among the people of the United States, perhaps as reflected
in public opinion polls. Or, in a related and more specific use of the term, it might refer to
whether people who disagree with a decision by the Court are willing to comply
with it.
Those who use legitimacy in one of these ways commonly say that the Court’s legitimacy
is crucial to the institution because the federal judiciary has no military or other way to coerce
people to comply; 43 the judiciary must rely on others to adhere to its decisions. 44 Alexander
Hamilton formulated the point in The Federalist in a way that has become virtually a cliché:
“The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse . . . and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” 45 The
Supreme Court’s capacity to function in its accustomed way, at least in the long term, arguably
depends on the Court retaining its legitimacy in this sense. 46
Sometimes, though, legitimacy is used in these debates to mean something else—to
express an evaluative judgment about the Court or its actions, not a prediction about whether
it will be obeyed. In particular, people who believe that the Court is functionally a “political”
or even partisan body might say that the Court is (or has become) illegitimate. That claim
might be made irrespective of whether the Court has lost popular support or its ability to
command obedience to its decisions. More generally, the assertion that the Court is illegitimate
might be an evaluative judgment that the Court has made decisions that are seriously wrong.
Of course, it would be rhetorical overkill, by any standard, to say that every mistaken decision
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draws into question the Court’s legitimacy. But an observer who believes that the Court has
made decisions that are wrong in some fundamental way might couch that criticism in terms
of legitimacy.
Finally, assertions about illegitimacy might combine these two elements: both a criticism
of the Court or its decisions and a commentary on its ability to command obedience. The claim
may be that the Court has become so partisan, political, ideological, or that the Court’s
decisions are so fundamentally wrong, that it is not entitled to obedience.
Because claims about legitimacy play a large role in debates about the Court—and
because the term has different possible meanings—there is a risk that participants in these
debates will talk past each other and not clarify their areas of agreement or disagreement. For
example, a claim that the Court is illegitimate because of the way in which some of its
members have been appointed or because it made a decision based on objectionable
motivations might be met with an assertion that the Court still commands substantial popular
support. However, the assertion about popular support is not truly responsive to the evaluative
claim about the Court. Conversely, a weakening of the Court’s popularity might be taken as
evidence that the Court has embarked on a misguided course of decisions—which need not be
true.
In fact, the relationship between popular acceptance of the Court and the correctness of
the Court’s decisions is a complex question that must be analyzed in its own right. Competing
assertions about legitimacy that do not recognize the complexity of that term can obscure,
rather than focus, the terms of debate.

Judicial Independence
Judicial independence is also invoked in varying ways. In one sense, judicial
independence is commonly, and correctly, thought to be a core requirement of the rule of law.
Judges must be free to decide cases without fear that they will be punished by the government
or will suffer physical or financial harm at the hands of private individuals. They must not be
corrupted by bribes. Their rulings must not be influenced by personal favoritism or family
relationships.
In those ways, judicial independence is not different from what we expect of other
government officials: that they be able to, and do, carry out the responsibilities of their office
without fear or favor. But the ideal of judicial independence might be understood to include
qualities that are distinctive and indispensable components of the work of judges in particular.
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Judges should not be partisans. Other government officials, depending on their positions,
might legitimately set out to promote the interests of the political party with which they are
associated; one requirement of judicial independence is that judges not do that. And,
importantly—because federal judges are appointed and confirmed by political actors—the
belief that the judiciary is independent can be undermined if judges are perceived to be
“playing on the team” of one party or another.
Beyond that, it is sometimes said that judicial independence requires that judges decide
cases solely according to the law. Of course, it is incontrovertible that judges should decide
cases according to law. But there are difficult questions—they have been debated, literally, for
centuries—about what making decisions according to law means. In particular, legal
decisions, especially those of a court like the Supreme Court that has responsibility to resolve
the most challenging issues facing our system, will sometimes require the exercise of judgment
on legal issues about which there can be reasonable disagreement and that may implicate—to
quote Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo—“[h]istory or custom or social utility or some
compelling sentiment of justice.” 47 Difficult decisions of those kinds, especially when they
involve controversial social issues, can leave judges and Justices open to the accusation that
they have compromised judicial independence by advancing a partisan or otherwise improper
agenda. That makes some of the duties associated with the judicial role and judicial
independence—candor, consistency, reasoned elaboration, attention to both the appearance
and reality of impartiality—all the more important.
There is a different meaning of judicial independence that raises more complex questions
about the role of the judiciary as a whole, and the Supreme Court in particular, in our
constitutional system. Judges and Justices should undoubtedly be independent in the sense of
making decisions that are unaffected by improper influences, whether those influences are
imposed from the outside (by threats, for example) or are the result of their own approach to
the job (if, for example, their decisions are influenced by an intention to run for office after
they leave the judiciary or if they simply act as members of a partisan “team”).
But judicial independence might also refer to the separate idea that the judiciary as an
institution has an independent role to play—a role that is distinct from that of the other
branches. Some of the confusion in debates about Court reform may result from a blurring of
these two different meanings of judicial independence—the unquestionable value of judges
acting free from fear or favor and according to law, and the more complex issues raised by the
relationship between the judiciary and the other institutions of our government. The question
of how independent of the other branches the judiciary should be is not easy to answer.
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On the one hand, especially because judges and Justices sometimes must decide issues
about which reasonable people disagree, there is an argument that the judiciary must not be
entirely independent of the elected branches of government. Some aspects of our system—
including not only the appointment and confirmation process, but also Congress’s role in
setting the Court’s budget, jurisdiction, and size, and its control of the impeachment process—
ensure that the judiciary is not entirely independent but is to some degree responsive to elected
officials and therefore to public opinion. On the other hand, the role of the judiciary, in any
system, is to decide cases according to law and not according to the desires of political actors.
Beyond that, in our constitutional system the judiciary has the responsibility to protect
minorities against impermissible exercises of political power. The independence of the
judiciary as an institution is crucial to the courts’ ability to carry out this responsibility. We
consider this clash between ideals more fully in our discussion of the relationship of the Court
to democracy.

Democracy
One far-reaching critique of the Court, also sometimes cast in terms of legitimacy, asserts
that the Court is too willing to intrude into matters that should be left to democratic political
processes. According to this line of criticism, many concerns about the Court are derivative of
its outsized role in the system of government. When the Court’s decisions are so important,
the confirmation process becomes more contentious and partisan; the incentives to attempt to
use the Court for partisan purposes become greater; and worries that the Court will entrench
views that the people have rejected become more acute.
This criticism highlights the tension between the role of an independent judiciary as a
check on the political process and the idea that our constitutional democracy must provide a
democratic check on the judiciary as well. The democratic check advocated by some critics
takes a variety of forms, each of which has different implications for the relationship between
the Court and democracy. Because each of these suggested ways of defining the relationship
between the Court and democracy also implicates the values associated with legitimacy and
judicial independence, we consider them in some detail.
a. Deference to the Political Branches
If the fundamental democratic goal is ensuring that decisions are made by relatively
democratic institutions, such as the legislature, a goal of reform might be to ensure that the
Supreme Court not interfere (or not interfere too readily) with the outcomes of the democratic
process—by, for example, holding unconstitutional federal or state legislation. Some
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advocates for reform thus contend that the Court should be more reluctant to declare legislation
unconstitutional, or that Congress should limit the Court’s power to do so. This understanding,
in various forms, has been advocated by commentators, judges, and Justices at various points
in history, and some of the witnesses before the Commission forcefully advanced this view. 48
In fact, it is difficult to think of any issue related to the Court that has been discussed more
extensively.
This conception gives rise to various questions. What is the category of decisions to which
the Court should be more deferential? Is the concern that the Court exercises too much power
just about the invalidation of Acts of Congress, or does it extend to the much more common
instances in which the Court declares unconstitutional the actions of states or local
governments? Those two forms of judicial review raise significantly different issues, but both
implicate the power of the Court to overturn enactments by democratically elected bodies. In
addition, the Court exercises power over the other branches of the federal government in ways
apart from its constitutional holdings. The Court interprets federal statutes and can declare
unlawful the actions of executive branch agencies. Though these decisions, unlike
constitutional holdings, can in principle be overturned by legislation, in practice the difficulty
of enacting legislation routinely means that what the Court says is the last word.
Perhaps the more fundamental question—the one that has attracted so much discussion
for so long—is when deference is justified and when it is not. In prominent cases, the Court
has intervened to try to protect racial or religious minorities or political dissidents from the
abusive actions of majorities. 49 If the Court were to adopt a posture of across-the-board
deference, it would no longer play that role. But some critics of the Court assert that greater
deference would be worth it—that the gains from those celebrated decisions are outweighed
by the instances in which the Court has prevented democratically-elected branches of
government from serving the nation’s interests, including by recognizing and protecting
individual rights and the rights of minority and disadvantaged groups. 50
b. A More Representative Court—and Avoiding Partisan Entrenchment
A second democracy-related argument aims for a Court that reflects, in broad terms, the
political makeup of the country. The assumption appears to be that such a Court would not
issue decisions that diverge too greatly from the preferences of the broader public. The
argument is that while the Court need not and should not be responsive to short-term swings
in public opinion, it is not good for the Court or the country for the Court to be substantially
out of line with public opinion for an extended period.
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Some critics of the current system contend that it produces a persistent gap between the
composition of the Court and long-term movements in popular opinion. This misalignment
might occur by happenstance, because the fortuitous nature of vacancies enables some
Presidents to make many more appointments to the Court than others and therefore to have a
much greater influence on its direction. 51 It may also happen by design, if a transient governing
majority, or one that is about to be superseded, succeeds in appointing to the judiciary a
significant number of candidates whose legal philosophy matches that majority’s
preferences—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as partisan entrenchment. During such
periods of misalignment, there may be a heightened risk that the Court’s direction on political
or social issues will be perceived as significantly or increasingly distant from the strongly held
preferences of a large majority of the public.
Some commentators assert that such a misalignment exists today. They point to the fact
that Republican Presidents have appointed fifteen of the last nineteen Justices and six of the
current nine Justices, “even though Democrats have held the presidency for 16 of the last 28
years and have received more votes in six of the last seven presidential elections.” 52 President
Trump, for example, appointed three Justices in his single four-year term; his immediate
Democratic predecessors, Presidents Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, and Jimmy Carter, made
only four appointments total in a combined twenty years in office. 53 This argument dovetails
with some of the concerns about Supreme Court legitimacy. Observers worry that, absent a
change in membership, the Court will reverse longstanding precedents that may be favored by
a large segment of the public, such as those concerning reproductive rights. 54
The prospect of misalignment arguably deepens in light of certain structural features of
the Constitution and their relationship to the country’s demographic development. As larger
states grow relative to smaller ones, the power imbalance in the Senate increases; Senators
from smaller states, who represent increasingly smaller portions of the electorate, nonetheless
retain the same power to move or block nominations. In addition, the vagaries of the Electoral
College will increasingly magnify the risk that candidates who do not secure the popular vote
will nonetheless win the presidency and with it the opportunity to appoint Justices to the Court.
What some critics cite as misalignment, however, others view as serving important values
or purposes of the constitutional system. It is by design that members of the Court (and the
rest of the federal judiciary) do not stand for reelection. The protection of life tenure may help
maintain judicial independence by providing a degree of insulation from the partisan politics
of the moment. This insulation also helps the Court to serve as a check on majority opinion in
order to protect constitutional rights and other principles that political majorities may not
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favor. Indeed, some would contend that any concerted attempt to align the Court’s decisions
with the preferences of political majorities tends to overlook that the Court’s obligation is to
the Constitution and laws. From this point of view, if the Court’s decisions are not favored by
current political majorities, that may simply be the unavoidable consequence of a system in
which the judiciary is expected to interpret and apply the law, not to do politics. Indeed, some
of the Court’s most consequential decisions on subjects ranging from school prayer to criminal
justice were quite unpopular when first issued. 55 Even if misaligned with public opinion at
first, the Court’s decisions may garner support as the “popular will” changes over time. Brown
v. Board of Education was met with significant resistance when it was issued, for example,
but is now one of the most respected Supreme Court decisions in history. 56
Further, the severity of any misalignment between the Supreme Court and popular opinion
is debatable. Some legal scholars argue that the Court has, for much of its history, issued
decisions that generally reflect the wishes of the public. 57 Still, those who criticize the current
Court on the basis of misalignment may see the present circumstances as meaningfully new
and different from past ones, and thus may not see history as a reliable guide on this point. In
any event, however, identifying whether misalignment exists is not straightforward. There is
no obvious way of distinguishing between cases where the Justices have simply reflected the
policy views of an earlier generation and those where they have provided a valuable and
principled counterweight to majoritarian excesses. Moreover, there are historical examples of
dominant political coalitions that tried to entrench themselves in the judiciary by
systematically appointing Justices with certain views, only to have those very appointees
decide cases in ways that diverged from the preferences or platforms of the appointing party. 58
This last point cuts against any assumption that nominees to the Court are nothing more than
political instruments of the Presidents who nominate them.
Ultimately, Commissioners hold different views on the extent to which misalignment is a
problem and on whether the Court is sufficiently deferential to the political branches.
Throughout this Report, however, we address and take seriously these democracy-related
concerns as we evaluate the various proposals that seek to advance different conceptions of
democracy.
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Chapter 1: The History of Reforms and
Reform Debates
Any account of what has precipitated today’s debate about the role and operation of the
Supreme Court would be incomplete without an understanding of the long history of political
debate and institutional reform surrounding the Court. This history, which dates back to the
Founding and encompasses formative periods of the nation’s history, highlights how
lawmakers and the public frequently have been keenly attentive to and engaged in debate about
the role the Court plays within the constitutional system. Reform debates have reflected the
institutional needs of an expanding nation, and they have involved partisan conflict and
philosophical struggle over substantive constitutional values and the power of government to
serve the needs of the people. We offer this history not to explain away or attempt to resolve
today’s debate according to a particular historical standard, but rather to underscore the fact
that debates about Court reform are part and parcel of U.S. constitutional history and the
development of the American political order.

The Origins of Federal Judicial Power
In the spring of 1788, Alexander Hamilton published an essay titled The Federalist No.
78 under the pseudonym “Publius.” The piece was one of a “Collection of Essays, written in
favour of the New Constitution” and addressed to “the People of the State of New York.” In
it, Hamilton offered “an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed
government.” Describing the role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional structure, he
wrote:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that,
in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The
Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The
legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of
the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be
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said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. 1
The Constitution’s separation-of-powers principle, Hamilton argued, gave courts the
power of “judgment” so that they could act as “an intermediate body between the people and
the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority.” 2
Federalist 78 was one of many political commentaries that were printed in newspapers
and sold as pamphlets while the ratification debates were taking place. Tracts defending and
criticizing the Constitution circulated through the markets, coffeehouses, shops, and parlors
of American towns. Not everyone who read Federalist 78 agreed with it. Some readers
preferred the writings of “Brutus,” who “found the Constitution flawed in its ‘fundamental
principles’ and advocated its rejection,” while others agreed with the “Federal Farmer,” in
whose view the Constitution “included ‘many good things’ as well as ‘many important
defects,’ and that ‘with several alterations’ it could create a ‘tolerably good’ federal system.” 3
By the time the Constitution began operating in 1789, Americans were already engaged in a
broad and lively public debate about the role that courts should play in the new republic. 4
The Constitution creates the fundamental law of the nation, understood to embody the
will of the people. But as a written document, it depends on actual governmental institutions
for its articulation and enforcement. Beginning in the founding era and continuing to the
present day, the role of the Court in carrying out this fundamental law has been contested.
Over the intervening centuries, the place of the Court in the American system has changed.
Four themes are especially vital to understanding modern debates concerning the current
role of, and potential reforms to, the Supreme Court:
• the persistence of debates over restructuring or reforming the Court, even as the nature
and content of these debates have varied over time;
• the tension in the Court’s role, insofar as it is both one of three co-equal branches of
the federal government and also the arbiter that sees itself as responsible for resolving
disputes among the branches and otherwise determining the meaning of the
Constitution;
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• the connection between the Court’s organization and deeper structural concerns (e.g.,
the connection between the Justices’ circuit-riding duties, the size of the Court, and
regional representation); and
• the relationship between the Court and politics.
Here, we trace the history of debates over potential reforms to the Supreme Court from the
early national period through the twentieth century. The discussion proceeds chronologically
in order to explicate the ways in which the themes just mentioned shaped, and were shaped
by, changing conceptions of the Court’s role in the American constitutional system.

The Origins of the Supreme Court: The Constitution and the
Judiciary Act of 1789
The Court’s origins are inextricably bound up with existential questions concerning the
structure of the judicial power of the United States. On March 4, 1789, the new government
created by the Constitution began operating. Many elements of the system remained uncertain
and disputed despite the preceding twenty-two months of discussion and drafting, first in the
Constitutional Convention and then in the state ratifying conventions. 5 The Constitution’s
beginning raised a host of new questions, the stakes of which were understood to be
tremendously high. 6
Chief among the issues still to be settled were the scope of the federal judicial power and
the practical details of how that power would function. Article III of the Constitution
established the Supreme Court. But the drafters of the Constitution had been unable to agree
on key points—most importantly, whether to create inferior federal courts, what types of cases
the federal courts would be able to hear, and what sort of relationship the Supreme Court
would have with the state courts. 7 The Constitution was also silent on the number of Justices
who would sit on the Court. The drafters therefore left to Congress the task of addressing many
of these questions as it saw fit, subject to the boundaries set forth in Article III. 8 The drafters’
decision to postpone the question of the inferior federal courts has been termed by modern
commentators the “Madisonian Compromise.” 9
When the First Congress convened in New York’s Federal Hall in April 1789, its
members immediately began debating a bill to establish the federal courts. “The importance
of the judiciary bill was obvious to contemporary observers both inside and outside Congress,”
according to several historians. 10
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In March 1789, weeks before a Senate committee had even been formed to draft a bill, an
anxious James Sullivan—soon to become the attorney general of Massachusetts—wrote to his
friend Representative Elbridge Gerry pleading for more news about the formation of the
judiciary. “[T]he freedom of the people depends so much upon the proper arrangement of this
part of the government,” he explained. James Monroe, not yet in Congress, told Representative
James Madison that the judiciary bill “will occasion more difficulty, I apprehend, than any
other, as it will form an exposition of the powers of the gov[ernment] itself, and sh[o]w in the
opinion of those who organize it, how far it can discharge its own functions.” Senator Richard
Bassett, a member of the committee drafting the bill, ventured to say that “our happiness as a
people very much depends on this System.” 11
A Senate committee comprising ten members (one from each state that had both ratified
the Constitution and sent senators by that point) produced a first version of the Act. The
committee then sent its draft to leading lawyers, jurists, and officials around the nation,
requesting their comments. What resulted was a compromise bill that attempted to balance
competing interests, most notably the Federalists’ focus on establishing a strong federal
judiciary with the Anti-Federalists’ desire to preserve state autonomy. 12 Following several
rounds of revisions and amendments, the bill won approval from the Senate and the House.
On September 24, the Judiciary Act of 1789 was signed into law by President George
Washington. 13
The Judiciary Act was far more than a restatement of Article III of the Constitution. 14 As
the intense debates surrounding the bill suggest, the provisions of the Act were hard fought,
and the final version represented a set of choices about how the judicial power of the nation
would be shaped. 15 Even its supporters expressed reservations about the bill. James Madison
wrote that the act was “pregnant with difficulties.” 16 On the floor of Congress a few weeks
later, however, he praised the bill as “as good as we can at present make it,” while noting that
it “may not exactly suit any one member of the House, in all its parts.” 17
The Act provided for a six-justice Supreme Court: one Chief Justice and five associate
Justices. It established the Court’s jurisdiction, both original and appellate. It also placed the
Court at the top of the hierarchy of courts in the nation, state as well as federal. Section 25 of
the Act granted the Court the power to review certain decisions of the highest courts of the
states. This provision was viewed by some as particularly delicate, insofar as it placed the
Supreme Court in the position of overseeing—and potentially overruling—the decisions of
state court judges.
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Proponents of the Act, including Senator Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, its primary
drafter (and a future Chief Justice of the United States), maintained that a robust system of
inferior federal courts with jurisdiction to hear cases arising under federal law would be a more
effective method of vindicating constitutionally secured rights and guarantees than relying on
state courts alone. 18 The Act thus established a system of inferior federal courts, which it broke
down into two categories: district courts and circuit courts. The thirteen district courts, each
with a single district judge, were apportioned along state lines, including one each for Maine
and Kentucky, which had not yet become independent states. The jurisdiction of the district
courts extended primarily to admiralty cases and cases involving minor federal crimes. The
three circuits—eastern, middle, and southern—were each staffed by the district judge and two
Justices of the Supreme Court, whom the Act charged with “riding circuit” to hold sessions in
each district of the circuit twice each year. 19 Both the district courts and the circuit courts were
primarily trial courts, with jurisdiction depending on the nature of the suit, the citizenship of
the parties, and the amount in controversy. The circuit courts also possessed limited appellate
jurisdiction.
The Act’s assignment of circuit-riding duties to the Justices of the Supreme Court proved
one of the most significant and controversial features of the U.S. judicial system for its first
century of existence. The circuit-riding system tied the Court to the circuits, in both numerical
and geographic terms. The original number of seats on the Court was set at six, allowing an
even division among the three circuits. Although it required substantial and difficult travel,
drawing complaints from the Justices, 20 the practice of circuit riding compelled the Justices to
leave the capital and travel to the nation’s periphery, where they mixed with a broad array of
lawyers and litigants. When hearing cases on circuit, the Justices acted as trial-court judges,
requiring them to deal with issues of fact, instruct juries, and issue rulings on procedure and
evidence.
Four months after Congress passed the Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court began
operations. On February 2, 1790, Chief Justice John Jay convened the initial session at New
York’s Royal Exchange, at which only three associate Justices were present.
The Court started its work amid intense arguments about the Judiciary Act. Within a year
of the Court’s first session, reform of the federal judiciary returned to the center of public
debate because of dissatisfaction with the allocations of authority between the district and
circuit courts, and between the federal and the state courts. 21 In 1790, President Washington’s
Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, submitted a report to Congress that recommended
restructuring the federal courts. Randolph’s report was soon followed by a set of proposed
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amendments to Article III drawn up by New York congressman Egbert Benson. Among the
proposed reforms in Randolph’s and Benson’s plans were ending circuit riding, creating circuit
judgeships, and vesting the inferior federal courts with jurisdiction to hear all cases arising
under federal law. 22 Neither plan gained sufficient support to bring about change. Yet reform
of the federal courts was a constant topic of political debate in the early years of the Republic.

The Court and Politics in the Early National Period
Throughout the 1790s, Congress continued to debate reform of the federal judiciary, with
much criticism focusing on the Justices’ circuit-riding duties. In his annual message to
Congress in 1799, President John Adams urged members to begin “a revision and amendment
of the judiciary system,” which he argued was “indispensably necessary” to “give due effect
to the civil administration of Government and to insure a just execution of the laws.” 23
In February 1800, a House committee met with Justices William Paterson and Bushrod
Washington to solicit their recommendations for reform. The following month, Congressman
Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina introduced a draft bill recommending substantial
reforms to the federal judiciary. The bill expanded the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts
to include all cases arising under federal law, increased the number of districts and circuits,
and created sixteen new circuit judgeships, thereby ending the Justices’ circuit-riding duties. 24
The bill reduced the number of Supreme Court Justices from six to five upon the next vacancy,
likely to limit the ability of a future President who was not Adams to shape the Court. 25 It also
added a new, sixth circuit, comprising Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Indiana and Ohio
territories. Following debate and minor modifications, the bill passed the House on January
20 and the Senate on February 7, 1801, and was signed into law by Adams on February 13,
1801. Officially titled “An Act to Provide for the More Convenient Organization of the Courts
of the United States,” the Act became known as the Judiciary Act of 1801. 26
The Judiciary Act of 1801 is sometimes assumed to have been entirely motivated by
Thomas Jefferson’s victory in the presidential election of 1800. Four days after the 1801 Act
was passed, on February 17, 1801, the House settled the disputed contest by electing Jefferson
on the thirty-sixth ballot. Jefferson’s Republican Party swept into power in Congress as well.
But reforms to the federal judiciary, including ending circuit riding and expanding the courts’
jurisdiction, had been debated since the 1790s, and the movement that led to the 1801 Act
predated the election by several months. 27
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Nevertheless, the election of 1800 clearly heightened political polarization, and with it the
politicization of the judiciary. When Jefferson and the Republicans took control of the
presidency and Congress in March 1801, they quickly moved to undo the Federalists’ judicial
reforms. On March 8, 1802, the Judiciary Act of 1801 was repealed. The new Act, known as
the Judiciary Act of 1802, revoked the grant of general federal question jurisdiction, abolished
the new circuit judgeships, and reinstated the Supreme Court Justices’ circuit-riding duties. 28
The 1802 Act also retained the enlarged number of circuits (six) but reversed the planned
reduction of the number of seats on the Court, bringing it back to six. For the third time in a
dozen years, the Founders adjusted the number of Justices on the Supreme Court.
Consequently, after 1802, the number of circuits matched the number of Justices, and the
Justices continued to ride circuit.
The 1802 repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act further inflamed debate surrounding the federal
courts. All sides accused the others of using the judiciary for political gain. Jefferson charged
the Federalists with having “retired into the Judiciary as a strong hold” in order to entrench
themselves in the face of electoral losses. 29 Alexander Hamilton, influential among Federalists
even though out of office, warned that “if the bill for the repeal passed, and the independence
of the Judiciary was destroyed,” the nation would before long “be divided into separate
confederacies, turning our arms against each other.” 30
The substance as well as the structure of federal judicial power was deeply contested
during the early national period. One of Adams’s most lasting achievements as President was
his appointment of John Marshall as Chief Justice in January 1801. During Marshall’s thirtyfour-year tenure as Chief Justice, the Court became stronger as an institution, claimed the
power to interpret the Constitution, and asserted with increasing force a particular vision of
the United States as a union rather than a confederation. Under Chief Justice Marshall’s
leadership, the Court positioned itself as an arbiter of the constitutional order.
In the early months of 1803, the Marshall Court issued two important rulings on key
constitutional issues. In both cases, Marbury v. Madison and Stuart v. Laird, the Court
demonstrated a notable ability to claim power while also appearing to limit that power. Both
cases were also deeply political, having arisen out of the election of 1800, and both had been
delayed when the Jeffersonian Congress postponed the Court’s 1802 term.
In Marbury v. Madison, the Court held that it lacked the authority to order Secretary of
State James Madison to issue a commission to William Marbury for a position as justice of
the peace, even though Marbury clearly had a right to the commission, and the remedy he
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sought—a writ of mandamus—was the proper remedy. 31 The problem, Chief Justice Marshall
held, was that the statutory provision on which Marbury relied to establish the Court’s
jurisdiction to grant the remedy was invalid because it exceeded Congress’s authority. The
Court therefore lacked the ability to grant Marbury his remedy, Chief Justice Marshall
determined.
The reason for this seeming weakness, however, was that the Court possessed a far
stronger weapon: the ability to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. This was the power
of judicial review. The authority that Congress sought to give the Court in Section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 “appears not to be warranted by the constitution,” Chief Justice Marshall
stated. 32 Then followed what became one of the most quoted passages in American
constitutional law:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is. . . So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably
to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. 33
As many scholars have noted, judicial review was not new to American law in 1803. 34
Courts—including the Supreme Court, state courts, and, even earlier, colonial courts—had
long claimed the authority to invalidate legislation. The Constitution did not refer explicitly to
judicial review. But the combined force of Article III, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI,
longstanding Anglo-American practice, and the nature of the written Constitution suggested
to Chief Justice Marshall and others that judicial review was within the Court’s power. 35 In
Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall established judicial review as a principle of American law,
claiming for the Court—in the name of the Constitution and the people—the power “to say
what the law is.” 36 Yet Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury was ambivalent, insofar
as it paired this claim of interpretive power with a disavowal of the power to order Madison
to deliver Marbury’s commission.
In addition, the power of judicial review that Chief Justice Marshall asserted did not
necessarily amount to judicial supremacy. As one leading constitutional law casebook puts it,
judicial review “means that a federal court can review statutes (or executive actions) for
constitutionality and refuse to enforce them in court proceedings if it finds them
unconstitutional.” Judicial supremacy, in contrast, “means that the federal courts’
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interpretation of the Constitution is supreme over the other branches.” 37 The boundaries
between the two concepts, and the Court’s claim on each, have been the subject of debate since
the founding era.
One week after the Court handed down its ruling in Marbury, it decided another case that
also carried important consequences for the role of the judiciary in the constitutional system.
That case, Stuart v. Laird, required the Court to rule on the constitutionality of the Jeffersonian
Congress’s 1802 repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801. The questions presented asked, first,
whether Congress could validly abolish the circuit courts created under the 1801 Act without
violating Article III of the Constitution, which stated that federal judges were to hold their
offices “during good Behaviour,” and second, whether the Justices could be required to sit as
circuit judges. 38 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1802 Act, found that the
reorganization of the inferior federal courts was within Congress’s power, and held that the
validity of circuit riding had been settled by “practice and acquiescence.” 39
Some commentators have characterized Stuart as a more overtly political—and perhaps
more consequential—decision than Marbury. Stuart forced the Court to confront existential
questions about the balance between judicial independence and congressional control of the
courts. One scholar has argued that “Marshall and his brethren apparently calculated that to
invalidate this statute was to guarantee Jeffersonian political retaliation against the Court,” 40
while another called the Stuart decision “an exercise in self-preservation.” 41 Chief Justice
Marshall himself seems to have remained skeptical about the basis of the decision, referring
in an 1823 letter, in ironic tones, to “the memorable distinction as to tenure of office, between
removing the Judge from the office, and removing the office from the Judge.” 42
As the Marbury and Stuart decisions demonstrate, the Court was at the center of
negotiations about both law and politics during the early nineteenth century. Through its
substantive decisions, the Court established its power even as it showed itself attentive to
political context. As the Court gained stature under Chief Justice Marshall’s leadership,
structural reforms to the judiciary continued to be a perpetual topic of discussion. In 1807,
Congress both increased the size of the Court to seven Justices and added a seventh circuit
comprising Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 43 The size of the Court and the number of circuits
were still understood as necessarily linked. Other changes to the Court’s jurisdiction were
periodically proposed. These included stripping the Court of its power under Section 25 of the
1789 Judiciary Act to hear appeals from state courts, an effort that was linked to specific policy
issues, including treaty enforcement, land sales, bank regulation, and internal improvements. 44
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The Jacksonian Era: National Expansion, Court Expansion,
and Partisan Strife
The antebellum decades saw continuing disputes over the federal judiciary’s structure;
the balance between political control of the Court and judicial independence; and the
orientation of the Court toward pressing political issues, including commerce, migration, and
slavery.
The election of Andrew Jackson as President in 1828, and the related rise of the
Democratic Party to national political dominance, was viewed by many contemporaries as “a
kind of revolution” akin to that which had swept Jefferson into office in 1800. 45 Jackson’s two
terms as President, from 1829 to 1837, brought a bold Executive who claimed broad powers,
the rise of modern party politics, and the entrenchment of sectionalism. Jacksonian nationalism
aimed, in the words of one historian, to “maintain white supremacy and expand the white
empire, to evict the Indian tribes, [and] to support and extend slavery.” 46
These imperatives had important consequences for the federal judiciary in three distinct
areas: the role of the Supreme Court and its relationship to contemporary politics; the structure
of the federal courts, in particular the ongoing debate over the Justices’ circuit riding; and the
related issue of the size of the Court. Throughout this period, the Court was embroiled in
important issues relating to the separation of powers (the Court’s relationship to the President
and Congress) and federalism (the relationship between the Court and the states, including
both state courts and legislatures).
First, the Supreme Court continued to be viewed by contemporaries as an institution that
was necessarily involved in politics. Prior to Chief Justice Marshall’s death in 1835, the Court
took stances in a few high-profile cases that appeared to be carefully calculated acts of
resistance to Jeffersonian-Republican policies. In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Osborn
v. Bank of the United States (1824), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Second Bank
of the United States against attacks on it by several states and by then-candidate Jackson.47
Chief Justice Marshall published a series of newspaper essays under a pseudonym in which
he defended the McCulloch decision against arguments that the Bank represented an overreach
by Congress and an invasion of state sovereignty.48 During Jackson’s presidency, the
Marshall Court heard a pair of cases brought by the Cherokee Nation in which the tribe sought
to vindicate its jurisdiction and ownership of lands against the state of Georgia. Jackson had
campaigned for the presidency on a promise of “Indian removal,” and, in 1830, a closely
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divided Congress had passed the Indian Removal Act.49 In the 1831 case of Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the tribe’s case.50 In 1832,
however, the Court ruled in Worcester v. Georgia that Georgia did not have authority to extend
its criminal laws over the Cherokee Nation.51 The Court’s ability to compel the state to carry
out its decision was limited, however, by the procedures set forth in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Contemporaries also speculated that the Court was leery of provoking Georgia at the same
moment that South Carolina was claiming the power to nullify federal law. 52
Following Chief Justice Marshall’s death in July 1835, President Jackson nominated as
his successor Roger Brooke Taney, who had previously served as Jackson’s Attorney General
and Treasury Secretary (the latter via a recess appointment which was subsequently rejected
by the Whig-dominated Senate). Earlier in 1835, President Jackson had nominated Taney to
an associate justiceship on the Court. At that time, the Senate had refused to confirm Taney
based on his removal of deposits from the Bank of the United States at President Jackson’s
direction. 53 Taney had removed the deposits following Jackson’s 1832 veto of the Bank’s
recharter, in which Jackson had rejected the Court’s power to decide with finality the issue of
the Bank’s constitutionality. 54 By 1836, Democrats had regained sufficient control of the
Senate to confirm him. 55
Contemporaries noted the interaction of politics with the structure of the federal courts
and the size of the Supreme Court. Territorial expansion and regional affiliations were
important factors with respect to these issues. By 1837, the Union comprised twenty-six states,
nine of which had been admitted since the addition of the most recent circuit in 1807. Since
then, the number of circuits and Justices had remained at seven. But residents of the six most
recently added states increasingly demanded that their states be incorporated into circuits,
rather than having district courts exercise both district- and circuit-court jurisdiction (and
without ever being visited by a circuit-riding Justice). 56 Jackson was the first western
president, and the West was an important piece of the Democratic political coalition. An
increasingly widespread belief held that the Court should represent the regions of the nation.
Relatedly, some observers felt that, for all its problems, circuit riding was valuable because it
ensured that the Justices were exposed to the issues and debates on the periphery, and that
Americans on the nation’s periphery felt connected to the center. Another view, however, held
that the Court was already too large, and that the quest for regional balance was either not
worth pursuing or doomed to failure. 57
While these arguments over the structure of the federal judiciary were churning, the
Court’s membership was shifting, in part due to deaths and retirements among the Justices and

44 | December 2021

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

in part due to politics. During his first term in office, President Jackson appointed two Justices
to the Court. During his second term, he nominated five additional Justices, including Taney
as Chief Justice, bringing to seven his total number of nominees to the Court, of whom six
served as Justices. The last five of President Jackson’s appointments came from slaveholding
states. 58 President Jackson thus “made more Supreme Court appointments than any other
president between Washington and Taft.” 59
President Jackson was able to appoint so many Justices to the Court because on March 3,
1837—his last day in office—Congress, which was controlled by Jackson’s Democratic Party,
passed a new Judiciary Act. 60 The Act of 1837 created two new circuits and added two new
seats to the Court, bringing the total for both to nine for the first time in the nation’s history.
The Act also took effect immediately, allowing outgoing President Jackson to nominate two
Justices: John Catron, whose circuit-riding duties would cover the newly created Eighth
Circuit, and William Smith for the new Ninth Circuit. When President Jackson’s successor
Martin Van Buren (who had previously served as Jackson’s Vice President and Secretary of
State) took office on March 4, 1837, the Senate confirmed both Catron’s and Smith’s
nominations. Smith, however, declined, and Van Buren nominated John McKinley through a
recess appointment. 61
After decades of wrangling over Court expansion, circuit riding, and western
representation, Congress ultimately restructured the federal judiciary in 1837 because it was
possible to do so in a way that consolidated the Democratic Party’s control. “The two events
which finally induced both Houses to agree were the election of Van Buren, bringing with it
the prospect of a four-year Democratic rule, and the Supreme Court appointments made by
Jackson in 1835 and 1836,” which eliminated “the fear that the addition of two new judges
would change the complexion of the Court.” 62 Describing Jackson’s impact on the Court, one
contemporary magazine characterized the “late renovation of the constitution of this august
body, by the creation of seven of the nine members under the auspices of the present
democratic ascendancy” as “the closing of an old, and the opening of a new, era in its
history.” 63 For the first time in the nation’s history, the Court comprised nine Justices. The
expansion had come about through a combination of factors: pragmatic concerns about the
federal courts’ efficacy; sectional demands; and political imperatives.
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The Upheavals of the Civil War and Reconstruction:
Transforming the Constitution
The Civil War and Reconstruction launched a series of constitutional transformations
that were accompanied by fundamental changes in the operation of the federal judiciary. At
the heart of this “second founding” were the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. 64 The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. 65 The
Fourteenth Amendment “constitutionalized the principles of birthright citizenship and equality
before the law and sought to settle key issues arising from the war, such as the future political
role of Confederate leaders and the fate of Confederate debt.” 66 The Fifteenth Amendment
granted Black men the right to vote. 67 Each of the Reconstruction Amendments also vested
Congress with the power to enforce these rights. In the realm of judicial power, the trend was
toward stronger federal courts with more robust jurisdiction. Beginning in the 1870s, however,
a series of narrow decisions from the Court severely limited Reconstruction’s revolutionary
potential.
Prior to the war, in 1857, the Supreme Court had drawn attack from growing numbers of
Americans for its immediately infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, in which Chief
Justice Taney wrote for the Court that “that class of persons” whose “ancestors were negroes
of the African race, and imported into this country and sold and held as slaves” were “not
included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution,
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for
and secures to citizens of the United States.” 68 To support his holding, Taney presented his
own version of Founding-era history:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political
relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and
traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. 69
Frederick Douglass, the great abolitionist political leader, excoriated the decision in a
series of public addresses. “You may close your Supreme Court against the black man’s cry
for justice, but you cannot, thank God, close against him the ear of a sympathising world, nor
shut up the Court of Heaven. All that is merciful and just, on earth and in Heaven, will execrate
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and despise this edict of Taney,” Douglass told a New York audience in May 1857. “Judge
Taney can do many things, but he cannot change the essential nature of things—making evil
good, and good evil.” 70
As part of his campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1858, Abraham Lincoln decried the Dred
Scott decision, calling it “erroneous” as a matter of law and warning that it would lead to “the
spread of the black man’s bondage.” 71 In his first inaugural address in March 1861, Lincoln
continued his criticism of the Court, suggesting that such judicial overreach as the Dred Scott
decision—which he did not mention by name—threatened democracy:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital
questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in
personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. 72
Following the secession of the eleven states that formed the Confederacy between
December 1860 and May 1861, the Republican-controlled Congress set about reshaping the
federal judiciary as “a partner against the South.” 73 Many contemporaries also hoped that these
efforts would redeem the Court from the stain of the Dred Scott decision.
The start of the Civil War witnessed a series of reforms to the circuit courts. In his first
message to Congress in 1861, President Lincoln observed that “the country has outgrown our
present judicial system” and called for the circuit system to be overhauled. 74 Eight states that
had been admitted over the past two decades had never had circuit courts visited by a Supreme
Court Justice. Yet Lincoln did not advocate expanding the size of the Court. Instead, he urged
that Congress sever the connection between the Court and the circuits, setting the size of the
Court at a “convenient number” and then establishing circuits of “convenient size,” with
circuit-judging duties to be handled by some combination of Justices and circuit judges. 75
Congress enacted some of Lincoln’s recommended reforms. In 1862 and 1863, enabled
by the exodus of southern Democrats from the federal government, Congress reorganized the
circuits in order to limit southern influence. Instead of five circuits composed entirely of
slaveholding states, there were now only three such circuits. The total number of circuits was
now ten, and a tenth seat was added to the Court. As in the eighteenth century, when the Court
had comprised six seats, reformers appeared unbothered by the prospect of an even number of
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Justices. The Justices responsible for the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits now all hailed from
northern states. 76
In 1866, after the war had ended, Congress once more reorganized the circuits and the
Court, again with the objective of limiting the influence of the former Confederate and other
slaveholding states. The statute reduced the number of circuits to nine and mandated a gradual
reduction of the number of seats on the Court from ten to seven, via attrition. 77 Congressional
Republicans sought to reduce the size of the Court in order to prevent President Andrew
Johnson, a foe of Reconstruction, from nominating Justices to fill any vacancies. 78
The judicial power of the United States was even more profoundly transformed in this
period by a series of statutes enlarging the federal courts’ jurisdiction. As one historian writes,
“[i]n no comparable period of our nation’s history have the federal courts, lower and Supreme,
enjoyed as great an expansion of their jurisdiction as they did in the years of Reconstruction,
1863 to 1876.” 79 Although Congress did on a few notable occasions strip the Supreme Court
of jurisdiction in specific sets of cases, 80 the broader movement was toward expanding the
judicial power of the United States. 81 The most important reforms were in three areas: first,
removal jurisdiction, which allowed certain cases that began in state court to be taken to
federal court; 82 second, the habeas corpus power, permitting federal courts to issue writs on
behalf of prisoners held by state authorities in violation of federal law; 83 and third, federal
question or “arising under” jurisdiction. 84
This growth in jurisdiction was accompanied by substantive legislation from Congress
that created new federal rights and causes of action, many of which were aimed at protecting
the rights of African-Americans. 85 As a result of these reforms, the inferior federal courts
“became the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the
Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.” 86
Despite Congress’s expansion of federal jurisdiction during the post-Civil War era, the
Court issued a series of decisions that significantly limited the reach of both civil rights
legislation and the Reconstruction Amendments. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court
interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly,
holding that the Clause covered only certain rights of national citizenship that did not include
the economic protections claimed by the plaintiffs, a group of white butchers in New
Orleans. 87 Three years later, the Court reaffirmed this constrained view of the Fourteenth
Amendment in United States v. Cruikshank, a case arising out of the infamous Colfax
Massacre in Louisiana, in which a mob of white vigilantes killed between 60 and 150 African-
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Americans, as well as three white men. 88 In Cruikshank, the Court overturned the federal
convictions of the vigilantes, holding that the Bill of Rights protected citizens only against
deprivations of rights by the federal government, not by states or private parties. 89
The next several years saw frequent litigation of the Reconstruction legislation and
Amendments. In the words of one historian, “[t]he opening of each term of the Court,
beginning in 1876, caused a buildup of anxiety regarding possible decisions in the civil rights
cases.” 90 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was regarded by many contemporaries as the most farreaching piece of Reconstruction legislation. 91 The Act’s stated aim was “to protect all citizens
in their civil and legal rights,” and it guaranteed to all citizens, regardless of color, access to
public accommodations, including public schools, churches, theatres, and transportation, as
well as jury service. 92 In 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court invalidated key provisions
of the Act, ruling that neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amendment permitted the
federal government to proscribe discriminatory behavior by private actors. 93 Many scholars
regard the Civil Rights Cases as the culmination of a decade-long shift by the Court toward a
narrow interpretation of the Reconstruction statutes and Amendments. As one historian
observes, “[t]he rights of the individual took precedence over obvious social inequalities that
federal officials sought to address.” 94 With the erosion of northern support for robust
Reconstruction policies, “[t]hat same narrow, highly individualized interpretation of rights
also allowed legal segregation to flourish.” 95

The Progressive Era: Structural Reforms and DemocracyBased Critiques of the Courts
Reorganization of the Federal Courts
As a result of the structural reforms of the Reconstruction era, the dockets of the federal
courts—and in particular the Supreme Court—became crowded “beyond all control.” 96 A
small reprieve came from Congress in an 1869 statute that created circuit judgeships, one for
each of the nine circuits. 97 The circuit-riding obligations of the Justices were also reduced. But
it was not enough to stem the tide of litigation in federal court. The number of cases pending
in the federal district and circuit courts rose from 29,013 in 1873 to 54,194 in 1890—an
increase of eighty-six percent. 98 Yet over the same period, the number of inferior federal court
judges rose only slightly, from sixty-two in 1873 to sixty-nine in 1890. 99
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Moreover, the booming dockets in the district and circuit courts meant a concomitant
surge in the Supreme Court’s caseload. “[W]ith no other exclusively appellate court and an
automatic right of appeal to the Court in many instances, the losing parties in such cases
inevitably brought their claims to the justices.” 100 The Court’s docket in 1860 numbered 310
cases. In 1890, the number was 1,816 cases—623 of which had been filed in 1890 alone. 101
Dissatisfaction with the federal courts’ organization and functioning spawned numerous
reform proposals. These included calls for an intermediate level of appeals courts, an
innovation that had been discussed for decades but had never gained sufficient support to be
attempted. Other proposals included expanding the Court to eighteen Justices, half of whom
would operate as a “National Court of Appeals.” Another proposal would have segmented the
Court into three “divisional” panels, each responsible for common-law, equity, and admiralty
and revenue cases, and with the entire Court hearing constitutional cases. 102
Finally, in 1891, Congress passed the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, known as the Evarts
Act in honor of its chief architect, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman William Evarts of
New York. 103 The Evarts Act “fundamentally reshaped the federal judicial system” and
“substantially established the framework of the contemporary system.” 104 For the first time
since 1802, the Justices were no longer obliged to ride circuit. The Act also created
intermediate courts of appeals, which “shifted the appellate caseload burden from the Supreme
Court to new courts of appeals, and, in so doing, made the federal district courts the system’s
primary trial courts.” 105 The reforms also drastically decreased the Court’s caseload by
limiting the right of automatic appeal, and by making the decisions of the courts of appeals
final in several categories of cases, including diversity suits and criminal prosecutions. The
courts of appeals could certify questions to the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court could
grant review by certiorari; for state court cases, the review mechanism remained the writ of
error. 106 Whereas the number of new cases filed before the Court in 1890 was 623, that number
dropped to 379 in 1891 and then to 275 in 1892. 107 Three decades later, Harvard law professor
and future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, along with his former student James M.
Landis, offered the following characterization of the Evarts Act: “The remedy was decisive.
The Supreme Court at once felt its benefits. A flood of litigation had indeed been shut off.” 108

The Progressive Critique of the Court
The end of federally enforced Reconstruction by 1877 also redirected Republican energies
from civil rights for African-Americans toward new forms of nationalism that prioritized
economic development, property rights, and the interests of large-scale enterprise. 109 Critics
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of the Court, especially those associated with the progressive movement (and the related
Progressive Party), charged the federal courts with favoring business interests, in part due to
the expansion of the courts’ diversity jurisdiction, the frequency of removal from state to
federal court by corporate defendants, and the application of a substantive body of law known
as “general federal common law.” 110 These critics charged the Court with deploying its power
of judicial review more often and in accordance with conservative policy preferences. Chief
among these preferences was the curtailing of legislation and regulations, especially those that
protected workers and consumers. Between 1864 and 1895, the Court invalidated an average
of three state laws each year, a sharp contrast with the pre-Civil War rate of less than one law
per year. 111
By the 1890s, what one scholar has described as a “muted fury” toward the federal courts
had developed among some reformers, many of whom mobilized as the Populist and later the
Progressive parties. 112 Three decisions that the Court handed down in 1895 drew particular
criticism: United States v. E.C. Knight Co. (holding that the federal commerce power did not
reach manufacturing); 113 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (invaliding the federal income
tax); 114 and In re Debs (upholding a labor injunction against striking railroad workers). 115
Progressive anger at the courts became a defining issue in the 1912 presidential election.
After having left office and embarked on a worldwide tour, former president Theodore
Roosevelt reentered the political fray with a blistering attack on the courts, focusing his ire on
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lochner v. New York. 116 Addressing a joint session of
the Colorado legislature, as well as an audience of thousands who had gathered outside,
Roosevelt decried the Court’s decisions in Lochner and E.C. Knight. 117 In print, Roosevelt
argued that the Justices had “strained to the utmost (and, indeed, in my judgement, violated)
the Constitution in order to sustain a do-nothing philosophy which has everywhere completely
broken down when applied to the actual conditions of modern life.” 118
Upon launching his presidential campaign in February 1912, Roosevelt proposed that
state judicial decisions invalidating a statute as unconstitutional (either under the Federal
Constitution or the state constitution) should be “recalled” by a vote of the citizens. 119 “[W]hen
a judge decides a constitutional question, when he decides what the people as a whole can or
cannot do, the people should have the right to recall that decision if they think it wrong,”
Roosevelt argued. 120 The former President’s proposal focused on rulings by state courts, and
he disavowed the notion that it would apply to federal courts. But one commentator notes that
despite his public statements, Roosevelt “confided to [progressive journalist Herbert] Croly
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that he believed the people would ultimately obtain the power to interpret even the federal
Constitution.” 121
Roosevelt’s recall initiative became a dominant issue during the 1912 presidential
election, a four-way contest that pitted Roosevelt, running as a Progressive, against Republican
incumbent William Howard Taft, Democrat Woodrow Wilson, and Socialist Eugene V.
Debs. 122 Ultimately, Roosevelt’s attacks on the judiciary failed to win him the Republican
nomination, repelling party conservatives and energizing Taft’s reelection campaign, which
focused on protecting judicial independence. 123 President Wilson, who prevailed in the
contest, did not support recall of court decisions, and the frontal attack on the judiciary faded
after Roosevelt’s defeat.
During and after Roosevelt’s unsuccessful presidential campaign in 1912, a group of U.S.
Senators continued to press the progressive critique of the Court. Led by Robert La Follette of
Wisconsin, William Borah of Idaho, George Norris of Nebraska, and Robert Owen of
Oklahoma, these western and midwestern lawmakers argued that the federal courts, especially
the Supreme Court, stood in the way of reforms that the Senators viewed as necessary remedies
for social and economic ills caused by industrialization. Arguing that the courts were unduly
solicitous of corporate interests and thus hostile to workplace regulation and the labor
movement, progressives sought tools to limit judicial power. In the name of popular
accountability, they proposed a number of mechanisms to constrain the judiciary, including
recalls, supermajority voting requirements, and legislative overrides. 124
In 1912, Senator Owen proposed that Congress be empowered to recall and remove
federal judges from office by a majority vote of both houses. In 1918, he sought to write into
a piece of legislation a provision shielding it from judicial review—as in a renewed federal
ban on child labor, after the Court had invalidated a similar ban. Inveighing against “judicial
usurpations” a few years later, Senator La Follette argued for a constitutional amendment that
would permit Congress to override the Court by passing again laws that the Court had
invalidated. Senator Borah, for his part, objected to decisions in which the Court decided by a
5–4 or 6–3 vote to strike down a statute. He therefore sponsored a bill in 1923 that would have
required the assent of at least seven Justices to hold a statute unconstitutional. 125 Though none
of these proposals ultimately succeeded, their numerosity and the seriousness with which they
were debated, both within Congress and among the broader public, demonstrates the force and
appeal of the progressive critiques.

52 | December 2021

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

Nominations to the Court: Increasing Controversy
During the same period, the process by which Justices were appointed to the Court
became increasingly public and controversial. The first significantly contested nomination,
and the first time that the Senate held a confirmation hearing for a nominee to the Court, was
President Wilson’s nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to the Court in 1916. 126 Brandeis, who
was one of Wilson’s informal legal advisers, was a leading progressive who had become
known as “the people’s attorney” for his successful and high-profile attacks on corporate
interests and his dedication to bringing the social and economic impact of regulation to bear
on legal arguments. 127
Brandeis’s nomination was strenuously opposed by many luminaries of the legal and
business establishment: former President William Howard Taft; Harvard President A.
Lawrence Lowell; former Attorney General George Wickersham; and former Secretary of
State and War (and current American Bar Association President) Elihu Root, among others.
President Wilson defended his nominee, charging that the opposition stemmed from
Brandeis’s refusal “to be serviceable to them in the promotion of their own selfish interests.” 128
Another factor in the attacks on Brandeis was bigotry: He was the first Jewish person to be
nominated to the Court. 129 After four months of debate, including hearings that Brandeis did
not attend, the Democratic-controlled Senate voted along party lines to confirm Brandeis in
June 1916.
Fourteen years later, another nomination that was controversial for very different reasons
failed to win Senate confirmation. In 1930, President Hoover nominated federal appeals court
judge John J. Parker to the Court. Given that Parker was a sitting federal judge, the nomination
was initially expected by many observers to yield a smooth confirmation process.
Parker’s nomination ultimately failed, however, because it was vocally and effectively
opposed by civil rights groups, led by the NAACP, as well as labor organizations—groups
that also shared the progressive sensibility. As a circuit judge, Parker had issued a strongly
worded opinion upholding an injunction against the United Mine Workers, earning him the ire
of organized labor. The NAACP and other organizations, meanwhile, condemned racially
inflammatory remarks Parker had made a decade earlier while running for governor of North
Carolina. “The participation of the Negro in politics is a source of evil and danger to both races
and is not desired by the wise men in either race or by the Republican Party of North Carolina,”
Parker had stated in 1920. 130 Two months after Hoover named Parker, the nomination was
rejected by a vote of 39 to 41. It was the Senate’s only rejection of a nominee to the Court in
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the seventy-four years between 1894 and 1968. For perspective, however, it is worth noting
that for most of the nineteenth century, the Senate had rejected or otherwise blocked an
average of nearly one out of every three nominees to the Court. 131

1937, FDR, and the Court: Existential Challenges
Populist and Progressive critiques of the Court continued to circulate through the early
decades of the twentieth century. By 1936, when the nation was in the grip of the Great
Depression, these criticisms gained new salience. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt won
reelection to a second term by an overwhelming margin, he turned his attention to the Court.
In a series of decisions in 1935 and 1936, the Court had invalidated key New Deal legislation
introduced by the Roosevelt Administration and supported by Democrats in Congress. 132 “A
majority of the Court seemed to have turned decisively against the Administration’s
programs,” notes one prominent casebook, adding that “constitutional challenges to a new
spate of laws—the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Social
Security Act—loomed in the coming months.” 133
In February 1937, Roosevelt presented a package of reforms to Congress that he described
as a remedy for overcrowded federal court dockets. The proposal authorized the President to
appoint one additional judge to the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to supplement
any federal judge who reached the age of seventy and did not retire. The size of the Court
would be limited to fifteen Justices. “The significant fact was that the plan would permit the
president to appoint six new Supreme Court justices, and thus to insure approval of the New
Deal programs. It was, as it was called, a ‘court-packing plan.’” 134 On March 9, 1937,
Roosevelt took to the national airwaves to present the reforms to the American people in a
“Fireside Chat.”
Roosevelt’s plan sparked a robust national discussion about the Court, its decisions, and
its and the President’s respective roles in the constitutional system. “Day after day for the next
half-year, stories about the Supreme Court conflict rated banner headlines.” 135
The question was debated at town meetings in New England, at crossroads country
stores in North Carolina, at a large rally around the Tulsa courthouse, by the
Chatterbox Club of Rochester, New York, the Thursday Study Club of La Crosse,
Wisconsin, the Veteran Fire Fighters’ Association of New Orleans, and the Baptist
Young People’s Union of Lime Rock, Rhode Island. In Beaumont, Texas, a movie
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audience broke out in applause for rival arguments on the plan when they were shown
on the screen. 136
While the public as well as members of Congress debated the merits and flaws of the
President’s plan, the Court itself took action in a manner that surprised many observers.
“Within weeks of the bill’s introduction . . . the Supreme Court began prudently to change
course by upholding New Deal measures that months earlier it seemed prepared to
invalidate.” 137 On March 29, 1937, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, upholding a state minimum-wage statute for women that was nearly
identical to one that it had struck down a year earlier. 138 On April 12, the Court decided NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., in which it held the National Labor Relations Act to be a
valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, appearing to diverge from
its position in a similar case from 1936. 139 And on May 24, in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
the Court upheld the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of
1935—again seemingly taking a broader view of congressional power than in previous
cases. 140 All three were 5–4 decisions. This seeming about-face was dubbed the “switch in
time that saved nine” by some observers 141 and “the constitutional revolution of 1937” by
others. 142 Also in May 1937, Justice Willis Van Devanter—one of the so-called “Four
Horsemen” who had steadfastly opposed most New Deal legislation—announced his
retirement from the Court. 143
By the summer of 1937, however, Roosevelt’s proposal was foundering in Congress. It
was ultimately defeated in July 1937. The controversy over the Court “helped weld together a
bipartisan coalition of anti-New Deal Senators”; it also led to a “deeply divided” Democratic
party. 144 Henry Wallace, a member of Roosevelt’s cabinet during the Court-packing
controversy, opined that “[t]he whole New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the
Supreme Court fight.” 145 But the battle over the Court was not the only factor in this
diminution of support for the President’s plan. Other pressures included “dismay at the harsh
recession of 1937–1938, anxiety over relief spending, and resentment at sit-down strikes.” 146
Many observers—at the time and since—charged Roosevelt with overreaching. 147 They
argue that had the plan succeeded, its passage would have “set a precedent from which the
institution of judicial review might never recover.” 148 On this view, Roosevelt’s effort to
expand the Court failed on two fronts: It was voted down in Congress and it hobbled Roosevelt
and the Democratic Party in their efforts to consolidate the progressive reforms that formed
the core of the New Deal agenda. 149 “[A]lthough the battle was won, the war was lost.” 150
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Court packing divided Democrats and undermined middle-class and bipartisan
support for the New Deal. It shattered FDR’s aura of invincibility, helped “blunt the
most important drive for social reform in American history,” and “squandered” the
president’s 1936 triumph by welding together a coalition of conservative Southern
Democrats and Republicans that blocked reform in Congress until 1964. 151
Other commentators contend, however, that the plan in fact achieved some of its
objectives. The Supreme Court’s constitutional doctrine did undergo changes in 1937, and
certain of those changes proved enduring. That spring, the Court began upholding major pieces
of New Deal legislation, despite challenges that the statutes exceeded Congress’s Article I
powers—in particular, the commerce power and the taxing and spending power. Roosevelt
did not succeed in “packing” the Court, but neither did he have to abandon his New Deal
agenda. Nor did he have to launch an effort for a constitutional amendment to limit the Court’s
power, as some in his administration had urged. 152
Scholars disagree regarding both the magnitude and the causes of these doctrinal shifts.
The Justices might well have viewed the Court-packing plan as a threat and altered their views
accordingly, engaging in “self-salvation by self-reversal.” 153 On this view, “[w]hile the
president lost the skirmish with the Court, he won the battle.” 154 Gradual shifts in specific
Justices’ doctrinal approaches might explain the Court’s shift in 1937. 155 The New Deal “did
not reconstruct constitutional law out of thin air.” 156 But “the doctrinal revolution would not
have happened without sustained Presidential leadership.” 157 Clearly, the struggle over the
Court “exacted an enormous toll” on Roosevelt and impeded the legislative momentum for
comprehensive economic and social reform. Yet, as one leading historian of the era notes,
these costs “should not obscure the President’s one huge success in the Court fight—the
legitimation of a vast expansion of the power of government in American life.” 158
The public debate surrounding the President’s plan placed undeniable pressure on the
Court in the late winter and spring of 1937. More than twenty-five bills regulating the Court
were introduced in Congress between January 8 and May 20, 1937. 159 Justice Owen Roberts,
the Justice whom many conventional accounts of the crisis identify as switching his views in
1937, recalled years later, in testimony before the Senate, “the tremendous strain and the threat
to the existing Court, of which I was fully conscious.” 160
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The Postwar Period: Brown v. Board of Education and the
Warren Court
The middle decades of the twentieth century witnessed revived debates about the role of
the Court in American public life, its ability to protect individual rights, and the relationship
between the federal courts and state officials, particularly in the context of the civil rights
movement.
In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 161 in which the Court unanimously held that
racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, some southern officials challenged
the authority of the Court’s decisions on issues concerning African-Americans’ civil rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and school desegregation in particular. Some southern state
legislatures passed “interposition” resolutions asserting that a given issue—typically, public
education—was within the exclusive control of the state. 162 In 1956, nineteen senators and
seventy-seven congressmen, all from former Confederate states, signed onto a document titled
“The Declaration of Constitutional Principles,” but which became known as the “Southern
Manifesto.” 163 Such efforts at blocking the implementation of the Court’s decisions explicitly
borrowed from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theories of state sovereignty associated
with James Madison and John C. Calhoun, among others. 164
The reaction against the Brown decision sparked a number of proposals for constitutional
amendments. Among the amendments presented to Congress by various state legislatures were
the following:
• An amendment making the Senate the final appellate court with power to review
decisions of the Supreme Court in cases “where questions of the powers reserved to
the States, or the people, are either directly or indirectly involved and decided, and a
State is a party or anywise interested in such question.” 165
• An amendment setting term limits for federal judges and revising the method of
selecting them. 166
• A procedure according to which if one-fourth of the states disapproved of a decision
by the Court that weakens states’ rights, the decision would be rendered null unless
three-fourths of the states approved it. 167
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• A proposed “Court of the Union” drawn from judges of state supreme courts, with the
power to review decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to “the rights reserved to
the States or to the people” by the Constitution. 168
• An amendment reserving to the states “the right to sole, and exclusive jurisdiction of
public-school systems in the separate States.” 169
None of these proposed amendments came to pass. But they demonstrate the broad range
of Supreme Court reforms that have been proposed from across the political spectrum by
critics of its decisions, its procedures, and, in some cases, its authority. In response to
continued and frequently violent southern resistance to federal court decisions that sought to
dismantle racial segregation, the Court explicitly claimed the mantle of judicial supremacy.
“The major act of the Supreme Court, in the ten years after Brown, was defending its newly
self-appointed role as ‘ultimate interpreter of the Constitution’ in Cooper v. Aaron.” 170 Cooper
was a 1958 case in which the Court held that Arkansas officials were bound by federal court
orders mandating desegregation in public schools. 171 The joint opinion, authored by all nine
Justices, stated that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution made the Court’s decisions
binding on every state, overriding any state laws to the contrary. 172 The Court’s decision in
Brown could “neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or
judicial officers nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation,” the
Court wrote. 173
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren’s tenure from 1953 to 1969, the Court became a focus
of public debate because “it displayed a willingness to confront a host of important issues
head-on and become, in important ways, a significant agenda setter for domestic policy.” 174
For some observers, the Warren Court stood for the protection of civil rights and civil liberties,
including the rights of criminal defendants as well as due process rights within the
administrative state. Others took a more skeptical view, warning of the risks that judicial
activism might pose when pitted against policies adopted by the people’s elected
representatives. An “Impeach Earl Warren” movement, led by several newly formed rightwing groups, placed advertisements and planted billboards throughout the U.S. 175
The Court was met with unusually sustained and pointed criticism in response to a set of
six cases that were argued together in November 1963 and decided in June 1964. Known
collectively as “the Reapportionment Cases,” the most prominent of which were Reynolds v.
Sims 176 and Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 177 the decisions effectively
invalidated the apportionment of nearly every state legislature. Rather than allocating
representatives by political subdivisions such as the county, the Constitution required a
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principle of “one person, one vote”—in other words, that any chamber of a state legislature
must be based on equal population districts.
In response to these decisions, the House of Representatives passed a bill stripping the
federal courts of jurisdiction over cases involving legislative apportionment. Members of
Congress, led by Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, spearheaded a movement for a
constitutional amendment overriding the Court’s decisions. The effort ultimately fell short of
the two-thirds of the states required under Article V of the Constitution to compel Congress
to call a convention to propose amendments. “The newly reapportioned legislatures, after all,
had no desire to return to the status quo ante the Reapportionment Cases.” 178
Debates about the role of, and potential reforms to, the Court continued through the
decades following the retirement of Chief Justice Warren in 1969. Many of these controversies
are, of course, pertinent to the Commission’s mission. They are discussed in the following
Chapters in the context of the specific structural issues they presented.

Conclusion
As this historical overview demonstrates, debates about the proper role of the Supreme
Court are as old as the Constitution. Though the focus of today’s discussions is, appropriately,
on current events and the immediate recent past, taking a longer view across 234 years of the
Republic’s existence allows for a deeper and more contextualized analysis of complex
imperatives of text, structure, politics, and reform. The combination of these factors was
present when the Constitution was drafted in 1787; when it was fundamentally reshaped
through the Reconstruction Amendments of 1865, 1868, and 1870; in the controversy between
the President, Congress, and the judiciary over Court-packing in 1937; and in the civil rights
struggles and victories of the 1950s and 1960s. The current debates require us to draw on the
strengths and insights of these previous conflicts while also recognizing the distinctiveness of
each moment across the history of the courts, the country, and the Constitution.
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Chapter 2: Membership and Size of the
Court
In recent years, calls to expand the size of the Supreme Court have become a significant
part of the debate over the Court and its role in American government. Although there is
widespread agreement among legal scholars that Congress has the constitutional authority to
expand the Court’s size, there is profound disagreement over whether Court expansion at this
moment in time would be wise. We do not seek to evaluate or judge the weight of any of these
arguments, and the Commission takes no position on the wisdom of expansion. In this Chapter,
we begin in Part I by presenting an account of past efforts to expand or contract the size of the
Court, which occurred at various points in the nineteenth century and perhaps most famously
during the New Deal era. In Part II, we consider whether Congress has the authority to expand
the size of the Court. In Part III, we articulate the arguments made by proponents of expansion,
as well as the arguments made by those who oppose any such efforts. In Part IV, we consider
other proposals that have been made during recent reform debates to restructure the Supreme
Court.

A Brief History of Efforts to Alter the Size of the Court
Although debates about Court expansion and restructuring have become increasingly
salient in recent years, there is a long history of similar disputes earlier in U.S. history.
Congress contracted or expanded the size of the Supreme Court several times in the nineteenth
century, and President Franklin Roosevelt sought to expand the Court during the New Deal
era. But the size of the Court has remained at nine Justices since 1869. This section details the
history of efforts to alter the size of the Court.

Nineteenth-Century Changes to the Court’s Size
Article III provides that the “judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court.” 1 But the constitutional text does not specify how many Justices should be on
that Court. Congress on several occasions in the country’s first century altered the size of the
Court. In 1789, Congress fixed the size of the Court at six members. 2 A decade later, Congress
began to make changes. After Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams for the presidency in
1800, but before the newly elected President Jefferson took office, the outgoing Federalist
Congress in 1801 reduced the Court’s future size to five members. 3 (The Federalists did not
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terminate the position of any existing Justice; the law provided that, whenever the next Justice
left the Court, the vacancy would not be filled.) In 1802, the new Democratic Republican
Congress then repealed that 1801 law and restored the Court to six members. 4 In 1807,
Congress added one Justice to increase the size to seven members, 5 and in 1837, Congress
expanded the size to nine members. 6
Each reform seems to have been motivated by a mix of institutional and political concerns.
During the early years of the Court, each Justice had two duties: both to sit on the Supreme
Court and to serve as a judge on a lower federal court (a practice known as “circuit riding”). 7
In 1789, Congress created a six-member Supreme Court to serve the existing federal circuits.
Over the next several decades, as the country grew in size, it became clear that more judges
were needed, particularly in newly admitted states such as Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio,
and (later) Louisiana, Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri. 8 In 1807, Congress added a seventh
circuit, and in 1837, an eighth and a ninth circuit. Each time, Congress expanded the size of
the Supreme Court accordingly. 9 These expansions served an institutional purpose: providing
sufficient judicial machinery for a growing nation. But each expansion also served the interests
of a political party. In 1807, the Democratic Republicans controlled Congress and trusted their
party leader—President Jefferson—to appoint the seventh Justice. In 1837, the Democrats
who controlled Congress had similar confidence in their party leader President Andrew
Jackson. 10 The new courts created also ensured that a majority of circuits would cover slaveholding territory and therefore that a majority of Justices would be friendly to slavery. 11
The reforms in 1801 and 1802 can also be explained by a mix of institutional and political
concerns. In 1801, the Federalist Congress temporarily ended circuit riding, 12 and so its
reduction of the Court to five Justices could have been justified by the fact that the Court could
now function effectively with only five members. But the reduction in size was also likely
attributable to the Federalists’ desire to prevent their incoming political rival—President-elect
Jefferson—from filling a Supreme Court vacancy. 13 When the Democratic Republicans
repealed the 1801 law and returned the Court to six Justices, they also re-established circuit
riding and thus the link between the number of Justices and the number of circuits. 14 But their
re-expansion of the Court also coincided with their political interest in giving President
Jefferson an opportunity to shape the future of the Court.
In the 1860s, Congress made several changes to the size of the Supreme Court in fairly
short order. These changes were not tied as closely to the number of lower circuit courts and
are often said to have had a primarily political motivation. 15 Many lawmakers were deeply
skeptical of the Court after its 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, which held that African-
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Americans were not “citizens,” and that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories. 16
Accordingly, there was a strong sense that the Court was in need of reform. During the Civil
War, the Republican Congress in 1863 created a new tenth circuit and added a tenth seat to
the Supreme Court for its new circuit Justice, enabling President Lincoln to appoint a proUnion, anti-slavery Justice. 17 Soon thereafter, Congress again modified the Supreme Court’s
size. In 1866, after the assassination of Lincoln led to the presidency of Democrat Andrew
Johnson, Congress reduced the Court’s future membership to seven. 18 The conventional view
is that the Republicans who controlled Congress in the post-Civil War era—and whose
primary goal was to reconstruct the South—did not trust Johnson to nominate Justices
sympathetic to those reconstruction efforts. 19 By contrast, in 1869, the Republican Congress
was willing to return the Supreme Court to nine members, once fellow Republican (and former
Union army general) President Grant was in charge. 20 But other historical experts conclude
that these changes “were motivated by practical and mundane performance goals,” including
returning the Court to a workable (and odd) number of Justices. 21

The Court-Packing Plan of 1937
The size of the Supreme Court has remained at nine members since 1869. But there was
a prominent attempt to remake the Court in 1937: President Franklin Roosevelt’s so-called
“Court-packing plan.” 22 As we explain in some detail in Chapter 1, the proposal was a response
to a series of decisions by the Supreme Court in 1935 and 1936 invalidating major New Deal
legislation enacted by Congress and championed by Roosevelt, as well as myriad state labor
and social welfare laws, all directed at bringing the nation out of the economic and social
calamity of the Great Depression. 23 With still more constitutional challenges to major New
Deal enactments on the horizon, and after his commanding victory in the election of 1936,
Roosevelt and his administration turned to protect the progressive New Deal from the courts. 24
Under Roosevelt’s plan, the President would be authorized to appoint one additional
Justice to the Supreme Court for each Justice over seventy years of age (who did not retire
within six months)—for a possible total of fifteen members. 25 The legislative proposal grew
out of a nearly two-year study in the Department of Justice as to the proper means of reforming
the Supreme Court. Justice Department officials considered a variety of proposals, including
constitutional amendments, measures to restrict federal jurisdiction, and proposals to expand
the Supreme Court. 26 Ultimately, officials advised that “the proposal to enlarge the Supreme
Court, while not without flaw, was ‘the only one which is certainly constitutional and . . . may
be done quickly and with a fair assurance of success.’. . . [I]t was the ‘only undoubtedly
constitutional method by which to obtain a more sympathetic majority of the Court.’” 27

December 2021 | 69

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

In public, President Roosevelt initially asserted that the Court reform was designed to
promote judicial efficiency. The Supreme Court, he argued, needed additional and younger
personnel to handle its growing caseload. 28 But Roosevelt soon acknowledged that the real
purpose was to alter the future course of the Court’s decisions. 29 In his Fireside Chat on March
9, 1937, the President urged that “new blood” was needed, because the Supreme Court was
“acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making body” in invalidating New Deal
programs. 30 “[W]e must take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from
itself,” 31 he proclaimed.
In congressional testimony, executive officials defended the plan as a constitutional and
desirable method of Court reform. Then-Assistant Attorney General (and later Supreme Court
Justice) Robert Jackson argued that “[o]ur forebears” placed certain mechanisms in the
Constitution to “enable Congress to check judicial abuses and usurpations.” 32 One of those
checks was the power of Congress to alter the size of the Supreme Court. Jackson insisted that
Congress had throughout the nineteenth century changed the Court’s size “to keep the
divergence between the Court and the elective branches from becoming so wide as to threaten
the stability of the Government.” 33 Jackson declared: “When immediate and effective action
has been necessary” to prevent the judiciary from “impos[ing] . . . its unsympathetic
predilections on the country,” “the method which the President now proposes has been used
throughout our constitutional history.” 34
Some modern observers assume that Roosevelt’s proposal was quickly rejected. 35 But at
least in Congress, that appears not to have been the case. To be sure, the plan faced
considerable opposition from Roosevelt’s fellow Democrats (notably, at a time when the
Democrats controlled over 70% of the seats in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate) 36 and prompted widespread media condemnation. 37 Some opponents saw the plan as
an effort to consolidate presidential control over the judiciary and “compar[ed] Roosevelt to
Stuart tyrants and European dictators.” 38 Chief Justice Hughes sent a letter to Senator Burton
Wheeler which sought to refute President Roosevelt’s initial claim that enlarging the Court
would improve judicial efficiency. The Chief Justice argued that “[a]n increase in the
number of Justices . . . would impair that efficiency so long as the Court acts as a unit. There
would be more judges to hear, more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to
be convinced and to decide. The present number of Justices is thought to be large enough so
far as the prompt, adequate, and efficient conduct of the work of the Court is concerned.” 39
But there was also considerable support in Congress for Roosevelt’s plan, and many in
Congress expected throughout much of the debate that the legislation would succeed in some
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form. 40 Democratic Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson pushed hard for Court expansion,
with the enthusiastic support of many other Democrats, including then-Senator (and later
Supreme Court Justice) Hugo Black. 41 Initially, the measure seemed likely to get through the
Senate, and many participants assumed that it would pass the House of Representatives by a
wide margin. 42
The political debate, which took place in the halls of Congress, across the editorial pages,
and in numerous local venues throughout the country, was then significantly affected by the
Supreme Court itself. Soon after the plan was announced, the Supreme Court issued a series
of decisions upholding state and federal regulation of the economy. 43 Although scholars
disagree as to why the Supreme Court changed its approach, 44 there is no question that this
apparent “switch in time” in the spring of 1937 dampened the congressional support for the
President’s plan. The Court’s decisions signaled that it might be more receptive to New Deal
programs, even absent a change in membership. 45
In June 1937, the Senate Judiciary Committee, voting 10 to 8, issued a strongly worded
report recommending against the plan. 46 The majority of the Committee denounced
Roosevelt’s plan as “a needless, futile, and utterly dangerous abandonment of constitutional
principle.” 47 The bill was “an attempt to impose upon the courts . . . a line of decision” and
thus “would undermine the independence of the courts.” 48 The report declared:
Let us now set a salutary precedent that will never be violated. Let us, of the Seventyfifth Congress, in words that will never be disregarded by any succeeding Congress,
declare that we would rather have an independent Court, a fearless Court, a Court that
will dare to announce its honest opinions in what it believes to be the defense of
liberties of the people, than a Court that, out of fear or sense of obligation to the
appointing power or factional passion, approves any measure we may enact. 49
Neither the Court’s decisions upholding New Deal legislation nor this vociferous criticism
in Congress ended debate over the Court-packing plan in Congress. Considerable support for
some type of Court expansion remained, and some historians contend that the harsh rebuke by
the Judiciary Committee backfired by leading some Democrats, who thought the attack
intemperate, to support the administration. 50 And it appeared for a time that Congress in fact
would authorize the President to appoint four additional Justices (one for every member over
age seventy-five). 51 It was not until after additional debates—and the sudden death of the bill’s
staunch proponent Senate Majority Leader Robinson—that political support for the measure
finally ran out, with the defeat of the plan in July 1937. 52
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As we note in Chapter 1, scholars and commentators disagree about how to put the long
debate over Court packing during the New Deal era into perspective. On some accounts, the
plan and the debate surrounding it prompted changes in the Court’s doctrine that left in place
Roosevelt’s existing New Deal and ended an era in which the Court frequently invalidated
laws designed to protect workers, consumers, and the public. In that doctrine, the Court
established that Congress and state legislatures have broad authority to regulate the economy.
But the political controversy over the Court-packing plan clearly divided Democrats and took
a major toll on the once broad political support Roosevelt enjoyed. According to some
historians, this “undermined bipartisan support for the New Deal,” which along with numerous
other developments of the time helped bring about the end of major social reform until the
1960s. 53

A Failed Constitutional Amendment to Fix the Court at Nine
In the ensuing decades, a strong constitutional norm against any measure that might be
deemed “Court packing” developed, leading some commentators today to describe Court
expansion as a “third rail in American politics.” 54 Members of Congress sought in the 1950s
to amend the Constitution to fix the size of the Supreme Court at nine members. 55 (The
proposed amendment would also have prevented Congress from restricting the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims.) 56 Senator John Butler led the charge,
declaring that the goal of the amendment was to “forestall future attempts to undermine the
integrity and independence of the Supreme Court.” 57
Supporters argued that the amendment would close “loopholes” in the constitutional
structure. 58 Senator Butler emphasized that Roosevelt was not the first to propose a change in
the Supreme Court’s size in order to influence the future course of its decisions: “The Congress
. . . in 1866, was guilty of the same wrong . . . except that in 1866, the attempt was successful”
at “prevent[ing] President Johnson from having an opportunity to fill the vacancies with
persons who were friendly to his policies.” 59 Butler asserted: “We cannot know, with these
historical illustrations fresh in our minds from what quarter and at what time the next attempt
to influence the judgment of the Supreme Court may come.” 60
Senator Butler’s amendment easily mustered the two-thirds supermajority needed to make
it through the Senate. 61 But the measure failed in the House of Representatives. Some
lawmakers worried that freezing the Supreme Court’s size would be unwise. 62 Congress might,
the legislators argued, need to modify the Court’s size for institutional reasons, such as to
enable it to tackle a larger workload. Representative Emmanuel Celler stated that, although he
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had protested “President Roosevelt’s proposal to pack the Supreme Court . . . with such
vehemence that Roosevelt never forgave me for it,” Congress should not “force upon ourselves
a rigidity which can in the future make much mischief. . . . In the event there is another such
move to increase the members of the Court, the then Congress, in the final analysis, can
approve or reject, as is deemed best in the national interest.” 63
Significantly, both supporters and opponents of this proposed constitutional amendment
shared one assumption: Congress has broad formal power to expand or contract the Supreme
Court, such that the only way to freeze the size of the Court in place was through a
constitutional amendment. But significant disagreement arose over whether fixing the size of
the Court at nine members would be wise. Some observers see these congressional debates as
reflecting a view that expanding the Court for partisan or ideological purposes is inappropriate,
but that changing the size of the Court for reasons of institutional efficiency is legitimate.
Since these efforts and until recently, no other attempts have been made in Congress to
fix or expand the size of the Court. But the longstanding norm against Court expansion is
being challenged today, and bills that would expand the size of the Court and those that
propose a constitutional amendment to fix the Court at nine have again re-emerged. 64 As we
describe in Part III of this Chapter, the reasons for this re-emergence are specific to our time.
But understanding the contested history of efforts at Court expansion is valuable in
highlighting the myriad institutional and political interests relevant to evaluating this turn of
constitutional events. As one witness before the Commission observed: “[S]eeking guidance
from the past can mislead policymakers” but it also “provides a way to make sense of the
world.” 65

The Legality of Court Expansion
Article III of the Constitution, which establishes the judiciary, requires that there be “one
supreme Court” but does not specify the number of Justices that shall serve on that Court. 66
Article I authorizes Congress to make all laws that are “necessary and proper” to carry out the
powers conferred on various institutions of government, which include the Supreme Court. 67
Determining the size of the Court that might be “necessary and proper” to its functioning
seems well within Congress’s formal discretion. 68
The historical practice we recount above also supports the conclusion that Congress has
broad authority to establish and change the Court’s size: Congress exercised that power on
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numerous occasions in the nation’s first century (in 1789, 1801, 1802, 1807, 1837, 1863, 1866,
and 1869), expanding or contracting the Supreme Court’s size for both institutional and
political reasons. On several occasions, Congress adjusted the Court’s size in large part to
influence the future course of its decisions: The Federalists in 1801, the Democratic
Republicans in 1802, the Republicans in the 1860s, and the Roosevelt administration in 1937
had this objective. President Roosevelt explained a few years after the failure of his 1937 plan
that he turned to Court expansion to influence the Court in part because of its “undoubted
constitutionality.” 69 Two decades later, in the early 1950s, members of Congress continued to
assume that the only way to permanently fix the size of the Supreme Court at nine members
was through a constitutional amendment.
During the Commission’s public hearings, one witness argued that, although Congress
has broad power to modify the size of the Supreme Court for many purposes, it cannot do so
for “partisan” reasons. 70 This argument faces a few challenges. 71 First, it is doubtful that
“partisan” reasons can be disentangled from “good-government” reasons. For example, the
changes to the Supreme Court in 1807 and 1837 by the Democratic Republicans and
Jacksonian Democrats, respectively, had both institutional and political motives; 72 lawmakers
not only sought to give the Court more personnel to serve a growing nation but also enabled
their party leaders—Presidents Jefferson and Jackson—to shape the Supreme Court. 73 Second,
and relatedly, the argument has little historical support; as discussed in Part I, every change to
the Supreme Court’s size has tended, at least in part, to serve the interests of one political
party.

Arguments in Support of and Opposition to Court Expansion
In order to fulfill our charge to provide a complete account of the contemporary Court
reform debate, this Part sets out arguments made by proponents and opponents of expansion.
The Commission as a whole takes no position on the validity or strength of these claims.
Mirroring the broader public debate, there is profound disagreement among Commissioners
on this issue. Accordingly, we present arguments for and against expansion independently of
each other.

The Case for Expanding the Court
The current calls to expand the size of the Court stem most immediately from the Senate’s
refusal to act on President Obama’s nomination of Judge Garland to the Supreme Court, as
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well as its confirmation of the three Justices nominated by President Trump—and the effect
those norm violations may have on both the health of the democratic process and the scope of
bedrock constitutional rights. Proponents motivated by these developments contend that the
Senate’s actions violated norms governing the confirmation process and that expansion of the
Court would serve to counteract these violations and bring the Court’s jurisprudence into better
alignment with prevailing values and views of the American public. Other proponents of
expansion regard it as critical to prevent the continued undermining of our democratic system
of government, which they regard as exacerbated by the Court’s jurisprudence. They view
recent changes in the composition of the Court as accelerating these jurisprudential
developments that began even before these most recent confirmations. On their view,
expanding the size of the Court represents a constitutional and immediately achievable
response to this threat to democracy that should not go unaddressed, even in the short term.
Still others who believe expansion of the Court may be warranted cite the reform as a possible
means of enhancing the diversity of the Court’s membership and assisting it to hear more cases
each year.

Responding to Norm Violations
In recent times, arguments to expand the Supreme Court have been relatively rare, but not
nonexistent. 74 In 2017, an academic’s call for congressional Republicans to expand the lower
federal courts spurred an historian of President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan to worry that
President Trump would adopt such a proposal. 75 Supreme Court reform also became a pivotal
topic in the 2020 Democratic primary, as several Democratic candidates endorsed significant
reforms. 76 The Democratic Party Platform for the election of 2020 ultimately called for
“structural court reforms to increase transparency and accountability,” 77 and candidates Trump
and Biden debated the merits of Court expansion. 78 Events surrounding the last three
nominations to the Supreme Court have helped spark the now-prominent calls for expansion
of the Court.
Some proponents of Supreme Court expansion charge that Republican lawmakers since
2016 have disregarded institutional norms in order to secure a conservative supermajority on
the Court. 79 They see expansion of the Court as particularly justified in light of Senate
Republicans’ handling of the election-year nominations of Judge Garland and Justice Barrett.
When Justice Scalia died unexpectedly on February 13, 2016, 269 days—more than 38
weeks—before the 2016 presidential election, the Senate held neither a hearing nor a vote on
President Obama’s nomination of Judge Garland. 80 Yet when Justice Ginsburg died only 46
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days before the election of 2020, Republicans quickly confirmed President Trump’s
nomination of Justice Barrett to fill the seat. 81
Calls for expansion in response to these developments did not begin immediately. Even
after Republican Senators refused to act on the Garland nomination and eventually confirmed
Justice Gorsuch instead, Democratic critics who accused Republicans of “stealing” a Supreme
Court seat largely refrained from calling for Democrats to respond with a Court-expansion
plan. Indeed, references to “Court packing” consisted primarily of arguments that Republicans
themselves had in fact “packed the courts” by refusing to act on the Garland nomination and
by moving swiftly to confirm President Trump’s nominations to the lower federal courts. 82
Calls for and by Democrats to expand the size of the Court first appeared in substantial
numbers upon the announcement of his retirement by Justice Kennedy, who had long been
seen as the median Justice on a closely divided Court, and during the subsequent controversial
nomination process of Justice Kavanaugh. 83 These calls increased in late 2020 when Senate
Republicans confirmed Justice Barrett, with Democrats arguing that Republicans had
contradicted their own prior arguments that Justices should not be confirmed in close
proximity to a presidential election. 84 According to news accounts, “[a]s soon as it became
clear that the Republican-controlled Senate would almost certainly confirm Judge Amy Coney
Barrett, creating a 6-3 conservative majority on the court,” a number of Democrats “argued
that if Democrats won in November, they should seriously consider increasing the number of
justices.” 85 Public discussion of Court expansion surged noticeably between 2019 and 2020.
In 2020, more than 400 articles appeared in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal,
Washington Post, and USA Today invoking the term “Court packing” in the context of the
Supreme Court, in contrast to approximately 100 articles in 2019. 86
Proponents of expansion who point to this series of events argue that the addition of new
seats to the Supreme Court, at the next opportunity, by a Democratic President and Congress,
could help restore the balance on the Court that was disrupted by significant norm violations
in the confirmation process, thus protecting the legitimacy of the Court. 87 Some of those who
argue for expansion in light of recent events emphasize that they are not motivated by partisan
politics but rather by a commitment to the protection of longstanding norms and important
constitutional rights. They worry that the current conservative supermajority established by
the recent norm violations threatens to take the law, and particularly federal constitutional law,
in a still more troubling direction than where it was already moving—perhaps by reversing or
continuing to revise longstanding precedents in the areas of reproductive rights, racial justice,
workers’ rights, the regulation of guns, religion, administrative law, voting rights, and
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campaign finance law. 88 But for the improper confirmation tactics of Republican lawmakers,
the argument goes, the Court’s doctrinal trajectory might have been considerably different. 89
Others emphasize that a failure to respond to what they regard as confirmation “hardball”
by Republicans since 2016—as well as a failure to advance expansion as a viable option in the
political process—might encourage future aggressive measures in the confirmation process,
such as a refusal to hold hearings on any judicial nominee put forward by a President of the
opposite party. 90 The judicial selection process has already become, in the view of many, a
partisan spectacle. 91 Further escalation of the battles surrounding the Supreme Court could put
additional pressure on the long-term legitimacy of the institution. On this account, a significant
reform such as Court expansion may be needed to calm the controversy surrounding the Court,
by attaching consequences to the Senate’s actions during the Trump years in order to deter
future conduct of this kind. 92

Preventing the Erosion of Democracy
Some proponents of expansion believe it to be essential to address the urgent
circumstances brought on by developments in the Court’s jurisprudence that predate recent
confirmation controversies but that have been accelerated by those appointments. They believe
that these developments threaten to seriously and perhaps irreversibly damage the democratic
process. These critics maintain that the Supreme Court has been complicit in and partially
responsible for the “degradation of American democracy” writ large. 93 On this view, the Court
has whittled away the Voting Rights Act and other cornerstones of democracy, and affirmed
state laws and practices that restrict voting and disenfranchise certain constituencies, such as
people of color, the poor, and the young. 94 This has contributed to circumstances that threaten
to give outsized power over the future of the presidency and therefore the Court to one political
party and to entrench that power. 95 As one witness before the Commission put it, the current
Court “could easily invalidate federal legislation containing . . . democracy-entrenching
measures . . . Those same Justices could easily invalidate measures designed to reduce the
influence of money in politics, increase the transparency of political spending, restore the
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act, and ameliorate economic inequality.” 96
Those holding this view regard expansion as required to ensure a Court more likely to uphold
future voting rights and democracy-enhancing legislation constitutionally enacted by
Congress and to prevent state legislatures from undermining or destroying the democratic
process. 97 In arguing the case for expansion, proponents contend this moment is unlike any of
the others in which this reform has been debated: Antidemocratic developments risk
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entrenching the judicial philosophy of the current Court majority for generations, while
advantaging one political party.
Those who advance arguments for expansion along these lines emphasize that
maintaining the status quo would amount to a failure to pursue available reforms with the
potential to restore the Court’s role as ensuring the representativeness of government and the
operation of democracy. On this view, any risks associated with expanding the Court at this
time would not compare in severity to the failure to take action.
For some proponents of expansion, even the calls for such reform could help prevent
further democratic backsliding. As some of the testimony before the Commission suggested,
an attempted expansion—or even just the prospect of expansion—could lead the Supreme
Court to be restrained in its jurisprudence and more respectful of the role of the political
branches, at least in the short term. 98 Soon after President Roosevelt unveiled his Court-reform
plan in 1937, the Supreme Court began to uphold New Deal programs. Although scholars
continue to debate the reason for this “switch,” a few years after the failure of his plan,
Roosevelt described it as “among the most important domestic achievements of [his] first two
terms in office,” because it led to changes in the Court’s jurisprudence. 99

Strengthening the Court
Some participants in the debate over Court reform also regard expansion as worth
considering because of its potential to strengthen the Court as an institution. 100 An expanded
Court might better incorporate diverse personal and professional perspectives. That diversity
could come from the inclusion of Justices with experience in different sectors of the legal
community or even the public sphere more generally. It also might include individuals of
diverse religious, socioeconomic, racial, geographical, or other demographic backgrounds.
Expanded diversity could enrich the Court’s decisionmaking, and a Court that was drawn from
a broader cross-section of society would be well received by the public. 101 A larger Supreme
Court might also be able to decide more cases and to spend more time on emergency
applications—an element of the Court’s work that has attracted considerable attention as is
discussed in Chapter 5 of this Report. 102 The Supreme Court’s rulings in merits cases have
decreased considerably in recent decades. In the 1980s, the Court decided around 150 cases
per year. 103 In recent years, that number has fallen to seventy or eighty cases. 104 To the extent
the public or lawmakers would like the Court to resolve more cases, expanding the size of the
Court might prompt the Justices to do so, 105 though other means to this end also could include
expanding the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction.
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Most proponents of Court expansion have focused on the possibility of an immediate
increase in the number of Justices sitting on the Supreme Court. But as noted in public
testimony before the Commission, proposals for Court expansion need not involve
congressional action to expand the Court all at once. 106 Congress could enact a law providing
for the expansion of the Supreme Court over time. For example, the Court could be increased
by one Justice during each four-year presidential term until the Court reached some maximum
size (say, thirteen members). Alternatively, the Court could be expanded by two Justices
immediately, followed by two more Justices after an intervening presidential election.
Proponents of expansion note that, though the longstanding convention has been for the Court
to have nine members, it is possible for a high court to be productive and functional with
significantly more than nine Justices. They note that other jurisdictions have larger courts that
function efficiently and collegially, and that countries other than the United States have tended
to settle on more than nine seats and have not necessarily maintained an odd number of seats
on their high bench. 107
The table below puts the U.S. Supreme Court in context with other constitutional courts.
7 Judges

Australia

9 Judges

Canada, United States

10 Judges

Chile

11 Judges

France, South Africa

12 Judges

Belgium, Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom

14 Judges

Austria, South Korea

15 Judges

Italy, Japan

16 Judges

Germany, Sweden

18 Judges

Denmark

The Case Against Packing the Supreme Court
Opponents of efforts to expand—or “pack”—the Court at this time hold a range of views.
Some critics of the calls for expansion regard the recent nominations to the Court as
appropriate reflections of electoral outcomes and as fully consistent with constitutional
processes and historical Senate practice. 108 They view the Court’s changing doctrine as
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reflecting a principled approach to constitutional interpretation. Meanwhile, other critics of
expansion, including some who take issue with the current Court and its jurisprudence and
conclude that other reforms of the Court would be beneficial, 109 believe efforts to expand the
Court or otherwise alter its structure at this moment would threaten the independence of the
Court. Critics of Court expansion worry that such efforts would pose considerable risk to our
constitutional system, including by spurring parties able to take control of the White House
and Congress at the same time to routinely add Justices to bring the Court more into line with
their ideological stances or partisan political aims. Court packing, in the critics’ view, would
compromise the Court’s long-term capacity to perform its essential role of policing the
excesses of the other branches and protecting individual rights. Opponents also conclude that
packing the Court would not serve democratic values because such reforms would not address
the Court’s power to resolve questions better left to the political process. Still other opponents
argue that the reform would be contrary to rule of law principles and that what they see as an
enduring bipartisan norm against Court packing should be reaffirmed and protected.

Protecting Judicial Independence
Opponents of Court packing contend that it would significantly undermine the Supreme
Court’s independence. Courts cannot serve as effective checks on government officials if their
personnel can be altered by those same government officials. In a system that permitted Court
packing, any time the Supreme Court issued a decision that was at odds with the preferences
of those in power—whether the matter related to the U.S. census, 110 immigration policy, 111 or
the validity of a presidential election 112—the party in power could respond by stacking the
Court with loyalists. One witness before the Commission further explained: “Court-packing
risks undermining the willingness of the Justices to maintain their independence” from “the
very political forces they are supposed to police in the name of the Constitution.” 113
Given these concerns, opponents underscore, it is crucial that for much of the past century,
there has been a strong—and bipartisan—constitutional norm or convention treating Court
packing as “something that just isn’t done.” 114 As one scholar wrote a few years ago, one could
say confidently that “court packing is essentially considered a wholly illegitimate means of
seeking to alter existing Supreme Court doctrine. No serious person, in either major political
party, suggests court packing as a means of overturning disliked Supreme Court decisions,
whether the decision in question is Roe v. Wade or Citizens United.” 115 Scholars could say,
until very recently, that even as compared to other Court reform efforts, “‘Court packing’ is
especially out of bounds. This is part of the convention of judicial independence.” 116
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For opponents of Court packing, the historical condemnation of the 1937 Court packing
plan illustrates what they regard as a fundamental principle of American constitutional
government. For example, in 2004, Democratic lawmakers celebrated how “President
Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to control the outcome of the Supreme Court by packing it with
loyalists was rejected by Congress in the 1930s, thereby preserving the independence of the
federal judiciary.” 117 Republican lawmakers have also repeatedly denounced Roosevelt’s
Court-packing plan. 118 On this view, the 1937 reform has long been regarded as one of the
most disgraceful assaults on the Supreme Court in American history. 119 Opponents of Court
packing also emphasize that those who resisted Court packing in 1937—particularly those
who stood up to the President and leader of their own party—are seen as having shown
tremendous political courage.
Opponents of Court packing argue that the strong bipartisan rejection of it has helped to
preserve the Supreme Court’s constitutional role for much of the past century. There has been
considerable pressure on this norm in recent years—as evidenced by the fact that the issue has
come before this Commission. But one witness during the Commission’s public hearings
noted opposition to expansion on the ground that there continues to be “[a] strong norm . . .
that the political branches do not threaten or change the Court’s membership because of
unhappiness with its decisions.” 120
For opponents, the United States’ fidelity to this norm has particular significance in light
of developments in other parts of the world where manipulation of the composition of the
judiciary has been a worrying sign of democratic backsliding. 121 After his election in 1989,
for example, Argentinian president Carlos Menem worked to draw greater power into the
executive branch, and in 1990 he successfully added four new members to a formerly fivemember supreme court. 122 In 2004, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela reined in judicial independence
by expanding the size of the constitutional court from twenty to thirty-two. 123 In 2010, Turkish
leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populist party consolidated control over the Turkish
constitutional court by expanding its membership from ten to seventeen and altering the
process by which judges were selected. 124 In 2010, the populist Fidesz Party won a narrow
majority in the Hungarian Parliament and quickly went about consolidating power, including
through the addition of several new seats to the constitutional court. 125 In 2018, a package of
judicial reforms in Poland forced sitting judges off the bench and dramatically expanded the
size of the supreme court. 126 By contrast, these critics argue, stable democracies since the midtwentieth century have retained a strong commitment to judicial independence and have not
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tended to make such moves. 127 For these opponents of expansion, it is important that the
United States remain firmly in the ranks of democracies standing behind this commitment.

Safeguarding the Court’s Legitimacy
Opponents also cite a concern related to the threat to judicial independence, underscored
by witnesses before the Commission: that Court packing would almost certainly undermine or
destroy the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. 128 Some witnesses testified that the reform would be
perceived by many as a partisan maneuver, 129 or a dangerous power grab by one political
party—a move that would render the decisions of the resulting (larger) Supreme Court of
questionable legitimacy to much of the public. 130 Critics argue that the public is less likely to
treat the decisions of a packed Court as authoritative, diminishing the Court’s capacity to
protect individual rights, equality, or constrain abuses of executive power.
Opponents of Court packing in this moment warn that it would also almost certainly
generate a continuous cycle of future expansions. Expanding the Court would be on the agenda
of every administration under unified government. 131 One (purportedly modest) estimate of
the consequences of expansions as parties gain Senate majorities and add Justices concludes
that the Supreme Court could expand to twenty-three or twenty-nine Justices in the next fifty
years, and thirty-nine or possibly sixty-three Justices over the next century. 132 Critics worry
that these repeated fights over the Court could lead the public to see the Court as a “political
football”—a pawn in a continuing partisan game. 133
Relatedly, critics of Court packing argue that it would further degrade the confirmation
process—a process that has already become a partisan spectacle. 134 There would be significant
battles over any Justice added by a Court-expansion measure. And past examples of Court
packing would easily become an excuse for blocking the confirmation of any nominee.
Critics of Court packing emphasize that it is hard to predict which forces will find
themselves at odds with the Court in the future. At some points in our history, the Court has
faced resistance from progressive groups—as illustrated by President Roosevelt’s effort to
pack the Court in 1937. By contrast, in the mid-to-late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, the Court was repeatedly attacked by conservatives who objected to the Court’s
jurisprudence on abortion, school prayer, desegregation, protections for criminal defendants,
and other civil rights issues. 135 This uncertainty leads even some who fundamentally disagree
with aspects of the current Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to believe it is better to preserve
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the Court’s long-term legitimacy and independence than to open up the Court to be packed by
potentially dangerous and even authoritarian political movements going forward.

Defending Democracy
Opponents of Court packing emphasize that polls show that large majorities of the public
oppose expanding the Supreme Court. 136 For that reason alone, they argue, it is difficult to
justify Court packing on grounds that it might serve democratic interests. Moreover, to the
extent that one goal of Supreme Court reform is to enhance the power of democratic bodies,
Court packing would not serve that end. Expansion would leave the Supreme Court’s existing
jurisdiction in place, as well as its existing approach to judicial review. An expanded Court
could just as easily hold unconstitutional federal and state government conduct as the current
Court. In addition, as noted above, given that Court packing could lead to cycles of Court
expansion, critics of the measure believe it to be questionable that it would “balance” the Court
to more closely align it with popular opinion over time. 137
Other critics of Court expansion contend that, to the extent it aims to align the outcomes
of Court decisions with the policy preferences and values of the country, the reform is
misguided and misconceives the role of the Court. 138 They emphasize that no single American
public exists and that popular views and opinions are divided across a range of issues the Court
addresses. Moreover, opponents contend, some of the Court’s most prominent decisions on
subjects ranging from school prayer to criminal justice were quite unpopular, 139 and that
decisions that meet with considerable political backlash sometimes become “canonical,” as
with Brown v. Board of Education. 140 These critics emphasize that, as Brown underscores, the
Supreme Court may play its best role in our democracy when it polices the political process
by working to ensure that the process is more open and responsive to all members of society—
whether by helping to dismantle racial segregation; invalidating laws that discriminate upon
the basis of gender or sexual orientation; 141 or requiring that each person’s vote be given equal
weight. 142 Opponents conclude that Court packing would so deeply compromise the Court’s
legitimacy and independence as to impede its capacity to serve this vital role. 143 In the long
run, they argue, putting judges under the thumb of sitting politicians is unlikely to serve the
broader interests of a democratic constitutional order. 144
***
As we noted at the outset of this Part, there is profound disagreement among
Commissioners over whether adding Justices to the Supreme Court at this moment in time
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would be wise. As a Commission we have endeavored to articulate the contours of that debate
as best as we understand them, without purporting to judge the weight of any of the arguments
offered in favor or against calls to increase the size of the Court.

Other Structural Reforms
At points in history, and in today’s debate over Supreme Court reform, lawmakers and
commentators have proposed different schemes for altering the composition of the Court
beyond its basic expansion. In this Chapter, we focus on three categories of such reforms:
proposals that would rotate the Court’s membership; proposals that would introduce panels
into the Court’s decisionmaking; and proposals designed to ensure partisan or ideological
balance on the Court.
The first set of reforms would structure the Supreme Court as a shifting or rotating set of
nine (or more) Justices from among a larger set of Article III judges. The details of rotation
schemes vary, but generally speaking, they would provide that judges rotate between service
on the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. Some subset of these judges would
constitute “the Supreme Court” in a given case or controversy, or for designated periods of
time. 145
The second type of reform would have the Justices sit on panels to hear cases. A panel
system could take a variety of forms: For instance, one subset of Justices might be entrusted
to decide questions falling within the Court’s “original Jurisdiction” and another subset of
Justices might be empowered to hear appeals (that is, cases reviewing decisions of the lower
courts). 146 Or, one subset of Justices might be entrusted to resolve statutory questions and
another subset could be entrusted to decide constitutional issues. 147 Or, the Justices might sit
in randomly assigned panels on any given case, much like the judges of the courts of appeals
today. Such a panel system could be instituted with the Court as currently constituted with
nine Justices, or it could be employed as a way to manage the decisionmaking of an expanded
Court. In either case, the system could be designed to enable all of the Justices to sit en banc,
or all together, to review the decisions of a single panel when necessary.
The final set of reforms would distribute partisan or ideological influence over the Court’s
composition in an attempt to achieve evenhandedness. One such proposal would authorize
each President to appoint two Justices to the Court during a four-year term. Another proposal
would design the appointments process to ensure that a roughly even number of Justices would
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be affiliated with each of the two major political parties. One version of this idea would expand
the Court to fifteen seats, with five Justices “affiliated with the Democratic Party” and “five
with the Republican Party.” 148 These initial ten Justices would then choose five additional
judges from the courts of appeals to serve for a short-term period. 149
In assessing these reforms, we begin by assessing the constitutional questions they raise.
This analysis entails consideration of past efforts in U.S. history to implement similar reforms.
We then proceed to consider the potential benefits of these different calls to alter the Court’s
structure. We ultimately find that these reforms may present more serious constitutional
questions than basic Court expansion, but that they are not all clearly foreclosed by the
Constitution. They may, however, offer uncertain practical benefits.

Legality
Rotation and Panel Systems and the Requirement of “one supreme Court”
The first two reforms—rotation and panel systems—raise similar legal questions. Both
proposals, if enacted through statute, face a potential constitutional obstacle in the
Constitution’s command in Article III, Section 1, that “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.” 150 The rotation proposals, because they would alter
the duties currently performed by the Justices of the Supreme Court, also could give rise to
distinct constitutional concerns, both under the “good Behaviour” Clause of Article III,
Section 1, and the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2. 151 Because some of the
proposals for term limits raise similar concerns, we address these particular constitutional
issues in Chapter 3. We focus here on the meaning of “one supreme Court.”
As a textual and structural matter, the “one supreme Court” provision requires an apex
juridical body that operates in some meaningful sense as a single court and not merely as a
scattering of individual jurists occasionally called upon to resolve questions of federal law.
The Constitution thus would almost certainly not permit treating all Article III judges sitting
at any given time as “the” Supreme Court of the United States and either polling that entire
mass or randomly sampling individual judges’ votes in order to emerge with a single result,
without mutual consultation or collaboration (and with no true opinion of the whole Court) in
each case.
The Commission is not prepared, however, to conclude that rotation and panel systems
are clearly unconstitutional simply on the ground that each would entail having less than the
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full set of sitting Justices making initial decisions in individual cases for the Court as a
whole. 152 One could reasonably read the text of Article III to suggest that the Supreme Court
must be a unitary apex court whose members sit together in every case the Court takes up on
the merits. But the text is also arguably consistent with having a large apex body that is
nonetheless organized into panels, at least as long as a mechanism exists to enable en banc
hearings, or some other form of review that would ensure that the Court produces a single,
authoritative answer to whatever questions of fact or law the “Judges of the supreme Court”
are charged with resolving. Such a structure could plausibly be considered “one supreme
Court.” The operation of the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals supports this
understanding. They are understood to constitute thirteen unitary courts even though each of
them typically sits in panels of three, treating each panel’s decision as binding on all future
panels of the same circuit unless and until the full circuit court, sitting en banc, reverses that
opinion. 153 In contrast, a system under which groups of Justices were drawn, on a bi-weekly
or other constantly rotating basis, from among all federal judges would raise more serious
constitutional concerns, because it would be difficult to identify any single complement of
Justices, sitting en banc or otherwise, to provide review as “one supreme Court.”
The history of the “one supreme Court” language at the Founding and its interpretation
over subsequent centuries supports the view that the Court must operate in some meaningful
sense as a single court. But nothing in the history the Commission has reviewed surrounding
the drafting or adoption of this “one supreme Court” provision reveals the thinking that
underlay the creation of one Supreme Court or resolves the question whether the Court could
sit in smaller panels or rotating groups, subject to a potential en banc review process.
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison initially proposed “that a
National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior
tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour;
and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services. . . .” 154 But a
few days later, the Convention opted for a “national judiciary . . . to consist of One supreme
tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals.” 155 Subsequent versions of the constitutional
text then consistently referred to “one supreme Court.” 156 Historians debate the significance
of this textual change. 157 There is evidence that at least some Framers anticipated that the
Supreme Court could divide into panels to complete its work more efficiently, while others
anticipated that the Court would only hear cases as a single unit. For example, later in the
Convention, when the participants debated how Congress could address workload concerns in
the judiciary, Madison argued that Congress could simply add more judges. 158 Gouverneur
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Morris responded that such an approach might work for the inferior federal courts but not for
the Supreme Court, because “[a]ll the business of a certain description whether more or less
must be done in that single tribunal.” 159
In the nineteenth century, Congress on a few occasions considered a rotation or a panel
system for the Supreme Court. Each time, some lawmakers supported the scheme in question
and others cast doubt on its constitutionality. In 1869, for example, when Congress increased
the size of the Supreme Court from seven to nine members, it also considered expanding the
size of the lower federal judiciary. 160 But one lawmaker suggested an alternative: Congress
could add sufficient personnel to the federal judiciary by greatly expanding the Supreme Court
(whose members were still at the time expected to serve in part as lower circuit court judges).
Under the proposed system, the Court would consist of eighteen members; nine members
would serve on the Supreme Court at any given time, while the other nine would serve as
circuit court judges (“riding circuit”). 161 That is, the judges would rotate between the Supreme
Court and the circuit courts.
Several lawmakers objected that this rotation system would be inconsistent with the
constitutional requirement for “one supreme Court.” 162 “The Constitution establishes the
Supreme Court. . . . [Y]ou have no right to say that half of those judges shall take no part in
the adjudications of that court.” 163 Opponents also worried that this system might lead to
instability in the law: “[A] court that was varying every year could never have stable decisions
upon which the people of the country could rely. . . .” 164 Supporters of the measure countered
that Congress had the power to say how many Justices could speak for the Court as a whole;
after all, Congress had long established a quorum for the Supreme Court. 165 Moreover,
supporters argued, past precedents had not proven unstable simply because they were decided
by less than the full Court (but still a quorum). 166 Opponents countered that establishing a
quorum—permitting fewer than the full number to issue a decision—was very different from
prohibiting some number of Justices from serving on the Supreme Court at any given time, if
they so chose. 167 Ultimately, the proposal for an eighteen-member Court died in Congress. 168
A few decades later, Congress considered a proposal for a panel system. The issue arose
as lawmakers sought to address a caseload crisis at the Supreme Court. The Court’s appellate
jurisdiction was still largely defined by the Judiciary Act of 1789, which required it to review
every case properly before it on appeal. 169 By 1890, the Court’s mandatory appellate docket
had swelled to over 1,800 cases, only four or five hundred of which it could dispose of in a
given year. 170 To address this caseload crisis, Congress considered a number of options.
Senator William Evarts proposed a plan to create a scheme of federal appellate courts and to
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give the Supreme Court the discretion to review certain classes of cases via writs of certiorari.
A version of this proposal was ultimately enacted as the Judiciary Act of 1891. 171
During the debates over this 1891 measure, several members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee proposed that the Court hear cases in panels. Under the proposal, the Court would
hear most appeals in three-Justice panels, but the full Court would resolve federal
constitutional questions and (at its discretion) other cases of “unusual difficulty or
importance.” 172 Observing that such panel systems existed in some states and other countries,
the Senators asserted that the Supreme Court could likewise “dispose speedily of all causes
that may be upon its calendar . . . by acting in separate divisions of three or more [J]ustices,”
all hearing cases “at the same time.” 173
The Senators argued that Congress could enact the proposal as part of its power to make
exceptions and regulations to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 174 Much like their
predecessors in 1869, they pointed out that Congress had long exercised the power to declare
how many Justices constituted a quorum and, thus, how many Justices were required to speak
for the Court as a whole. Congress could, by extension, direct the Court to decide cases in
panels. 175 Nor, according to the proponents, was such an arrangement at odds with the
constitutional requirement for “one supreme Court.” The Justices would “proceed at the same
time to hear arguments and pronounce decisions, not as three separate Supreme Courts, but as
one Supreme Court, exercising its appellate jurisdiction in a twofold or threefold manner at
the same time.” 176 The Senators added that, if a panel was presented with “a question of
extraordinary difficulty or high consideration, . . . provision should be, and can be, made for
the matter being heard before all.” 177
Other lawmakers were skeptical of the reform. Some insisted that a panel system would
violate the constitutional requirement for one Supreme Court. “The power of Congress [to
regulate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction] can not be held to extend to legislation which would
break up the Supreme Court into fragments and substitute several courts with power to hear
and finally determine causes for the one Supreme Court provided by the Constitution.” 178
Some lawmakers also worried that a decision rendered by less than the full Court would lack
legitimacy with the public. 179 Ultimately, the proposal was rejected by the Senate. 180
Congress does not appear to have debated the validity or legality of rotation or panel
systems after these various efforts at reform. But on several occasions, when Congress has
considered reforms to deal with the Supreme Court’s capacity constraints, individual Justices
have noted—and expressed concerns about—the possibility of splitting the Court into subsets.
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For example, in the 1920s, Chief Justice Taft insisted that Congress “could not adopt” the
panel approach that existed in some states, “because our Constitution provides that there shall
be one Supreme Court, and it is doubtful whether you could constitutionally divide the court
into two parts.” 181 Likewise, in responding to President Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing plan,
Chief Justice Hughes expressed doubts about the wisdom and the constitutionality of a panel
system. He argued that the proposed expansion would “impair [the Court’s] efficiency so long
as the Court acts as a unit” but noted that a decision by less than the full Supreme Court may
not be seen as legitimate or consistent with Article III. 182 In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress
debated reforms that eventually led to the Judiciary Act of 1988, which granted the Supreme
Court the discretion to decide whether to review virtually every appeal. 183 During the debates,
Chief Justice Burger asserted that a panel system was not a viable alternative: “Such a change
would appear to alter the basic concept of ‘one supreme Court’ under Article III.” 184
It is arguably of some significance that individual lawmakers and Justices in the past have
questioned the legality of structural reforms such as rotation and panel systems; these views
underscore that the claims should be taken seriously. But lawmakers have reached different
conclusions, and the statements of the Justices made outside of the context of judicial opinions,
and in favor of preserving the existing structure, are not authoritative in establishing the
meaning of Article III. Ultimately, we cannot conclude that the Constitution precludes rotation
and panel reforms, at least as long as processes exist to ensure that a juridical body operates
in some meaningful sense as a single “Court.”

Proposals to Distribute Partisan or Ideological Influence
Reforms designed to secure partisan or ideological balance on the Court present at least
two potential constitutional difficulties. First, such reforms may be in some tension with core
First Amendment freedoms of political speech, association, and thought, as they may be seen
as locking the major parties as they exist today into control over Court appointments. Second,
proposals that would have the Justices select part of the Court’s membership would seem to
be on a collision course with the Constitution’s clear specification in Article II, Section 2, of
how “Judges of the supreme Court” are to be selected—namely, by presidential nomination
and Senate confirmation. 185 Article II does not permit “Judges of the supreme Court” to be
selected by other members of that Court.

The Value of Rotation, Panel, and Balance Systems
The rotation and panel proposals might enhance the Court’s operations by injecting
vitality and diversity of various kinds into the Court or better enabling the Court to hear greater
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numbers of cases. These reforms also would reduce the power of any single individual on the
Court, though by themselves they would not meaningfully reduce the power of the Court as a
whole within the U.S. system of constitutional government. The proposals aimed more directly
at distributing the partisan or ideological affiliations and identities of the Justices could help
reduce the stakes of the nomination and confirmation processes and in turn make the Court
less of a source of political acrimony, particularly proposals that would give each President a
specific number of appointments each term. These types of reforms also squarely acknowledge
the political implications of the Court’s decisionmaking, but they do not directly address the
scope of the Court’s power. Ultimately, however, though these proposals may have real
benefits, those benefits may not be sufficiently significant or assured to justify the dramatic
reconceptualization of the Article III judiciary they would require.

Policy Analysis of Rotation and Panel Proposals
a. Rotation Proposals. Proposals that would call for the rotation of Justices on and off the
Supreme Court involve changing the membership of the Court on some sort of semi-regular
basis; judges would alternate between actively hearing the cases of the Supreme Court and
serving on the courts of appeals. Justices would be drawn according to a sorting process from
a considerably larger collection of Article III judges—a set that could include all Article III
judges or a prescribed subset of those judges. That larger set of Justices would be formally
designated Supreme Court Justices serving during good behavior from the time of their
appointment, but only a smaller subset of these judges would function as the Supreme Court
of the United States in any given “case” or “controversy.” 186
By expanding the number of Justices who would sit on the Court, rotation proposals
reduce the power of any single individual over the outcomes of the Court’s cases. Rotation
would thus address the need for litigants to gear their strategies toward the predilections of a
single Justice perceived as the swing vote and would reduce the power of a single swing voter
on the Court (though not necessarily a moderate swing “bloc”) from shaping the trajectory of
the Court’s doctrine. 187 In addition, by incorporating a greater number of judges, these
proposals could help regularly rejuvenate the Court by consistently introducing greater
diversity of perspective, interpretive approach, and professional and geographic background,
among other things, into its decisionmaking. Taken together, these features of rotation systems
might enhance the quality of the Court’s decisionmaking or the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes
of the public by extending decisionmaking power over matters of great consequence beyond
the same nine individuals, though the Court would still be composed of Article III judges with
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life tenure. And rotation might lower the stakes of any single confirmation and thus help to
ameliorate the partisan warfare that characterizes the nomination and appointment process. 188
Each of these potential benefits, however, may well be offset by significant costs. A
rotation system could introduce inefficiencies into the Court’s work or otherwise undermine
the supervisory and unifying functions it performs within the U.S. legal system. 189 The utility
of these proposals would depend in part on the size of the pool from which the Justices would
be drawn; a pool that is too small or chosen by partisan actors would produce little advantage
over the status quo. But the larger that pool, the more unwieldy and unstable the Supreme
Court’s decisionmaking processes would become. A regularly fluctuating Court might also
undermine the collegiality and familiarity that enables the Justices to manage contentious
cases, including the resolution of hard cases through compromise. A lack of consistency in the
Court’s personnel could compromise its ability to provide guidance to lower courts and state
courts as the result of more rapid doctrinal change on the Court. Most importantly, a rotation
system that does not otherwise address the power of the Court could well heighten the stakes
of confirmation processes for appellate judges.
Proponents of rotation contend, however, that Justices under this model would prioritize
restraint and narrow decisionmaking for fear that a subsequent collection of Justices might
overrule extreme or outlying precedent, 190 which in turn would lower the stakes of Supreme
Court judgments and therefore judicial confirmations. But it is not clear that having a larger
Court whose personnel churns will lead the Court to accept fewer cases of great import or
otherwise exercise the power of judicial review more modestly.
b. Panel Proposals. The need for the Justices to sit on panels could well arise as a
consequence of other reform proposals that would lead to significant expansion of the Court’s
numbers. If an initial attempt at Court expansion were to prompt future expansions as the result
of partisan competition in the political branches, or if the transition to a system of term limits
were to temporarily expand the size of the Court, there could be too many Justices to efficiently
hear cases in all instances. Size would thus necessitate panels, with a potential en banc
procedure for resolving significant disputes or conflicts between panels in order to provide
adequate guidance to the lower courts, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this Report.
The question then becomes whether there would be virtues in the first instance in
establishing a panel system. It is possible that this model would introduce some inefficiencies
into the Court’s decisionmaking. But constitutional and high courts in other jurisdictions
function effectively on this model, whether by assigning particular types of cases to different
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panels or to different courts (constitutional vs. statutory cases, or criminal vs. civil cases, for
example). 191 The Commission heard persuasive testimony suggesting that some apex courts
in other nations manage to function with panels or layers, suggesting that complaints about
the inherent infeasibility or inoperability of such systems are overdrawn. 192
A Court structured in this way would have to be sensitive to the need for the clear
development of doctrine so as to provide adequate supervision of the lower courts. The often
fractured decisionmaking of the U.S. Supreme Court underscores that even the current
composition can produce inefficiencies, however; such challenges might simply be an
unavoidable aspect of any system in which a set of individuals who hold different theories of
interpretation and of the Constitution’s meaning is tasked with deciding complex and novel
cases. A panel system that accompanied an increase in the number of Justices on the Court
would certainly expand perspectives and representation on the Court, as discussed in Part
III.A, though the extent of these benefits would be limited by the need to keep the overall size
of the Court reasonable and manageable. Structuring panels along substantive lines might also
produce specialization benefits, which might be especially useful when the Court deals with
technical matters whose resolution would benefit from particularized expertise. And yet, the
current Court’s non-specialized character is itself a virtue; at least in theory, it facilitates fresh
and open judgment about cases. More importantly, substantive areas of the law intersect and
are deeply interrelated; it would be difficult, for example, to bifurcate constitutional and
statutory analysis, since constitutional presumptions frequently inform how courts evaluate
statutes.

Proposals to Distribute Partisan or Ideological Influence
As the Commission heard from numerous witnesses, and as we discuss throughout this
Report, calls for reform have been motivated in significant part by the perceived mismatch
between the ideological composition of the Court and the views of the public as reflected in
election outcomes at particular points in time. 193 The fact that the Court’s membership is often
determined by the contingencies of the Justices’ retirement or death exacerbates this concern
and raises the stakes of the nomination and confirmation processes. It is not surprising, then,
that some reform proposals would attempt to ameliorate this problem by distributing
appointments more predictably and by trying to ensure rough alignment between the Court
and electoral majorities.
One such proposal, closely related to the term limits proposal and discussed in Chapter 3,
would give each President two nominations per term. 194 This proposal could reduce the
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partisan rancor of the confirmation process and lower the stakes of appointments by ensuring
that a party controlling the White House need not wait for happenstance to be able to influence
the Court. This proposal also would address the anomaly of some Presidents appointing as
many as three Justices in one term and others having no opportunities to make appointments
in the same amount of time. As noted in Chapter 3, this particular benefit would depend on a
functional confirmation process to ensure that each President could in fact make two
nominations. And ultimately this sort of proposal is most productively considered alongside
term limits; unlike a system of term limits, which could eventually stabilize at a particular
number of Justices, this proposal could lead to an irregularly expanding and contracting Court.
The other type of proposal that would introduce partisan or ideological balance onto the
Court as a matter of design would require an even or roughly even number of Justices with
affiliations from the two major political parties, on the model of independent commissions,
with additional judges to be chosen from the circuit or district courts by the party-affiliated
Justices. 195 This approach—sometimes called the balanced bench—might ensure some form
of ideological even-handedness, and therefore moderation, which could help to keep the
outcomes of Court decisions in line with public opinion. This form of balance could help
induce compromise among the Justices, especially under those proposals that would set the
size of the Court at an even number. 196 These virtues might in turn temper the confirmation
wars by ensuring that both parties have roughly equal influence over the Court.
But it is far from clear that ideological balance is in and of itself a desirable goal. If there
is no such balance in the political branches, requiring such balance on the Court could make
the Court insufficiently reflective of or connected to electoral outcomes. In other words, if the
goal were to ensure that the Court roughly reflects the public will and exhibits a degree of
responsiveness to the political composition of the people at a given time, artificial balance
between the two political parties would not achieve that objective. A balanced bench could be
preferable to the status quo for those observers of the Court who perceive a significant
mismatch between its composition today and the body politic. 197 But institutionalizing such a
requirement would block farther-reaching change.
What is more, an explicit requirement that Justices be affiliated with particular parties
would constrain the pool of potential nominees and reinforce the notion that Justices are
partisan actors. Even if we accept the fact that the Justices’ judgments have political
implications and ideological motivations, this close identification of Justices with political
party could undermine the perception of judicial independence, which is important to the
acceptance of and compliance with the Court’s decisions. It also seems likely that a “balanced
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bench” would continue to produce a significant number of divided results in contested cases,
even on an evenly divided Court, keeping the Court at the center of charged political debates,
for better or worse. Unless the types of cases the Court hears were to change markedly, its
decisions would continue to have major political significance. Even the sort of more
moderated outcomes that could result from these balancing proposals would still keep the
Court central to political life.
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consider proposals to provide for fluctuating Court membership, or a ‘decoupling’ of appointments from
vacancies, by guaranteeing one, or two, presidential appointments each term, while letting the overall numbers on
the Court fluctuate. . . . Such a mechanism could be capped (e.g. at 11) to keep the Court to a workable
number.”); see also Daniel Hemel, Can Structural Changes Fix the Supreme Court?, 35 J. ECON. PERSPS. 119,
136-38 (2021) (making a similar proposal, albeit without fixing an upper boundary on the number of Justices).
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107

See Resnik Testimony, supra note 100, at 23; Greene Testimony, supra note 100, at 9.

108

See Thomas E. Griffith, The Degradation of Civic Charity, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 119, 122, 136 (2021).

109

For example, during the Commission’s public hearings, some witnesses who opposed Court packing asserted
that term limits could be a beneficial reform. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 106, at 2; Presidential
Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 17-20 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Neil S.
Siegel, Duke Law School) [hereinafter Siegel testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/Siegel-Testimony.pdf.

110

See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575-76 (2019) (holding that the federal executive branch
failed to adequately explain its decision to add a citizenship question to the U.S. Census, and concluding that the
matter must be sent back to the agency for further explanation).

111

See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020) (holding that the
rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program was arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act because DHS did not “provide a reasoned explanation for its action”).

112

See, e.g., Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230, 1230 (2020) (rejecting, on standing grounds, an original action
brought by a state to prevent several other states—Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—from
certifying presidential electors); see also Siegel Testimony, supra note 109, at 6 (“[B]y most accounts, the
federal courts—including the Justices—performed well during the controversies surrounding the 2020
presidential elections, regardless of the political affiliations of the judges.”).

113

Siegel Testimony, supra note 109, at 5-6. This position has considerable historical support. See TOM S. CLARK,
THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 15-16, 193 (2011) (arguing, based on a statistical analysis of judicial
reactions to legislative proposals to curb the Supreme Court from 1877-2008, that “when Court-curbing bills are
introduced in Congress, the justices will exercise self-restraint by attenuating their use of judicial review to
invalidate federal legislation”); see also WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 62 (1962) (arguing
that, historically, the Justices have been “acutely aware of the attacks against their decisions, and . . . willing to
make concessions when they felt that danger had become too threatening”).

114

Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE
RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 79-81 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einer Himma
eds., 2009) (“[W]hat Roosevelt had proposed to do was something that just isn’t done. It violated the customary
norm obligatory on Congress even though not formally part of the Constitution.”); see Bradley & Siegel, supra
note 54, at 269-87; Grove, supra note 54, at 505-17, 538-44; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of
Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 424 (2012) (noting that “the rejection of Roosevelt’s
court-packing plan in 1937 . . . is said by many to have created an unwritten constitutional norm against courtpacking”); Tom Donnelly, Note, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education and the Stories We Tell Our
Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 994 (2008) (“No contemporary textbook presents an account that even subtly
suggests the potential legitimacy of an argument in favor of ‘packing’ the Court under similar circumstances.”);
infra notes 108-144 and accompanying text.
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Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 70, at 1063-64.

116

David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 34 (2014).
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H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 110 (2004) (Minority Report) (invoking Roosevelt’s plan to criticize bills that would
have restricted federal jurisdiction over challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act and to the use of “under God”
in the Pledge of Allegiance, and arguing that, just as Roosevelt’s plan failed, “so too must this modern day effort
to show the courts ‘who is boss’ fail as well”).

118

See Grove, supra note 54, at 512-17 (recounting how, beginning in the 1950s, both Republican and Democratic
lawmakers treated “Court packing” as a political epithet and repeatedly denounced Roosevelt’s plan).

119

Id. at 532-33.

120

Jackson Testimony, supra note 106, at 20-21.

121

David Kosar & Katarina Sipulova, How to Fight Court-Packing?, 6 CONST. STUD. 133 (2020).

122

Jodi Finkel, Judicial Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How Electoral Incentives Shape Institutional Change, 39
LAT. AM. RSCH. REV. 56, 63-64 (2004).

123

Steven Levitsky & James Loxton, Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in Latin America, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POPULISM (Carlos de la Torre ed., 2018).

124

Ozan O. Varol, Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Nuno Garoupa, An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Transformation in
Turkey, 65 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 187, 197-99 (2017).

125

David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 209 (2013); Kim Lane Scheppele,
Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 551-52 (2018).

126

Michał Ziółkowski, Two Faces of the Polish Supreme Court After “Reforms” of the Judiciary System in Poland:
The Question of Judicial Independence and Appointments, 5 EUR. PAPERS 347, 350 (2020).

127

Skeptics of expansion also argue that the American example in the world matters and that politicians at home
and abroad who might wish to control their courts might find themselves emboldened to take such actions if the
United States engages in Court packing, regardless of the reasons for the U.S. reform. See Presidential
Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 8:15:20-8:17:15 (July 20, 2021) (oral testimony of Marin
K. Levy, Duke University School of Law), https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/public-meetings (stating that
“[c]ertainly if we were to see expansion of the Supreme Court, that could be seen as some sort of green light” at
the state level, although also noting that any such impact would be uncertain); Presidential Commission on the
Supreme Court of the United States 10-11 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Rosalind Dixon, University of
New South Wales, Sydney) [hereinafter Dixon Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/Dixon-Letter-SC-commission-June-25-final.pdf (noting that “[c]omparative scholars . .
. highlight the potential for renewed use of court-packing in the US to be seen as legitimating new and expanded
attempts at court-packing in a range of democracies under threat” while suggesting that the risk of such
borrowing with respect to “court-packing” may be less severe because authoritarians are already able to rely on
Roosevelt’s 1937 plan).

128

Feldman Testimony, supra note 98, at 8 (“Under almost all ordinary circumstances, court-packing would
seriously undermine the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.”); Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of
the United States 1 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Michael W. McConnell, Stanford Law School)
[hereinafter McConnell Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/McConnellSCOTUS-Commission-Testimony.pdf (“Any attempt to increase the size of the Court . . . would be a severe
blow to the reputation of the Court as a legal institution . . . .”); Siegel Testimony, supra note 109, at 2 (“Courtpacking would significantly undermine the Court’s independence and, in almost all circumstances, risk its legal
and public legitimacy.”); Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 90 (July 20, 2021)
(written testimony of Supreme Court Practitioners’ Committee, co-chaired by Kenneth Geller and Maureen
Mahoney) [hereinafter Supreme Court Practitioners’ Committee Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/Geller-Mahoney-Testimony.pdf (“[T]he independence of the Court and its standing
with the public would be gravely compromised if Congresses were to add seats for the purpose of affecting the
Court’s jurisprudence . . . .”).

129

See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 2:58:15-2:58:44 (June 30, 2021) (oral
testimony of Maya Sen, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/public-meetings/june-30-2021 (“How would the public perceive court
expansion? . . . [I]t’s going to be filtered through partisan concerns at the public opinion level.”).
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130

McConnell Testimony, supra note 128, at 1 (“Any attempt to increase the size of the Court would be widely, and
correctly, regarded as a partisan interference with the independence of the Court. This would be a severe blow to
the reputation of the Court as a legal institution . . . .”); Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the
United States 16 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Stephen E. Sachs, Harvard Law School),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Sachs-Testimony.pdf (“[R]eforms that are not
perceived by both sides as enhancing the courts’ legitimacy will never succeed in doing so.”).

131

See Feldman Testimony, supra note 98, at 9 (“Court-packing would likely become a tit-for-tat practice” and
would “drastically reduc[e] the court’s institutional legitimacy.”).
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See Adam Chilton, Daniel Epps, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, The Endgame of Court-Packing 2-3 (May 3, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3835502 (“We find that the
median result of repeated partisan court-packing would be to increase the size of the Court to 23 justices within
50 years and to 39 justices within 100 years. . . . [I]f court-packing happens every time the president’s party has
appointed a minority of justices on the Supreme Court and there is unified government—the worst-case tit-fortat scenario cited by opponents of court-packing—we find that the median size of the Court across the
simulations is 29 justices after 50 years and 63 justices after 100 years.”).

133

Jackson Testimony, supra note 106, at 20-21 (“[E]xpanding the Court simply to give one specific President the
power to fill seats . . . risks turning the Court into even more of a perceived political football.”); see also
Supreme Court Practitioners’ Committee Testimony, supra note 128, at 90 (“If Democrats were to [add seats for
the purpose of affecting the Court’s jurisprudence] now, Republicans would surely adopt the same tactic when
they next have the opportunity. This would exacerbate the public perception that the Court is a mere political
body.”).
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See Peck Testimony, supra note 91, at 5 (noting, and proposing reforms to address, “the level of partisanship and
tribalism associated with Senate processes on Supreme Court nominations”); Wittes Testimony, supra note 91,
at 1 (emphasizing “the decay of the confirmation process”); see also Presidential Commission on the Supreme
Court of the United States 8:31:32-8:34:27 (July 20, 2021) (oral testimony of Randy E. Barnett, Georgetown
University Law Center), https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/public-meetings/ (suggesting that the Senate’s
repeated refusal to confirm a nominee could violate the spirit of the Constitution, given that “all discretionary
power can be abused”).

135

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 237-79 (2009); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal
Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 900-16 (2011).

136

See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 7-8 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony
of Maya Sen, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/Sen-Written-Testimony.pdf (noting that “simply expanding the size of the Supreme
Court is unpopular among the public” and citing polls showing that only 26% or 32% of Americans favor
increasing the number of Justices).

137

Critics who reject democracy-based arguments for Court expansion also note that Supreme Court Justices are
selected by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the constitutional methods of selecting
the President and the Senate do not guarantee that those bodies will reflect the popular will. The President is
selected through the Electoral College, and on five occasions, a President has been elected without winning the
popular vote. And the Senate is designed to provide equal representation to the states, not to reflect a broad
national mandate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2-4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. Electoral College
Fast Facts, HIST., ART, & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Electoral-College/Electoral-College/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (“Five
times a candidate has won the popular vote and lost the election. Andrew Jackson in 1824 (to John Quincy
Adams); Samuel Tilden in 1876 (to Rutherford B. Hayes); Grover Cleveland in 1888 (to Benjamin Harrison); Al
Gore in 2000 (to George W. Bush); Hillary Clinton in 2016 (to Donald J. Trump).”).

138

Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“This independence of the
judges is equally requisite to guard the [C]onstitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men . . . sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which,
though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
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meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in
the community.”).
139

See Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY
62, 68-70, 77 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) [hereinafter PUBLIC OPINION]
(showing that, in the 1970s, over seventy percent of the public disapproved of the Court’s school prayer
decisions); Amy E. Lerman, The Rights of the Accused, in PUBLIC OPINION, supra, at 42-43 (“In many ways,”
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions “were out of step with public opinion and may even have
shifted public opinion against the Court’s pro-rights position.”).

140

See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”);
J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1018 (1998)
(describing Brown as “[t]he classic example” of a canonical case); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 379, 381 (2011) (“[T]he constitutional canon” is “the set of decisions whose correctness participants in
constitutional argument must always assume. Brown . . . is the classic example.”). For discussions of the
resistance to school desegregation, see JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 242-314 (2019); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 290-442 (2004).

141

See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675-76 (2015) (holding that “under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of” the right to
marry); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774-75 (2013) (holding invalid the Defense of Marriage Act,
which allowed states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages that were lawful under another state’s law);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556-58 (1996) (holding that a state university could not lawfully
exclude women).

142

See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (establishing the one-person, one-vote rule for legislative
apportionment).

143

Siegel Testimony, supra note 109, at 20 (“Repeated Court-packing, or repeated threats of it, would make it
increasingly difficult for the Supreme Court to perform functions that no other governmental institution is likely
to perform better.”).

144

See Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 55, 60 (1994) (asserting that elections,
when elections exist at all, in political systems where courts are treated as “nuisances” and “impediments” to be
overcome, “are [] very emotional and high-stakes events: candidates compete for a chance to rule virtually free
of all constraints save those imposed by naked, noninstitutionalized power relations”); see also Whittington,
supra note 70, at 2134 (asserting that Roosevelt’s 1937 “Court-packing plan might have indicated that the
President no longer took constitutional constraints seriously, that the Constitution was suffering a crisis of
fidelity.”).

145

Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 181 (2019); see also John
O. McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 541, 541 (1999) (making a similar proposal with
six- to twelve-month stints on the Court); Greene Testimony, supra note 100, at 17 (“[T]he suggestion is for a
16-member Court whose members serve 16-year terms and are drawn from what are now designated as the
courts of appeals. . . . [T]he first step in the proposal would be to expand the formal size of the Supreme Court to
equal the size of the Article III appellate bench—currently 179 authorized positions. . . . The second step would
be to enact, via statute, an appointment procedure that would designate which judges of the formally expanded
Supreme Court exercise the powers of the functional Supreme Court. The remaining judges of the formal
Supreme Court would exercise roughly the same powers, including appeals of right from federal district courts,
that the courts of appeals enjoy today.”).

146

E.g., Jack Balkin, Don’t Pack the Court. Regularize Appointments, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/10/dont-pack-court-regularize-appointments.html.

147

E.g., Bruce Ackerman, Trust in the Justices of the Supreme Court is Waning. Here are Three Ways to Fortify the
Court, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018, 3:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ackerman-supremecourt-reconstruction-20181220-story.html.

148

See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 145, at 193.
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Id.

150

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).

151

Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that: “The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” The Appointments Clause of
Article II, Section 2 provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law . . . .” Id. § 2. The concern under the “good Behaviour” Clause is that a statute that would
have judges sit on the Supreme Court for only brief periods, interspersed with service on the lower federal
courts, would significantly change the nature of the office. The concern under the Appointments Clause is that
the Clause creates an office of Supreme Court Justice separate and apart from the office of lower federal court
judge. These constitutional issues are complex, and scholars disagree over their appropriate resolution. If these
rotation reforms were to be pursued via a constitutional amendment, these concerns would not arise.

152

See Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of Proposals to
Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 110 (2011) (“The Court
sitting en banc would be the ‘real’ indivisible Supreme Court, while the panels could be understood as lower
federal courts.”); see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, “The Threes”: Re-Imagining Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1825, 1847 n.85 (2008) (providing several justifications for the
constitutionality of panel proposals).

153

Some circuits are more numerous than others, and the size of the court might affect how often it might sit en
banc to resolve disagreements on the Court: The number currently ranges from six judges on the First Circuit to
twenty-nine on the Ninth.

154

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21-22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter RECORDS]; see Ross E. Davies, A Certain Mongrel Court: Congress’s Past Power and Present
Potential to Reinforce the Supreme Court, 90 MINN. L. REV. 678, 684 (2006) (noting that this proposal was
“[t]he ninth ‘Resolve’ in the ‘Virginia Plan’ presented at the opening of the Philadelphia convention in late May
1787”).

155

1 RECORDS, supra note 154, at 95 (emphasis added).

156

The only change was the capitalization. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 154, at 186 (showing that the draft from the
Committee of Detail on August 6 provided that “[t]he Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the
Legislature of the United States.” (emphasis added)); Id. at 600 (showing that the draft from the Committee of
Style in mid-September provided that “[t]he judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, shall be
vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. . . .” (emphasis added)); Id. at 660 (showing the final text adopted on September 17, 1787, which
provided for “one supreme Court”).

157

See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior
Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1452-53 (2000) (“In providing for one supreme court and ruling out the
possibility of multiple supreme courts, the Framers appear to have contemplated that the Supreme Court was to
play a distinctive role as the hierarchical leader of the judicial department.”). But see David E. Engdahl, What’s
in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 465 (1991) (disputing this
understanding of the “wording change”).

158

See 2 RECORDS, supra note 154, at 44-45; Id. at 45 (statement of James Madison) (“The increase of business will
be provided for by an increase of the number who are to do it.”).

159

Id. (statement of Gouverneur Morris); see Davies, supra note 154, at 685-86 (“In other words, [Morris was
asserting that,] because the work of the Supreme Court could not be divided up among the members of the
Court, adding Justices would only add to the number of people involved in each decision and every other piece
of Court business.”).
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160

See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 8, at 73-76 (discussing the efforts of Senator Lyman Trumbull, R-IL, to
establish a nine circuit-judge panel that would “ride circuit,” thus easing the circuit-riding burdens placed on
Supreme Court Justices).

161

CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 208-09 (1869) (statement of Sen. George Williams, R-OR); see
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 8, at 74-75.

162

See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 213-14 (1869) (statement of Sen. William Stewart, R-NV) (“The
Constitution says there shall be one Supreme Court. You make a man a justice of that court and can you say that
he shall not sit there after you have made him a justice of the Supreme Court? That raises a grave doubt.”); see
also Id. at 210 (statement of Sen. Allen Thurman, D-OH) (“[W]hile I am inclined to think that the very best
model of a court in the world is the French court of cassation, consisting of twenty-four judges divided into three
sections, yet with my understanding of the Constitution of the United States it is not competent for us to provide
such a system.”).

163

Id. at 214-15 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull, R-IL) (predicting that “such a law would be held
unconstitutional by that court, and then you would have eighteen judges of your Supreme Court of the United
States”).

164

Id. at 215.

165

See id. at 212 (statement of Sen. George Williams, R-OR) (stating that “this bill, reported from the Judiciary
Committee, provides that six of the judges shall constitute a quorum. . . . [And t]here is nothing in the
Constitution that restricts the power of Congress [to set a quorum for the Supreme Court]”); Id. at 217 (statement
of Sen. George Edmunds, R-VT) (“[M]y friend says that the Constitution of the United States declares that there
shall be one Supreme Court. I agree to that; but it does not declare how it shall be composed . . . . It leaves . . .
that to general principles of legislation, where it ought to be left.”).

166

See id. at 216 (statement of Sen. George Edmunds, R-VT) (noting that, under current law, “only a majority of
th[e Court’s] quorum are necessary to make a decision. . . . Do you find that when the whole number get together
at the next meeting of the court they reverse that [decision]? Not by any means.”).

167

See id. at 213 (statement of Sen. William Stewart, R-NV) (“[W]e can fix the quorum. But that does not meet the
point. After you have fixed the quorum, the question arises, have not all the justices of the Supreme Court the
right to sit there all the time?”); Id. at 215 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull, R-IL) (agreeing with this point
and noting that “a law that should declare that the rest of the Senate besides the quorum had no right to vote and
participate in [its] decisions would be utterly void”).

168

See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 8, at 75-76 (noting Congress instead passed a proposal by Senator
Lyman Trumbull, R-IL, for additional circuit judges).

169

See Eugene Gressman, Requiem for the Supreme Court’s Obligatory Jurisdiction, 65 A.B.A. J. 1325, 1327
(1979).

170

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 8, at 60-61 (noting that, from 1850 to 1890, the Court’s docket grew from
253 to 1,816 cases); see H.R. REP. NO. 51-1295, at 3 (1890) (noting that, according to Justice Harlan, the Court
disposed of 451 out of 1,396 cases on its docket in 1886).

171

See Evarts Act, ch. 517, §§ 1, 2, 5-6, 26 Stat. 826, 826-28 (1891) (authorizing discretionary review over cases
from new appellate courts involving diversity, revenue laws, patent laws, federal criminal laws, and admiralty
law). For discussions of the history behind this law, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a
Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 948-50, 952-59 (2013); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649-57
(2000).

172

S. REP. NO. 51-1571, at 3-5 (1890) (describing the views of a minority of senators).

173

Id. at 3.

174

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases
before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”); S. REP. NO. 51-1571, at 3 (“It is true that
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the Constitution provides that there shall be ‘one Supreme Court;’ but it also provides that the appellate
jurisdiction of that court shall be exerted ‘both as to law and as to fact with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as Congress may make.’”).
175

See S. REP. NO. 51-1571, at 3 (“Congress has from the beginning, from time to time, declared what number out
of and less than the whole number of justices shall be such a quorum.”).

176

Id.

177

Id. at 4.

178

21 CONG. REC. 10,227 (1890) (statement of Sen. Joseph Dolph, R-OR).

179

See, e.g., Id. (stating that he “sympathize[d]” with the notion held by some senators that such a division “would
detract from [the Court’s] dignity and importance and from the weight, if not from the authority, of its
decisions”).

180

See 21 CONG. REC. 10,316 (1890) (showing that the proposal was rejected by a vote of 36-10).

181

Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearing on H.R. 10479 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 3 (1922) (statement of Chief Justice Taft). To address the Court’s
growing caseload, Congress instead expanded the scope of discretionary certiorari review. See Judiciary Act of
1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936.

182
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Chapter 3: Term Limits
Among the proposals for reforming the Supreme Court, non-renewable limited terms—
or “term limits”—for Supreme Court Justices have enjoyed considerable, bipartisan support.
Advocacy groups, nonprofits, and membership organizations have expressed their support for
term limits. In testimony before the Commission, a bipartisan group of experienced Supreme
Court practitioners concluded that an eighteen-year non-renewable term “warrants serious
consideration.” 1 Major think tanks and their leaders have also endorsed the concept, 2 as have
both liberal and conservative constitutional scholars. 3 When the National Constitution Center
organized separate groups of “conservative” scholars and “progressive” scholars to draft their
own proposals for improving the Constitution, both groups concluded that Supreme Court
Justices should be limited to eighteen-year terms. 4 Yet other scholars and commentators have
questioned the idea of altering the system of life tenure, 5 which has been in place since the
Constitution established the Supreme Court and the judicial power.
This Chapter considers the full range of debate over term limits and addresses numerous
design questions that policymakers would need to take into account if they were to develop
such a system, including the question of whether implementation would require constitutional
amendment or could be achieved by statute. Consistent with its charge, the Commission does
not take a position on whether or how term limits ought to be implemented but rather seeks to
define and inform the debate over these questions.
Part I presents a series of arguments for term limits, explaining how, in the view of
proponents, term limits would enable a regularized system of appointments to the Court that
would preserve the value of judicial independence, make it more likely all Justices would serve
for roughly equal numbers of years, and ensure that the Court’s membership would be broadly
responsive to the outcome of democratic elections over time. Part II then sets out a series of
objections to term limits and articulates the harms opponents of the proposal believe it might
have on judicial independence and legitimacy. In Part III, we consider the design questions
presented by a constitutional amendment that would institute a system of term limits. In Part
IV, we consider whether and how such a system would be achievable by statute. Throughout
Parts III and IV, we consider questions about the design of a system of limits, such as the
length of Supreme Court Justices’ terms, the number of appointments each President should
be able to make in four years’ time, and how transitioning to a term-limited system would be
accomplished. We conclude in Parts V and VI by addressing some additional concerns: first,
the potential impasse in the Senate’s confirmation process that would stymie a new system of
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term limits; second, the possibility that the adoption of term limits through statute would invite
further intervention in the judiciary by Congress.

The Justifications for Term Limits
U.S. Supreme Court Justices have always had life tenure. But as proponents of term limits
point out, life tenure is virtually unique to the U.S. federal judiciary. Defined terms for high
court justices are commonplace at the state level. Since the Founding, states have decidedly
moved away from life tenure for justices of their highest courts. Thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia have some form of mandatory retirement, 6 with the majority of states
setting the retirement age at 70. 7 Almost all states also establish terms for high court justices,
ranging from six to fifteen years. Though these terms are renewable through elections in many
states and reappointment in others, mandatory retirement applies in the majority of such
systems. Rhode Island is the only state that currently has neither term limits nor a mandatory
retirement age for its supreme court justices. 8
The United States is the only major constitutional democracy in the world that has neither
a retirement age nor a fixed term limit for its high court Justices. 9 Among the world’s
democracies, at least 27 have term limits for their constitutional courts. And those that do not
have term limits, such as the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, typically impose age
limits. 10 In light of this contrast, one scholar who testified before the Commission opined that,
“were we writing the United States Constitution anew, there is no way we would adopt the
particular institutional structure that we have for judicial tenure. No other country has true
lifetime tenure for its justices, and for good reason.” 11
In the view of proponents of term limits, the existing system lacks adequate justification
beyond the fact that it has always been in place. Currently, the number of appointments
available to a President can vary greatly because of random chance; when a vacancy arises
depends on when Justices leave the bench due to illness or death, or when they themselves
choose to retire. As elaborated in more detail below, some Presidents are able to make three
(or more) appointments in a term while others make none. These differences in opportunities,
term limits proponents argue, serve no obvious structural purpose.
Proponents of term limits argue that regularizing the appointments process would address
these arbitrary consequences of life tenure by making judicial appointments more predictable
and the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court more rationally related to the outcome of
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democratic elections over time. Proposals for staggered eighteen-year terms, for example,
discussed in detail in Parts III and IV, would ensure that all Presidents have the opportunity to
appoint two Justices to the Supreme Court in each term they serve. This predictability,
proponents argue, would strike a more appropriate balance than the current system between
two important features of our constitutional system of checks and balances: judicial
independence on the one hand and long-term responsiveness of the judiciary to our democratic
system of representation on the other.
By providing for tenure during “good Behaviour,” Article III of the Constitution provides
judges with independence from direct and inappropriate external pressures and political
influence when they interpret laws, review executive actions and administrative regulations,
and consider the constitutionality of state and federal legislation. 12 Article II of the
Constitution authorizes the elected branches to affect the composition of the judiciary through
appointments over time; the Constitution gives the President and Senate power over
appointments to the federal judiciary, and it gives Congress power over the structure and
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Proponents of term limits emphasize that the influence of
elections on the composition of the Court and its work is thus indirect, but that it is nevertheless
an important element of the constitutional system. From the perspective of those who urge
term limits, these various provisions of the Constitution aim to make the individual members
of the judiciary independent at any given point in time, but the composition of the judiciary as
a whole responsive over time to the people’s will, as expressed through its electoral decisions
about who occupies the presidency and the Senate.
Proponents of term limits contend that the reform would better strike this balance than the
current system in two respects. Long fixed terms, such as terms of eighteen years, coupled
with post-service guarantees of financial security, would insulate individual Justices from
political pressure and financial temptation and function as effectively as life tenure to
safeguard judicial independence. At the same time, such fixed terms enable democratic
majorities, as reflected in who is elected to the presidency and the Senate, to have the same or
a roughly equal opportunity to influence who sits on the Supreme Court through new
nominations—an objective that is poorly served by the current system of life tenure. Relatedly,
proponents stress, lifetime tenure does not comport with the ideal of limited government
authority. The nine individuals who sit on the Supreme Court wield extraordinary power over
critical social and political questions, often for several decades. Though judicial independence
requires them to be insulated from the same forms of accountability imposed on the political
branches, life tenure arguably arrogates too much power to single individuals.
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Proponents of term limits caution that one should not confuse the argument that the
Court’s composition should reflect electoral outcomes over time with a claim that Presidents
have a right to make the Supreme Court generate a particular set of results. In our constitutional
system, judges and Justices are not and should not be considered the mere representatives of
political parties or the creatures of a particular President, and the argument for term limits does
not rest on such assumptions. Moreover, Presidents may appoint Justices for many reasons
other than the hope or expectation that the Justice will support the President’s particular policy
agenda or constitutional philosophy. Presidents may wish to achieve geographic or
demographic diversity on the Court, attract new voters through the selection of a nominee, or
choose a Justice with a particular set of professional experiences. And history shows that
Presidents cannot necessarily predict the path a Justice will pursue; Justices often confront
new issues in contexts quite different from the circumstances in which they were appointed.
Thus, the argument for regularized appointments is not an argument for making Justices the
representatives of Presidents or a particular ideology. Rather, according to proponents, the
ability of Presidents to nominate Justices at regular intervals that would be afforded by term
limits, coupled with the Senate’s authority to advise and consent, would help ensure, at least
in the long run, that “[t]he political balance of the Court would reflect the opinions of the
people over time as expressed in their choice of presidents and senators, rather than the
happenstance of health or accident or the strategic timing of the justices.” 13
Proponents underscore that the value of term limits in advancing these constitutional
principles is heightened by various ways in which the consequences of life tenure have
changed over time. In particular, the average length of Justices’ terms has expanded. 14 Life
spans have lengthened and modern Justices may increasingly delay retirement. 15 Up until the
late 1960s, the average term of service was around fifteen years. By contrast, the average
tenure of the Justices who have left the Court since 1970 has been roughly twenty-six years. 16
In the future, it’s quite possible that tenure will continue to lengthen, as several recent Justices
have been younger than their predecessors and life spans generally continue to grow. The
increasing length of the Justices’ terms, in turn, raises the stakes of each nomination. Political
partisans may press for nominating younger candidates in the hope that they will serve longer
and thus allow for the entrenchment of particular views on the Court for three or more decades
into the future. 17
Proponents also note that the variation in the number of each President’s opportunities to
nominate a Justice has become more pronounced. Throughout history, the median, modal, and
mean number of chances for a Supreme Court appointment has been approximately two per
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four-year term. 18 Most Presidents have had either one or two opportunities, and a small number
have been very lucky and received four or more. But sometimes Presidents get none at all.
This situation has occurred more frequently since the mid-1970s. In the 188 years from the
presidency of George Washington to the presidency of Gerald Ford, there were only five
presidential terms out of forty-seven (just eleven percent) in which Presidents did not get an
opportunity to make a Supreme Court appointment. 19 But in the forty-four years from Jimmy
Carter to Donald Trump, Presidents did not make a single appointment in three out of eleven
terms (twenty-seven percent)—and four out of eleven terms if we include Senate Republicans’
refusal to consider the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland during President Barack Obama’s
second term.
Again, proponents of term limits do not seek partisan balance. According to proponents,
if a party wins the White House more often, its Presidents should have the opportunity to
nominate more Justices, though this opportunity may be checked, as with all judicial
appointments, by the Senate’s advice and consent. But, proponents emphasize, our current
system allows parties to shape the composition and influence the direction of the Court to a
degree that does not necessarily reflect their record of electoral success over time. 20 They
argue that the existing system—buffeted by chance illness or deaths, possible strategic
behavior, and aggressive political tactics—makes it easier than it should be for parties that
lose elections to nevertheless have outsized impact on who sits on the Court and on its general
direction.
Another justification offered for term limits is that they would largely eliminate the
possibility of “strategic retirements” and, just as importantly, the perception that Justices retire
for strategic reasons. Through strategic retirements, Justices attempt to control the future
direction of the Court by creating openings when there is a particular President or Senate
majority. Conversely, Justices may remain on the Court, even if they are no longer up to the
job, because they are waiting for a different President to select their replacement on the Court.
This kind of strategic calculation, or the perception of it, can fuel public beliefs that the Court
is a partisan institution. It can contribute to the perception that the system is unfair or rigged,
in part because strategic retirements prevent Presidents from receiving a roughly equal number
of appointments for each term in office. Moreover, the possibility that Justices might retire
strategically can lead to public relations campaigns to push a Justice to retire precisely so that
a particular President can appoint a successor. Though it may be impossible to know why any
particular Justice chooses to retire at a particular moment, term limits could put a stop to both
the possibility and perception of strategic retirements. Under one possible design of term limits
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that we discuss further below, Presidents (with Senate advice and consent) would only be able
to fill out the remaining years of the term for a retiring Justice, eliminating much of the
advantage of, and hence the motivation for, retiring strategically. Proponents do not claim that
term limits are a panacea for polarization, nor that they would stop political parties from
fighting over judicial appointments. But by regularizing Supreme Court appointments, term
limits would make the system of Supreme Court appointments fairer, less arbitrary, and more
predictable, and therefore enhance the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
Finally, in addition to these arguments based in constitutional structure and principle,
proponents of term limits also believe that they would enhance the Court’s decisionmaking,
on the ground that a regular rotation in personnel tends to improve the quality of
decisionmaking over time. 21 Judges, like others, are inevitably a product of their time. After
distinguished professional careers and eighteen-year terms on the Court, judges may tend to
grow more distant from the experiences and contexts to which their legal decisions apply.
Judges, like others, can also become set in their ways, making fresh perspectives on issues
more difficult to achieve. Rotation in office introduces new voices and new interpersonal
dynamics into the deliberations of multimember bodies, as well as more generational diversity,
which may bring valuable perspectives. 22 Ensuring that there are regular changes in
composition can be especially important for bodies where a small number of people hold
considerable power. Indeed, given how powerful the Court has become as an institution—
certainly more powerful than the Framers of our Constitution expected—relying on Justices
to voluntarily make way for other figures who can help revitalize the Court is asking a great
deal. These are some of the reasons that rules and norms governing the leadership of other
organizations often require a change of leadership after many years. 23 These are also some of
the reasons that other systems that appoint judges through non-political mechanisms, such as
through committees of judges and lawyers, nonetheless impose either term limits or mandatory
retirement ages on their judges. 24
The possibility of imposing a mandatory retirement age on Justices is sometimes offered
as an alternative to term limits, and the Commission heard testimony on this possibility. 25
Mandatory retirements would arguably improve the quality of decisionmaking for the reasons
stated above and provide some degree of responsiveness to elections over time, while
preserving judicial independence by allowing for long terms. As with term limits, a mandatory
retirement age would make it possible to know when a given Justice will retire (assuming that
the Justice does not die or leave the bench early). But, according to term limit proponents, a
mandatory retirement age is inferior to term limits in important respects. It would not
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guarantee regular appointments. It would still encourage parties to nominate ever younger
candidates in order to squeeze the maximum number of years out of each appointment. Thus,
if the goal is to regularize appointments and to ensure that political parties that win elections
get a predictable number of opportunities to appoint new Justices, term limits offer a better
option.

Objections to Term Limits
The Commission also heard and considered arguments against term limits. In the main,
the opponents argue that the current system of appointing and protecting the independence and
neutrality of federal judges and Justices, through life tenure, has worked well for over 230
years. The independent federal judiciary, protected by lifetime tenure, is one of the most signal
accomplishments of our constitutional system. Opponents of term limits for Supreme Court
Justices argue that proponents therefore have a heavy burden of persuasion when they seek to
remove what opponents regard as an important pillar of judicial independence. Opponents
point to the Constitution’s provision that judges serve for “good Behaviour,” which they
regard as providing for life tenure, as one of only two express protections of judicial
independence. 26 Opponents contend that far from meeting the burden of persuasion, term
limits are likely to worsen existing problems, such as the partisanship of the confirmation
process, while at the same time introducing new problems. In addition, opponents argue that
term limits would be extraordinarily difficult to implement.
Most fundamentally, term limit opponents deny that it would be good for each President
to receive two appointments to the Court. They are concerned that the proposal would further
politicize appointments and heighten the belief that Justices are allies of the President and the
President’s party—developments they think could do great damage to the Court. Because they
believe that term limits could be perceived as founded on the view that judges are partisan,
political actors, opponents of term limits believe that inestimable damage could be done to the
federal courts by adoption of this reform proposal.
Opponents also raise a number of more specific objections to term limit proposals and
their justifications.
First, opponents see term limits as setting up a dynamic in which the presidential election
focuses not just on Court appointments in general but on the two guaranteed vacancies and
appointments specifically. If two seats on the Supreme Court are guaranteed to open every
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four years, the Court might become even more of an issue in electoral politics than it currently
is. Presidential candidates might have even greater incentives to make promises about whom
they will appoint, and presidential elections might increasingly appear to the public to also be
elections of specific identified persons—now candidates—to the Supreme Court. In a highly
polarized environment, it might be especially harmful to reinforce connections between the
Court and presidential politics. Such an electoral process might change not just the public’s
perception of the Court, but also how the Justices view themselves and behave, making the
institution more partisan. Moreover, introducing term limits might reinforce the erroneous
message that appointments to the Supreme Court are the spoils of politics or the property of a
particular President or party. Relatedly, one critic of term limits worries that the Justices “will
be Republican appointees or Democratic appointees in a more explicit sense than they are
now,” and that some Justices “may . . . view their own roles in a manner a little more political
and a little less law-like.” 27
Second, opponents of term limits point out that if one of the failings of the current system
is a bitterly partisan confirmation process, then prescribing yet more regular confirmation
hearings, as term limits would, simply worsens an already bad situation. While there is
sometimes the suggestion that eighteen-year terms might engender less partisanship than
lifetime appointments, opponents of term limits think a reduction of such partisanship in the
United States is unlikely given the underlying dynamics of the current confirmation process
and the incentives of interest groups. 28
Third, some commentators and scholars have also expressed concern that term limits
(whether through constitutional amendment or by statute) would threaten the basic structural
principle of judicial independence. 29 They argue that life tenure is essential to that
independence, as evidenced in our longstanding historical practice. Opponents are not
comforted by citations to foreign courts, or to the state supreme courts where judicial terms
are renewable through different systems of election or reappointment. Opponents note that it
is perilous to draw conclusions from systems that are so fundamentally different. They also
argue that the federal system of life tenure is the gold standard for judicial independence.
Opponents of term limits further believe that even long, non-renewable terms could
undermine judicial independence by virtue of the fact that at least some Justices would have
to consider what they would do after their terms expire. Their plans for the future might affect
either their performance as Justices or public perceptions of that performance. One might
worry that a Justice who is eyeing future positions in government might try to curry favor with
political constituencies, or that a Justice who is eyeing future positions in industry or at a law
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firm might decide cases in light of those plans or might appear to do so. While it might be
thought that term limits reduce the pressure for Presidents to appoint younger people, such
that most Justices who serve eighteen-year terms may still view their positions on the Court
as their last major position, other Justices who have served some portion of the eighteen-year
term might decide that they would prefer to take a different unlimited position in government
or the private sector rather than filling out the rest of the term. In order to address this problem,
term limits proposals would have to be coupled with what opponents see as troubling
restrictions on post-Court employment. 30
Fourth, by design, term limits would produce more turnover on the Supreme Court than
has been typical in recent decades. Opponents argue that this turnover could have costs as well
as benefits. At the outset, one might object that term limits would deprive the Court of certain
benefits that can result from Justices serving for several decades. Some might believe life
tenure tends to improve the judgment of the Justices because wisdom and, perhaps, openmindedness come with age and experience. Moreover, several of the greatest Justices in
American history—Chief Justice Marshall comes quickly to mind—served on the Court for a
very long time. Opponents argue that a system of term limits would make such distinguished
careers less possible—or at least shorter—in the future and might reduce the stature of the
Court as a whole, including its stature with the public, the bar, and the lower courts. Moreover,
the concern for the advanced age of long-serving Justices ignores, in the view of critics, that
the most pronounced divisions on the Court are not by age, but by judicial philosophy.
Another concern about increased turnover is that it might destabilize the Court’s doctrine.
To the extent that new Justices have different views of the law than their predecessors, and to
the extent that they are willing to overrule or narrow precedents with which they disagree,
more turnover on the Supreme Court could lead to more frequent doctrinal shifts, or even
cycles in which major precedents are discarded only to be reinstated later, perhaps in very
short order. To opponents of term limits, the current system provides sufficient turnover and
there is little reason to adopt a new and untried system simply to generate more turnover. 31
Fifth, those who object to term limits fear that such limits would give the President too
much power, an especially worrying concern given how powerful the modern presidency has
become. If Presidents make new appointments to the Supreme Court every two years, twoterm Presidents will have appointed four of the nine active Justices by the final year of their
administrations. The power to appoint four-ninths of the Supreme Court is a substantial power;
term limits would lock in that power and make it less subject to the vagaries of chance. 32
Critics might therefore argue that the randomness of presidential opportunities to make
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Supreme Court appointments throughout history has actually been an advantage, because it
limits presidential power and ambitions, and thereby helps preserve the Court’s independence.
And over time, opponents argue, we might expect a “balancing out,” such that the randomness
of appointments over more limited periods is not a sufficient source of concern to justify the
institution of a system of term limits. Opponents also argue that a focus on the presidency and
presidential politics in structuring regularized appointments mistakenly minimizes the role of
the Senate. These concerns would be heightened were the term limit reduced to twelve years;
in the course of two terms, a single President would have appointed a majority of the Court.
Sixth, a different type of objection involves the incentives for gamesmanship in particular
cases. If it is known that a swing Justice will lose the power to participate in cases on a specific
date, either litigants or lower court judges might try to time a case accordingly. 33 Conversely,
Justices who want to weigh in on a question while they still have the power to do so might be
inclined to grant certiorari before the question has fully “percolate[d]” through the lower
courts, and they might also face temptations to accept cases that are not ideal “vehicle[s]” for
presenting and deciding the question. 34 Similarly, other Justices might vote to defer hearing a
case or an issue until their colleague had been forced to leave the Court.
A final objection returns to the premises of the proposal. Proponents ground their support
for term limits on the principles and values that underlie the original constitutional structure.
Opponents emphasize, however, that the Constitution expressly provides for judicial service
during “good Behaviour.” Opponents of term limits point to Hamilton’s observation in
Federalist 78 that “nothing can contribute so much to [the judiciary’s] firmness and
independence as permanency in office,” a quality he regarded as “an indispensable ingredient
in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public
security.” 35 In the view of those who oppose term limits, life tenure as guaranteed by the
Constitution helps protect both the decisional and institutional independence of the third
branch from being “overpowered, awed, or influenced” by the other branches. 36
***
Opponents of term limits caution that any such proposal should not appear as a settling of
scores, as an attack on particular Justices, or an effort to change the substantive opinions and
direction of the current Court. And term limits by themselves cannot ensure that the President
will nominate high-quality individuals. Those who object to term limits believe that the
Supreme Court has functioned with life tenure ever since the Founding, and switching to a
system of term limits poses major design challenges and could well further politicize the
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confirmation and selection process while also affecting the culture and standing of the Court.
A broader concern they hold is less about term limits than about any reform that weakens one
of the Constitution’s two express protections of judicial independence. In our current polarized
environment, opponents argue, any change to the structure of the Supreme Court might be
regarded with suspicion, and the risks of unintended consequences are significant. Opponents
further contend that, if pursued by statute rather than constitutional amendment, such reform
might open the door to further structural changes, such as an overreaching President’s attempt
in collaboration with Congress to remove life tenure from all Article III judges, with
considerable risk to the stability of the judiciary. In short, say opponents of term limits, the
current system of life tenure is not broken, and term limit proponents have not met their heavy
burden of persuasion.
Term limit proponents acknowledge that the risk of unintended consequences is an
important point to consider, but they argue that it is not a conclusive argument for inertia,
particularly because the status quo has significant problems. Indeed, they argue, inertia too
can have unintended consequences, as illustrated by the gradually lengthening tenure of
Justices over time and the increased perception that Justices retire strategically. Responding
to the costs and risks asserted by opponents, they note that the average tenure of the Justices
who left the Supreme Court from the Founding until 1970 was less than eighteen years. 37 So,
proponents argue, the Court has historically experienced greater turnover than a system of
eighteen-year terms would be likely to produce now. They argue that concerns over judicial
independence or increased executive power are not supported by actual experience in courts
that have term limits or mandatory retirement ages, nor are they supported more generally by
the empirical literature. 38 Moreover, these concerns can and should be addressed through the
careful design of the system, such as through long and non-renewable term limits, a guaranteed
lifetime of judicial office and compensation while performing other judicial duties, and the
coupling of term limits with some restrictions on the types of post-Court employment. Even
some critics of term limits, they note, think it fair to expect that “long fixed terms followed by
assignment to a court of appeals” would give individual Justices a degree of independence
comparable to the status quo. 39 And they respond to opponents’ concerns about politicization
of the appointments process by pointing out that the process is already highly politicized and
that an eighteen-year term is long enough to avoid any increase in the heat of confirmation
battles.
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Analyzing a Constitutional Amendment for Term Limits
This section identifies the major issues to consider in designing a system of term limits.
These issues include the size of the Court, the length of the Justices’ terms, how to fill
vacancies that arise before a set term ends, and how to transition from the current system.
Many of these issues arise under either a proposed constitutional amendment creating
term limits or a statutory term limit proposal. But the options for addressing them differ
depending on which path is being considered. In this Part, we discuss these issues in the
context of a constitutional amendment to adopt term limits. In Part IV, we do so in the context
of a statutory term limits proposal, and we also discuss whether these reforms would require
constitutional amendment or whether they could be enacted by Congress. While our aim is not
to recommend a specific proposal, we believe it is necessary to discuss plausible reform
options in order to ground our analysis.

Setting the Court’s Size and the Appropriate Term Length
A system of term limits ought to specify the appropriate size of the Court. One major
justification for a staggered, term-limited system of appointment is that such a system would
bring about less randomness and greater equality across presidential terms in the number of
Justices a President would have the opportunity to appoint. That aim would be drastically
undermined, however, were Congress free to vary the size of the Court. We separately evaluate
proposals to expand the size of the Court in Chapter 2 of this Report. For purposes of our
analysis here, we assume that an amendment would fix the Court’s size at nine Justices.
With a nine-member Court, the two likeliest options for term limits would be a twelveyear term or an eighteen-year term, as both would create a roughly equal number of
appointment opportunities in each presidential term. In recent decades, the overwhelming
majority of term limit proposals have endorsed the eighteen-year version. In that version, each
President would have two regular appointments in a single presidential term. In the twelveyear version, each President would have three such appointments.
Important tradeoffs are involved in this choice. As we noted at the outset of this Chapter,
from the perspective of the state courts and international peers, an eighteen-year term is quite
long. Of the forty-seven states that impose term limits for their highest court judges, only one
state has a term longer than twelve years. 40 Similarly, of the twenty-seven countries that
impose a term limit, those limits range between five and fifteen years. 41 The German
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constitutional court, considered one of the strongest constitutional courts in Europe, is
composed of judges who serve twelve-year non-renewable terms and who must retire at age
sixty-eight. 42
As this experience in the states and other countries suggests, there is a case to be made
for twelve-year, non-renewable terms if the structure of the Court is considered in isolation
from the larger political circumstances of the appointments process. With twelve-year terms,
each presidential term would involve three regularly scheduled appointments. In addition, a
President elected for two terms would have the power to appoint six regularly appointed
Justices. Even if a constitutional amendment for term limits would to some extent reduce the
intensity of political conflict over Court appointments, however, three appointments every
four years would put the Court at the center of the political process on an almost yearly basis.
There are also reasons to be concerned that enabling a single two-term President to make six
appointments gives one person too much power to reshape the Court. This tradeoff has led
most proponents of term limits in the United States to endorse an eighteen-year term. For
simplicity’s sake, and in the light of these considerations, we will use an eighteen-year term
limit to ground our analysis.
That said, circumstances could change, making potential turbulence less of a risk. If so,
the costs and benefits of a twelve-year term as opposed to an eighteen-year term might be
weighted differently than at present. For this reason, the designers of a constitutional
amendment might consider whether the amendment should give Congress the power to adopt
prospectively a twelve-year term (that is, to adopt a statute that would take effect for Justices
appointed after the date of enactment). Drafters should take care to hew to the core purpose of
such an amendment by ensuring that each President receives the same number of regularly
scheduled appointments.

Effective Date and Timing of Appointments
The designers of a constitutional amendment to implement a term limit system must make
several choices related to the timing of the reform.
First, drafters must decide when the amendment would take effect. The amendment could,
of course, take effect upon adoption. If there is concern that knowledge of who the sitting
President is at the time the amendment takes effect would make it more difficult for the
amendment to be adopted, the amendment could be structured to take effect starting at some
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later date. For instance, it could begin in the first presidential administration elected after the
amendment is approved.
Second, drafters must also determine the timing of appointments. The amendment could
specify when during a presidential term the President’s two appointments would arise. If the
drafters wished to avoid appointments arising during an election year, they could specify that
appointments would arise in years one and three of a presidential term. To avoid disrupting an
ongoing Supreme Court term, the amendment could specify that the outgoing Justice’s term
ends on a specific date that typically falls after the Court has issued all its opinions in argued
cases. The incoming Justice’s term can be made to run from that date, in which case Justices
might serve slightly fewer than eighteen years, given the time it would take for confirmation.
Third, drafters must also address how to fill seats that become vacant due to retirement,
death, or impeachment before the end of a Justice’s eighteen-year term. Once every Justice
has been appointed to an eighteen-year seat, this situation is not likely to occur often. Only
one Justice appointed in the last fifty years has served fewer than eighteen years. 43
We identify three options for how to fill seats that become vacant:
The first is to leave those seats unfilled for the remainder of any retiring Justice’s term,
thereby preventing any President from having more than two appointments in a presidential
term. That option would leave the Court to function without a full complement of Justices for
what might be extended periods; it would also mean the Court would likely have to function
for periods with an even number of Justices. The Court has functioned occasionally with an
even number of Justices, as it did for fourteen months after Justice Scalia’s death. Some argue
that an even-numbered Court encourages the Justices to deliberate more to find common
ground, in an effort to avoid leaving the Court unable to decide a case. In addition, the Court
would not be able to find state or national action unconstitutional absent greater consensus
than a five-to-four decision entails. But a significant cost of having an evenly divided Court is
that it could prevent the Court from ensuring that federal law is uniform throughout the
country. If the courts of appeals are divided on an issue, for example, there would be no higher
judicial authority to resolve that difference if the Court itself is evenly divided on the issue.
The same law could be held constitutional in one part of the country and unconstitutional in
another.
A second option is that the sitting President, with Senate confirmation, would have the
power to appoint a candidate to fill out only the remainder of the original eighteen-year term.
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Some witnesses testified that confirmation in this context should require a supermajority
Senate vote. 44 The justification for that higher hurdle is that seats that become vacant before
the end of an eighteen-year term reintroduce a random element into the timing of appointments
by allowing certain Presidents to make more than two appointments. On this view, those
appointments should succeed only if they are backed by a significant consensus in the Senate.
Although a supermajority requirement might lead some seats to remain vacant (as in the first
option), no President would be deprived of the right to make two regularly scheduled
appointments in a presidential term. If the amendment does permit the President to fill out the
term of a seat that becomes vacant prematurely, the drafters might consider prohibiting the
person appointed from being reappointed to a full eighteen-year term.
A third option depends on how the amendment treats Justices who have reached the end
of their eighteen-year terms. The amendment might define these individuals as “Senior
Justices,” who continue to hold offices as Article III judges but no longer participate in the
day-to-day operation of the Court. Given that these Justices have all been confirmed by the
Senate, the amendment could give the President the option to designate a Senior Justice, if one
is available, to fill out an eighteen-year term that has become vacant prematurely. If unilateral
presidential designation is undesirable, the amendment could instead require the Senate to
confirm the President’s choice (if no Senior Justices are available, one of the first two options
would have to apply).

Designing the Transition to Fixed-Term Appointments
How to structure the Court’s transition to fixed-term appointments presents significant
practical challenges. The most significant options that have been proposed are discussed
below. For purposes of this analysis, our discussion will assume an eighteen-year term with
regular presidential nominations in years one and three of a President’s term.

Sitting Justices Retire on a Fixed Schedule That the Amendment
Establishes
Under this approach, once the amendment takes effect, the longest-serving Justice would
retire in year one of the first presidential term in which the amendment takes effect. The next
most senior Justice would retire in year three, and so on. This strategy is the conceptually
cleanest structure for the transition. Were this approach adopted, sixteen years after the first
Justice is appointed to a term-limited seat, the full Court would consist entirely of Justices
serving eighteen-year terms. For instance, if the amendment took effect in 2025, the most
junior Justice on the current Court would retire in 2041, after twenty-one years of service. If
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this were done through a constitutional amendment, the Commission does not perceive there
to be any significant constitutional issues in applying the amendment to sitting Justices.

Sitting Justices Remain on the Court as New Term-Limited Justices Are
Appointed
The Commission is aware that while the simplest approach would be to apply a term limits
amendment to the sitting Justices, this strategy might generate political conflict that would
make passage of an amendment difficult.
If the amendment is designed not to apply to currently sitting Justices, the Court could
expand temporarily. New Justices would start being appointed every two years for eighteenyear terms after the amendment’s effective date. As legacy Justices leave, their seats would
not be filled as long as at least nine Justices would remain on the Court. It is likely that the
Court would never drop below nine Justices. One study concludes that, under this approach,
it would take around thirty-five years until the full Court consisted entirely of Justices serving
for fixed terms. 45
This approach does come with potential costs, however. It would likely produce a
considerably expanded Court for a period of years. In Chapter 2, we consider some of the
consequences of a larger bench, including that it could hamper the Court’s decisionmaking
(depending on how large the expansion is). That said, many of the highest courts in other
democracies have eleven or more members, and in many cases they function effectively by
sitting in panels, a prospect we also explore in Chapter 2. 46 On the other hand, no state supreme
court has more than nine judges and only seven are even that large; most have seven judges
and seventeen have five. 47 As one former federal judge testified to the Commission, above a
certain size, effective collective deliberation becomes more difficult. 48 In addition, in some
years, the Court might also have an even number of Justices, which would raise the issues
discussed above about the pros and cons of an even-numbered Court. 49 It is also uncertain how
the public would perceive the Court if its size fluctuated from year to year for many years.
Closely divided decisions on a Court that sometimes has nine members, sometimes eleven,
sometimes thirteen, might make the Court appear less stable and generate perceptions that
outcomes turn on the fortuity of how many Justices happen to be on the Court at any particular
moment.
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New Term-Limited Justices Are Appointed Only When Currently Sitting
Justices Vacate Their Seats
Another alternative proposed in academic work on this issue is that current Justices
continue to serve for life and new appointments are made only when the seat of a currently
sitting Justice becomes vacant. 50 The amendment would still establish a schedule of regular
eighteen-year appointments, into which retirements of currently sitting Justices would then
have to be integrated. For example, if a currently sitting Justice retires before the date for
vacating that seat occurs, the President nominates a Justice who would serve the next eighteenyear slot that is scheduled to become available. Suppose under the amendment the first three
eighteen-year terms would arise in 2025, 2027, and 2029. If a currently sitting Justice leaves
the bench in 2024, the President would nominate a Justice whose term would be nineteen years
(2024-2025 plus the eighteen-year term that begins in 2025). If the next sitting Justice leaves
in 2025, the President would nominate a Justice whose term would be twenty years (20252027 plus the eighteen-year term that begins in 2027). If another seat does not open up until
2031, the President would nominate a Justice who would serve for only sixteen years (filling
the term that was scheduled to begin in 2029 and end in 2047).
This proposal would avoid temporary expansion of the Court, but it would also generate
the longest time interval before the full Court was composed of Justices serving eighteen-year
terms. One study estimates that, under this proposal, it might take around fifty-two years
before the Court reached the point that all Justices were serving eighteen-year terms. 51 The
additional complexities just noted about timing of appointments might also be considered a
cost of this proposal.

Addressing Seats Held by Currently Sitting Justices That Become Vacated
Prematurely
If the amendment applies to currently sitting Justices, as in the first option above, a distinct
issue arises concerning the seats of those Justices that might become vacant prematurely. For
example, a currently sitting Justice whose term would be scheduled to end in 2033 might
vacate the seat in 2025. This may be a more likely scenario than that a new Justice appointed
to an eighteen-year term would vacate that seat prematurely. Simply for reasons of age, it
seems more likely that a Justice on the current Court would leave office eight years before a
scheduled end-of-term date than would a newly appointed eighteen-year term Justice.
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One option is the same as discussed earlier: the seat could remain vacant. But in this
context, that could leave the Court with fewer than nine Justices, and possibly an even number
of Justices, for an extended time—eight years, in the example above.
If the seat that becomes vacant is the next one the sitting President would be entitled to
fill in any event during the four-year term, the President could be given the power to nominate
the Justice to fill that seat. That Justice would then serve eighteen years plus the small amount
of additional time involved; if a currently sitting Justice’s term is scheduled to end in 2027,
but ends in 2026, the new Justice would serve one year plus the new eighteen-year term. Given
that a new Justice under this scenario would never serve more than twenty years, the normal
presidential nomination and Senate confirmation process might be appropriate (that is, without
a supermajority requirement).
If the President has not yet filled any of the two allocated seats, and the Justice who leaves
is the one whose term would expire in year three of the administration, there are two options
for addressing that scenario. In the first, the amendment would treat this situation as if the
President is filling the first of two seats. The Justice who would otherwise be scheduled to
retire first during that term would instead stay on until the term ends of the Justice scheduled
to retire in year three—the Justice who has left prematurely. At that point, that Justice retires
and the President fills the second seat. The second option is that the President appoints a Justice
to fill out the remainder of the term for the Justice who left early plus eighteen years. When
the term of the Justice scheduled to retire in year one of the administration ends, the President
fills that term as well. The first option reduces possibilities of strategic retirements, but might
be considered overly complex.
In any other context, the current President should at most have the authority to appoint a
replacement only for the rest of the term that the departing Justice was scheduled to serve.
Under the theory behind the term limits amendment, no President should get to make more
than two eighteen-year appointments in any single presidential term. With respect to the
replacement Justice, moreover, the options discussed earlier might be appropriate. First, a
supermajority vote requirement in the Senate might be appropriate. Second, if there are
“senior” Supreme Court Justices, one could be designated to serve out the remainder of the
scheduled term.
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Constraints on Justices Who Have Fully Retired After Finishing
Their Term of Service
Many countries that impose term limits or retirement ages on judges of their highest courts
also impose constraints on the post-service activities of those judges. There are two main
reasons for imposing such constraints. The most important is to avoid undermining the fact
and appearance of judicial independence by eliminating the likelihood of Justices’ altering
their behavior in their last years of their service on the Court to enhance certain post-service
employment opportunities. In addition, certain post-service positions might be detrimental to
the public’s sense of the integrity and professionalism of the Court. At the same time, it is
important that former Justices who choose to retire from judicial service altogether after their
term ends have appropriate opportunities to pursue other professional interests.
In order to address these concerns, the amendment could specify that at the end of their
service, Justices have the option of retaining the office of an Article III judge and remaining
available to serve by designation on any of the lower federal courts; to serve by designation
on the Supreme Court if a Justice in an eighteen-year seat vacates that seat prematurely; or to
perform other federal judicial functions. The amendment could also specify that upon
completion of their terms, Justices would continue to receive a pension for life commensurate
with their salaries on the bench. 52 But these two provisions would not solve the problem fully.
With term limits, some Justices would complete service at younger ages than the current
average age at which Justices leave the Court. Some might prefer to relinquish their Article
III commission and work in other capacities.
Former Justices who have chosen to retire fully from the bench could be barred from
certain kinds of employment for a certain period of time. The prospect of high-level
government employment is a particular concern, given the risk of public perceptions that a
Justice will have ruled in certain ways late in their term to curry favor with the sitting
government. Retired Justices could be prohibited from involvement in legal matters that had
been the subject of proceedings before the Court and, perhaps, closely related matters. 53
Former Justices could also be barred from working on any matters before the Court. Service
in roles such as mediator, arbitrator, or law school lecturer, on the other hand, are most
compatible with the role of a retired Justice. While some of these concerns should be addressed
in any constitutional amendment—such as whether term-limited Justices retain the option of
remaining Article III judges—others might be appropriately handled through legislation.
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Enacting Term Limits through Statute
Members of the Commission are divided about whether Congress has the power under
the Constitution to create the equivalent of term limits by statute. Some believe that a statutory
solution is within Congress’s powers. Others believe that no statutory solution is
constitutional, or that any statute would raise so many difficult constitutional and
implementation questions that it would be unwise to proceed through statute. Opponents of
term limits cite these complexities as reasons to eschew term limits altogether.
In this Part, we consider the primary statutory approach and two alternative approaches.
In all three proposals, Presidents appoint new Justices in the first and third years of their terms
in office. As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, we focus on these proposals to ground
our analysis rather than to endorse these proposals over all others. In addition, because the
Commissioners are divided as to whether it would be constitutional to implement term limits
via statute, we offer what we take to be the best argument for each position but do not seek to
resolve the matter. We also examine some of the prudential concerns arising from these
proposals. If Congress were contemplating imposing term limits by statute, a constitutional
amendment that simply specified the size of the Court might still be advisable, for the reasons
discussed above.
The main focus of our analysis is the so-called Junior/Senior Justice proposal. It creates
the functional equivalent of term limits by providing that, after eighteen years of service,
Justices become Senior Justices and stop participating in the ordinary work of the Court. This
proposal features elements common to other proposals that scholars and advocates have
offered, 54 and the constitutional issues we discuss here are also common to those proposals.
The two alternative solutions—the Original/Appellate Jurisdiction proposal and the
Designated Justices proposal—attempt to address potential constitutional problems with the
Junior/Senior Justice proposal, but they raise their own sets of constitutional issues.
In all three proposals, Justices would spend an eighteen-year nonrenewable term
participating in the ordinary work of the Supreme Court. After that period, they would perform
a different or a subsidiary set of duties.

The Junior and Senior Justices Proposal
In the Junior/Senior Justice proposal, Congress passes a statute that provides that, after
eighteen years of service as a “Junior Justice” deciding cases, each Justice would assume

130 | December 2021

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

senior status. Thereafter, these “Senior Justices” would no longer participate regularly in the
ordinary work of the Court. But they would perform other duties, including sitting by
designation in the lower federal courts and assisting the Chief Justice with administrative
duties. Congress could specify these duties by statute, or it could leave it to the Justices
themselves to decide on them through an internal rule. 55
If the duties of Senior Justices were not sufficiently germane to the office of a Supreme
Court Justice, the change in duties might amount to appointment to a new office. This would
require a new nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. However, it is not
clear that the germaneness requirement applies to the prospective redefinition of an office. In
any case, the Supreme Court’s understanding of germaneness appears to be very broad. In
Weiss v. United States, 56 for example, the Court held that the duties of a military judge were
sufficiently germane to the duties of a commissioned officer that the officer could be
designated to serve as a judge without going through the appointments process.
The Justices already perform the duties listed above and that would pertain to Senior
Justices under the proposal. Current federal law authorizes Justices to sit on circuit courts. 57
And as a historical matter, federal law long required the Justices to sit on other federal courts
in addition to hearing cases on the Supreme Court. For almost all of the first hundred years of
the Republic, Supreme Court Justices “rode circuit”: they heard and decided cases in the lower
federal courts. With the Judiciary Act of 1801, Congress abolished circuit riding, only to
reinstate it in the Repeal Act of 1802 after control of Congress changed hands. The Supreme
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the 1802 Act in Stuart v. Laird, 58 in which the
challenger sought to reverse a circuit court’s judgment partly on the ground that “the judges
of the supreme court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed as such.” 59 The
Supreme Court responded that circuit riding was so well established that its validity was no
longer open to question: “[P]ractice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years,
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and
has indeed fixed the construction.” 60 Justices continued to have circuit-riding duties until the
late nineteenth century. 61
Existing practice and precedent offer a model for the types of duties Senior Justices might
perform. A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 371, provides two options for federal judges, including
Supreme Court Justices, who meet certain service and age requirements. They may “retire
from the office” under § 371(a), at which point they no longer hold the office of federal judge
or Justice but continue to receive an annuity equivalent to their salary at the time of retirement.
Or they may “retain the office but retire from regular active service” under § 371(b) and
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“continue to receive the salary of the office” if they perform a different set of duties, which
they may select from a list set out in later sections. Listed duties include “a caseload involving
courtroom participation,” “substantial judicial duties not involving courtroom participation,”
“substantial administrative duties directly related to the operation of the courts,” or
“substantial duties for a Federal or State governmental entity.” For lower court judges, the
status created in § 371(b) is usually called senior status.
Under the current rules, judges who take senior status need not sit on any cases at all.
They may, however, sit by designation within their own circuit at the discretion of the chief
judge or judicial council of their circuit. They may also sit by designation in other circuits at
the discretion of the Chief Justice upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief
judge or circuit justice of the other circuit. Supreme Court Justices who retire from regular
active service (and take the analogue of senior status for lower court judges) are not allowed
to participate in any decisions or actions of the Supreme Court, but they may sit by designation
in the lower federal courts. 62
As with a constitutional amendment, drafters of a Junior/Senior Justice statute would have
to make decisions about whether it would apply to sitting Justices, when the appointments of
term-limited Justices would begin, how to handle vacancies that arose outside of the scheduled
process, and whether there should be restrictions on the future employment of former Justices.
The discussion of these issues in the constitutional amendment section applies equally to such
a statute, with the caveat that applying the statute to sitting Justices might raise additional
constitutional questions, as noted below.

Constitutional Issues Raised by the Junior/Senior Justice Proposal: The
Good Behavior and Appointments Clauses
Article III, Section 1 provides that: “The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.” 63 The Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2 provides that the President “shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law . . . .” 64 The issues raised under these constitutional provisions by any term
limits statute are complex, and what follows is a brief review of the relevant considerations.
Commissioners disagree about the proper resolution of the questions raised.
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Those who believe that the Junior/Senior Justice proposal is unconstitutional start with
the Good Behavior Clause, which is conventionally interpreted to give federal judges “life
tenure”: Federal judges hold their offices for an indefinite period that ends only when they die,
voluntarily resign, or are involuntarily removed through the process of impeachment and
conviction. Although the Good Behavior Clause does not specify the details of the “Offices”
that federal judges hold, the Appointments Clause arguably recognizes a separate office of
“Judge[] of the supreme Court” that is different from other federal judicial offices. If so, people
who have been appointed to the Supreme Court must remain “Judges of the supreme Court.”
Those who believe that the Junior/Senior Justice proposal is unconstitutional argue that Senior
Justices (who would be barred from participating in the ordinary work of the Court after
eighteen years) do not remain “Judges of the supreme Court” in the sense that the Constitution
requires. Indeed, given the enormously consequential constitutional decisions of the Court that
this Chapter emphasizes, these critics argue it is implausible to claim that individual Justices
can be involuntarily removed from most of the Court’s constitutional work without being
deemed to have lost their “office.” In addition, some believe that these specific textual
provisions should be understood in the context of more general separation of powers
principles, including the principle of judicial independence. Part of the reason the Good
Behavior and Appointments Clauses are best understood to deny Congress the power to
modify life tenure by statute, in this view, is to protect the structural principle of judicial
independence that underwrites Article III of the Constitution.
Proponents of the Junior/Senior Justice proposal believe that Congress may redefine the
office prospectively. Thus, for all new appointments made after the statute takes effect, the
office of Justice of the Supreme Court would mean serving as a Junior Justice for the first
eighteen years and serving as a Senior Justice thereafter. All Justices would have the same
duties and powers, but the nature of these duties would change over time. Under this approach,
every Justice, unless they retire, would eventually become a Senior Justice if they stay on the
Court for more than eighteen years. Note that under the terms of this argument, the statutory
changes would not apply to sitting Justices.
The debate hinges on the nature of the “office” of Justice of the Supreme Court that the
Constitution creates and whether a statute that contemplates that the Justices’ duties will
change after eighteen years removes them from that office in violation of the Good Behavior
Clause. Proponents, relying on the senior status statute, 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) and (e), conclude
that a change in duties does not necessarily involve a change in office because senior status
judges still hold their office. For the same reason, they believe that deciding cases is not
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essential to continuing to hold office as a federal judge, and that deciding Supreme Court cases
is not essential to continuing to hold the office of a Supreme Court Justice.
In support of this conclusion, proponents argue that the Supreme Court approved this
system for senior judges in Booth v. United States. 65 In Booth, a unanimous Supreme Court
held that a lower court federal judge who retired under the predecessor of § 371(b) “remains
in office” within the meaning of Article III, Section 1. 66 The Court pointed out that senior
judges exercise the judicial power of the United States in deciding cases when designated to
do so. “It is scarcely necessary to say that a retired judge’s judicial acts would be illegal unless
he who performed them held the office of judge. It is a contradiction in terms to assert that one
who has retired in accordance with the statute may continue to function as a federal judge and
yet not hold the office of a judge.” 67 On one reading of Booth, a statutory change of duties
does not remove a judge from office as long as “[t]he purpose is . . . that he shall continue . . .
to perform judicial service.” 68 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this reasoning in 2003 in Nguyen
v. United States. 69
Booth thus distinguishes between a change in duties, which is within the power of
Congress, and removal from office or reduction in compensation, which are not: “Congress
may lighten judicial duties, though it is without power to abolish the office or to diminish the
compensation appertaining to it.” 70 Moreover, those who believe statutory term limits are
constitutional argue that the reasoning of Booth and Nguyen also extends to retired Justices.
Retired Justices such as David Souter and Sandra Day O’Connor have often participated in
courts of appeals decisions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294. When they do, proponents of the
Junior/Senior Justice proposal believe they are best understood as having retained their office
as Supreme Court Justices because they are exercising federal power and they have not been
appointed to any new office. Hence, proponents conclude, Senior Justices retain the office of
Justice of the Supreme Court even if their duties have changed and no longer include
participation in the ordinary work of the Court. Critics, however, believe that retired Justices
still hold federal judicial office, which is required under Booth if they are to exercise federal
judicial power, but that they do not necessarily continue to occupy the constitutional office of
Supreme Court Justice. 71
Setting Booth aside, critics believe that the best understanding of the Constitution forbids
the change in duties that the Junior/Senior Justice proposal entails. One constitutional scholar
puts the argument this way: “To say there is a particular office of Supreme Court Justice, as
opposed to federal judge in general, is to say that the Constitution contemplates some
connection between the justices and the work of the Court.” 72 On one view, because the Court
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is a decisionmaking body in which members participate and deliberate together, the ability to
“participat[e] in substantially all the body’s final decisions” is a necessary constitutional
feature of holding the office of “Judge[] of the supreme Court.” 73 Because the Junior/Senior
Justice proposal eliminates the right to participate in the Court’s decisions after eighteen years,
some think it marks a change in office that violates the Good Behavior Clause.
Commentators have also discussed an alternative understanding of what it means to be a
“Judge[] of the supreme Court”: Instead of participating in substantially all of the Court’s final
decisions, perhaps each Justice must be able to participate in an equal share of the Court’s
work. There is a sense in which the Junior/Senior Justice proposal establishes equality among
the Justices, because each Justice has the same powers for the same period of time. But even
so, critics argue that “the proposal is not consistent with the Constitution’s idea of a term” (and
with the prevailing view that the Good Behavior Clause prevents Congress from imposing
straightforward term limits). 74 In the critics’ view, Congress cannot establish a time limit after
which Justices lose the ability to participate equally in the Court’s decisions, even if all Justices
are subject to the same time limit.
To the extent that the proponents’ argument rests on the precedential authority of Booth,
critics believe that the precedent is limited. Booth involved the Compensation Clause of
Article III and the issue was whether Congress could cut the pay of lower federal court judges
who had voluntarily taken what we now call senior status. As permitted by a 1919 amendment
to the Judicial Code, they had chosen to “retire . . . from regular active service on the bench”
but had not “resign[ed] [their] office,” 75 and they continued to hear cases or perform other
judicial duties. The Court held that Congress could not constitutionally reduce their
compensation because they still remained in office and exercised federal judicial power. Thus,
critics of statutory term limits argue, Booth only holds that when judges voluntarily take senior
status, but continue to hear cases, Congress may not reduce their compensation under the
Compensation Clause. According to critics, it does not follow that Congress can require lifetenured Supreme Court Justices to stop participating in the Supreme Court’s exercises of
judicial power after eighteen years. 76
Proponents argue that if judges who have elected senior status “[c]ontinu[e] in Office”
within the meaning of the Compensation Clause, then a statute requiring judges to take senior
status after eighteen years would not deprive them of their “Offices” within the meaning of
the Good Behavior Clause. In the proponents’ view, moreover, Booth and subsequent
established practice with respect to retired Justices foreclose the critics’ arguments about the
essential nature of the offices of “Judges of the supreme Court.” According to proponents,
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there is no meaningful legal distinction between Supreme Court Justices and other federal
judges as to whether they retain their judicial office after senior status, and whether or not that
status is voluntarily chosen or imposed by statute. On this view, substantial participation or
equal participation in all merits decisions is therefore not “inherent” in the nature of the office
of Supreme Court Justice. The critics’ assertion to the contrary, proponents argue, is belied by
practice.
Critics respond that practice does not support allowing Congress to mandate a reduction
in duties after a certain number of years. And the fact that our current practices make a
reasonable accommodation for voluntary decisions does not mean that those practices
establish a general principle that extends to a new set of arrangements in which Justices have
no say in the matter.
Indeed, critics believe that the argument from history favors their position. Throughout
most of American history, members of Congress have assumed that the only constitutional
way to achieve term limits for Supreme Court Justices is through constitutional amendment.
Starting as early as 1807, 77 and continuing to the present, more than two hundred proposals
have been introduced in Congress to amend the Constitution to establish term limits for
Supreme Court Justices or for federal judges more generally—sometimes in conjunction with
other changes, sometimes as a stand-alone measure. But the first bill to establish the functional
equivalent of term limits by statute was not introduced until 2020. 78 The very idea of
mandating term limits by statute is a recent innovation.

An Alternative Proposal: Original/Appellate Jurisdiction
An alternative to the Junior/Senior Justice proposal is the Original/Appellate Jurisdiction
proposal, under which all Justices continue to hear original jurisdiction cases throughout their
tenure in office, but only the nine most junior Justices in service hear cases brought to the
Court under its appellate jurisdiction. 79 The Court hears only a small number of cases through
original jurisdiction every year. Most cases, and almost all of the controversial cases, come
before the Court through its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. In addition to participating in
cases involving original jurisdiction, Senior Justices may also perform other duties, as in the
Junior/Senior Justice proposal above or under the current retirement statute. This proposal
does not separate appellate jurisdiction cases for reasons of efficiency. Rather, the proposal
offers another way of creating the effective equivalent of term limits that might avoid some of
the constitutional problems of the main proposal.
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The central argument for the Original/Appellate proposal is that it can be linked to a
specific textual provision in the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction: “[T]he supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.” 80 In Marbury v. Madison, 81 the Court held that the
Exceptions and Regulations Clause applied only to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction and that
Congress could not alter the Court’s original jurisdiction. 82 The proposal argues, accordingly,
that although Congress must allow all Justices to hear all cases arising out of original
jurisdiction, it may provide, as a regulation of appellate jurisdiction, that only Junior Justices
hear appeals.
Although this proposal invokes a different congressional power, it raises some of the same
constitutional issues discussed above. No matter which enumerated power Congress is
exercising, Congress’s statutes must comport with the Good Behavior Clause and the
Appointments Clause. If critics are correct that everyone who holds the office of “Judge[] of
the supreme Court” must be able to participate in substantially all of the Court’s final
decisions, or must remain eligible to participate in an equal share of the Court’s work, then the
Original/Appellate proposal would be vulnerable to the same objections as the Junior/Senior
Justice proposal.
Critics may raise several additional objections. First, critics will argue that the Exceptions
and Regulations Clause gives Congress the power to change the scope of the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction, but not the personnel who decide appeals. Put another way, the Clause
allows Congress to decide what appeals the Court can hear, but not who hears the appeals.
Proponents, in turn, will argue this does not attend to the distinction between “exceptions”
to and “regulations” of appellate jurisdiction that appears in the text of Article III.
“Exceptions” to appellate jurisdiction involve limiting what cases the Court may hear. But
“regulations” of appellate jurisdiction may also include deciding how the Court hears appeals
and who hears them. The Supreme Court has never addressed this precise issue.
A second objection is that the Original/Appellate proposal creates two panels. One panel,
consisting of all of the Justices, hears original jurisdiction cases. The other, consisting only of
the nine Justices most junior in service, hears appellate cases. As we discuss in Chapter 2 at
greater length, there is an argument that this aspect of the proposal would violate the provision
in Article III, Section 1 that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court.” 83 From a textual point of view, if there is “one” Supreme Court, then perhaps
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the Justices must participate together in deciding merits cases and may not decide cases in
separate panels.
A third objection to the Original/Appellate proposal is that, like all other proposals for
Supreme Court panels, it gives Congress too much power to gerrymander the Justices by
subject matter to attempt to manipulate the outcome of particular cases. If Congress may divide
cases in this way, why not in other ways that would undermine the Court’s integrity and
independence? For example, Congress might create a special panel that heard only cases
involving abortion or the environment.
Proponents might respond that whether or not a general power to divide the Court into
panels poses dangers, the Constitution itself creates a distinction between the Supreme Court’s
original and appellate jurisdiction. This provision offers a bright-line rule, which, according
to Marbury v. Madison, Congress may not vary. When Congress follows this bright-line rule,
there is no danger to judicial independence. Congress cannot expand or contract the Court’s
original jurisdiction. Therefore, the proposal does not assume that Congress has a general
power to create panels of the Court. It simply argues that this one, which matches distinctions
already present in the text of Article III, is constitutionally valid.

An Alternative Proposal: Designated Supreme Court Justices
The third proposal attempts to respond to the concern that the Junior/Senior Justice
proposal effectively removes Justices from their offices. Instead, it proposes that Presidents
henceforth only appoint judges from the lower federal courts to sit by designation on the
Supreme Court for a non-renewable term of eighteen years. The relevant statute will specify
that one of the duties of lower federal court judges (or some statutorily demarcated subset of
these judges) is that they may be called upon to serve by designation on the Supreme Court
for eighteen years, after which they would return to their original court. 84
Under this proposal, Presidents would no longer appoint anyone to the office of “Judge[]
of the supreme Court.” Instead, Presidents would simply designate lower court judges to serve
on the Court temporarily. The statute could provide that the designation is subject to the
ordinary advice-and-consent process. If the designation does not amount to appointment to a
different office (see the discussion below), advice and consent would not be required by the
Constitution, but Congress might nevertheless provide for it.
One main objection to the Designated Justices proposal is a textual argument. As noted
previously, the Appointments Clause of Article II contemplates a separate office of “Judge[]
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of the supreme Court.” Therefore, critics will assert that the judges who sit and decide cases
on the Supreme Court must hold the office of “Judges of the supreme Court.”
Proponents will respond that the existence of a separate office of “Judge[] of the supreme
Court” does not mean that someone not appointed to that office is forbidden to serve on the
Supreme Court by designation. Federal judges often serve on different courts by designation
without receiving new commissions. Retired Supreme Court Justices serve on appellate and
district courts; appellate judges serve as district judges, and district judges serve as appellate
judges by designation. In addition, Supreme Court seats have been filled on a temporary basis
through recess appointments without a lifetime appointment, and even without Senate
confirmation. The Vacancies Clause of Article II, Section 2, Clause 3, which applies to federal
offices generally, provides that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at
the End of their next Session.” 85 Over three hundred federal judges, including fifteen Supreme
Court Justices, have been appointed through this process. 86 Lower federal courts have
approved of its constitutionality. 87 If Presidents may temporarily fill Supreme Court vacancies
without the Senate’s advice and consent, the argument goes, a fortiori they should be permitted
to do so with the Senate’s advice and consent. 88
Critics will say that the Constitution distinguishes the Supreme Court from other federal
courts and that everyone who sits on the Supreme Court must hold the office of “Judge[] of
the supreme Court” (whether pursuant to a regular appointment under the Appointments
Clause, which lasts during good behavior, or a recess appointment under the Vacancies Clause,
which lasts for at most two years). Critics may also note that in the vast majority of cases,
when a President has made recess appointments to either the lower courts or the Supreme
Court, Congress has subsequently confirmed these judges and Justices to lifetime
appointments. 89 And when judges sit by designation on other courts, they usually remain only
for a short time, and sometimes only for a single case. This practice, critics of this proposal
will argue, is very different than a statutory designation lasting eighteen years, which would
cover a sizeable proportion—and often a majority—of any federal judge’s career. There is
nothing temporary about such appointments, and hence they cannot be justified by existing
practice.
A second main objection to the Designated Justices proposal is rooted in past practice:
No person who does not hold the office of Justice of the Supreme Court has ever sat on or
decided a case before the Supreme Court. 90 Justices have indeed sat on lower federal courts
from the beginning of the Republic, and Justices who take senior status sit by designation
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today. Nevertheless, the opposite has never occurred—lower federal court judges have never
sat by designation on the Supreme Court. The novelty of the practice suggests that it is
unconstitutional.
Proponents will respond that if Justices may “move down” and sit on lower courts by
designation, there is no reason why lower court judges may not “move up” by designation. In
fact, district court judges often sit by designation on circuit courts of appeals. Proponents
would assert, therefore, that district and circuit court judges should also be able to sit by
designation on the Supreme Court. The novelty of a practice does not by itself prove that it is
unconstitutional; otherwise, a host of federal laws that exercised constitutional powers in new
ways would be unconstitutional. 91

Addressing the Risk of Repeated Confirmation Impasse
It is essential that any term limits proposal provide an acceptable mechanism for resolving
the problem of repeated confirmation impasses. Absent such a mechanism, the repeated failure
of the Senate to confirm any nominee would undermine a major justification for staggered
term limits: that each President be entitled to the same number of regular nominations.
Designing a structure to address the risk of impasse, however, is not an easy matter. That
structure must not give too much effective power to the President but also address the risk of
repeated confirmation impasses. And the difficulty of reforming the confirmation process is
among the reasons opponents of term limits reject the reform.
Reform of the general structure of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation is not
squarely within the Commission’s remit. In this Part we consider some means by which to
address potential confirmation impasses under a system of term limits. In addition, in an
Appendix to this Report we summarize some helpful testimony regarding potential reforms to
the confirmation process more generally.

Term Limits by Constitutional Amendment and the Confirmation
Process
The options for designing a mechanism to avoid a confirmation impasse are different and
broader in the context of designing an amendment as opposed to a statute. Some have
suggested that a constitutional amendment should provide that a nominee will be deemed
confirmed if the Senate does not vote to disapprove within a specified time, such as four
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months after nomination. 92 (This proposal is somewhat similar to Madison’s initial proposal
at the Constitutional Convention that judges be deemed confirmed if they were not rejected
by a two-thirds vote of the Senate by a date certain, a proposal that the Convention rejected. 93)
This might be a good idea as a starting point, but more is required to address the risk of the
Senate repeatedly voting down successive nominees for a particular eighteen-year seat.
To begin to address this potential concern, the amendment would first have to define the
circumstances that trigger any fallback mechanism. For instance, the trigger might be the
Senate voting down two consecutive nominees. This trigger may be particularly apt if the
amendment also adopts the provision deeming a nominee automatically confirmed if the
Senate fails to vote at all after a set time. If that time is set at four months, then this fallback
mechanism would come into play after roughly eight months of a confirmation impasse.
Another option would be to trigger the fallback mechanism at a set amount of time after the
date the President nominates a person for the particular eighteen-year position.
The Commission is not aware of any scholarship that explores in-depth the issue of an
appropriate design for a fallback mechanism. Witnesses offered a few brief suggestions. One
is that the President present three nominees to the Senate; if the Senate rejects all three, the
President is then empowered to choose one of those to sit on the Court. 94 But Presidents could
easily game this system, choosing two figures the Senate would never approve and thereby
effectively gaining unilateral power to fill the seat. Another possibility would be for the
amendment to specify that the Senate cannot conduct other business while a nomination is
pending. 95 But this approach would preclude the Senate from acting on any number of urgent
issues that might arise, including those involving our national security.
From an institutional-design perspective, the challenge is that any backup mechanism that
stays within the traditional President-Senate framework risks giving either too much unilateral
power to the President or too much blocking power to the Senate. The solution might need to
rest with an institution that sits outside this framework. One possibility is that, in case of a
prolonged impasse, the chief judges of the twelve non-specialized federal courts of appeals (or
a subset of them) could be assigned one of two roles. 96 On one approach, once this fallback
mechanism is triggered, this body of chief judges would become the confirmation body for
the President’s choice. Two institutions of the government would thus still be required to
confirm a Justice. A subsidiary issue to consider is whether the President should be precluded
from nominating any individual whose appointment to the Court the Senate has affirmatively
rejected.
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A second option would be to give the chief judges (or a subset of them) the power to
directly designate a Justice after a prolonged impasse. The amendment could also limit the
chief judges to selecting a sitting federal court of appeals judge. These are the individuals with
appropriate experience whose fitness for the Court the chief judges would be in the best
position to evaluate. Good reasons might exist to appoint to the Court persons other than
federal court of appeals judges. But empowering the chief judges to directly appoint anyone
in the country to the Court would put enormous discretion in the hands of this body. Limiting
the set of potential appointees to existing court of appeals judges would substantially constrain
this power. Because this fallback mechanism would come into play only when the Senate
repeatedly rejects a President’s nominees, it is not likely to affect the majority of seats on the
Court.
If one worries that the knowledge of the sitting chief judges’ identities would shape the
actions of the President or the Senate, this power could be given to a random selection of seven
or five of the chief judges. An advantage of using the chief judges (or a subset of them) is that
the amendment would not have to design from scratch a new, independent institution to serve
as the fallback mechanism. Given the complexities of designing such a new institution, as well
as questions about how well the public would accept that institution, the easier course may be
to use a set of actors who have been Senate confirmed already and for whom a selection
mechanism also already exists. 97
An amendment could instead provide that if the Senate rejected one nominee, the
threshold for confirmation of the next nominee for that seat would decrease. Alternatively, the
amendment could provide that if the Senate fails to confirm a nominee by a certain point, the
President would have the power to designate any sitting federal judge (or any circuit judge) to
fill that eighteen-year seat. But both of these options might be thought to give too much power
to the President.

Term Limits by Statute and the Confirmation Process
If term limits are implemented by a statute rather than a constitutional amendment,
modifications to the confirmation process must be consistent with the current constitutional
framework, which gives the President the power to select a nominee and the Senate the power
to approve or disapprove. It might still be possible to create a backup mechanism of the sort
discussed above, but such a mechanism would have to be understood as a delegation of
authority by the Senate and/or the President. The constitutionality of such a delegation is not
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clear, and the relevant actor might also be able to revoke it unilaterally, undoing most of its
benefits.
Another means of dealing with the possibility of a prolonged impasse might include a
statute that prescribes that the threshold number of votes for confirmation decreases each time
the Senate refuses to confirm a nominee. The constitutionality of such a statute is unclear,
however, given that the Constitution gives each chamber the power over its own rules and
procedures. 98 The Senate could instead incorporate such a policy into its own Senate rules; a
later Senate, however, could change that rule. Alternatively, consistent with the Designated
Justices proposal set out above, a statute might provide that in the event of an impasse, the
President could designate a lower court judge to fill the Supreme Court vacancy for an
eighteen-year term without Senate confirmation. This statute would be subject to many of the
same constitutional concerns as the Designated Justices proposal, although it would operate
with respect to only some seats rather than all of them.
Last, a statute might provide that if the Senate fails to confirm one or both of a President’s
scheduled appointments, the next President of a different party would lose a corresponding
number of appointments. While this approach might occasion substantial constitutional
debate, its justification might be grounded in the view that Congress has authority to determine
the timing of judicial appointments, as well as the size of the Court. But even if constitutionally
defensible and reasonably effective, making party affiliation relevant to the operation of the
statute is arguably problematic. Such a statute also poses the risk that an extended impasse
would shrink the Court. And because what is effected by statute can also be undone by statute,
this alternative could also become another front in the polarized and destabilizing partisan
contestation of the times.

Concluding Considerations
A final set of concerns about enacting term limits via statute rather than constitutional
amendment can be viewed as prudential or grounded in the separation of powers. If Congress
has the power to change the composition of the Court by statute, it could mean that Congress
has considerable flexibility in altering the duties of the Justices in other ways. Once Congress
has exercised the power to change the Court’s composition by statute in order to regularize
appointments, Congress might seek to do so for other purposes. If federal statutes can validly
restrict members of the Supreme Court to a very limited set of duties after a certain number of
years, Congress might try to establish other criteria for imposing similar limits on a subset of
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Justices. Even if one focuses entirely on term limits, moreover, the group of Supreme Court
practitioners cited in the introduction to this Chapter warns that “a statutory solution would be
inherently unstable”; over the years, Congress might amend the system depending on whether
Congress and the White House are in the same hands at the moment. 99 Opponents of term
limits are especially critical of a statutory approach, arguing that if term limits may be changed
by statute, then an angry Congress could punish the Court by reducing the term of office
anytime it chose to do so. Critics of the statutory approach argue that it is precisely to avoid
such risks that the Constitution does not permit Congress to impose term limits by statute. On
this view, the degree of consensus required for a constitutional amendment provides important
security against the composition of the Court being manipulated for partisan or ideological
reasons.
For some members of the Commission, the existence of constitutional doubt, as well as
the significance and complexity of adopting a system of term limits, are themselves reasons
to pursue the reform through constitutional amendment. They worry that a statute altering the
Court’s composition will generate greater uncertainty and mistrust than other constitutional
questions. When litigants eventually challenge a term limits statute, the Court would have to
decide on the constitutionality of a law that restructures the Court itself. There might also be
strong disagreements about which Justices should participate in the decision. No matter which
way the Court came out on the question, these Commissioners worry that the Court’s
legitimacy, or perceptions of its legitimacy, would be undermined.
Members of the Commission who support a statutory solution believe these concerns are
overblown. They do not believe that a term limits statute would be any more destabilizing than
a host of other issues that the Court has confronted over the years. They also think that inaction
carries its own risks, and that the appointments process now displays a degree of dysfunction
that makes remedial action urgent. Given the powers that Congress and the President already
have to regulate the Court, proponents believe that recognizing the power of Congress to
regularize appointments would not add more risk than it is worth—and as a practical matter,
if the reform were adopted with strong bipartisan support, the precedent established by the
statute might not carry over to other situations.
At a minimum, the contestability of statutory approaches counsels in favor of serious
deliberation by Congress if it chooses to consider this route. In these deliberations, we hope
that Congress would keep in mind the central structural values of our Constitution, particularly
the principle of judicial independence, and consider what future Congresses, armed with the
same constitutional powers, might someday attempt. Indeed, in recent years, we have seen
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democratic governments “regress” or “backslide” with respect to judicial independence. This
has come about through electoral majorities using their power to restructure previously
independent institutions, including courts, to favor the political agendas of those governments.
Comparative political scientists have concluded that the democratic systems most resistant to
this prospect are those in which an electoral majority is not sufficient to change the
fundamental structure of institutions such as the courts.
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Chapter 4: The Court’s Role in the
Constitutional System
Many observers view the judiciary and especially the Supreme Court as vital to the
preservation of individual rights, democracy, federalism, and other constitutional values. 1 On
this account, the Court serves as an important counterweight to majoritarian impulses,
safeguards the Constitution, and helps ensure the rule of law. But others argue that the
Supreme Court has exerted too much power in our system of constitutional governance by
interfering with or taking control of matters that should be resolved by the elected branches
and the political process. Under this view, the Court has emerged as an obstacle to the
realization of important social goals and undermined the ability of Congress and other political
actors to protect rights. 2
Proposals to disempower the Court generally rest on two interrelated assumptions. First,
Court rulings that statutes violate the Constitution typically require exercising judgment about
the meaning of the Constitution, over which reasonable people might disagree, as is often
illustrated by divisions among the Justices themselves in constitutional cases. Second, in cases
of reasonable disagreement over whether a law comports with the Constitution, principles of
democracy necessitate that Congress and the executive branch have opportunities to check the
judgments of an unelected judiciary and to advance their own views about what the
Constitution requires. In the view of some proponents of judicial disempowerment, the modern
Supreme Court has injected itself into spheres appropriately left to democratic argument and
resolution—for example, by invalidating laws that prohibit or restrict abortion or legislation
designed to protect voting rights. For these critics, the Court’s fundamentally
“countermajoritarian” character is in tension with the basic commitments of a democracy; an
unelected judiciary, in this view, acts undemocratically when it invalidates the acts of
democratically elected representative bodies. 3 For some, the problem is also that Supreme
Court Justices are nearly always drawn from the elite and are therefore insufficiently
representative of the population as a whole. 4
Those who critique the Supreme Court’s power emphasize that when the Court acts to
invalidate statutes, its decisions “have an unusually high degree of finality or ‘strength’[] by
global standards.” 5 This high degree of finality derives in part from the Court’s approach to
judicial review, known as “judicial supremacy.” 6 That is, the Court has held that it has the last
word on constitutional interpretation and that its decisions bind not only the parties in a
particular case but also future action by the President, Congress, and the states. 7 The Court has
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embraced judicial supremacy since at least the 1950s, when it asserted that “the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.” 8 Yet, as discussed below
in Part III of this Chapter, this approach to judicial review is not explicitly required by the text
of the Constitution or by the Court’s early precedents establishing the power of judicial review.
Indeed, judicial supremacy has long been contested, sometimes by Congress and the President
and sometimes even within the Court. Critics argue that the Court was not intended to be the
exclusive interpreter of the Constitution; rather, as long as legislative and executive branch
actors obey specific Court orders in specific cases, they can act in their spheres on a contrary
interpretation of the Constitution. 9
Two other features of our constitutional system combine with judicial supremacy to
insulate the Court’s constitutional judgments from the will of the people as it evolves over
time. First, the U.S. Constitution is very difficult to amend—much more so than most state
and foreign constitutions. 10 Second, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this Report, because Justices
serve for life, the timing of nominations is unpredictable. Some Justices serve for many
decades and some Presidents have few or no opportunities to make appointments. According
to some observers, the result is that the Court may not be reflective of, or responsive to, the
people, as expressed through electoral preferences over time.
Proposals to curb judicial power are diverse. Without purporting to be comprehensive,
this Chapter examines proposals (1) to strip the Supreme Court and other federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear certain kinds of cases, (2) to impose supermajority voting requirements or
require courts to give deference to legislative judgments about constitutionality, and (3) to
authorize congressional overrides of judicial decisions striking down legislation. As we
emphasize, some disempowering proposals specifically target the Supreme Court, while others
would apply to lower courts as well. Some would insulate broad categories of legislation from
judicial review; others would limit judicial power only with respect to specifically identified
issues.
We consider the extent to which such proposals would affect the Supreme Court’s role,
or that of the judiciary as a whole, in relation to the other branches of government in the
resolution of major social, political, and cultural issues. We also highlight the
counterarguments advanced by those who defend the existing role of the Court in our
constitutional system. Among other concerns, critics of proposals to disempower the courts
worry that such reforms might undermine protections for individual rights, particularly
minority rights, or that as more constitutional interpretation is performed by the political
branches, the law could become less settled or well-reasoned. Critics also emphasize that
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disempowerment reforms could undermine the rule of law by eliminating the courts’ role in
ensuring officials’ accountability. Some also question whether courts necessarily operate in
ways that are antidemocratic. 11
Our discussion is predominantly analytical. We do not purport to resolve the fundamental
questions of democratic and political theory that any substantial disempowering of the courts
would raise. Instead, we analyze the extent to which the various proposals to disempower the
courts would in fact realize their stated goals. We also identify some of the potential costs of
various proposals, including from the perspective of those who emphasize the importance of
the courts in protecting individual rights, federalism, or other constitutional values and
structures. Finally, we discuss the constitutional issues to which leading proposals would give
rise and evaluate whether the proposals could be achieved without constitutional amendment.
Given the importance of concerns about the Court’s power in relation to the elected
branches—and given the relative lack of attention disempowering proposals have received
compared to some of the other reforms discussed in this Report—a key aim of this Chapter is
to inform future debate on these topics. 12

Proposals to Restrict the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction
One set of proposals to reduce the power of the Supreme Court involves limiting the
Court’s jurisdiction to hear and decide certain types of cases. Over the last fifty years, various
members of Congress have proposed bills that would strip the jurisdiction or authority of the
Supreme Court—sometimes in conjunction with the jurisdiction of other courts—to rule on
the constitutionality of anti-abortion legislation, 13 school prayer, 14 the Affordable Care Act, 15
prohibitions against pornography, 16 local mandates to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, 17 and
the now-invalidated Defense of Marriage Act. 18 Proponents of such jurisdiction-stripping
measures may hope that limiting the Court’s power in this way would shift control over
affected public policies to the political and democratic processes. However, we note that
jurisdiction stripping has no inherent partisan valence and could be utilized to serve the
ideological goals of nearly any constituency with the political capacity to enact it.
Jurisdiction stripping has long been a topic of debate among legal academics as well, and
it has drawn new attention in the last few years. For example, one commentator recently
suggested that Congress might use jurisdiction stripping to protect specific legislation, such as
a hypothetical federal wealth tax, from judicial invalidation. 19 Others have proposed
jurisdiction stripping as a general means of disempowering the Court and shifting authority to
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more democratically accountable institutions. 20 Jurisdiction stripping is also a mechanism that
has been used in other countries to make apex courts more politically accountable. 21
Though the academic debate has been robust, no recent commentator has offered a
programmatic blueprint for jurisdiction stripping. In the analysis that follows, we provide a
brief historical background concerning congressional efforts to strip courts of their
jurisdiction, an evaluation of various types of jurisdiction-stripping proposals, and an
assessment of the constitutionality of jurisdiction stripping in its various forms.
At bottom, one cannot assess the constitutionality of jurisdiction stripping in the abstract.
Congress certainly has some power to impose limits on the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. However, the extent of that power is unclear, and the constitutionality of
specific proposals would depend upon the particular details of those proposals. The
Commission does not have a firm view on the overall merits of jurisdiction stripping, but we
are skeptical that the aim of promoting more democratically accountable control of public
policy can be achieved solely by limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Constitutional and Historical Background
The Constitution undisputedly gives Congress power to grant and withhold the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, though the precise scope of that power is much debated.
Article III of the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with “original” jurisdiction in a small
category of cases. Article III then specifies that “[i]n all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” 22 Although the scope
of Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause has never been settled definitively, Congress
always has made some exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The 1789 Judiciary
Act, for example, made no provision for Supreme Court review of criminal cases tried in the
lower federal courts. 23
The Constitution also contemplates broad congressional power to determine and adjust
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. As the result of a deliberate compromise at the
Constitutional Convention, Article III authorizes Congress to create lower federal courts but
does not require it to do so. It provides instead that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.” 24 This language has always been understood to authorize
Congress to create or not create lower courts, and to vest the lower courts with less jurisdiction
than the maximum amount that Article III would permit.
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In the 1789 Judiciary Act, Congress accepted the Constitution’s invitation to create lower
federal courts and gave them broad jurisdiction, but Congress also imposed significant
limitations. For example, the Act included jurisdictional dollar-amount requirements not only
for cases brought by parties from different states (what is known as diversity jurisdiction), but
also for civil actions brought by the United States. 25 The 1789 Judiciary Act also omitted any
general grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal courts to address suits arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Such cases could be filed only if they
happened to fall within other more specific grants of jurisdiction, which many did not.
From the beginning, moreover, the federal courts’ exercise of their jurisdiction conferred
by Congress provoked occasional controversy and calls for statutory revision. In the early
decades of constitutional history, contention surrounded the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act to review the decisions of state supreme
courts. Throughout the antebellum era, a number of states and state courts objected that
Supreme Court review of state court decisions was incompatible with the partial sovereignty
of states and their institutions as guaranteed by the Constitution. In 1831, the House Judiciary
Committee reported out a bill that would have stripped the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to
review state court judgments, but that measure failed on the floor amid concerns about asserted
state authority to nullify acts of Congress. 26
Following the Civil War, fearing that the Supreme Court might invalidate the Military
Reconstruction Act, 27 Congress enacted a statute depriving the Court of appellate jurisdiction
over a pending habeas corpus case that presented important constitutional questions
concerning Reconstruction. The Court upheld this deprivation of its appellate jurisdiction in
Ex parte McCardle. 28 However, in upholding this jurisdiction-stripping statute, the Court’s
view of Congress’s power remained ambiguous. The Court noted that although Congress had
eliminated one avenue for parties to bring their challenges to the Military Reconstruction Act
to the Court, it had potentially left open another avenue that could be used in future cases.
In another case from the Reconstruction Era, United States v. Klein, the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute that made it harder for pardoned rebels to receive compensation from the
United States. 29 Formally, the statute directed both the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court
to dismiss “for want of jurisdiction” certain claims against the United States in which a party
relied on a presidential pardon to establish proof of loyalty during the Civil War. The Court
issued an opinion whose rationale, to this day, has inspired uncertainty and debate. It held that
a statute that confers Supreme Court jurisdiction up to “a given point” in a case, but then
requires the Court to dismiss that case “when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists,”
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is “not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe
regulations to the appellate power.” 30 In other words, limits exist on Congress’s power to make
exceptions, though there is debate about what these limits are.
Congress enacted a small spate of legislation restricting the jurisdiction of the federal
courts during the 1930s, primarily to limit the remedies lower federal courts could issue for
violations of the law. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 sharply limited the capacity of “the
courts of the United States” to issue injunctions “in a case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute.” 31 The Supreme Court upheld that restriction against a constitutional challenge in
Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co. 32 The Johnson Act of 1934 stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction to enjoin state orders fixing rates for public utilities whenever certain conditions
were satisfied, including where “[a] plain, speedy and efficient remedy” for illegality was
available in state court. 33 The Tax Injunction Act of 1937 similarly provided that “[t]he district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 34
Since at least the 1950s, members of Congress regularly have introduced legislation that
would strip the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, or both, of jurisdiction to resolve
particular hotly contested and politically salient constitutional issues. 35 Only one of these
proposals, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has ever been enacted into law (and that
statute was subsequently invalidated, as noted below). In the 1950s, Congress gave serious
consideration to bills that would have restricted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review
challenges to national-security legislation. 36 In the 1970s, a number of proposals sought to
limit federal jurisdiction to order busing as a remedy for school segregation. 37 The 1980s
witnessed repeated failed proposals to limit federal jurisdiction over challenges to abortion
restrictions and school prayer. 38 In 2004, the House of Representatives enacted bills that would
have deprived both the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over suits
challenging the Defense of Marriage Act, 39 as well as over suits against laws requiring students
to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in school. 40 But those measures died in the Senate. In more
recent years, members of Congress have introduced jurisdiction-stripping legislation involving
abortion, religious liberty, and other matters.
In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) withdrew the
Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction to review decisions by the federal courts of appeals
denying prisoners convicted by state courts the permission to file second or “successive”
petitions for federal writs of habeas corpus. 41 The Court upheld that limitation in Felker v.
Turpin. 42 In doing so, however, it emphasized that the AEDPA provision curbing the Court’s
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certiorari jurisdiction did not deprive it of jurisdiction to consider original petitions for habeas.
AEDPA would “inform” its consideration of such petitions, the Court said, but not exert a
preclusive effect.
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of
2006, purported to strip all courts of the United States, including the Supreme Court, of habeas
corpus jurisdiction in all cases brought by noncitizens being detained as enemy combatants.
(Congress instead tried to provide a substitute for habeas corpus: providing the D.C. Circuit
with limited review of detention decisions made by non-Article III military tribunals.) But the
Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush 43 that the withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction
violated the Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that
“[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” 44 The Court did not opine on
jurisdiction stripping outside of the habeas context.
Overall, the Constitution gives Congress power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. This was the conclusion of the various experts who testified before this
Commission on the issue. 45 However, Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping power is not
unlimited, and neither the Court’s jurisprudence nor past practice fully defines its reach or
scope. Thus, the constitutionality and policy merits or demerits of jurisdiction-stripping
proposals are contingent on the proposals’ details. We evaluate those details below.

Evaluation of Current Jurisdiction-Stripping Proposals
In this Section, we consider proposals to strip courts of their jurisdiction to review the
constitutionality of federal and state legislation. Jurisdiction-stripping legislation might also
seek to shield executive action from judicial review, though we are aware of fewer proposals
to do so. Our analysis necessarily takes a selective approach, given the many possible kinds
of jurisdiction-stripping measures. We focus mostly on issue-specific jurisdiction-stripping
legislation that would seek to disempower courts from ruling on a specific law or type of law.
Examples include proposals that would bar jurisdiction over challenges to a wealth tax or to a
law regulating abortion. We omit discussion of most general jurisdiction-stripping bills, such
as those that exclude relatively unimportant cases (as measured by dollar amount, for example)
from the federal courts. We do consider general jurisdiction-stripping efforts insofar as they
would seek to temper or eliminate the federal courts’ authority to declare legislation
unconstitutional, and thereby to decrease the courts’ power relative to other institutions of
government.
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In evaluating jurisdiction stripping, we also differentiate among proposals based on the
courts they would affect: Some proposals would restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court alone, while leaving lower court jurisdiction intact. Others would withdraw
jurisdiction from all federal courts, including the district courts and courts of appeals, while
leaving state court jurisdiction intact. Still others would withdraw jurisdiction not only from
the Supreme Court, but also from all other federal and state courts. The merits and
consequences of each type of proposal would differ, as we explain.
To organize our analysis, we begin by considering the goals of jurisdiction-stripping
proposals and the proposals’ likely efficacy in achieving those goals. We then consider the
consequences that successfully implementing the proposals might have for the functioning of
the constitutional system. 46 We defer consideration of the constitutional issues that their
enactment would present until Section I.C. We do not evaluate the specific policy goals that
any jurisdiction-stripping proposal might serve.

Goals and Efficacy
Most prominent jurisdiction-stripping proposals today would shield specific,
substantively defined issues, legislation, or policies from judicial review by the Supreme
Court, by all federal courts, or by all federal and state courts. The goals of such proposals are
overwhelmingly substantive in nature—to protect the particular laws in question from judicial
invalidation. Nevertheless, proposals to curb judicial jurisdiction can also have more abstract
goals, involving the redistribution of decisionmaking authority within our scheme of
government. More specifically, some proponents of jurisdiction stripping regard it as a means
of promoting greater democratic accountability by transferring power from the Supreme Court
to more democratically responsive institutions. 47
The Commission does not take a position on the desirability of any particular substantive
proposal. These issues are ones over which Commissioners disagree. However, in analyzing
the issue of jurisdiction stripping, we are skeptical that jurisdiction stripping could promote
meaningful democratic accountability if Congress were to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court alone.
The reallocation of authority would be most dramatic if Congress were to strip jurisdiction
from all courts, including state as well as federal courts, to entertain constitutional challenges
to particular substantive legislation. In foreclosing all judicial review of legislation, Congress
might be viewed as effectively claiming authority to determine that any covered statutes—
such as one imposing a wealth tax or those banning abortions—were constitutionally valid.
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Proponents of such legislation, moreover, would likely defend it as enhancing political
democracy and accountability by enabling Congress, as a democratically accountable
institution, to authoritatively resolve a constitutional issue about which reasonable minds
could be expected to differ. 48
However, the ability of issue-specific jurisdiction-stripping legislation to promote
political democracy seems by definition limited, since legislation of this kind would still leave
responsibility for the overwhelming bulk of constitutional interpretation in the courts, despite
stripping it from discrete contexts. Similarly, general jurisdiction-stripping bills that affect a
smaller subset of courts rather than the full set of federal and state courts would have limited
effect in enhancing democratic accountability in the domain of constitutional interpretation.
Measures that would restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court alone, for
example, would not straightforwardly transfer interpretive authority from the judiciary to
Congress or to any other democratically accountable institution. They would instead reallocate
power from the Supreme Court to the lower courts. There seems to be little reason to preclude
Supreme Court jurisdiction over specific constitutional questions that remain subject to
decision by the lower courts. Precluding Supreme Court review alone would do little or
nothing to enhance political democracy. Nor would it advance interests in justice or accuracy
to permit different courts to issue incompatible rulings on the same substantive constitutional
issue with no possibility of Supreme Court review.
Proposals that would withdraw jurisdiction from all federal courts but allow continued
adjudication of a constitutional issue in the state courts might more plausibly aspire to promote
a democracy-enhancing goal. They would leave responsibility for constitutional decisions in
the hands of state judges who are, in many instances, democratically elected or otherwise
amenable to the influence of public opinion. By contrast, Article III of the federal Constitution
seeks to insulate federal judges from political influence through guarantees of life tenure and
protection against salary reduction.
We are uncertain, however, about the precise extent to which a transfer of adjudicative
power from federal to state courts would enhance the influence of political majorities over the
resolution of constitutional issues. To reach such a conclusion would require resolution of
myriad empirical and normative issues. State court judges would remain bound by the
Supremacy Clause, which provides that the Constitution is the “supreme Law of the Land”
and that “the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,” 49 but it is not clear whether state
court judges would be bound by preexisting Supreme Court precedents speaking to the
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constitutional question over which Congress had precluded formal Supreme Court review. If
state courts found that prior Supreme Court precedents tied their hands, then this sort of
jurisdiction stripping would be limited as a means of promoting democratization of authority
over constitutional interpretation. An unintended effect might even be to freeze in place the
Supreme Court doctrine on the books at the time of the jurisdiction stripping.
Proposals that would strip the jurisdiction of all courts to rule on the constitutionality of
federal (and possibly also state) legislation would undoubtedly have a major effect in allowing
Congress and state legislatures to insulate their preferences and judgments of constitutional
validity from judicial review. Whether congressional preclusion of all judicial review of
specific legislation or policies could fairly be described as injecting political accountability
into the process of constitutional interpretation would depend on (a) whether Congress actually
purported to conclude that the legislation or policies that it shielded from judicial review were
constitutionally valid and (b), if so, whether it took its responsibilities to apply and interpret
the Constitution seriously. Some commentators believe that legislatures in countries that do
not have judicial review discharge their responsibilities to protect individual rights with
impressive conscientiousness. 50 It is also imaginable, however, that legislation precluding all
judicial challenges to particular statutes or programs could have the purpose and effect of
undermining constitutional rights, because Congress and state legislatures might not feel
bound to protect them.

Consequences for the Functioning of the Federal System
The systemic consequences of jurisdiction-stripping legislation would similarly depend
on the details of any particular measure that Congress might adopt. Legislation that withdrew
appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court but retained jurisdiction in the lower federal
courts and in state courts would obviously diminish the capacity of the Supreme Court to
ensure uniformity in constitutional interpretation (and consistency in constitutional outcomes)
across federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts. The courts of appeals and state
supreme courts could become the courts of last resort with respect to the constitutional status
of federal legislation. Thus, a federal statute could be held constitutional by one circuit and
unconstitutional by another, with no apex court to resolve the circuit split. We would regard
this resulting lack of uniformity on matters of great political or constitutional salience as a
significant cost.
In some cases, moreover, the absence of opportunity for appeal to the Supreme Court
could result in a single lower court having the capacity to utter the last, controlling word on
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an important constitutional issue. This result would occur if, for example, a court of appeals
upheld a nationwide injunction against the enforcement of a federal statute or policy based on
a constitutional ruling. Partial jurisdiction stripping would thus empower the lower courts.
A statute that simultaneously withdrew jurisdiction from both the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts could have similar effects in producing unreconciled disagreements
among state courts about important constitutional issues, leading to variation in the U.S.
Constitution’s reach and effects. Furthermore, many courts have concluded that state courts
lack the power to issue injunctions against federal officials, which would contribute to further
disagreement and tension. 51
A jurisdiction-stripping statute that bars state as well as federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to legislation would have even farther-reaching
systemic consequences. Whether by accident or design, it would impliedly reject longstanding
assumptions about what it means to possess a constitutional right in the United States. More
specifically, it would make rights more dependent on legislative exposition, a task that
legislatures may not currently be well-positioned to undertake. Legislatures are not currently
adept at anticipating all possible future applications of a statute and crafting exceptions for
cases that would present constitutional difficulties. It is possible that legislatures might
enhance their relevant skills and resources if courts no longer played such a dominant role, for
example by expanding legal staff dedicated to constitutional analysis. To the extent that
jurisdiction stripping reflects majoritarian impulses while depriving individuals of any right to
seek redress in court, it might also make it harder for minorities to vindicate individual rights
that, in some instances, are essential to constitutional democracy itself.
A final systemic consequence that merits consideration is the extent to which a particular
jurisdiction-stripping measure would tend to contribute to partisan polarization and
institutional instability. 52 There is little empirical data on this point. 53 One might worry that
the turn by transient majorities in Congress to jurisdiction stripping to insulate their preferred
policy objectives from judicial scrutiny could give rise to escalating jurisdiction stripping as
control of Congress changes hands, ultimately resulting in serious abuses of power. Against
this worry, it might be argued that the fact that Congress has long had this tool at its disposal
and has used it infrequently suggests this concern is more hypothetical than real. However, we
cannot rule out the possibility that in the current era, lawmakers might resort to jurisdiction
stripping with increasing frequency in partisan political struggles.
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The Constitutional Permissibility of Jurisdiction Stripping
Debates about the constitutional limits on Congress’s power to restrict the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and the state courts have generated an enormous
literature that was described decades ago as already “choking on redundancy.” 54 Here we can
do no more than highlight some areas of virtual consensus among scholars and identify some
of the issues that different types of jurisdiction-stripping legislation would pose.

Sources of Congress’s Regulatory Power
In order to enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation, Congress must be able to point to a
specific source of authority within the Constitution. Insofar as legislation restricting the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is concerned, power would come from the
Exceptions Clause, as discussed in Section I.A, possibly in conjunction with the Necessary
and Proper Clause. 55
Where jurisdiction-stripping legislation also extends to the lower federal courts, a prima
facie source of authority lies in Article III’s Judicial Vesting Clause, which provides that
Congress “may from time to time ordain and establish” tribunals “inferior” to the Supreme
Court. 56 Traditional understandings hold that the power to create lower courts includes a power
to prescribe and limit their jurisdiction. If a further source of authority were needed, the
Necessary and Proper Clause may provide it.
Insofar as Congress might seek to restrict state court jurisdiction in conjunction with a
restriction on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, its authority would rest solely
on the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress could deprive the state courts of jurisdiction to
entertain a constitutional challenge to state or federal legislation only if doing so was
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” one of the powers of the federal
government, 57 which presumably would include making effective or viable Congress’s
restraints on the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, we note that jurisdiction-stripping legislation might have a spillover impact on
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Because the Supreme Court’s Article III original
jurisdiction extends to cases “in which a State shall be [a] Party,” any case brought by a state
could potentially be filed under the Court’s original jurisdiction. 58 For instance, the landmark
voting rights case of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 59 which upheld the Voting Rights Act
against a broad constitutional challenge, was brought within the Court’s original jurisdiction.
We note that states have filed several high-profile challenges to federal policies in recent
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years. 60 While few of these challenges have been brought as original jurisdiction suits, the
practice could take on more importance if politically salient jurisdiction-stripping legislation
were enacted. The prospect of states filing original actions is significant partly because it is
questionable whether Congress can restrict the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; the
Article III exceptions power does not extend to Supreme Court original jurisdiction. Although
the current original jurisdiction statute does not authorize the full extent of jurisdiction that the
Article III appears to contemplate, some Justices and commenters have expressed doubts about
Congress’s capacity to confine the Court’s original jurisdiction short of its constitutionally
specified bounds. 61 In other words, original jurisdiction could potentially be an important
loophole in many jurisdiction-stripping proposals.

Sources of Limitations on Congress’s Jurisdiction-Stripping Power
For analytical purposes, it is helpful to distinguish two kinds of limitations on Congress’s
powers to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and state
courts. One category includes limitations that are inherent in, or “internal” to, Article III’s
grant of jurisdiction-limiting powers to Congress. Another category of limitations arises from
constitutional provisions that circumscribe congressional power by creating individual rights.
In scholarly literature, such limits are often referred to as “external” limits on congressional
power.
Limits from Within Article III
It is difficult to identify specific examples of clear and noncontroversial internal limits,
because each possible limit is much debated among scholars. That said, it is easy to give
general examples that illustrate the idea. In perhaps the best-known example, Professor Henry
M. Hart, Jr., argued in a much-celebrated contribution to the federal courts literature that the
Constitution’s provision that “the judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court” establishes an implicit limit, internal to Article III, on Congress’s power to
make exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 62 Constitutionally authorized
restrictions, Hart maintained, cannot go so far as to “destroy the essential role of the Supreme
Court in the constitutional plan.” To offer an illustration of this concern, a statute that limited
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to cases presenting issues of statutory interpretation only—
and thus excluded all constitutional issues—might be thought to destroy the Court’s essential
role and thus overreach Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause. We note, however,
that some scholars and commentators appear unpersuaded by Hart’s argument on this point. 63
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In another controversial example, some have argued that a jurisdiction-limiting statute
would exceed Congress’s powers if it were enacted for constitutionally forbidden purposes,
whatever those might be. 64 Whether such an inquiry into purpose is appropriate is a subject of
debate. Ex parte McCardle contains a dictum clearly precluding the inquiry. In response to the
argument that Congress had withdrawn the Court’s appellate jurisdiction for the forbidden
purpose of preventing the enforcement of a constitutional right, the Court answered that “[w]e
are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.” 65 But there is arguably language
in United States v. Klein that supports the inquiry into forbidden purposes; there, the Court
stated that jurisdiction-stripping legislation that is enacted “as a means to an end” that is not
constitutionally valid “is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make
exceptions . . . to the appellate power.” 66 In addition, Supreme Court decisions in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries have made legislative motives relevant to the assessment of statutes’
constitutional validity under a broad range of other constitutional provisions, such as the First
Amendment. 67 In light of those decisions, it is arguable that motive-based analysis could now
be invoked.
Limits from Elsewhere in the Constitution
No one doubts that rights under some provisions of the Constitution define limits on
Congress’s power to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts. In
Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Suspension Clause constitutes a
rights-based limit on congressional power to curb jurisdiction over petitions for the writ of
habeas corpus. 68 Although Boumediene was decided by a narrowly divided Court, it should be
uncontroversial to say that a statute stripping jurisdiction over suits brought by racial
minorities or adherents of a particular religion or political party would violate constitutional
guarantees against discrimination.
Henry Hart famously argued that jurisdiction-limiting legislation would violate the Due
Process Clause if it removed all grants of jurisdiction and all judicial remedies through which
those rights might be vindicated, because a law of that kind would effectively destroy
constitutional rights. According to Hart, it would be “monstrous illogic” to construe
Congress’s power to limit jurisdiction and withhold judicial remedies as a de facto power to
destroy constitutional rights. 69 But there is little case law or other authority identifying where
exactly the lines between the permissible and the impermissible are drawn.
Hart did not believe—and the Supreme Court has denied—that the Constitution
guarantees an effective remedy in court to every person whose constitutional rights have been
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violated. Hart’s concern about the nullification of rights appears to have involved systemic
effects, such as those of imagined legislation that would make it impossible for anyone ever
to judicially vindicate a particular constitutional right at all. But Hart again did not attempt
line drawing of his own and ultimately equivocated even with regard to the question of whether
and when a total deprivation of jurisdiction and remedies to enforce a right might violate the
Constitution. “The multiplicity of remedies, and the fact that Congress has seldom if ever tried
to take them all away, has prevented the issue from ever being squarely presented,” he wrote. 70

The Constitutionality of Particular Jurisdiction-Curbing Proposals
It would be infeasible to attempt to apply the principles delineated above—many of
which, as we acknowledged, are disputed anyway—to all of the specific types of jurisdictioncurbing legislation that Congress might enact. Instead, we analyze some of the general issues
that would arise from jurisdiction-curbing legislation within each of the three categories that
we distinguished at the outset of Section I.B. First, we consider proposals that would restrict
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court alone, while leaving lower court jurisdiction
intact. Second, we consider proposals that would withdraw jurisdiction from all federal courts,
while leaving state court jurisdiction intact. Finally, we consider proposals that would
withdraw jurisdiction from all federal and state courts, including the Supreme Court, to rule
on the constitutionality of federal (and possibly also state) legislation.
Restricting the Jurisdiction of Only the Supreme Court
If Congress were to withdraw the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over a class
of cases—such as those challenging the constitutionality of a wealth tax or of prohibitions
against abortion—while allowing such challenges to be litigated in other courts, including
federal district courts and courts of appeals, challengers would likely argue that the restriction
overstepped congressional power under the Exceptions Clause by precluding the Court from
performing a function essential to its status as the nation’s “one supreme Court.” The argument
would be that the Court is deprived of an aspect of its “supreme” status when it is denied the
opportunity to pronounce authoritatively on a justiciable issue with respect to which the
decisions of lower courts may diverge and might even (from the Court’s perspective) err
egregiously. 71 Proponents of this argument could acknowledge Congress’s authority to
withdraw rights to de novo appellate review by the Supreme Court, but insist that the Court
must retain some minimal capacity to correct clear lower court errors—capacity that
traditionally existed through “discretionary writs, such as mandamus, habeas corpus, and
prohibition.” 72
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When the Supreme Court confronted a statute that deprived it of appellate jurisdiction
over a narrow class of court of appeals decisions in the habeas corpus case of Felker v. Turpin,
the Court upheld the statute, but it emphasized—as it had more than a century earlier in Ex
parte McCardle 73—that it retained jurisdiction to oversee the courts of appeals by entertaining
original applications for the writ. 74 As a result, there appears to be no squarely on-point
precedent deciding whether Congress could more categorically strip the Supreme Court of all
jurisdiction over a particular issue or set of issues that the lower courts could continue to
decide. Perhaps the only clear conclusion is this: A total preclusion of all opportunity for
Supreme Court oversight of lower court decisions involving specific issues, statutes, or
policies would run a greater risk of judicial invalidation than a less-than-total preclusion.
Restricting the Jurisdiction of All Federal Courts, but Not State Courts
There also appears to be no authoritative ruling and no consensus among scholars on the
permissibility of Congress’s stripping all federal courts of jurisdiction over a class of cases—
which again might be cases challenging the constitutionality of a wealth tax or prohibitions
against abortion—while permitting those specified issues to be litigated in the state courts.
Reviving an argument that Justice Joseph Story advanced in the iconic case of Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 75 one prominent modern commentator has argued energetically that
legislation of this kind would violate the provision of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 that “[t]he
judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority.” 76 Under this principally text-based argument, the Exceptions
Clause permits elimination of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in cases “arising
under” federal law if and only if they are subject to the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
Similarly, Congress can divest the lower federal courts of jurisdiction over cases presenting
federal questions that remain within the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review state
court judgments. But, the argument maintains, Congress cannot simultaneously preclude the
exercise of jurisdiction by both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in cases arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.
Other distinguished modern scholars have disagreed with this argument on both
originalist and precedent-based grounds. 77 Among other arguments, they maintain that Article
III’s provision that the judicial power shall extend to “all cases” under the Constitution serves
mainly to clarify that Congress can provide for federal jurisdiction over both civil and criminal
actions if it chooses to do so. 78
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Restricting the Jurisdiction of All Courts, Including State Courts
Simultaneous preclusion of jurisdiction by all courts to consider challenges to the
constitutional validity of legislation would present a plethora of serious constitutional issues.
Among other things, because a statute precluding all judicial jurisdiction would necessarily be
invalid if a preclusion of all federal jurisdiction would be invalid, the grounds for constitutional
objection cumulate as the scope of an attempted issue-specific preclusion of judicial review
expands. Here we identify a few of the distinctive issues that a preclusion of all judicial
jurisdiction would present, though without pretense of exhaustive treatment.
If Congress sought to deprive state courts of jurisdiction to rule on challenges to the
constitutional validity of state legislation under the U.S. Constitution, there would be a serious
question about the source of Congress’s authority to do so. It is not obvious that a federal
statute divesting state courts of jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of state legislation,
for purposes other than granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts, would be
“necessary and proper” for carrying any federal power into execution.
If Congress sought to deprive all courts of jurisdiction to rule on the constitutional validity
of federal legislation, a similar question would arise about the source of Congress’s power. It
might be argued that legislation of this kind would be “necessary and proper” to implement
whatever substantive power supported the enactment of the federal legislation that Congress
sought to shield from judicial scrutiny—for example, a statute imposing a wealth tax or barring
abortions. But that conclusion would be disputable. The Necessary and Proper Clause, and the
doctrine interpreting it, leave room for an argument that a categorical bar on judicial challenges
to arguably unconstitutional legislation is not necessary and proper because of its adverse
impact on constitutional rights.
Depending on the details of any particular measure that Congress might enact, rightsbased restrictions on congressional authority would likely come into play, as well. The
restrictions would perhaps be plainest if Congress sought to provide for coercive enforcement
of a statute by the courts while purporting to withdraw judicial jurisdiction to entertain
constitutional objections to the statute that courts were charged with enforcing. Consider, for
example, if a doctor were prosecuted for violating a statute that forbade performing abortions,
or a taxpayer were prosecuted for refusing to pay a wealth tax. If Congress purported to bar a
court from entertaining defenses that the abortion prohibition or the wealth tax were
unconstitutional, the doctor or the taxpayer would have a more than colorable argument that
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the “jurisdictional” statute violated the Due Process Clause or otherwise intruded on the
courts’ exercise of an irreducibly judicial function.
Conclusion on Constitutionality
Given the Exceptions Clause, Congress undoubtedly has some capacity to disempower
the Supreme Court by restricting its jurisdiction if Congress should choose to do so. But the
precise scope of congressional power is uncertain. Moreover, even if we were prepared to
make conclusions about the proper resolution of disputed issues, the requisite judgments
would depend on the fine-grained details of particular proposals.
That said, we offer three general conclusions: First, congressional legislation aimed at
disempowering the Supreme Court by limiting its jurisdiction to resolve particular
constitutional issues would likely trigger constitutional challenges. Second, depending on the
precise form that jurisdiction-limiting legislation might take, the Supreme Court could
plausibly find some of the possible challenges to be meritorious. Third, the more that
jurisdiction-limiting legislation leaves open alternative avenues for judicial enforcement—
such as through state courts and lower federal courts—the more likely it is to survive
constitutional challenges. However, leaving open alternative avenues for judicial enforcement
might also hinder jurisdiction-stripping legislation from achieving the ends that its proponents
would wish to realize.

Proposals for Supermajority Rules or Deference Rules at the
Supreme Court
A second way to reduce the Supreme Court’s power would be to impose a supermajority
voting requirement for decisions finding actions of the political branches unconstitutional, or
alternatively, to require the Court to apply a deferential standard of review in constitutional
cases. These proposals would make it more difficult than it is today for the Supreme Court to
invalidate legislation and other acts of the elected branches on constitutional grounds. Like
other proposals discussed in this Chapter, they therefore would shift some power away from
the Court, although they would still leave the Court as the ultimate authority over
constitutional matters.
This Part provides an overview of supermajority voting requirements and deferential
standards of review as potential reforms. It begins with a historical and comparative look at
proposals for supermajority voting requirements advanced at earlier times in U.S. history and
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approaches adopted in foreign and state courts. It next considers the advantages and potential
drawbacks of a supermajority voting rule and assesses the feasibility of particular approaches
to implementation, particularly by considering the implications for the lower courts of a
supermajority rule at the Supreme Court. It then considers the advantages and drawbacks of
reducing the Court’s power by requiring a deferential standard of review. Finally, this Part
concludes by examining Congress’s power under the Constitution to impose either type of
reform.

Supermajority Voting Requirements—Historical and
Comparative Context
Proposals for supermajority voting requirements generally focus on the U.S. Supreme
Court. Federal district judges preside alone, or on three-judge panels, such that decisions by
the district courts are either unanimous or by 2-1 panel vote. Similarly, federal courts of
appeals typically preside in three-judge panels, deciding cases either unanimously or by 2-1
panel vote, though when they sit en banc, a supermajority requirement could be applied to
change their current simple majority voting practice. Congress might prescribe supermajority
voting rules for state courts, but this is an uncommon suggestion and, as discussed below, it
may be subject to substantial constitutional objections.
By longstanding practice, the U.S. Supreme Court decides cases by simple majority vote.
Neither Article III of the Constitution nor Congress in the 1789 Judiciary Act directly specified
how the Supreme Court’s cases should be decided. From the beginning, however, the Court
appears to have assumed that a simple majority vote was sufficient to determine its rulings—
a conclusion generally consistent with the practices of Anglo-American multimember courts
of the time.
The first proposal in Congress for a supermajority voting requirement at the Supreme
Court seems to have been made in 1823, and over sixty such proposals have been offered at
various times since then. 79 During the Reconstruction Era, the Republican-controlled House
of Representatives passed a bill imposing a supermajority vote requirement for invalidating
federal legislation, but the Senate did not act on it. 80 In the 1920s, Idaho Senator William
Borah made an influential proposal to require that:
in all suits now pending, or which may hereafter be pending, in the Supreme Court of
the United States, except cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls and those in which a State shall be a party, where is drawn in question an Act
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of Congress on the ground of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States, at
least seven members of the court concur before pronouncing said law
unconstitutional. 81
A more recent proposal, from 1967, encompassed rulings against both state and federal
law:
The Supreme Court may not in any case hold that any provision of an Act of Congress,
an Act of the legislature of any State, or a constitution of a State is invalid because it
violates a provision of the Constitution of the United States unless at least six Justices
of the Supreme Court concur in that holding. 82
Many (perhaps all) of these proposals appear to have been reactions to particular rulings
or lines of rulings of the Court, or concerns about particular rulings the Court might issue. For
example, in the 1820s, members of Congress were principally concerned about Supreme Court
decisions invalidating state laws. 83 After the Civil War, Congress worried that the Court might
invalidate Reconstruction legislation or even question the validity of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself; in the early twentieth century, Senator Borah and his supporters were
reacting to pro-business decisions issued by narrow majorities of the Court. 84
Although Congress never enacted a supermajority rule for Supreme Court voting, North
Dakota, Nebraska, and Ohio each adopted supermajority voting for their supreme courts in the
early twentieth century. The North Dakota Constitution provides that the state supreme court
“shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at least four of the [five]
members of the court so decide.” 85 Similarly, the Nebraska Constitution provides: “No
legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five [of seven]
judges.” 86 A scholarly examination of experience under these provisions suggests that they
have not posed significant operational difficulties. 87 Ohio adopted a similar constitutional
amendment in 1912, which it repealed in 1968 after experiencing difficulties in practice. 88
Although majority voting is the most common practice among multimember courts
worldwide, a number of high courts outside the United States (including in Mexico and South
Korea) operate under a supermajority voting requirement for constitutional adjudication.
According to a recent study, at least ten countries have such a requirement, typically imposed
in their constitutions. 89 Some of these countries have substantial experience with constitutional
litigation under supermajority voting rules. For example, South Korea adopted the current
version of its supermajority rule for its constitutional court in 1987, requiring the votes of six
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out of nine justices to find a statute unconstitutional. A study of the South Korean
constitutional court counted sixty-two cases from 1987 to 2016 decided by a 4-5 vote (that is,
in which five, but not more than five, justices thought the statute was unconstitutional), along
with a substantial docket of constitutional cases in which the votes were not so closely
divided. 90 The study does not suggest significant tensions arising in Korean law or in the
conduct of the court as a result of the supermajority voting rule, although it identifies a few
issues of implementation. 91 Comparative experience also indicates that a supermajority voting
rule does not necessarily prevent a constitutional court from issuing important rulings finding
statutes to be unconstitutional. For example, Mexico’s Supreme Court—despite operating
under a rule generally requiring the vote of 8 of 11 justices to invalidate legislation—has issued
a number of important constitutional rulings against the government. 92

Evaluating Supermajority Voting Requirements
In this section, we begin by articulating the arguments made by proponents of
supermajority voting requirements as well as those made by skeptics. We then evaluate the
extent to which supermajority voting rules would achieve the goals of their proponents and
identify some implementation concerns that must be taken into account when considering
these proposals.

Goals and Risks
The principal goal of proposals for supermajority voting requirements is to make it more
difficult for the Court to invalidate laws or other government actions on constitutional grounds.
A supermajority voting requirement would require broader agreement among the Justices with
the judgment of unconstitutionality than under a simple majority voting rule. In the view of
advocates of these proposals, the Court today is not sufficiently deferential to lawmakers by
historical standards; it is too prone to overturning laws and thwarting the outcomes of the
democratic process. 93 Relatedly, proponents emphasize that the Court has resolved too many
disputed constitutional issues by narrow 5-4 majorities, particularly in the modern era. 94 This
observation sometimes centers specifically on the Court’s perceived willingness to overturn
acts of Congress, while other times it is raised more generally about the Court’s resolution of
disputed matters of social policy. Some proponents of these proposals view supermajority
voting requirements as a bright-line, readily enforceable means of approximating the kind of
deference to legislative judgment that James Bradley Thayer sought to achieve through a “rule
of [judicial] administration” under which courts would invalidate congressional legislation
only in cases of “clear” unconstitutionality. 95
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Some scholars also ground their support for supermajority voting on the greater likelihood
that the Court will reach correct constitutional decisions if a supermajority must agree that a
law is unconstitutional. 96 Supermajority requirements would, in their view, also enhance
deliberation and consensus-building among the Justices, leading on balance to superior
outcomes. 97
For skeptics of supermajority voting rules, a central concern is that such measures would
undercut judicial capacity to protect constitutional rights against majoritarian overreach. One
longstanding, conventional view of the courts and constitutional review is that they serve as a
valuable countermajoritarian check on the political branches by vindicating individual and
structural rights in constitutional cases, limiting the abuse of power by overweening
legislatures and executive officers. 98 A supermajority voting requirement would make it more
difficult for courts to protect constitutional rights as they interpret them. A related concern is
that a supermajority voting rule would weaken courts’ ability to protect the constitutional
structures of federalism and separation of powers against encroachment by Congress.
Supermajority voting rules thus might not only enhance congressional power as compared to
the courts; they might also enhance congressional power as compared to the states and the
executive branch.
Supporters of disempowering proposals counter that supermajority voting requirements
actually may bolster constitutional rights precisely by restricting the Supreme Court, on the
ground that “rights protection may well be available in superior form through political
branches.” 99 Instead of looking exclusively to courts as protectors of individual rights and
legislatures as threats to those rights, such commentators admire legislative efforts like the
Voting Rights Act as protective of constitutional rights and criticize the Court’s decision to
invalidate Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder. 100 They see an
important role for the political branches in promoting constitutional freedom that courts
recently, in their view, have undercut. 101 Moreover, if one thinks the courts are too protective
of the states and the executive branch, or that structural disputes are better worked out
politically rather than through the judiciary, enhancing congressional power in the area would
be an advantage.

Efficacy and Implementation
Any ultimate assessment of the systemic consequences of supermajority voting
requirements will depend on one’s perspective on the role the Supreme Court and the federal
judiciary ought to play within our system of government and on how well the democratic
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lawmaking process and its various institutions currently operate. Evaluating these proposals
will hinge in large part on one’s view of the relative abilities of courts and legislatures to
protect constitutional rights. Whatever one’s perspective on this question, which we do not
purport to answer, we think it useful to offer observations concerning the likely effects of a
supermajority voting requirement for the Supreme Court.
We believe that supermajority voting requirements are likely to achieve at least some of
the effects intended by proponents. Supermajority voting may shift authority over
constitutional questions marginally away from the Supreme Court and toward other
government actors by reducing the likelihood that the Court would find actions of the political
branches unconstitutional. But supermajority requirements also would bring with them their
own potential costs, and it is uncertain that greater “correctness” would result from
supermajority voting in the absence of agreed-upon criteria for differentiating correct from
incorrect decisions. 102 The extent of success would depend on how the supermajority voting
requirements were imposed, and the general idea of supermajority voting gives rise to some
specific implementation challenges, particularly given the wide range of cases that come
before the Court in varied procedural posture. Below, we highlight a few of the many
complications that might arise.
First, a supermajority requirement would complicate the Supreme Court’s supervision of
the courts of appeals. Though a full accounting of these technical issues would be too extensive
to analyze in detail here, it is important to consider what the weight of a 5-4 decision of the
Supreme Court would be in a world where a 6-3 decision is required to find a statute
unconstitutional. Imagine that the Supreme Court votes 5-4 to affirm a lower court decision
that invalidated a federal law on constitutional grounds. What happens to the constitutional
challenge? The 5-4 vote falls short of the requisite supermajority needed to find
unconstitutionality, so does the Court’s decision amount to a decision to reverse the lower
court judgment invalidating the statute? We would assume so, given that the principal
motivation for the supermajority rule is greater judicial deference to the political branches.
The alternative, in which the lower court decision is undisturbed, would not actually promote
judicial deference; it would only shift power from the Supreme Court to the lower courts.
But this disjunction between the majority of judges who have heard a case and concluded
that a law is unconstitutional and the legal outcome of the case dictated by the supermajority
voting requirement could cause confusion for subsequent courts that must interpret the
doctrinal meaning of those cases. Should courts follow the reasoning of the majority of Justices
in the 5-4 case, or disregard the majority opinion and instead follow the reasoning of the four-
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Justice minority that controls the outcome of the case under the supermajority requirement?
The greater precedential weight given to the minority’s opinion, the greater the level of
deference produced by the new supermajority requirement. These issues are novel, as far as
we can tell, for U.S. law. Past practice with supermajority voting at the state level is too sparse
to establish a clear model for judicial decisionmaking. As noted, other countries with
supermajority voting requirements for their highest court apply their rules without substantial
difficulty, but these systems are often procedurally distinct from the U.S. system, particularly
in terms of appellate structure. 103
Second, Congress might consider extending a supermajority voting requirement to lower
federal courts or state courts in addition to the Supreme Court. As noted, this extension would
not change current practice for lower federal courts apart from en banc hearings. Most state
supreme courts use majority voting, but their cases generally involve state law rather than
federal law, so the effect (assuming it applied only to decisions under the U.S. Constitution)
would not be wide-reaching.
A supermajority voting requirement applied only to the U.S. Supreme Court (or to all
federal courts) might have the incidental effect of empowering state courts. Even if Congress
extended a supermajority voting requirement to state supreme courts when they decide federal
constitutional questions, state courts would still remain free to decide the constitutionality of
state laws under their state constitutions, which often contain guarantees that parallel the
federal Constitution. 104 These state-law guarantees would likely increase in importance if
courts were constrained in their authority to decide under the federal Constitution (assuming
the supermajority vote requirement applies only to federal constitutional questions). As
discussed in connection with jurisdiction stripping, it is not necessarily preferable to have state
courts substitute for federal courts in constitutional review of state lawmaking.
Third, in designing a supermajority voting rule, Congress also would need to consider to
which laws or actions it would apply. Supermajority voting requirements could be imposed
for review of (a) only federal legislation; (b) federal legislation and federal executive actions;
or (c) all federal and state lawmaking. The reduction in judicial influence vis-à-vis the other
branches of government would vary in step with the reach of the supermajority voting
requirement. Simply put, the more actions to which the supermajority voting requirement
applied, the greater the shift in influence to other institutions such as Congress, the Presidency,
and state legislatures.
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The proper specification of scope depends on the particular motivation for imposing a
supermajority voting requirement. If the motivation is limited to addressing the courts’
insufficient constitutional deference to Congress, then extension of the requirement to cases
involving executive action or state laws seems unnecessary. However, if the motivation is a
broader concern about judicial countermajoritarianism and insufficient judicial deference
generally to the full political process, extension of the supermajority voting requirement to
cases involving a wider spectrum of democratic actors makes more sense. Again, extension of
the requirement beyond federal actors and federal law complicates the constitutional analysis,
as we discuss in the next section.
Another important question of scope is whether the requirements would apply to all laws
or just to those that Congress singled out on an issue-specific or even a law-specific basis. For
example, instead of specifying a supermajority voting rule for all constitutional decisions of
the Supreme Court, Congress might do so only for constitutional review of a wealth tax or
only for constitutional review of abortion restrictions. As we discuss further in our
constitutional analysis, whether a supermajority voting rule applies generally or on an issuespecific basis might influence its constitutionality as well.
No matter how the requirement is designed, a supermajority voting requirement is likely
to affect only a limited number of cases as a practical matter. By its terms, the requirement
would not affect cases where a majority of the Court votes to uphold the action in question. In
addition, the requirement would not change the outcome where the Court finds a constitutional
violation by a supermajority vote. Unlike other disempowering reforms such as jurisdiction
stripping, a supermajority voting rule would leave the Court (and lower courts) with clear
authority to invalidate laws for unconstitutionality. The supermajority requirement changes
outcomes only where the Court would invalidate a law by a bare majority rather than a
supermajority. 105
Of course, the relatively few close cases where a supermajority voting requirement would
affect the outcome may be quite important. Shelby County v. Holder, in which a 5-4 majority
of the Supreme Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, was such a case. 106
Similarly, United States v. Windsor, where a 5-4 Court majority declared unconstitutional part
of the Defense of Marriage Act, 107 also would have been decided otherwise under a
supermajority voting rule. Much of the support for disempowering reforms galvanizes around
similarly controversial closely decided cases, in which the Court has divided narrowly along
ideological or partisan lines. For those critical cases, supermajority voting requirements could
marginally redistribute resolution of close constitutional calls to Congress, where these
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advocates contend they belong. 108 In addition, even if a supermajority voting rule changes the
outcomes of only a few Supreme Court cases, the jurisprudential consequences of these
decisions may be far reaching, as they may set legal precedent for a large number of lower
court cases as well. For instance, a decision in which only a bare majority, but not a
supermajority, of Justices thought the application of a statute to a criminal defendant violated
the defendant’s constitutional rights would apply potentially to many other cases involving the
same statute; similarly situated defendants thus might be precluded from raising the same
constitutional claim against the federal criminal statute.
An additional challenge involving the application of supermajority voting rules is that
court majorities may be able to achieve their preferred outcomes despite a supermajority
requirement by narrowly interpreting laws rather than finding them unconstitutional. A
supermajority voting requirement would apply only when courts find a constitutional violation
but (we assume) not when a court simply reads a law to have a narrow application that stunts
its impact. In those cases, a court would avoid the supermajority requirement by understanding
it not to be triggered in the first place. One witness testified before us that courts in Japan and
the United Kingdom are widely known for their judicial restraint regarding outright
invalidation of legislation, but they nonetheless engage in “wide-ranging sub-constitutional
review in the guise of statutory (re)interpretation” that effectively limits the purpose and reach
of challenged laws. 109

Deferential Standards of Review
Another means of reducing the power of the judiciary by changing its decisionmaking
practices would be for Congress to impose a deferential standard of review in constitutional
cases. (We assume this reform would apply to the judiciary generally, as it appears to make
little sense to impose deference only on the Supreme Court.) Like a supermajority voting
requirement, this reform would have the purpose of reducing the courts’ propensity to
invalidate acts of Congress (or acts of the political branches and the states more generally,
depending on how the standard is designed). 110 Congress could provide by statute that the
federal courts shall not invalidate legislation (or other government action) unless the court
concludes that it is clearly unconstitutional (or some similar standard). As mentioned earlier,
James Bradley Thayer famously proposed a standard of clear unconstitutionality before courts
should invalidate congressional statutes, though his proposal was principally directed to courts
themselves rather than as a legislative reform. 111 Notably, the Court on its own initiative has
adopted highly deferential standards of review in particular subject areas of constitutional
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adjudication, such as review of ordinary economic regulation for consistency with the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 112
Though Congress has sometimes imposed deferential standards of review on the federal
courts with respect to statutory and other sub-constitutional questions of law, 113 requiring a
more deferential standard of review for constitutional questions has been quite uncommon. In
AEDPA, Congress imposed a highly deferential standard of review on federal courts (in a
different context) that might offer a potential example; the statute prohibited federal courts
from granting federal habeas corpus relief to state criminal defendants unless the previous
state court adjudication of the claim was an “unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law” or based on an “unreasonable determination” of the facts. 114 Congress could
consider imposing a similarly deferential standard on constitutional review of legislation.
A deferential standard of judicial review would be functionally similar to, but distinct
from, a supermajority voting requirement. It would achieve greater deference than current
practice by requiring greater subjective certainty as to a law’s unconstitutionality from each
judge before voting to invalidate a law. But at the Supreme Court only a simple majority of
Justices would need to vote in favor of unconstitutionality for a statute to be invalidated. By
comparison, a supermajority voting requirement is what some scholars call a “hard
solution.” 115 It would not require the Justices to adjust their subjective evaluations, but it would
seek to protect the decisions of the elected branches by requiring a greater number of Justices
to find unconstitutionality. A supermajority voting requirement would not directly impose the
clear unconstitutionality standard advocated by Thayer, because it would not restrict judges to
voting to invalidate statutes only in cases of clear error. For example, it is possible that a
supermajority of Justices could agree that it was a close (not clear) question whether a statute
was constitutional but decide that the statute was ultimately unconstitutional. In such a
situation, a supermajority of Justices might still decide in favor of unconstitutionality and
therefore satisfy the supermajority voting requirement, in spite of the fact that they also agree
that the constitutional question is a close or debatable one. Supermajority voting requirements
and heightened deference standards thus can produce different outcomes.
A required deferential standard of review seems easier to adopt than a supermajority
voting requirement, avoiding some of the complexities mentioned above. It might be less
effective in shifting power away from the courts, depending on the extent to which judges
were willing to internalize an externally imposed deference standard. Like a supermajority
voting requirement, it might lead courts to reach their preferred outcomes by sub-constitutional
means, such as by interpreting statutes narrowly. Also like a supermajority voting requirement,
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the principal objection would seem to be that it would lessen courts’ ability to protect
constitutional rights and structure from transgressions by Congress and the Executive.

The Constitutional Permissibility of Supermajority Voting and
Deference Rules
Supermajority Rules
Whether Congress could impose some form of supermajority voting requirement on the
Supreme Court without a constitutional amendment is a difficult question. 116 As with
jurisdiction-stripping legislation discussed earlier, a central issue would be the constitutional
source of Congress’s power. Again, like jurisdiction stripping, one possibility is the
Exceptions and Regulations Clause of Article III, which grants the Supreme Court “appellate
Jurisdiction, as to both Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.” 117 Reliance on this provision would be subject to many of the
difficulties discussed earlier with respect to jurisdiction stripping. Further, it is less clear that
this clause allows Congress to regulate decisionmaking procedures of the Court, as opposed
to matters affecting its jurisdiction—the term used in the text. However, one could argue that
a supermajority voting rule is a “regulation” of the manner in which the Court exercises its
appellate jurisdiction. 118
To the extent the power to create supermajority voting rules is located in the Exceptions
and Regulations Clause, that power would likely not extend to matters under the Court’s
original jurisdiction, which is described in a separate sentence of Article III and so appears not
to be covered by the Exceptions and Regulations Clause. 119 That could create an odd situation:
The majority required to overturn a statute on constitutional grounds would depend on the
route the case took to reach the Court. Although the vast majority of cases currently reach the
Court through its appellate jurisdiction, that might change if the supermajority rule applied to
one type of jurisdiction but not the other. 120
Another possible source of congressional authority to impose a supermajority voting rule
might be the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8. 121 That clause grants
Congress authority to “Make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” It is commonly
understood that this clause is the source of Congress’s power to legislate with respect to the
structure and procedures of the Court. For example, Congress has by statute designated the
size of the Court as nine Justices, 122 with a quorum of six required for issuing decisions, 123 and
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set the start of the Court’s annual Term (the first Monday in October), 124 to be held at the “seat
of government.” 125 These statutory provisions “carry[] into Execution” the judicial power
vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution.
However, one might conclude that Congress’s power to carry into execution the powers
of the Supreme Court only empowers Congress to facilitate the operation of the Court.
Legislation designed to limit the power of the Court (as a supermajority voting requirement
might plausibly be described) would arguably not be enacted to carry into execution the
Court’s power, but rather to frustrate (to some extent) the Court’s power. It thus might not be
regarded as “necessary and proper” to a constitutionally permissible purpose.
Alternatively, one might locate Congress’s power to prescribe judicial supermajority
voting rules in Congress’s power to make laws necessary and proper to carry into execution
Congress’s own powers. For example, in legislating to regulate commerce among the states,
Congress might think that limiting the Court’s review of such legislation is necessary and
proper to giving that legislation full effect. But one might also conclude that Congress’s power
to effectuate its own legislation does not extend to limiting the Court’s power of constitutional
review (or, in textual terms, that limiting the Court’s review is not “necessary and proper” to
Congress’s exercising its own power).
Regardless of the potential sources of congressional power, the Court might also take the
position that judicial action by majority vote is implied by the grant of “the judicial Power” to
the Court in Article III, 126 since action by majority is the usual and historical practice of
multimember courts and was the presumed way that courts operated at the time of the
Founding. At minimum, it might be thought that the power to determine voting rules lies with
the courts through the Constitution’s vesting of the judicial power. On this view, Congress
would not have power to interfere with a power constitutionally granted to another branch.
However, judicial action by majority vote could also be viewed merely as a default rule that
could be altered by Congress, assuming Congress had an applicable power granted to it by the
Constitution.
There is little precedent or practice to inform any of these matters. Congress has rarely
acted in ways that materially restrict the Court’s decisionmaking procedures. As discussed in
Part I of this Chapter, scholars have debated how the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Klein 127 affects Congress’s powers to control the Court’s decisionmaking. Klein’s
implications for Congress’s power to impose a supermajority voting rule on the Court are
uncertain. 128 One reading of Klein is that Congress infringes the judicial power when it directs
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courts to reach an unconstitutional result, which arguably would be the effect of a
supermajority voting rule. Thus, the Court might conclude that Klein bars Congress from
influencing judicial outcomes through devices such as a supermajority voting rule.
A supermajority voting requirement could be restricted by Congress to particular pieces
of legislation, or alternately to a specified area of law, where congressional action arguably
warrants greater judicial deference. For instance, Congress might understand the Fourteenth
Amendment’s textual direction that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article” as granting Congress broader prerogatives vis-à-vis
the courts. The argument would be that a higher bar should apply before courts can invalidate
legislation enacted under the specified congressional enforcement powers. To be sure, this
position likely would not withstand review by the Supreme Court, absent a change in
doctrine. In a different context, the Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 129 largely
rejected the view that Congress possesses enhanced authority to interpret the Constitution
when acting pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Still, four dissenting
Justices and many scholars from across the political spectrum have argued that historical and
textual considerations support broader congressional interpretative authority with respect to
the Fourteenth Amendment than the Court majority recognized. 130
Attempts by Congress to impose broad versions of the supermajority voting rule—for
example, extending it to state courts or to judicial review of state legislation—seem even more
likely to raise constitutional doubts as to the source of Congress’s power. Any claim of
congressional power to regulate voting requirements in state courts would need to rely on its
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. To the extent that the Necessary and Proper
Clause allows Congress to impose a supermajority rule on the Supreme Court’s review of
federal legislation (an untested proposition), that power might also be thought to extend
equally to state court review of federal legislation. Requiring state court supermajorities to
invalidate federal legislation might similarly be necessary and proper to implementation of
federal policies. Requiring state court supermajorities to invalidate state legislation on federal
constitutional grounds seems less capable of justification under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, as it would not involve the implementation of federal legislation.
In sum, while definite conclusions are elusive in this area and the analysis will vary
depending on the particular contours of any proposed reform, it seems quite plausible that the
Court would find a congressional attempt to impose a supermajority rule on the Court’s
decisionmaking, or courts generally, to be beyond Congress’s power. It should be noted that
Congress might be able to impose a version of a supermajority rule on the Court by prescribing
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an even number of Justices. As discussed in Chapter 2, Congress has broad power to establish
the number of Justices on the Court. 131 Even using a rule of majority vote, a six-Justice Court
in effect requires a 2/3 supermajority vote (four of six) to act, while an eight-Justice Court in
effect requires a 62.5% supermajority (five of eight).

Deferential Standards of Review
The related proposal discussed above—for Congress to limit the Court’s authority to
situations of clear constitutional error (or a similar standard of review)—would raise generally
parallel constitutional issues. There would first be the question of the constitutional source of
Congress’s power. Congress might claim power from the Exceptions and Regulations Clause
or from the Necessary and Proper Clause, each of which would be subject to the potential
objections noted above in relation to supermajority voting proposals. There might also be the
objection that establishing a standard of constitutional review for the Court, like establishing
a voting procedure in constitutional cases, is committed to the Court, not Congress, by the
vesting of “the judicial Power” in the courts in Article III, Section 1.
Congress commonly prescribes standards of review for courts in statutory and
administrative matters, and this is generally not thought to raise constitutional problems. For
example, the Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of certain agency
actions under an “arbitrary or capricious” standard, and some statutes wholly preclude judicial
review of administrative or executive determinations. As described previously, in AEDPA
Congress imposed a deferential standard of review on federal courts’ habeas corpus review of
state criminal convictions, and the Supreme Court has routinely applied AEDPA without
finding constitutional problems. 132 However, a congressionally prescribed standard of review
for constitutional claims more generally is arguably distinguishable. AEDPA applies only to
cases on collateral review after state court convictions have been upheld pursuant to
nondeferential standards on direct review or otherwise have ripened into final judgments. The
Court might well find a congressionally mandated standard of review in constitutional cases
to be an infringement of the judicial power.
Of course, a supermajority voting rule or a deferential standard of review could be
imposed by constitutional amendment, regardless of any limitations under the current
Constitution. Several of the historical proposals for supermajority voting requirements took
the form of constitutional amendments. 133 As discussed above, there would be substantial
technical issues of implementation, particularly for supermajority rules, but these could
conceivably be addressed by careful drafting.
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Proposals to Enable Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court
Decisions
Another way to reduce the Supreme Court’s power would be to allow Congress to
override Court decisions that strike down federal or state legislation on constitutional
grounds. 134 A constitutional amendment adopting a system of legislative overrides was urged
in the Progressive Era and during the New Deal period. More recently, the idea of an override
has been floated by advocates on both the right and left of the political spectrum as a way to
minimize judicial supremacy—i.e., the system under which the Court is the final and
authoritative arbiter of the constitutionality of statutes or executive action. Legislative
overrides exist in several countries, including in Canada and Israel, and other countries reject
judicial supremacy even without a formal system of legislative overrides.
Legislative override systems can take different forms. For example, section 33 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, known as the “notwithstanding clause,” allows
both the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to “expressly declare” by a simple
majority that a law “shall operate notwithstanding” a provision in the Charter, whether or not
a court has already ruled the law unconstitutional. Only some Charter provisions may be
overridden, and an override ceases to have effect five years after it comes into force, though it
may be reenacted by the legislature upon its expiration. 135 Israel’s legislative override system
is similar but allows an override only by the national parliament, applies only to the right to
“freedom of occupation,” and has a four-year sunset provision. 136
A constitutional amendment establishing a legislative override system would allow
Congress and the President to override Supreme Court decisions that strike down legislation
on constitutional grounds. The system could follow the ordinary legislative process of
bicameralism and presentment; alternatively, an override could require a supermajority vote
by both houses of Congress, as well as presidential signature. A system could allow override
of any court decision striking down a statute on constitutional grounds, or it could be limited
to decisions involving certain constitutional provisions. It could allow permanent override of
decisions or it could specify that the override will sunset after a particular period of time, at
which point the courts’ prior interpretation would prevail. In addition, the system could allow
Congress to act prospectively in anticipation of a negative court decision or only after a court
has struck down legislation. 137
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Supporters argue that legislative overrides would cabin excessive judicial power in favor
of democratic decisionmaking, while also encouraging greater constitutional discourse and
deliberation within the legislative and executive branches and among the public as part of the
political process. They contend that the system can be designed in ways to minimize risk to
individual rights, structural design, and the stability of law. Perhaps because an explicit
override system would very likely require a constitutional amendment, the academic debate
on legislative overrides is relatively limited. No recent commentator has offered a
programmatic blueprint for overrides, though arguments have long existed to support the
assertion of constitutional interpretive authority by Congress (and the Executive) in ways short
of an override. In the analysis that follows, we briefly provide a historical background, an
evaluation of various forms of legislative overrides, and a constitutional assessment.

Constitutional and Historical Background
As discussed in the Introduction to this Chapter, it is widely believed that the Supreme
Court has the last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that its decisions
bind not only the parties in a particular case but also future action by the President, Congress,
and the states. This approach to judicial review—known as “judicial supremacy”—has been
embraced by the Supreme Court for many decades. 138 Yet the extent of the Court’s authority
to serve as the final interpreter of the Constitution—or to foreclose contrary interpretation by
other branches of government acting in their own spheres—has also long been contested.
In the early years of the Republic, many argued that each of the three branches of
government was endowed with the power of constitutional interpretation. As long as
legislative and executive branch actors obeyed specific Court orders in specific cases, they
could act on a contrary interpretation of the Constitution. 139
Those who embrace judicial supremacy often point to Chief Justice John Marshall’s
famous pronouncement in Marbury v. Madison that “it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 140 Indeed, that line has been cited by the
Supreme Court in recent decades to support a strong approach to judicial supremacy. However,
according to many scholars, Chief Justice Marshall was asserting only the authority of judicial
review—i.e., the power of a court to refuse to give effect to an act or mandate of a coordinate
branch of government—not the power of judicial supremacy. Moreover, over the course of
the country’s history, numerous Presidents have claimed the right to engage in independent
and co-equal constitutional interpretation. Although nearly all Presidents have conceded that
they are bound by direct orders from the Supreme Court, they have also offered their own
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constitutional interpretations through signing statements, litigation, and enforcement practices
that have been in tension with, or even contrary to, Supreme Court precedent. 141 Likewise,
Congress has sometimes resisted—or refused to acquiesce to—the Court’s constitutional
interpretations, for example by attempting to overrule Court decisions through legislation, or
by enacting statutes in considerable tension with prior Supreme Court decisions. 142
On several occasions over the course of U.S. history, advocates have sought to amend the
Constitution in order to grant Congress power to overrule the Supreme Court’s rulings striking
down federal statutes through a formal system of legislative overrides. The Progressive Party,
which ran a ticket with Senator Robert La Follette (Wisconsin) and Senator Burton Wheeler
(Montana) in the 1924 presidential election, included a provision in its platform calling for “a
constitutional amendment providing that Congress may by enacting a statute make it effective
over a judicial veto.” 143 La Follette was a vocal advocate for the amendment, which would
have allowed Congress to override the Supreme Court by repassing any legislation previously
declared unconstitutional. 144
In 1937, Senator Wheeler, who remained a Democratic Senator from Montana following
his unsuccessful bid for the Vice Presidency, along with Senator Homer Bone, a Republican
from Washington State, introduced a variation on the Progressive Era proposal. Their
constitutional amendment would have allowed Congress, by a two-thirds vote of each
Chamber, to overturn a Supreme Court decision holding an act unconstitutional—but not until
after the election following the Supreme Court decision. 145 Notably, Senator Wheeler was a
strong supporter of the New Deal but adamantly opposed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
proposal to increase the size of the Supreme Court. 146 Reportedly, two of President Roosevelt’s
closest advisors, Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran, also privately opposed the proposal
for Court expansion in favor of a constitutional amendment similar to the one proposed by
Senator Wheeler. Their version would have allowed Congress to overturn immediately a
Supreme Court constitutional decision striking down a federal statute by a two-thirds vote
from each chamber, or to overturn such a decision by a simple majority following the next
election. 147
More recently, proposals for overrides by Congress have appeared only in academic
writing and public commentary. For example, in 1996, Robert H. Bork—who served as a judge
on the D.C. Circuit and as Solicitor General of the United States—wrote an essay in which he
argued that the “most important moral, political, and cultural decisions affecting our lives are
steadily being removed from democratic control.” He suggested that the Constitution be
amended to enable modification or reversal of Supreme Court decisions by a simple majority
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vote of the Senate and House of Representatives. 148 A few scholars from the opposite side of
the political spectrum from Bork have recently expressed support for legislative overrides,
albeit without offering any detailed proposal. 149 Meanwhile, at the state level, numerous state
legislators have introduced legislation to allow overrides of state court decisions, though none
of these efforts has been successful. 150

Evaluation of Override Proposals
In this Section, we consider (a) the goals of a system of overrides and whether such goals
are likely to be achieved by the reform; and (b) the overall consequences for the functioning
of the constitutional system if overrides are successfully implemented. We also distinguish
among different forms of override systems. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that
an override system would be adopted through constitutional amendment, though we discuss
the arguments regarding how Congress might engage in independent constitutional
interpretation or attempt to limit the reach of Supreme Court decisions in Part III.C.
As with the other reforms discussed in this Chapter, we note that a system of legislative
overrides has no inherent or fixed partisan or ideological valence—an override system could
be used to advance the goals of any legislative majority or supermajority. However, some
commentators have argued that elite interests are more likely to find a favorable audience with
the Supreme Court, and therefore to benefit from a system of judicial supremacy; on this
account, shifting power away from the courts and toward the legislature would benefit nonelites. 151 Others, however, have argued that Congress is also more responsive to elites than it
is to non-elites or the poor. 152

Goals and Efficacy
Congress on occasion has enacted one-off efforts to override a Supreme Court decision.
But its efforts, such as its attempt to override the Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona 153
with the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1968, have tended to have subject-specific goals (to change a
particular constitutional doctrine) and have generally been rebuffed by the Court. 154 The goals
of a constitutional amendment enabling legislative overrides would be more fundamental.
Their chief aim would be to allocate power away from the Supreme Court and toward the
elected branches. Proponents of legislative overrides, as with other disempowerment reforms,
worry that the Supreme Court exercises excessive power over the resolution of major social,
political, and cultural decisions—decisions that would be better resolved through the
democratic process. As we discuss in the Introduction to this Chapter, for these critics, the
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Supreme Court’s fundamentally “countermajoritarian” character is in tension with the basic
commitments of a democracy.
The concern about excessive Court power is not limited to one political camp.
Conservatives objected to the Warren Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy in desegregation
and criminal law cases, 155 as well as to more recent rulings striking down prohibitions on gay
marriage and restrictions on abortion. On the left, concerns about judicial supremacy,
dominant during the early twentieth century when the Court routinely struck down legislation
protective of workers and consumers, have returned in recent years as the Court has exercised
less deference to congressional judgments about the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments
and civil rights (e.g., in voting rights cases such as Shelby County v. Holder), 156 and as it has
used the First Amendment to invalidate campaign finance regulation and union security
agreements. 157
Proponents of legislative overrides also emphasize two other, related goals: Overrides
would strengthen the system of checks and balances by allowing Congress the power to
override the Court much like it can override presidential vetoes, and they would strengthen
public deliberation and discourse on constitutional matters by empowering the people’s
representatives to decide constitutional questions and thus returning such questions directly to
the political process. 158
As a theoretical matter, a system of legislative overrides should accomplish all three of
the goals their proponents advance. By expressly allowing Congress to overrule the Court’s
constitutional decisions, the power of Congress over fundamental social, political, and cultural
decisions would be augmented, the power of the Court would be checked, and more actors
would be engaged in constitutional interpretation.
In practice, however, the evidence from countries with both judicial review and legislative
override systems—chiefly Canada and Israel—is mixed. 159 In both Canada and Israel, despite
language in the constitutions enabling legislative overrides, the federal legislatures have used
the power rarely. 160 One might predict a similar outcome in the United States, particularly if a
legislative override system were to require a two-thirds or other supermajority vote by
Congress. Scholars note, however, that even if the use of legislative overrides is infrequent,
the mere possibility of legislative overrides may influence the Court, for example by making
it more deferential to the elected branches. 161
Another way in which legislative overrides might not achieve their goals is if they enable
Congress to overrule constitutional decisions made only by the Supreme Court. This approach
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would still leave extensive power in the lower federal courts and the state courts. Because the
U.S. Supreme Court is under no obligation to grant certiorari after a lower court or state court
rules a federal statute unconstitutional, a legislative override system that did not empower
review of lower court decisions striking down federal statutes would leave such decisions more
insulated from democratic review than similar decisions of the Supreme Court. This problem
is soluble, however, by enabling overrides of lower court or state court decisions, as well as
Supreme Court decisions, on federal constitutional grounds.
Finally, some observers question whether legislative overrides are the best way to achieve
the ends that their proponents desire. A better approach, they argue, would be to change Article
V of the Constitution, making the Constitution easier to amend. Changing the Constitution
through amendment, these critics contend, produces more reasoned democratic deliberation;
in contrast, overrides are too tied to particular controversies. The Commission notes that there
may well be sound arguments for making the Constitution easier to amend. However, because
such substantial reform to the Constitution is outside the scope of this Commission’s mandate,
we do not consider this proposal. In addition, it is worth noting that a system of legislative
overrides might have advantages over making the entire Constitution significantly easier to
amend. A legislative override process could enable Congress to advance its own constitutional
vision, re-enacting statutes that the Court has struck down subject to a temporal sunset or to
other limitations, without enabling too-frequent wholesale reforms to the structure of
government or the text of the Constitution.

Consequences for the Political Process and Legal System
Given that legislative overrides would at least partially achieve the goal of reducing the
Supreme Court’s power vis-à-vis the democratic branches, one important concern is whether
they might result in insufficient protection of individual rights and, in particular, minority
rights. Another concern is that allowing actors other than the Court to determine the
constitutionality of statutes might result in less settled law and less well-reasoned
constitutional decisionmaking. In addition, some worry that allowing congressional overrides
might have implications for federalism, with Congress potentially more likely to use
legislative overrides to favor its own power over states’ rights (though some might find that
to be an advantage rather than a disadvantage).
Proponents of legislative overrides (and critics of judicial supremacy more generally)
respond that, in practice, the Court has not consistently protected rights of underprivileged,
politically powerless minorities who lack support from popular majorities; indeed, some argue
it has rarely done so. 162 Notably, many scholars observe that parliamentary democracies
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without American-style judicial supremacy—including Australia, New Zealand, and
numerous European countries—are just as effective when it comes to protecting rights
(although it is important to note that the comparative analysis is challenging, in part because
those jurisdictions have very different structures of governments and broader commitments to
universal social benefits). 163 Proponents of overrides would also argue that federalism
concerns are overstated, given that the design of Congress already adequately represents the
interests of states.
Meanwhile, concerns about minority rights, rule of law, and deliberation could potentially
be addressed in the design of the system. The systemic consequences of congressional
overrides would depend significantly on the details of the system adopted. The varying
approaches have tradeoffs. For example, requiring a two-thirds majority of both houses of
Congress to override the Court would reduce the risk of threat to minority rights and would
require significant congressional deliberation about the underlying constitutional issue. But
this approach would also make overrides much less likely to occur. Limiting overrides to cases
that do not involve certain fundamental rights—as is done in Canada 164—would limit the risk
to those rights, but unless very clearly elaborated, would leave great discretion with the
Supreme Court. Adopting a “sunset” element, where Congress’s override would last only for
a certain number of years and then would need to be reenacted, 165 might also serve as a
safeguard against long-term incursions on individual rights and would encourage continued
constitutional debate but could introduce greater uncertainty and instability in the law. Finally,
a system that only permitted a legislature to issue an override after the Court has rendered its
constitutional judgment, rather than insulating its laws preemptively, could help raise the
political costs of an override and prompt the legislature to directly engage the constitutional
principles at stake.

Constitutional Analysis
As noted in the preceding analysis, the most straightforward way to adopt a system of
legislative overrides would be through constitutional amendment, as was urged during the
Progressive and New Deal eras. Absent constitutional amendment, it is highly likely that the
Supreme Court would strike down a statute (or congressional rule of procedure) setting forth
a system for legislative overrides. The Court would likely conclude that it—not Congress—
has ultimate authority under Article III to determine the constitutionality of federal statutes (as
well as state statutes and executive action). 166 On this view, any effort at legislative override
absent a constitutional amendment would constitute an impermissible end run around the
amendment process established by Article V of the Constitution. Indeed, the Article V
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amendment process has been used on numerous occasions to overrule Supreme Court
opinions. 167
Nonetheless, Congress may be able to assert greater authority to engage in independent
constitutional interpretation or to limit the reach of judicial opinions, short of enacting a system
of legislative overrides. 168 As previously noted, numerous scholars have long contended that
Article III never expressly states that the Supreme Court is the final or sole arbiter of statutes’
constitutionality. 169 Under this view, although specific Court orders must be obeyed, Congress
and the President can continue to enforce the Constitution as they see fit, as long as they are
not in defiance of a particular order. By way of example, Congress might make it a crime to
burn the flag; the Court might hold that such a law is unconstitutional; Congress does nothing
wrong by enacting the statute again and saying it does not agree with the Court’s interpretation,
particularly if it includes new legislative findings. But if someone is prosecuted under the new
law, and the Court maintains the view that the law is unconstitutional and enjoins the
prosecution, the Court’s orders in that case must be followed.
According to this understanding of judicial review, Congress could enact a statute that
affirms congressional authority to reenact a statute after a negative Court ruling; Congress
could also establish procedures for such reenactment, consistent with bicameralism and
presentment requirements. In addition, Congress could attempt to establish a general rule
regarding what weight stare decisis ought to carry. The argument would be that determining
the prospective precedential effect of opinions is within Congress’s “necessary and proper”
power to regulate the operations of the federal courts, similar to its power to provide rules of
evidence and procedure. 170 Others, however, have argued that determining the significance of
stare decisis in constitutional cases is an inherent aspect of the judicial power to interpret the
Constitution. 171 In any case, there is widespread agreement that Congress could not
prospectively or retroactively deny the reach of a court order to the parties in a particular
case. 172
Apart from possible constitutional difficulties, Congress’s assertion of authority to limit
the precedential effects of prior Court decisions might raise arbitrariness and unfairness
concerns about giving the parties to a particular case the benefit (or burden) of a rule
announced by the Court, while denying the same benefit (or burden) to others similarly
situated. 173 In other words, the government would remain free to bring prosecutions against
individuals who have violated a statute that the Court has declared unconstitutional in another
case, leaving it to each individual defendant to raise the constitutional objection anew. Such
concerns would be less pressing with a legislative override system achieved by constitutional
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amendment; such a system would clearly enable Congress to declare that, for all parties,
“notwithstanding” a court’s interpretation of particular constitutional provisions, a particular
statute is permissible, for a defined period of time. However, as discussed above, the broader
system may raise other concerns about protection of rights.

Conclusion: Legislative Overrides
In short, a constitutional amendment adopting a system of legislative overrides would
reduce the power of the Supreme Court over fundamental social questions and would increase
the power of Congress. Design of the system might mitigate concerns about rule of law,
constitutional structure, and minority rights. However, those design questions are difficult and
would require further debate and elaboration, particularly because this reform has attracted
less attention than some of the other reforms discussed in this Report. Short of constitutional
amendment, some argue that Congress could still do more to resist judicial supremacy, though
that, too, would likely face a critical audience from the current Supreme Court. Some
proponents of reducing the power of the Court argue that the Court’s commitment to judicial
supremacy should not be a concern and that statutory reform to facilitate Congress’s ability to
assert its own constitutional authority would be worth trying. 174 Others disagree—not only
because they question the legality of congressional non-acquiescence to the Court, but also
because resistance to judicial supremacy would mark a substantial shift in contemporary
practice, the legitimacy of which would be questionable without constitutional amendment. 175
In any event, further public debate could help flesh out the merits of the various approaches.
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agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
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It is important to note that not everyone has been convinced that AEDPA’s deferential review scheme is
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We focus on a system of legislative overrides that would allow Congress to overrule decisions by the Supreme
Court or other courts striking down federal or state legislation. However, a broader approach would allow
Congress to overrule any constitutional opinion that upholds or rejects claims of constitutional rights, whether or
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rejection of a Free Exercise claim in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), or of a Takings claim
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departmentalist view—that legislative and executive branch actors could act on their own interpretations of the
Constitution in their respective spheres—seems to have been Hamilton’s view, in contrast to the views of the
antifederalist writer Brutus, who suggested that the federal courts would have greater interpretative authority
under the Constitution and opposed it on that ground. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 245-52 (1994); The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton); Essays of Brutus, No. XI, reprinted in 2 Herbert J. Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist § 2.9.138139 (1st ed. 1981).
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See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141-43 (2007) (discussing how, in enacting the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Congress “responded” to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
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146
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See William Lasser, Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937—Was there a “Switch in Time”?,
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https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/assaults-courts-legislative-round.

151

See Bowie Testimony, supra note 2, at 23; see also William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor
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See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (holding that Congress could not overrule Miranda v.
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156

570 U.S. 529 (2013).

157
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168
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States 8-9 (Aug. 15, 2021) (written testimony of Christopher Jon Sprigman, New York University School of
Law) [hereinafter Sprigman Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ProfessorChristopher-Jon-Sprigman.pdf.
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the principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental component of stare
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Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
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Chapter 5: The Supreme Court’s Procedures
and Practices
In recent years, Supreme Court observers have engaged in vigorous debates about how
the Court conducts its work and explains its decisions. The Commission recognizes that the
discourse about reform, in addition to focusing on the structural proposals discussed in prior
Chapters, has also addressed the Court’s operations and its procedures for reviewing cases. As
observers, including members of Congress, have emphasized, internal procedures and
practices at the Court can have a significant external impact: They affect perceptions of the
Court’s impartiality, the credibility of its rulings, and the clarity of its guidance for lawyers
and for other courts. And they have real consequences for the parties in each case, as well as
for the many people and institutions affected by the federal laws or constitutional rights at
issue.
The Commission received testimony on a broad range of the Court’s internal procedures
and practices. The testimony included criticisms and counterarguments, as well as proposals
aimed at increasing transparency, improving procedure, and generating more visible
adherence to standards of judicial ethics. 1 A number of Justices have also expressed their
views on some of these issues in written opinions and public discussions. Although it is not
the Commission’s charge to present suggestions to the Court, we are tasked with examining
prominent debates about the work of the Court; and this task entails addressing a range of
proposals from witnesses and commentators, including policies the Court would be able to
implement on its own.
This Chapter focuses on three sets of issues. While some of these issues have become
more salient under the pressure of recent events, others have been the subject of longstanding
public discussion, debate, and analysis. The first issue is the Court’s use of emergency orders,
issued without the usual rounds of briefing or oral argument and often without a written
explanatory opinion. The second is judicial ethics. The third is public access to the Court’s
proceedings. In addition, Appendix D to this Report details analyses offered by witnesses
before the Commission about the sources of advocacy and information provided to the Court.
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Emergency Orders
Many people associate the work of the Supreme Court with its “merits cases.” These are
cases in which the Court grants review and the parties then conduct established rounds of
briefing and participate in oral argument. The Court may also receive briefs from interested
non-parties called amici curiae. In these cases, the Court eventually issues a decision with a
reasoned, written opinion and discloses the votes of all Justices. These robust procedures are
intended to ensure that the Court’s decisions are well informed, fair to the parties, and attentive
to implications for the broader legal system. The opinions in these merits cases generally carry
the full weight of precedent and thus are written in a manner that not only binds lower courts
but also aspires to guide them, all while limiting the likelihood that the Court will dramatically
change its own positions in the near future.
Yet the Court’s business goes beyond its merits cases. As the Court explains on its
website, the “vast majority of cases filed in the Supreme Court are disposed of summarily by
unsigned orders.” 2 The most common orders—there are thousands of these each year—are
those in which the Court declines to review cases by denying the parties’ petitions for
certiorari. 3
In another category of unsigned orders, the Court responds to parties’ emergency requests
by issuing an injunction, vacating a lower court’s injunction, granting or lifting a stay of a
lower court ruling, or denying such emergency relief. Because these emergency orders often
concern legal challenges to governmental decisions and practices, they can have substantial
effects on the rights and obligations of governments, private institutions, and broad segments
of the American public.
In contrast to its merits cases, however, the Court issues emergency orders without the
same regularized rounds of full briefing, amicus participation, and oral argument; without
much time for deliberation; often without a written opinion speaking for the Court and
explaining its reasoning; and often without disclosing how each of the Justices voted. Many
of these orders respond to requests from parties in the early stages of litigation and thus are
issued before the lower courts have completed their adjudication and appellate review of
the case.
The Court’s use of various truncated procedures has at times attracted public scrutiny.
Beginning in the 1950s, some commentators criticized its use of summary decisions on
grounds of procedural inadequacy and lack of guidance for the lower courts. 4 Others argued
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that these practices were useful for managing a large caseload and supervising the lower
courts. 5 Subsequent scholarship has continued to address certain forms of summary or
unsigned decisions, 6 and recently the phrase “shadow docket” has come into use as a catch-all
term for the Court’s “orders and summary decisions that defy its normal procedural
regularity.” 7
In the past few years, many commentators have focused their attention on the Court’s
increasing use of emergency orders, 8 especially in cases of public importance or controversy. 9
Several Justices have addressed the issue in recent statements, offering both critiques and
defenses of this practice. 10 The Commission also received testimony and comments about the
Court’s use of emergency orders. It should be emphasized that the concerns raised are not
about the existence of emergency procedures—no one disputes that they are needed for true
emergencies—but about specific aspects of their current use by the Court.
This section first examines three sets of concerns about emergency orders: limited process
in high-impact cases; limited information about the Justices’ votes and the Court’s reasoning;
and uncertain signals about a ruling’s precedential effect. This section then examines proposals
from witnesses and commentators for changing current practices, including proposals
addressed to concerns about emergency orders generally, as well as those specifically
addressed to cases involving the death penalty. 11

Limited Procedure for Important Cases
The Court’s recent emergency orders have involved issues of national importance and
public debate, including abortion, 12 immigration policy, 13 environmental regulations, 14 and
evictions during a surge in COVID-19. 15 Yet the Court’s practice in issuing such orders has
involved relatively limited briefing, no oral argument, no norm that the Court’s reasoning must
be publicly explained in a written opinion, and no expectation that the Justices’ votes will be
revealed. Thus, a prominent line of critique has focused on the dissonance between the
significance of many of the Court’s orders and the limited procedures that apply to them.
Commentators initially focused criticism on orders that granted emergency applications
seeking results contrary to those reached by the lower courts. More recently, following the
Court’s first ruling in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, which denied an emergency
application that would have prevented a Texas abortion law known as S.B. 8 from going into
effect, 16 critical attention has also turned to orders that deny such relief.
Although emergency orders technically are temporary and used in service of further
adjudication, they often have the practical effect of being the final word on the issue. Since
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2016, for example, the Court has issued orders that have effectively determined the end of the
period for responding to the 2020 Census; 17 limitations on absentee and curbside voting,
including for voters with disabilities and other vulnerable populations, at the height of the
pandemic; 18 the degree of exposure to COVID-19 infection for inmates in prisons and jails; 19
and the extent of the right to congregate for religious services during the pandemic. 20 Even
where such orders eventually expire, moreover, and even where they directly involve only one
person as a party, they can have profound implications for affected individuals and influence
larger societal debates. 21
As these examples suggest, the issues resolved through emergency rulings often are
controversial as well as consequential. Emergency orders breaking down 6-3 or 5-4 along
ideological lines have multiplied in recent years, indicating that the Court increasingly is
deciding contested legal questions through cursory and relatively non-transparent emergency
procedures. 22 During the 2017 Term, there were five orders from which at least three Justices
publicly dissented; during the 2020 Term, there were 29 such orders. 23 This increase has
occurred even while the merits docket has remained at historically low levels, 24 and during the
2019 Term there were nearly as many 5-4 decisions among emergency rulings as on the merits
docket. 25
Various explanations have been offered for the Court’s increasing use of expedited
procedures in important and controversial cases: the lower courts’ issuance of so-called
“nationwide” or “universal” injunctions that “control the behavior of the federal government
toward everyone, not just the plaintiffs,” and which often prompt the government to seek
relief; 26 federal executions during the Trump Administration; emergency requests during the
COVID-19 pandemic; 27 a growing divide between the views of the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts; and possible changes in how the Justices apply the traditional legal
standard for emergency relief pending appeal. 28 Critics and defenders of the Court’s practices
draw competing conclusions from such explanations, some of which point to passing rather
than persistent causes.
Those who defend the Court’s recent use of emergency rulings argue that the problem—
if there is one—is not of the Court’s own making. As in the lower courts, emergency
applications come to the Court from parties seeking urgent relief. 29 The consequential nature
of the interests at stake is precisely why the Court must act quickly, lest significant rights be
left unprotected or harm imposed on the parties and the public while the full judicial process
unfolds. 30 Deciding important issues using a truncated process, on this view, is not illegitimate;
it is the nature of emergency adjudication. And the de facto final resolution of important
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matters through temporary relief is an unavoidable part of the tradeoff that can happen at any
judicial level.
Indeed, virtually everyone agrees that nothing is inherently suspect about emergency
orders. Every court must have procedures for accelerated determination of urgent matters,
even at the expense of a more deliberative process or more fully reasoned decisions.
Disagreement, then, tends to center not on the fact of emergency procedures, but on which
matters warrant the Court’s immediate intervention. Critics have argued that the Court is too
often using relatively impoverished procedures and deliberation to intervene on important
issues, including by overturning reasoned decisions of the lower courts. 31 Relatedly, some
commentators contend that the Court too often acts to disrupt the appropriate “status quo”
rather than to preserve it—in some cases, at least, without clear explanation of when or why
intervention is warranted. 32
In some respects, these debates may reflect disagreement about the underlying merits of
the disputes or about how to weigh the threatened interests or risk of harm. 33 An additional
source of disagreement is the question of how to characterize the baseline condition or “status
quo” that emergency relief is meant to preserve and the “disruptive force” that is to be held at
bay pending full judicial consideration. 34 Witnesses before the Commission differed on the
proper conception of the status quo for purposes of evaluating the Court’s emergency orders, 35
and as one witness acknowledged, the choice will often be contested and “normatively
tinge[d].” 36 One possible understanding of the status quo is the state of affairs that exists based
on the last ruling in the courts below. 37 That is the baseline some critics claim the Court too
often disrupts, as it did in a number of pandemic-related voting, prison safety, and religious
gathering cases, among others. 38 A different conception of the status quo is the state of affairs
created by the law, policy, or practice being challenged. 39 A third understanding was captured
by Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Whole Woman’s Health, in which he explained: “I would
grant preliminary relief to preserve the status quo ante—before the law went into effect—so
that the courts may consider whether a state can avoid responsibility for its laws in such a
manner.” 40 This question becomes more complicated still when policymakers are responding
(or not) to a sudden change in the state of the world, such as during a pandemic.

Transparency
The Court often issues emergency orders without accompanying explanation, or with very
little of it. A standard defense of such a norm is that emergency decisionmaking may not allow
time for a thorough expression of the Court’s reasoning in every case, and that anything less
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(such as a rote citation to a legal standard without elaboration on its application to a given
case) would rarely provide much useful information.
Yet the question is not whether all emergency orders require detailed explanation; there
has been no serious suggestion that routine denials of obviously unwarranted relief need to be
accompanied by a written opinion. 41 Rather, the question is whether some emergency orders
are important enough (as all merits cases are presumed to be) that the public—and the public
record—should receive an express statement of the Court’s reasoning and of how the Justices
voted.
Critics and defenders alike recognize that the Court sometimes does issue opinions
explaining its emergency orders, and individual Justices even more frequently write opinions
concurring in or dissenting from the Court’s orders. For critics of the Court’s orders practices,
such opinions demonstrate that reasoned explanation is possible; the problem, in their view, is
that it is not provided more regularly in cases of national importance.
Critics argue that the lack of a stated rationale on behalf of the Court—and the lack of full
disclosure of the Justices’ votes on emergency orders—deprive the public of valuable
information about how the Court and each of its members understands and applies the
substantive legal principles at issue in important cases. 42 Similar arguments extend to the
procedural rules that govern emergency orders: Critics contend that it is sometimes unclear
whether or how the Court is applying the traditional multipart standard used to determine
issuance of emergency relief. 43
Another line of critique focuses on the disciplining function of reasoned opinions. For
example, some critics argue that the Court has not followed a straight line on the question of
when to grant emergency relief, and that it has been willing to break new legal ground in
certain cases while disclaiming that power in others, without explaining the difference. 44 In
the critics’ view, the lack of explanation enables such variation by removing the rigor and
consistency that the writing of carefully reasoned opinions is said to impose on judicial
decisions.
Critics more broadly charge that the issuance of high-profile orders without adequate
explanation damages the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of those rulings, or even of the
Court, in the public eye: When the Court does not routinely explain its reasoning in cases of
great public concern, people may speculate that the Justices are making decisions based on
politics.
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Defenders of the Court’s rulings respond that detailed opinion writing is infeasible in
many emergency settings. 45 On this view, the relative lack of explanation in emergency orders
is simply part of the process of faster decisionmaking. Moreover, in certain cases, the chances
of the Justices reaching rapid agreement on the outcome might be improved by dispensing
with an expectation that a majority of Justices will agree on legal reasoning set out in an
opinion speaking for the Court. 46
Relatedly, it may be practically useful for the Justices to reveal less rather than more in
their emergency orders, to avoid locking themselves into positions or reasoning that is based
on limited process, reflection, and information. 47 A similar argument supports the view that
Justices ought not be required to reveal their votes in emergency orders.

Uncertain Precedential Effect
A third set of concerns centers on the uncertain precedential effect of the Court’s
emergency rulings. Even to expert legal observers, including judges, it remains unclear which
orders and related opinions operate as precedents binding on lower courts. 48 In the context of
emergency orders, one might think that, at most, only opinions designated as “Opinions of the
Court” should function as binding precedents; indeed, Justice Alito recently noted in a public
address that a ruling on an emergency application is not a precedent with respect to the
underlying issue in the case. 49 Yet at times the Court has appeared to expect its emergency
orders to be treated as precedential, at least if statements of individual Justices or concurring
opinions accompany the order, even though none of them is designated as the opinion of the
Court.
An example from the Court’s pandemic cases about religious gatherings illustrates this
issue. 50 In Gateway City Church v. Newsom, the Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit’s “failure
to grant relief was erroneous,” and explained that “[t]his outcome is clearly dictated by this
Court’s decision in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom.” 51 But the South Bay
case was an emergency ruling that presented no majority rationale. As one Commission
witness noted, the Court seemed to require lower courts to discern binding legal principles
from an order with a concurring opinion by Justice Barrett (joined by Justice Kavanaugh), a
statement of Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito), and a concurrence by
Chief Justice Roberts. 52
Critics as well as many defenders of the Court’s emergency orders appear to agree that
orders like the one in South Bay should not carry precedential weight for lower courts. More
broadly, even when emergency orders do include an opinion for “the Court,” the nature of
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such orders and the quality of the processes that precede them generally counsel against giving
dispositive weight to decisions reached on an emergency footing. 53 Without clarification,
uncertainty about the precedential effect of emergency orders can breed confusion about the
content of the law for the lower courts, for relevant parties, and for the public.

General Proposals
Commentators have made various proposals aimed at addressing the concerns described
above while acknowledging the reality that emergency orders are, and will remain, a necessary
component of the Court’s work.

Giving Reasons
Specific reforms proposed in response to concerns about inadequate transparency—and
the accompanying risk of an appearance of inconsistency, arbitrariness, or bias—urge the
Court to explain the majority’s reasoning in emergency orders involving matters of great
public debate. A different approach would place a premium on providing an explanation
whenever the Court is undoing reasoned rulings in the lower courts. 54 Another proposal would
urge the Justices to disclose their votes in emergency orders. 55
The aim of such explanations and disclosures would be to provide guidance to parties,
lawyers, and lower court judges; to allow the public to know the role of each Justice in granting
or denying an emergency order; and to ensure that especially consequential decisions benefit
from the rigor and discipline associated with reasoned opinions. 56 The explanations need not
be lengthy, nor does anyone suggest that opinions need to be written in every case. Instead,
the goal is to enable observers to understand the bases for the Court’s most significant
rulings—to follow the legal trail through each decision and from one decision to the next.
Proponents of reform argue that, at a minimum, the Court should clearly articulate the test it
is using to assess the application for emergency relief and indicate how (or whether) it applied
each prong of the test. 57
The category of “important” cases in which explanation may be most valuable is not selfdefining; reasonable minds will differ about that threshold. Even short opinions take time to
write, moreover, and the suggestion that the Court indicate how it applied each prong of a
four-part test may be in tension with the suggestion that the writing need not be lengthy.
Indeed, there may be an unavoidable tradeoff between the explanatory benefits of any given
opinion and the costs of producing it—including not only the time and effort spent preparing
the opinion, but also the possibility of committing the Justices to positions they have not yet
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had time to consider fully. On the one hand, an opinion in which the Court merely articulates
the relevant legal test and states its conclusions on the application of each prong may not pose
undue risks of delay or lock-in. On the other hand, such an opinion—lacking the detailed
explanation of the underlying reasoning typically found in merits opinions—may not provide
much illumination. 58
The Court has demonstrated, however, that it can issue informative opinions in an
expedited way. In a high-profile case concerning the second federal eviction moratorium, the
Court released an eight-page per curiam opinion providing a concise analysis of the majority’s
view of the likelihood of success on the merits, weighing of the equities, and consideration of
the public interest. 59 Given that public perceptions of the legitimacy of its rulings may be at
stake, the Court may well benefit from continuing to adjust its explanatory practices in
important cases, with an eye toward providing insight into the Court’s reasoning, reinforcing
procedural consistency, and avoiding the possible appearance of arbitrariness or bias.
Relatedly, the Court might also avoid most of the procedural and transparency concerns
about emergency rulings by more frequently exercising its discretion to transfer emergency
applications to the merits docket on an expedited basis, as it recently did in the ongoing
litigation concerning the Texas abortion law, 60 as well as in Ramirez v. Collier, a capital case. 61

Clarity on Precedential Value
Many observers seem to agree that emergency orders should not, as a general matter, carry
precedential weight. In some of its orders, the Court is careful to say that the grant or denial
of emergency relief should not be construed as resolving the merits of the case. The opinions
accompanying the first emergency order denying relief in Whole Woman’s Health present an
illustration: The Court stated that “we stress that we do not purport to resolve definitively any
jurisdictional or substantive claim in the applicants’ lawsuit.” 62 And, as the dissent by Chief
Justice Roberts elaborates, “[a]lthough the Court denies the applicants’ request for emergency
relief today, the Court’s order is emphatic in making clear that it cannot be understood as
sustaining the constitutionality of the law at issue.” 63
By contrast, when the Court earlier implied that lower courts are bound even by an
emergency order issued with no opinion on behalf of the Court, in Gateway City Church v.
Newsom, it risked confusing lower courts, relevant parties, and the public. Such an implied
expectation would also be hard to square with a central justification for using truncated and
relatively non-transparent procedures for emergency orders. 64 To the extent the Court has been
taking steps since that case to clarify whether emergency rulings should have any precedential
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effect on lower courts, 65 or to specify which aspects of individual rulings should or should not
be construed as precedent, these are welcome developments.

Existing Norms of Deference
A committee of regular advocates before the Court, including several former Solicitors
General and Deputy Solicitors General, provided testimony highlighting established principles
that the Court has endorsed and yet may not be regularly applying. 66 These principles, if
applied more consistently, might relieve pressure on the Court to intervene early in at least
some lower court proceedings. For example, their testimony pointed to “the Supreme Court’s
traditional ‘two-court rule,’” which places an especially heavy thumb on the scale against
reversing findings of fact that have been made by the trial court and affirmed by a court of
appeals. 67 Also, “when the Court of Appeals sets an expedited schedule to address an
important constitutional issue, the interest in ordinary process weighs against Supreme Court
intervention.” 68 One potential cost of more regular adherence to such principles might arise
from privileging lower court rulings that turn out to be erroneous. An additional limitation is
that these principles are relevant only to a subset of cases. The reach of both principles may
be expanded, however, by the greater use of expedited scheduling in the federal appeals courts
for cases likely qualifying as emergencies. 69

Nationwide Injunctions
Another approach would aim to eliminate or reduce the number of “nationwide” or other
defendant-oriented injunctions in the lower courts, some of which give rise to emergency
applications to the Court. 70 Recommendations along these lines, including proposed
legislation, have been primarily motivated not by concerns about the Court’s emergency orders
but by considerations about the power of the lower courts; such proposals have inspired
extensive debate among commentators and policymakers, which we do not rehearse or
evaluate here. 71 A witness before the Commission proposed the alternative of legislation
allowing the government to “transfer all civil suits seeking ‘nationwide’ injunctive relief to
the D.C. district court—to avoid the concern of overlapping (or diverging) ‘nationwide’
injunctions.” 72 Funneling litigation involving the federal government into a single court,
however, would only affect the subset of cases in which federal law or policy is at issue—and
perhaps only the still-smaller subset in which there is a realistic risk of conflicting injunctions.

December 2021 | 211

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

Proposals for Capital Cases
The Supreme Court’s emergency orders draw the most attention in high-profile cases
where controversies directly impacting large numbers of people are at stake. Another
component of the Court’s emergency rulings, however, arises in the context of capital
punishment, where the Court often has the final word on whether a state or federal execution
will go forward. These cases come to the Court in an emergency posture as the date of
execution approaches, when there are unresolved legal challenges to the execution pending in
the lower courts. 73 If the lower courts do not stay the execution, the condemned person will
ask the Court to do so. If the lower courts do halt the execution, the state will typically ask the
Court to vacate that stay so the execution can proceed. 74 These decisions form a substantial
and well-known component of the Court’s emergency orders. 75
In recent years, the Court’s handling of emergency applications in capital cases has drawn
criticism from commentators as well as from members of the Court itself. Several Commission
witnesses presented arguments and proposals specific to the death penalty context, based on
the premise that “death is different” because there is no opportunity to correct a legal error if
an execution goes through, and because ending human life is a uniquely serious form of state
action. 76 At the extreme, the risk of legal error may compound a risk of factual error, thus
raising the worry that the state may kill an innocent person; 77 one Commission witness testified
that to date “185 people have been exonerated after being wrongfully convicted of a capital
offense and condemned to death.” 78 In other cases, the concern is not that the state might
execute someone who is innocent, but rather that it will violate constitutional or other legal
rights and protections in the course of administering a death sentence. 79 These cases include
challenges concerning the risk of severe and needless pain and suffering due to the method of
execution, 80 the individual’s competency to be executed, 81 or the presence of a religious
advisor at the time of death. 82 Commentators have argued that the Court should err on the side
of pausing an execution if such legal challenges remain unresolved. 83
Yet there are those who argue, to quote Justice Thomas, that injustice can also come “in
the form of justice delayed.” 84 Executions typically are authorized pursuant to warrants that
expire on a given date; if a judicial stay prevents the execution from going forward, the state
often needs to obtain a fresh warrant, a process that can delay an execution by a month or
more, while frustrating the state’s interest in carrying out the sentence. 85 And a stay that
remains in effect during the pendency of lower court or Supreme Court review can remain in
place for considerably longer. 86
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Until very recently, such debates centered on death penalty cases in the states, with little
attention paid to federal executions, for the simple reason that federal executions are far less
common. Between 1963 and 2001, the federal government did not execute anyone, and it
executed only three people between 2001 and 2019. 87 By contrast, the states have executed
more than 1,500 people since 1973. 88 In the months before the Commission’s formation,
however, a spike in federal executions gave rise to multiple emergency applications to the
Court. Commission witnesses and commentators cited these rulings, in addition to state cases,
as salient examples of problems with the Court’s handling of its emergency orders. 89
The federal executions at issue occurred during the last six months of the Trump
administration, when the Department of Justice sought the execution of thirteen individuals. 90
Legal challenges were filed in all thirteen cases, including claims that the Department’s
proposed execution plan violated federal statutes and constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 91 In multiple instances, the lower federal courts
noted that the challenges raised significant and complex issues, and in some cases they
concluded that the challengers were likely enough to succeed on the merits to warrant a stay
of execution to permit time for the courts to resolve the issues. 92 At the Supreme Court, one
or more requests for emergency relief were filed in each case, sometimes from the government
seeking to vacate a lower court stay and sometimes from the person seeking the stay. The
combined effect of the Court’s orders in these cases was to permit all thirteen executions to
go forward. 93 In most cases, it did so in brief orders that gave no rationale for its decision, 94
though multiple dissents were filed. 95 A Commission witness defended these rulings on the
ground that the challengers did not convince the Court that they were likely to succeed on the
underlying merits. 96 Other Commission witnesses criticized the Court’s handling of the
cases. 97 So did Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. 98 In Justice Sotomayor’s view, the way the
Court made these decisions, “with little opportunity for proper briefing and consideration,
often in just a few short days or even hours,” and often without a public explanation of their
rationale, “is not justice.” 99
In their testimony before the Commission, several witnesses argued that because in capital
cases the stakes of error are asymmetrical, the Court’s approach to stays of execution should
be asymmetrical as well. “[T]here is no symmetry between an erroneous execution and an
erroneous non-execution,” one witness reasoned. “If proper attention is given to irreparability
[of harm] and the need to preserve the judiciary’s ability to decide a case, then the Justices
should be much more willing to give shadow-docket orders that delay an execution than
shadow-docket orders that accelerate an execution.” 100 Below, we address two sets of reforms
proposed by witnesses taking this view of asymmetrical stakes.
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Asymmetric or Automatic Stays of Execution
Several witnesses endorsed the view that the Court should apply an explicitly
asymmetrical approach to staying executions, 101 for example, with a presumption in favor of
staying an execution when there is genuine doubt as to its legality, or with a heightened
standard of review for vacating stays when lower courts have issued them. 102 One witness
testified that such an asymmetric approach could be imposed by congressional legislation,
either in the form of a statute prescribing asymmetric standards of review or one removing the
Court’s jurisdiction to review stays of execution entered by lower courts. 103 We address
jurisdiction stripping generally in Chapter 4 of this Report. But absent any action from
Congress, the Court can alter its own threshold for staying an execution.
Commission witnesses also proposed variations of an automatic stay of execution during
certain stages of litigation. Under one proposal, previously endorsed by Justice Stevens and
by a commission led by Justice Powell, “the Supreme Court should be required to
automatically grant a stay of execution to any defendant who has not yet completed a first
federal habeas review.” 104 In another proposal, every person with a pending execution date
would have at least one full opportunity to litigate any challenges to the state’s proposed
method or administration of execution. 105 Arguing against these proposals, a Commission
witness contended that the availability of automatic stays might induce litigation based on
weak claims; that the existing legal standard could account for the irreversibility of an
execution; and that any additional delay could undermine the government’s interests in cases
where the legal challenge has little chance of success, even if lower court judges view the
underlying question as unsettled or unresolved. 106

Four Votes to Stay an Execution
Another approach would be for the Court itself to reduce the number of votes required to
grant a stay of execution, from five votes to four—a reform embraced by a number of
Commission witnesses, 107 as well as certain Justices in the past. 108 Such a reduction would
address a related but distinct set of concerns called to the Commission’s attention regarding
what one commentator has termed “a lethal gap” in the Court’s internal processes: “It takes
four votes to put a case on the court’s docket” via a writ of certiorari, “but it takes five to stop
an execution.” 109 Thus, it is possible that the Court could grant a petition for certiorari and set
a case for full briefing and argument to resolve a significant legal question, and yet also allow
the petitioner to be put to death while the case is pending. Given this concern, some Justices
have at times employed a practice known as the “courtesy fifth,” whereby a Justice who does
not believe that either certiorari or a stay is warranted will nonetheless vote to issue a stay if

214 | December 2021

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

four other Justices have voted to grant certiorari, thus preserving the Court’s jurisdiction. 110
The contours and the continuing viability of this norm are unclear, however. 111
In recent years, the Court has declined to halt executions when four Justices requested
more time for consideration—before a vote on certiorari. In one instance, four Justices voted
to call for the views of the Solicitor General, a step typically taken only in cases in which the
Court is seriously considering granting certiorari. But as Justice Breyer noted in dissent: “[N]o
Member of the majority . . . proved willing to provide a courtesy vote for a stay so that we can
consider the Solicitor General’s view once received. As it is, the request will be mooted by
petitioner’s execution.” 112 More recently, in Dunn v. Price, 113 after the state sought to vacate
a lower court stay on the evening of the execution, four Justices requested that the application
be held until the following morning when all the Justices could discuss the issue at their
regularly scheduled conference; the Court refused and entered a brief order vacating the
stay. 114
In such situations, a case that four Justices are seriously considering placing on the merits
docket for full consideration can be denied a path forward by a decision disposing of the case
through an emergency order. The proposal of a rule that four votes are sufficient to grant a
stay of execution would resolve this concern. So would an extension of the “courtesy fifth”
norm to include circumstances in which four Justices need more time to determine whether to
vote to grant certiorari, an approach taken by Chief Justice Roberts in a capital case several
years ago. 115
Arguing against such a proposal, a Commission witness urged that if the Court is to
prevent the government from carrying out a death sentence as scheduled, it should only do so
if a majority of the Justices endorse that action. 116 A related concern is the one raised by thenJustice Rehnquist, who argued to his colleagues that “four Justices out of a total number of
nine could frustrate the effectuation of the will of the majority” by banding together to issue a
stay “in every death penalty case.” 117 Other commentators are skeptical of this concern,
however, asserting for instance that “there are many reasons—including collegiality, the
likelihood of an adverse outcome on the merits, and the probability of negative public and
congressional comment—why the minority would be unlikely to behave in this fashion.” 118 A
Commission witness observed, moreover, that the Court for many years had four Justices who
were generally sympathetic to legal issues raised by capital defendants, but who did not use
“their existing authority to disrupt the operation of the court” by granting certiorari in every
capital case and pressing for a courtesy fifth. 119
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Judicial Ethics
The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court are the only members of the federal judiciary who
are not covered by a code of conduct. Since 1973, the United States Judicial Conference has
composed and updated an advisory Code of Conduct directed to all other federal judges. That
Code, by its own terms, is not addressed to the Justices.
In a 2011 year-end report, Chief Justice Roberts addressed concerns over the Justices’
exclusion from the Code. He emphasized that “All Members of the Court do in fact consult
the Code of Conduct in assessing their ethical obligations. In this way, the Code plays the
same role for the Justices as it does for other federal judges since . . . the Code ‘is designed to
provide guidance to judges.’” 120 In 2019, during an appropriations hearing in Congress, Justice
Kagan similarly stated that the Justices follow the Code to the very best of their ability. 121
There is some debate over whether the Justices always follow the Code even if they do
consult it. 122 The Commission has not undertaken a study of the Justices’ adherence to the
standards in the existing Code and makes no finding in this respect. Regardless of whether the
Justices do consult and follow the existing Code, not having a formally adopted code might
not be best practice for the Court. On this view, even if there were no apparent issue with
ethical practices on the Court, the explicit adoption of a code could promote important
institutional values. Most significant public and private entities have adopted codes of conduct
for their organizations and employees. 123 It is not obvious why the Court is best served by an
exemption from what so many consider best practice. To bring the Court into alignment with
other courts and entities, some observers argue that the Supreme Court should adopt a code of
conduct—either the existing Code applicable to other judges or its own version of a code—or
that Congress should impose one.
The discussion of whether the Court should adopt a code of conduct has included a further
discussion about whether the Justices should be subject to a disciplinary framework as well.
The Justices are not subject to the complaint and discipline framework that applies to other
federal judges. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 allows for any person to file
a complaint against a federal judge alleging that the judge “engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts” or “is unable to
discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability.” 124 The Code of
Conduct can be relevant to determining whether a judge has engaged in prejudicial conduct.
However, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act excludes the Justices from its reach. 125
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Relatedly, though the Justices are subject to statutory standards that require recusal in
specified situations, unlike recusal decisions by lower court judges, the Justices’ recusal
decisions are not subject to further review.
This section discusses potential benefits and drawbacks of reforms that would impose a
code of conduct, a disciplinary framework, or recusal review.

Code of Conduct
A code of conduct for the Court would bring the Court into line with the lower federal
courts and demonstrate its dedication to an ethical culture, beyond existing statements that the
Justices voluntarily consult the Code. In other contexts, such a demonstration of commitment
has affected conduct over time, in part by encouraging periodic training and other similar
techniques that enhance attention to ethical concerns. 126
There are two paths to a code of conduct for the Supreme Court: The Court could
internally adopt a code, or Congress could externally impose a code upon the Court. In either
case, the code could mirror the one that applies to other federal judges or could be specific to
the Supreme Court.

Internal Adoption of a Code
The Court could formally adopt the Code of Conduct that already applies to other Article
III federal judges. It has adopted similar non-binding regulations in the past: In 1991, the Court
formally adopted ethical regulations enacted by the Judicial Conference under the Ethics
Reform Act of 1989. 127 Those regulations now govern the Justices’ ability to receive gifts,
honoraria, and outside income, and they require the Justices to make periodic financial
disclosures. Adopting the current Code could be done quickly. Furthermore, the Justices’
ethical obligations would then parallel those of the rest of the federal judiciary. The Code
comprises, for the most part, broadly stated aspirational principles. Were the current Code to
apply to the Justices, it might not be necessary to amend the actual language of the Code, 128
although the opinion letters interpreting the Code in the context of particular situations
involving lower court judges might not be directly applicable to the Justices.
As an alternative to adopting the current Code, the Court could create its own code. In a
2019 appropriations hearing, Justice Kagan stated that the Chief Justice was “studying” the
question of whether to adopt a code applicable only to the Supreme Court. 129 In that same
hearing, Justice Alito was asked why the current Code of Conduct does not apply to the
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Supreme Court; among other things, he commented that the working life of the Court is a
“little different” from that of the rest of the federal judiciary. 130
An advantage of creating a new code drafted by the Justices is that the language of the
code could be geared to the unique institutional setting of the Court. For example, the
considerations involved in the recusal context might be different for the Justices, even though
the statutory standards are the same as for other judges. 131 This is because a Justice, unlike a
lower court judge, cannot simply be replaced by another judge. As another example, a new
code for the Justices might also provide guidance on public and private appearances, as the
considerations could be different for a Justice than for other judges who are not the object of
so much public attention. The Justices themselves might be well positioned to consider the
tensions and issues that can arise from their public and private activities, and to set standards
for themselves. While the Justices’ participation in a broad range of educational and
professional activities undoubtedly benefits the profession and the country, the Justices must
be mindful of appearances if they choose to attend meetings of organizations that have a
political or other valence that could cause the Justices’ attendance to become controversial or
cast doubt on their neutrality. 132 A code drafted by the Justices, amplified over time through
its application, might help the Justices navigate these waters.
In either case, the Supreme Court clearly has sufficient authority to adopt a code—doing
so raises no constitutional problems. The Court has the power to affect its own internal
governance, so long as it continues to meet its constitutional responsibilities.

External Imposition of a Code
In the absence of Court action, Congress could enact a code for the Supreme Court.
Several bills have been proposed to this effect, although none has been enacted. 133 Typically,
the proposed bills direct the Judicial Conference to craft a code for the Court (or simply make
the existing Code applicable to the Justices). In his 2011 year-end report, Chief Justice Roberts
pointed out that the Judicial Conference currently lacks the statutory authority to do so. The
Chief Justice put it bluntly: “Because the Judicial Conference is an instrument for the
management of the lower federal courts, its committees have no mandate to prescribe rules or
standards for any other body.” 134 The proposed bills would address this precise issue of
Judicial Conference authority.
Alternatively, Congress could write a code itself. One observer points out that Congress
already imposes requirements on the Court that are analogous to a code of conduct. 135 For
example, Congress requires that Justices take an oath of office, requiring them to swear to
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“administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the
rich . . . .” 136 The oath resembles provisions that might be included in a code of conduct.
External proposals would give Congress more control over the composition of a code of
conduct. If Congress were to write a code, it would need to be careful to ensure that the code’s
demands did not encroach on the Court’s constitutionally exclusive judicial decisionmaking
function. 137 Further, Congress has largely delegated procedural matters to the courts. 138

Judicial Discipline
In addition to the adoption of a code, there is a similar question of whether the Court
should adopt a complaint and discipline framework. Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability
Act, other federal judges can be subject to sanctions for conduct that is prejudicial to the
“effective and expeditious” business of the courts; the Code is highly relevant to an appraisal
of judicial conduct under this misconduct formulation.
This section will discuss first the benefits and costs of applying the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act to the Justices. It will then discuss the benefits and consequences of an internal
disciplinary framework.

Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act is a framework for disciplining misconduct that
does not rise to the level of impeachment. The Judicial Conference provides nationally
uniform guidelines governing the substantive and procedural aspects of misconduct
proceedings. The following is a simplified description of the procedures currently in place for
the lower federal courts:
(1) “Any person” may file a complaint alleging misconduct or disability.
(2) The chief judge of the relevant circuit (or the most senior active circuit judge in the event
that the chief judge is disqualified) reviews the complaint and decides whether to dismiss
the complaint for lack of conformity with the statute or because voluntary corrective action
has been taken.
(3) If the complaint is not dismissed, a special committee appointed by and including the chief
judge investigates the complaint and reports to the circuit judicial council. 139
(4) Upon receiving the special committee’s report, the judicial council may conduct additional
investigation, dismiss the complaint, impose sanctions, or refer the complaint to the United
States Judicial Conference.
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(5) If a complainant is dissatisfied with the disposition of the circuit council, the complainant
may petition for review by the judicial conduct and disability committee of the Judicial
Conference (review is discretionary).

Applying the Act to the Justices without modification would place inferior court judges
in the position of evaluating members of a body that is hierarchically superior. This could
possibly lead to undue deference. Applying the Act to the Court might be constitutionally
infirm as well if the disciplinary process encroached on the judicial decisionmaking function
of the Court. 140
Additionally, the Act’s lack of a standing or jurisdictional requirement for filing a
complaint may be open to abuse. The Act allows “any person” to file a complaint against a
federal judge. In 2013, chief circuit judges resolved 1,167 filed complaints, dismissing all but
20 as “merits-related, lacking sufficient evidence, frivolous, or otherwise improper.” 141 These
numbers would likely be even higher if the statute applied to the Supreme Court due to the
visibility of the Court and the individual Justices. 142
Furthermore, the stakes of the procedure would be much higher if applied to the Court.
Sanctions under the Act “may include . . . ordering that, on a temporary basis for a time certain,
no further cases be assigned to the judge whose conduct is the subject of a complaint.” 143
Although Justices do not have their own dockets, temporarily restricting a Justice from the
work of the Court would be a highly consequential event that would deprive litigants and the
American people of whatever number constitutes a full complement of Justices. 144 Unlike in
the lower courts, there is currently no mechanism for replacing an absent Justice. The
availability of such a sanction could cause groups to file more complaints in the hope of
removing those Justices with whom they tend to disagree. Further, and more broadly, it is
possible that interest groups seeking to mobilize support, raise money, and pursue their own
agendas would see in this process an avenue for seeking their own ends to the detriment of the
Court, individual Justices, and the public.

Internal Disciplinary Procedures
An internal disciplinary procedure for the Court would avoid the issue of having inferior
court judges sit in judgment of the Justices or the more serious risks that could arise if the
disciplinary process were run by persons outside the judiciary. 145 Some of the mechanisms of
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, detailed above, could serve as a model for procedures
tailored to the Justices. If these procedures called for internal enforcement, the Chief Justice
(or next most senior Justice, in the event of conflict) could review complaints against
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individual Justices. The complaint could be referred to the entire Court or a subset of Justices.
How such a procedure might affect the overall role of the Chief Justice and the working
relationships of the Justices is not clear, although the development of deep personal rifts seems
at least possible as a result. And again, the sanction of removal from a case could have broad
repercussions for the Court, litigants, and the public.
Some might conclude that the adoption of a code of conduct would not be beneficial
without an additional mechanism for receiving and reviewing complaints. However,
experience in other contexts suggests that the adoption of an advisory code would be a positive
step on its own, even absent binding sanctions. 146

Recusal
All federal judges, including the Justices, are subject to statutory standards that require
recusal in specified situations. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, requires a judge or Justice to
recuse “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 147 The
statute also requires recusal in more specific circumstances, such as when the judge has a
financial interest in the proceedings or personal knowledge of disputed facts. 148 Recusal
decisions by lower court judges are orders in a case and, like other rulings, are subject to
review on appeal. By contrast, a recusal decision by a Justice is not subject to further review.
Perhaps in part for this reason, the Justices rarely offer any explanation either for refusing to
recuse or for recusing. Justices Rehnquist and Scalia famously wrote memoranda explaining
their decisions not to recuse in two high-profile cases. 149 But those memoranda were quite
unusual.
Moreover, when a lower court judge recuses, another judge is selected to hear the case.
While it can be disruptive to a case when a judge recuses after participating in the proceedings
for a substantial period of time, most recusals come at the first assignment of a case and do
not affect the handling of the case. In contrast, when a Justice recuses there is no current
possibility of adding another Justice. For this reason, the mere fact of the recusal may be case
dispositive. The Justices may therefore be justified in being more hesitant than lower court
judges to recuse, and correspondingly should be more careful to avoid circumstances that
might trigger recusal.
The Justices’ recusal decisions are subject to significant public attention, and Justices are
often criticized for failing to recuse. 150 Even so, the Justices recuse somewhat frequently, at
least at the certiorari stage. There was an average of 193 recusals at the certiorari stage over
the last six Terms, and an average of four recusals at the merits stage. 151
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U.S. Supreme Court Term

Recusals at the Certiorari Stage

Recusals at the Merits Stage

2020

247

1

2019

145

4

2018

198

3

2017

228

6

2016

206

4

2015

181

4

The Justices do not offer reasons for their recusals, but reasons sometimes can be inferred
based on context. For example, a Justice’s financial disclosure forms may reveal whether a
recusal was due to an interest such as owning shares of stock in a publicly traded company.
Based on context, it appears that the most common reason for recusal in the past six Terms is
that the Justice was involved with a case during previous employment as a circuit judge or as
Solicitor General. Following that, recusals due to stock ownership were the next most
common.
After stock ownership, there is a significant dip. A few recusals were likely because a
Justice (or Justices) were named in the suit, or because of a family relationship (Justice Breyer,
for example, will routinely recuse in cases that were handled by his brother, a U.S. district
judge). A negligible number of recusals involve other reasons. In 2020, for example, Chief
Justice Roberts recused from a case involving the Smithsonian Institute apparently because
the Chief Justice serves as the chancellor of that institution.
Proposals for recusal reform largely focus on making the process more transparent and
accountable. There are three common proposals for reform: (1) require the Justices to state
their reasons for recusal or for refusing to recuse; (2) establish a formal procedure by which
recusal decisions may be reviewed by another Justice or by the entire Court; and (3) reform
recusal laws to make it easier for Justices to avoid financial conflicts.

Stating Reasons for Recusal
Statements from the Justices explaining their reasons for recusal could enhance the
transparency of the recusal process and help build a “common law” of recusal on the Court.
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Recusal decisions could serve as guidance to Justices and might also clarify whether the
Justices use the same standards for recusal on recurring issues, particularly a Justice’s prior
contact with a case when a circuit judge. While the Justices may provide such statements on
their own, Congress or the Court itself might also require such statements from the Justices. 152
However, requiring full discussion on every decision to recuse could be time consuming and
burdensome. A reasoning requirement could also force Justices in some situations to divulge
private matters—for example the medical condition of a family member—and this could
discourage recusal where otherwise appropriate. A recusal opinion might also have the
appearance or effect of lobbying the other Justices. 153 One answer to these concerns might be
to require only a short statement without specific details; for example, the Justice might state
that the recusal is based on the Justice’s involvement with the case when a circuit judge and
identify the nature of the involvement (e.g., served on the panel, reviewed a motion to hear the
case en banc).
In tandem with requiring explanations for recusal, there may be benefits to requiring
Justices to state reasons for not recusing when a motion for recusal has been filed. Requiring
reasoned explanations could ensure that the Justices have thoroughly considered whether to
recuse. And, like explanations for recusal, explanations for not recusing could help build a
body of guidance to future Justices that is also accessible to the public. Even more so than
with explanations for recusal, however, requiring explanations for not recusing could become
burdensome and time-consuming if motions to recuse became more common and interested
groups see such motions as an opportunity to harry or embarrass Justices with whom they
disagree.

Establish a Review Procedure
A Justice’s decision whether to recuse is totally independent, and recusal decisions are
not subject to any kind of review. The Justices may well consult with one another over difficult
recusal decisions, but the decision is still that of the individual Justice and not subject to further
review. This places the Justice in the position of being the final arbiter of a recusal motion that
challenges the Justice’s own impartiality. 154
Other individual decisions made by the Justices are subject to a form of review by another
Justice or the full Court. Parties regularly make applications to individual Justices. These
applications include, for example, requests for filing deadline extensions and requests for a
temporary stay of an injunction. If a Justice denies one of these requests, Supreme Court Rule
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22 provides that a party may renew its request to another Justice on the Court. 155 Sometimes
Justices refer emergency motions to the entire court.
It is not clear how the Court’s operations or relations among the Justices would be affected
by an internal process for review of recusal decisions. There has been at least one occasion in
the Court’s history where disagreement over recusal has led to a significant feud. 156 Because
recusal can be case dispositive, were the ultimate decision on recusal to rest with the entire
Court, a decision by the Court to force a Justice to recuse may lead to accusations of improper
purpose. These issues may not be insuperable; some state supreme courts have a referral
process for recusal decisions and the process appears to work without undue friction or burden
in that setting. 157 The practice of comparable high courts in other countries, such as those in
Canada and the UK, also may be instructive. It appears that neither Canada nor the UK has a
referral practice for recusal on its highest court and that high court justices decide recusal on
their own without further review, as in the U.S. Supreme Court. The views of the Justices
would be particularly helpful in any further analysis.

Reform Financial Recusal Laws
Context suggests that a significant number of Supreme Court recusals are due to a
Justice’s financial conflict. Indeed, a study of recusals at the certiorari stage in Terms 20032013 revealed that there was at least one recusal in 10% of certiorari petitions involving a
Forbes 100 company. 158 What makes these numbers surprising is that the Justices (along with
their spouses and dependent children) are legally enabled to divest themselves of any stock
that is causing a conflict without incurring capital gains tax. 159 It may be that there is something
about the wording or operation of the relevant statute, 26 U.S.C. § 1043, that limits its reach
or effectiveness. 160 If so, the Court might speak to this issue so that the statute might be
improved.
Given the significant number of financial recusals, some have suggested reforms that may
reduce the number of recusals due to financial conflicts. For example, Congress could act to
prohibit Justices, their spouses, and any dependent children from owning individual shares in
publicly traded companies, or Congress could require divestment when a conflict arises. 161
Both reforms would reduce financial conflicts significantly (and eliminate conflicts arising
from stock ownership).
The Commission notes a building consensus among observers that no Justices or their
spouses and dependent children should own or continue to own individual publicly traded
securities. 162
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Courtroom Transparency
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court conducted oral arguments over
teleconference beginning in the 2020 Term. For the first time, oral arguments were routinely
livestreamed, so the public could listen in from anywhere an internet connection was available.
The Court has decided to continue livestreaming oral arguments for the first few months of
the current Term (through December 2021), although it has not yet announced whether this
practice would continue beyond that period. The present experiment in simultaneous audio
has added additional fuel to a longstanding debate over whether there ought to be cameras in
the Supreme Court’s courtroom, which is usually capable of seating only around 50 members
of the general public at a time.
In many respects, the work of the Court has become more accessible over the past few
decades. The Court’s opinions are available online for anyone to read or download, as are its
orders, including decisions on petitions for certiorari. Even before arguments were
livestreamed, recordings could be accessed after the fact in most modern cases. Still, the Court
has never made the leap to allowing video streaming or video recording of its proceedings.
Proponents of cameras in the courtroom emphasize the potential educational, historical,
and civic benefits of being able to see the Justices at work. Congress has introduced bills
calling for cameras. Numerous members of the media and interested members of the public
also urge video coverage. Moreover, lower federal courts and state courts have experimented
with cameras, and scholars and judges have documented the results of those experiments. 163
However, several Justices have made clear that they disfavor video recording and
streaming of the Court’s proceedings. 164 They and other opponents of cameras raise concerns
that being on camera may lead to grandstanding by attorneys or even by the Justices, that the
nature of the discussion may become more scripted and less useful, and that video clips of the
Court may be taken out of context and used to mislead the public.
As an alternative to cameras in the courtroom, the Court could continue its current practice
of livestreaming audio of oral arguments. Prior to the pandemic, attendance at the courtroom
was determined on a first-come, first-served basis, and important cases often attracted long
lines and large crowds. 165 Critics have documented the unfortunate practice of paid linestanders, a problem the Court itself partially addressed in advance of one especially highprofile case. 166 Livestreamed audio is far more accessible; one does not need to be in
Washington, D.C., to listen to arguments, and attendance is not limited by seats available.
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Livestreamed audio also gives the American public real-time access to important events in the
Supreme Court’s courtroom. This may be practically important in those few cases where the
oral argument itself may have significant immediate effects, for example on public markets.
In addition to hearing arguments, it could also be meaningful for members of the public to
hear opinion announcements from the Justices themselves in real time.
Although livestreaming of the arguments prevents the Court from fixing minor mistakes
that may occur during oral argument, the past two Terms indicate that this problem is minor.
Livestreamed audio has led to few, if any, hiccups; any such technical problems were related
to the telephonic format of the arguments during the pandemic. There is also some concern
that observers in the courtroom might attempt to use the fact of livestreaming to disrupt the
proceedings. A short delay in transmission to allow livestreaming to be halted during any
outburst could prevent any such disruption.
Given the Court’s longstanding opposition to cameras, a continuation of nearsimultaneous audio would be a step toward enabling the media and interested members of the
bar and the public to better follow the work of the Court. Perhaps further experience with
simultaneous audio will encourage the Court to try cameras as well.
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June 29, 2021) (mem.); Chrysafis v. Marks, No. 21A8, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2021) (mem.).

16

141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021).

17

See Ross v. Nat’l Urban League, 141 S. Ct. 18 (2020) (mem.).

18

See Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020) (mem.); Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020)
(mem.); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (mem.).

19

See Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620 (2020) (mem.).

20

See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam); Tandon v. Newsom,
141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).

21

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 13 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of
Sharon McGowan, Lambda Legal), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/McGowanTestimony.pdf (describing how although the Court later denied cert in a Virginia school board’s effort to reverse
a lower court injunction allowing a transgender student to use the boys’ bathroom, the Supreme Court’s initial
stay in the case, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016) (mem.), had the effect of
barring Gavin Grimm from “using the boys’ restroom along with all the other boys throughout his last year of
high school”).

22

Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8, at 7.

23

Steve Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2021 1:27 PM),
https://mobile.twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/1434568812045742086.

24

In the 2020 Term, the Court decided fewer than 70 merits cases, below its average over the past 15 years. See
Kalvis Golde, In Barrett’s First Term, Conservative Majority Is Dominant but Divided, SCOTUSBLOG (July 2,
2021, 6:37 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/07/in-barretts-first-term-conservative-majority-is-dominantbut-divided; SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR THE SUPREME COURT’S 2020-21 TERM 18 (2021),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Final-Stat-Pack-07.02.2021.pdf. The merits docket for
the 2019 Term contained the lowest number of cases since the Civil War. Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS:
Something We Haven’t Seen in the Supreme Court Since the Civil War, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16, 2020, 5:22 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/empirical-scotus-something-we-havent-seen-in-the-supreme-court-sincethe-civil-war; see SCOTUSBLOG, FINAL STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2019, at 1 (2020),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Final-Statpack-7.20.2020.pdf.

25

Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8, at 7-8.

26

Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 5-7 (discussing such injunctions and their relationship to the shadow docket).

27

See Alito, “The Emergency Docket,” supra note 10.

28

As an example of the latter point, Professor Vladeck argues that a majority of the Justices believe that state and
federal governments are irreparably harmed when their actions are enjoined by a lower court and suggests that
this is a relatively new development. Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8, at 14.
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29

In Whole Woman’s Health, for example, abortion providers and other groups challenging the Texas law applied to
the Court for emergency relief after a federal appeals court issued an administrative stay halting proceedings in
the district court. Challengers asked the Court to issue injunctive relief or, in the alternative, to lift the appellate
court’s stay. Given that the law was set to go into effect the following day, the Court faced great pressure to act
quickly—and its decision could hardly have failed to be important and controversial.

30

See Alito, “The Emergency Docket,” supra note 10. See also Mark Rienzi, The Supreme Court’s “Shadow”
Docket—A Response to Professor Vladeck, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 16, 2021, 1:30 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/the-supreme-courts-shadow-docket-a-response-to-professorvladeck.

31

See, e.g., Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8, at 4-6 (focusing on evidence of an increase in “cases in which the
Justices are using the shadow docket to change the status quo—where the Court’s summary action disrupts what
was previously true under rulings by lower courts”); Id. at 14-15 (critiquing the Court’s apparent readiness to
intervene on the ground that “when any government action is enjoined by a lower court, the government is
irreparably harmed, and the equities weigh in favor of emergency relief no matter the consequences to those who
might be injured by allowing the policy to remain in effect,” as well as the Court’s apparent willingness to grant
emergency relief to protect “newly minted rights”).

32

Id. at 6 (describing the rise of “cases in which the Justices are using the shadow docket to change the status quo”
and arguing that “part of the significance of the shadow docket of late has been in how often the Justices are using
it to disrupt the state of affairs until a case reaches the Court on the merits (which, increasingly, may be never)”).

33

See, e.g., Rienzi, The Supreme Court’s “Shadow” Docket, supra note 30. For a response, see Texas’s
Unconstitutional Abortion Ban and the Role of the Shadow Docket, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary 20-21 (Sept. 29, 2021) (written testimony of Stephen I. Vladeck, University of Texas School of Law),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Vladeck%20testimony1.pdf [hereinafter Vladeck Senate
Testimony]. See also Charlie Savage, Texas Abortion Case Highlights Concern Over Supreme Court’s ‘Shadow
Docket,’ N.Y. Times (Sept. 2, 2021) (“‘I think the real concern [of critics] is that the court has been reaching out
aggressively in some of the immigration and Covid cases, and [in Whole Woman’s Health] it is not. . . . And why
is it when it’s a Covid restriction in church service, the court rushes in, in the middle of the night, to stop the
government, but when it’s an anti-abortion law, the court lets it go?’” (quoting Professor Will Baude)).

34

Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 9.

35

Compare Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 5:19:47 (June 30, 2021) (oral
testimony of Samuel L. Bray) [hereinafter Bray Oral Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/publicmeetings/june-30-2021 (defining “status quo” as used in the testimony of Samuel L. Bray) with Id. at 50:20:12
(defining “status quo” as used in the testimony of Stephen I. Vladeck).

36

Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 9 (“I recognize that these judgments inevitably have a normative tinge. I know
that it is a choice to see the national injunction as the disruptive force, not the executive policy or rule that
prompted the national injunction. I know it is a choice to see the state public health measures as the disruptive
force, not the worship services that ran up against the public health measures.”).

37

See, e.g., Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8, at 4 (describing “orders that . . . change the status quo” as those that
“stay[] a lower court decision and/or mandate pending appeal,” “vacat[e] a stay . . . imposed by a lower court,”
“grant[] an emergency writ of injunction pending appeal,” or “vacat[e] a lower court’s grant of an emergency
injunction”).

38

See, e.g., Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam) (issuing a writ of injunction against
enforcement of California’s pandemic-based limits on in-home gatherings); Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S.
Ct. 190 (2020) (staying a lower court order lifting a ban on Alabama counties from offering curbside voting in
light of the COVID-19 pandemic); Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620 (2020) (mem.) (staying a lower court
preliminary injunction requiring implementation of safety measures to protect inmates during the COVID–19
pandemic).

39

See, e.g., Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 21A23, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Aug. 26,
2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We should not set aside the CDC’s eviction moratorium in this summary
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proceeding.”); Bray Oral Testimony, supra note 35 (defining status quo as “the last peaceable moment” that
existed prior to a disruption, and explaining that in a case in which a lower court enters an injunction blocking a
new executive policy, “the disruption is coming from the lower courts usually”).
40

Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2496 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

41

For example, Justice Barrett recently denied a request for emergency relief concerning Indiana University’s
vaccine requirement. The denial is noted on the Court’s docket without any accompanying explanation. See
Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana University, No. 21A15,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21a15.html; Amy Howe,
Barrett leaves Indiana University’s vaccine mandate in place, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 12, 2021, 9:40 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/08/barrett-leaves-indiana-universitys-vaccine-mandate-in-place/.

42

As an example, commentators cite the Court’s decisions in a series of cases concerning the rights of people facing
execution to have a religious advisor of their chosen spiritual denomination present in the execution chamber at
the time of their death. See Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725 (2021) (mem.); Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 127
(2020) (mem.); Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (2019) (mem.); Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (mem.).
To some observers, the Court’s rulings suggest that some of the Justices’ understanding of the governing legal
principles may have shifted across the four cases, but in the absence of majority opinions speaking for “the Court”
and information about how each Justice voted in each case, the answer is not clear. See Vladeck Testimony, supra
note 8, at 8-9 & 18 (discussing the lack of written explanation for the Court, as well as the lack of disclosure of
certain Justices’ votes, in the emergency orders in the religious-adviser capital cases).

43

See Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, supra note 9, at 131; Vladeck Testimony, supra note
8, at 14 (citing the Court’s decision in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay II), 141 S. Ct.
716 (2021) (mem), and emphasizing that none of the four separate opinions issued by Justices who supported the
order “purported to apply the four-factor test the Court traditionally follows when considering whether to grant an
injunction”). For some of the recent articulations of the standard, which may vary by context, including
procedural posture, see, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021) (“To prevail in an
application for a stay or an injunction, an applicant must carry the burden of making a strong showing that it is
likely to succeed on the merits, that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay, that the balance of equities favors
it, and that a stay is consistent with the public interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (“To obtain a stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition
for a writ of certiorari, an applicant must show (1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the
issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse
the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay. In close cases
the Circuit Justice or the Court will balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the
respondent.”); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (citing the factors as “(1) whether the stay applicant has
made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies”). Cf. John Does 1-3 v. Mills, No. 21A90, slip op. at 1 (U.S.
Oct. 29, 2021) (Barrett, J., concurring) (“When this Court is asked to grant extraordinary relief, it considers,
among other things, whether the applicant is ‘likely to succeed on the merits’. . . I understand this factor to
encompass not only an assessment of the underlying merits but also a discretionary judgment about whether the
Court should grant review in the case . . . Were the standard otherwise, applicants could use the emergency docket
to force the Court to give a merits preview in cases that it would be unlikely to take—and to do so on a short fuse
without the benefit of full briefing and argument.”).

44

See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, The Supreme Court Doesn’t Just Abuse Its Shadow Docket. It Does So Inconsistently.,
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2021, 10:43 AM), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/09/03/shadow-docket-elena-kagan-abortion (contrasting the
Court’s refusal to issue relief in Whole Woman’s Health, the Texas abortion case, on grounds of legal uncertainty,
with cases in which the Court “showed no compunction about [making new law] where alleged infringements on
religion were at issue”); Lee Kovarsky, Abortion, the Death Penalty, and the Shadow Docket, SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept. 6, 2021, 12:03 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/09/abortion-the-death-penalty-and-the-shadowdocket (contrasting Whole Woman’s Health with cases involving federal executions); see also Alabama Ass’n of
Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 21A23, slip op. at 1-2 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2021) (Breyer, J.,
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dissenting) (criticizing the majority for vacating a stay entered by a lower court when the agency order was not
“demonstrably wrong” (citation omitted)); Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 965-68 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority’s decision to issue an emergency injunction where the legal
rights at issue were not “indisputably clear,” as required by precedent interpreting the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 507 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993))).
45

As one Commission witness put it, “[i]t is common in our legal system for preliminary orders, rather than merits
decisions, to have different norms of justification and attribution.” Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 13. See also
Alito, “The Emergency Docket,” supra note 10.

46

As Professor Michael Morley argued in congressional testimony, “it may often be much easier for Justices to
agree on an ultimate outcome than to craft an opinion with detailed reasoning . . . .” The Supreme Court’s Shadow
Docket: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 117th Cong. 3 (2021) (statement of Michael T. Morley, Florida State University College of Law)
[hereinafter Morley House Testimony], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20210218/111204/HHRG-117JU03-Wstate-MorleyM-20210218-U1.pdf.

47

See, e.g., Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 18 (July 16, 2021) (written
testimony of Kenneth Geller, Mayer Brown LLP, & Maureen Mahoney, Latham & Watkins, LLP) [hereinafter
Geller & Mahoney Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Geller-MahoneyTestimony.pdf (arguing that “requiring the Court to announce legal conclusions may appear to commit the
Justices to particular views before merits briefing—which itself is a criticism of some emergency orders”); Bray
Testimony, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing potential psychological precommitment effect).

48

See, e.g., Trevor N. McFadden & Vetan Kapoor, The Precedential Effects of the Supreme Court’s Emergency
Stays, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 830 (2021); AliKhan House Testimony, supra note 9, at 12-13.

49

See Alito, “The Emergency Docket,” supra note 10.

50

There are other examples. One witness testified that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit grappled
with the same problem in CASA de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2020). See Vladeck Testimony,
supra note 8, at 10 n.30; see also Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, supra note 7, at 13
(describing the Seventh Circuit’s effort in Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014), to discern the meaning
of the Supreme Court’s stays in the earlier marriage equality cases). Cf. Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., No. 21A23, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2021) (per curiam) (explaining, in the second of
two eviction moratorium cases, that the district court concluded that “the Government was unlikely to succeed on
the merits, given the four votes to vacate the stay in this Court and Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion” in
the first case); Id. at 5 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Certainly this Court did not resolve the question by denying
applicants’ last emergency motion, whatever one Justice might have said in a concurrence.”).

51

141 S. Ct. 1460, 1460 (2021).

52

Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8, at 14.

53

See, e.g., Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 7-9, 18 (analogizing emergency rulings to preliminary injunctions and
arguing that “[i]f the shadow docket works (and fails to work) in the same way as the preliminary injunction, then
we want to tamp down the precedential effects, not ramp them up”).

54

See, e.g., Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8, at 22-26.

55

Id.

56

One defender of the Court’s use of emergency orders explained that “there does not appear to be a need for either
vote tallies, or the identities of the Justices who voted to grant or deny a petition, to be withheld from the public.”
Morley House Testimony, supra note 46, at 3.

57

See Vladeck Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at 27 (critiquing the Court’s order in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021), which articulated the standard four-part test for relief and concluded that the
applicants failed to “me[e]t their burden,” but did not explain how the Court weighed the four factors (or whether
it deemed some factors irrelevant in the absence of a sufficient showing on the merits)). For a response, see
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Jurisdiction and the Supreme Court’s Orders Docket, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 29, 2021)
(written testimony of Jennifer L. Mascott).
58

See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2500 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (faulting the
majority for “barely bother[ing] to explain its conclusion—that a challenge to an obviously unconstitutional
abortion regulation backed by a wholly unprecedented enforcement scheme is unlikely to prevail”).

59

Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 21A23, slip op. (U.S. Aug. 26, 2021) (per
curiam).

60

United States v. Texas, No. 21A85, slip op. (U.S. Oct. 22, 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21a85_5h25.pdf (treating application for emergency relief as a
petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and granting the petition with an expedited schedule for briefing
and oral argument); Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21-463, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 5326 (Oct. 22, 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/102221zr_986b.pdf (granting petition for certiorari before
judgment with an expedited schedule for briefing and oral argument).

61

Ramirez v. Collier, No. 21-5592 (21A33), 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3681 (Sept. 8, 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/090821zr_n7ip.pdf.

62

Whole Woman’s Health, 141 S. Ct., at 2495. Disavowing a decision on the merits, while potentially deflecting
mistaken treatment of an emergency ruling as precedent, might not dull its practical effects. See United States v.
Texas, slip op. at 2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The promise of future adjudication
offers cold comfort, however, for Texas women seeking abortion care, who are entitled to relief now. These
women will suffer personal harm from delaying their medical care, and as their pregnancies progress, they may
even be unable to obtain abortion care altogether.”).

63

Whole Woman’s Health, 141 S. Ct., at 2496 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

64

Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 18.

65

The Commission has focused primarily on the issue of emergency orders as “vertical precedents” that are binding
on lower courts. Significant complications are raised by the questions of whether, when, and how emergency
orders should operate as “horizontal precedents” that bind the Court itself in later cases. The Court might, for
example, treat its statements about the standards for review in emergency rulings as carrying some precedential
weight in later cases even if it does not treat the more substantive elements of its emergency rulings, such as
predictions about likelihood of success on the merits, as precedential. One’s views on these matters might inform
the questions of whether and on what issues the Court should be “consistent” across the run of its emergency
rulings, and vice versa.

66

Geller & Mahoney Testimony, supra note 47, at 18-19 (detailing such existing principles but noting that “the
Court may not always garner universal acclaim—even among the Justices themselves—for its adherence to these
settled standards”).

67

Id. at 19 (citing Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 882 (2015) as stating that Supreme Court does not review
“concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious sand exceptional showing of
error”).

68

Id. at 19. The testimony points to Doe v. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., in chambers), as an
endorsement of the expedited-schedule norm. Id.

69

Professor Vladeck, for example, has proposed that “[i]n any cases in which any (state or federal) government
action is enjoined by a lower federal court, speed up the appellate timelines so that appeals of lower court rulings
receive plenary appellate review much faster — by shortening the time for filing an appeal; by mandating
aggressive briefing schedules; and by strongly encouraging courts to give such cases all due priority.” Vladeck
Testimony, supra note 8, at 24. Although Professor Vladeck is suggesting this as a reform for Congress to enact,
similar acceleration may be accomplished to some degree by the courts themselves.

70

Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 18 (endorsing the Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2021, H.R. 43, 117th
Cong. (2021)); see also Morley House Testimony, supra note 46, at 7 (arguing that if nationwide injunctions were
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“curtailed—whether through a clear Supreme Court precedent directly on point, a federal statute, or an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—at least one of the contributing factors to the recent growth
of the shadow docket w[ould] be removed”).
71

In the specific context of “nationwide” injunctions, as relevant to emergency orders, one limitation is that such
restrictions would address only a subset of the orders that have been of concern. See Vladeck Testimony, supra
note 8, at 11-12 (reporting that cases involving the federal government—and, thus, the potential for a nationwide
injunction—account for “only one modest slice of the shadow docket,” and that “even within the DOJ slice, less
than half of the Trump administration’s applications for emergency relief involved nationwide injunctions”
(emphasis omitted)).

72

Id. at 24.

73

There is a debate over the extent to which litigation commenced as execution dates approach is an example of
strategic gamesmanship, versus a more benign outgrowth of the nature of death penalty law and litigation itself.
Several Justices clearly view it as the former. See, e.g., Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1482 (2019) (mem.)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“This Court receives an application to stay virtually every execution; these applications are
almost all filed on or shortly before the scheduled execution date; and in the great majority of cases, no good
reason for the late filing is apparent.”); Price v. Dunn, 139 S. Ct. 1533, 1538 (2019) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“A stay [when] the petitioner inexcusably filed additional evidence hours before his scheduled
execution after delaying bringing his challenge in the first place — only encourages the proliferation of dilatory
litigation strategies that we have recently and repeatedly sought to discourage.”). On the other hand, Professor
Lee Kovarsky observes that litigation in the lead up to an execution is a natural consequence of two other factors.
First, the Court’s own doctrine creates a set of “intrinsically delayed claims,” such as challenges to a person’s
competency to be executed or to the method of execution, for which “the nature of the constitutional challenge
itself thwarts early-phase litigation” because the claims are unripe for adjudication until an execution date is
imminent. Lee Kovarsky, Delay in the Shadow of Death, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1319, 1322-23 (2020) (citing, inter
alia, Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 946 (2007)); cf. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 923-24 (2015)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]elay is in part a problem that the Constitution’s own demands create.”). Second,
Kovarsky observes that a lack of resources available to capital defendants forces a small number of lawyers to
triage their representation, such that litigation is often “undertaken after the state sets an execution date—because
that is the first time that many capital prisoners have the legal representation necessary to enforce certain rights.”
Kovarsky, supra, at 1321. See generally Id. at 1356-85.

74

See Adam Liptak, To Beat the Execution Clock, the Justices Prepare Early, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012, at A19.

75

The clerk who handles all emergency applications at the Court is sometimes referred to as the “death clerk” due to
the salience of this category of cases. Id. This category is also procedurally distinctive in that many cases involve
habeas corpus, “a thorny and evolving area of the law governed by intricate rules, multi-faceted statutes, and a
complex (and still developing) jurisprudence.” Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States
(July 26, 2021) (written testimony of Federal Capital Habeas Project) [hereinafter Federal Capital Habeas Project
Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Federal-Capital-Habeas-Project.pdf.

76

See, e.g., Geller & Mahoney testimony, supra note 47, at 28 (“On balance, based on the Supreme Court’s
recognition that capital cases are different and on the potential beneficial effects of a heightened standard of review
on the process for consideration of applications to vacate a stay of execution, a majority of the Committee [of
experienced Supreme Court practitioners] believes that proposals for heightened standards of review for such
applications warrant serious consideration.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of death
is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice”); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 45-46 (1957) (on rehearing) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The taking of life is irrevocable. It is in capital
cases especially that the balance of conflicting interests must be weighed most heavily in favor of the procedural
safeguards of the Bill of Rights.”).

77

Cf. Glossip, 576 U.S. at 937 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[R]eview by courts at every level helps to ensure reliability;
if this Court had not ordered that Anthony Ray Hinton receive further hearings in state court he may well have
been executed rather than exonerated.” (citing Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014))).
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78

See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 2 (June 25, 2021) (written testimony of
Christina Swarns, Innocence Project) [hereinafter Swarns Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/Swarns-Presidential-Commission-on-SCOTUS-Testimony.pdf. Given these statistics,
“the risk of convicting and executing an innocent person is real and,” the witness argued, “constitutionally
unacceptable.” Id. See also Glossip v. Gross, 567 U.S. 863, 927 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Several inmates
have come within hours or days of execution before later being exonerated.”) (citing multiple examples); Dahlia
Lithwick, Cruel but not Unusual, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2011/04/connick-v-thompson-clarence-thomas-writes-one-of-the-cruelest-supreme-court-decisionsever.html (noting that John Thompson had seven death warrants signed, each setting an imminent date for his
execution, before he was exonerated).

79

One Commission witness drew a sharp distinction between challenges to a condemned person’s conviction and
arguments that the execution itself would violate the condemned person’s constitutional or statutory rights.
Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 2 (Sept. 15, 2021) (written testimony of
Hashim M. Mooppan) [hereinafter Mooppan Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/Hashim-Mooppan.pdf.

80

See, e.g., Glossip, 576 U.S. at 876-77 (2015) (describing the standard for an Eighth Amendment method-ofexecution claim).

81

See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

82

See supra note 42 (discussing religious advisor cases).

83

See, e.g., Swarns Testimony, supra note 78, at 1 (arguing that there “is no area of the law in which reliability,
accuracy, and fairness are more critical than capital punishment”).

84

Price v. Dunn, 139 S. Ct. 1533, 1540 (2019) (mem.) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting
Ivana Hrynkiw, Execution Called Off for Christopher Price; SCOTUS Decision Allowing It Came Too Late,
ALABAMA.COM (Apr. 12, 2019, 7:03 AM), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2019/04/christopher-price-setto-be-executed-thursday-evening-for-1991-slaying-of-minister.html). Most death sentences are never carried out.
See Glossip, 576 U.S. at 931 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Of the 8,466 inmates under a death sentence at some point
between 1973 and 2013, 16% were executed, 42% had their convictions or sentences overturned or commuted,
and 6% died by other causes; the remainder (35%) are still on death row.”). Those that are take a very long time:
for those put to death in 2014, an average of 18 years had elapsed between the imposition and the execution of
sentence. See id. at 924-25. Most of that delay is attributable to the ordinary course of judicial review (as opposed
to emergency stay applications) or to factors independent of the judicial process. See, e.g., Jones v. Chappell, 31
F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055-60 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding after reviewing multiple reports on death penalty delay
in California “that delay is evident at each stage of the post-conviction review process, including from the time
the death sentence is issued”).

85

Mooppan Testimony, supra note 79, at 3 (“Especially given the lengthy delay before an execution is scheduled at
all, further delaying an execution even for a limited time in these circumstances essentially undermines for that
period the judgment of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the sentencing judge and jury that continued
imprisonment is inadequate and only death is sufficient punishment for the most heinous of murders.”).

86

A further consequence, also noted by Justice Thomas, is that surviving relatives of the victims sometimes travel to
witness the execution and may be “forced to leave without closure” after years of waiting if the execution is
postponed at the last minute. Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1533, 1540 (2019) (mem.).

87

See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Historical Information: Capital Punishment, at
https://www.bop.gov/about/history/federal_executions.jsp (last accessed Oct. 3, 2021); see also Lee Kovarsky,
The Trump Executions 10 (July 27, 2021) (U. Tex. L. Sch., Pub. L. Res. Paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3891784.

88

See Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executiondatabase (last accessed Oct. 3, 2021). Against this backdrop, several witnesses who shared assessments and
recommendations with the Commission regarding the Court’s emergency capital orders grounded their analyses at
least in part on cases from the states, including a series of recent cases from Alabama and Texas about the
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presence of a religious adviser at the execution. See Swarns Testimony, supra note 78; Bray Testimony, supra
note 7; cf. Mooppan Testimony, supra note 79, at 22 n.10.
89

Federal Capital Habeas Project Testimony, supra note 75; Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8; see also Kovarsky,
The Trump Executions, supra note 87. The Commission also solicited and received testimony from one witness
who defended the Court’s approach to the federal execution cases. See Mooppan Testimony, supra note 79.

90

For detailed (and divergent) accounts of the cases and litigation described in this section, see Kovarsky, The
Trump Executions, supra note 87; Federal Capital Habeas Project Testimony, supra note 75; Mooppan
Testimony, supra note 79.

91

Federal Capital Habeas Project Testimony, supra note 75, at 5-6 (listing legal challenges raised by federal
prisoners that were unanswered by the Supreme Court); Kovarsky, The Trump Executions, supra note 87, at 2728 (noting Eighth Amendment claims). Notably, these executions were conducted pursuant to a recently adopted
execution protocol that was being implemented for the first time in the midst of a pandemic, and they implicated a
set of statutes that had not previously been examined closely by the courts.

92

Federal Capital Habeas Project Testimony, supra note 75, at 3 & n.14.

93

Professor Kovarsky summarized these requests as follows: the Court “entertained some twenty-four requests for
emergency relief, touching on all of the executions”; and while it “granted no emergency relief to prisoners,” it
issued “shadow-docket orders granting emergency relief to the U.S. Solicitor General” multiple times. Kovarsky,
The Trump Executions, supra note 87, at 43 & n.322 (citing United States v. Higgs, 141 S. Ct. 645 (2021); Rosen
v. Montgomery, 141 S. Ct. 1232 (2021); United States v. Montgomery, 141 S. Ct. 1233 (2021); Barr v. Hall, 141
S. Ct. 869 (2020); Barr v. Purkey, 141 S. Ct. 196 (2020); Barr v. Lee, 140 S. Ct. 2590 (2020)). See also Federal
Capital Habeas Project Testimony, supra note 75, n.14 (“In eight of these cases, the government filed emergency
applications to vacate the stays, which the Court uniformly granted—and in seven of those eight, the Court provided
no explanation at all for its orders.”).

94

See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 141 S. Ct. 645 (2021) (granting certiorari before judgment and vacating two lower
court decisions preventing execution); Barr v. Purkey, 141 S. Ct. 196 (2020) (vacating the lower court’s preliminary
injunction without reasoning). As one commentator observes, in the rare instance where the Court did issue a brief
per curiam opinion, it appeared to change the underlying Eighth Amendment doctrine. Prior precedent issued in
2019 (via the merits docket) had held that a person challenging a method of execution under the Eighth Amendment
must demonstrate that the challenged method would “superadd” pain above and beyond a “feasible and readily
implemented alternative method of execution.” Buckley v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1125 (2019). In contrast to
that comparative analysis, the Court’s per curiam opinion in the federal execution case of Barr v. Lee, 140 S. Ct.
2590 (2020), “appeared to ground its vacatur [of the lower court’s stay] in the idea that pentobarbital-only
executions [a]re unconditionally consistent with the Eighth Amendment,” even when compared to a proposed less
painful alternative that had not previously been analyzed by the Court. Kovarsky, The Trump Executions, supra
note 87, at 24 (emphasis added).

95

Ten of the orders, out of 25, were issued over dissents. Mooppan Testimony, supra note 79, at 11. Also, in several
cases, the Court vacated lower court stays even though the courts of appeals had set expedited briefing schedules
to resolve the cases promptly. See, e.g., Rosen v. Montgomery, 141 S. Ct. 1232 (2021) (mem.) (vacating D.C.
Circuit’s stay of execution pending highly expedited en banc consideration of FDPA statutory question); Barr v.
Lee, 140 S. Ct. 2590 (2020) (per curiam) (vacating similarly expedited D.C. Circuit consideration of Eighth
Amendment challenge to federal execution protocol).

96

See generally Mooppan Testimony, supra note 79, at 1-16; see also Id. at 12 (defending “the orders where the
criticism of the Court would seem to be most relevant, because a divided Court used emergency rulings to”
summarily vacate lower court says, on the ground that “the dissenting Justices did not assert that the inmate’s
claim was likely to succeed”).

97

See Vladeck Testimony, supra note 8; Federal Capital Habeas Project Testimony, supra note 75; Presidential
Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 16 (Sept. 1, 2021) (written testimony of Janai S. Nelson,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/NAACP-LDF.pdf (“In
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eight orders supported by little to no reasoning, the Court lifted lower court stays of federal executions, denying
the inmates a fair opportunity to present evidence for their claims.”).
98

In United States v. Higgs, the final case to reach the Court during the Trump administration, Justice Sotomayor
argued in dissent that:
This unprecedented rush of federal executions has predictably given rise to many difficult legal disputes. . . .
Throughout this expedited spree of executions, this Court has consistently rejected inmates’ credible claims
for relief. The Court has even intervened to lift stays of execution that lower courts put in place, thereby
ensuring those prisoners’ challenges would never receive a meaningful airing. The Court made these weighty
decisions in response to emergency applications, with little opportunity for proper briefing and consideration,
often in just a few short days or even hours. Very few of these decisions offered any public explanation for
their rationale. This is not justice.
Higgs, 141 S. Ct. at 647 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was similarly critical: “None of these legal
questions is frivolous. What are courts to do when faced with legal questions of this kind? Are they simply to
ignore them? Or are they, as in this case, to ‘hurry up, hurry up’? That is no solution.” Id. at 646 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).

99

Id. at 647 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

100

See, e.g., Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 16. Professor Bray’s point echoed others, most notably Mr. Amir Ali,
who told Congress earlier this year that “When it comes to ending someone’s life, there is no do-over. And when
the matter before the Court is one of life or death, the public’s interest in transparency and the need to ensure
public confidence in our legal system are at their apex.” The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 1
(2021) (statement of Amir H. Ali, Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center) [hereinafter Ali House
Testimony], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20210218/111204/HHRG-117-JU03-Wstate-AliA20210218-U2.pdf; see also Swarns Testimony, supra note 78; cf. Eric M. Freedman, No Execution If Four
Justices Object, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 652-54 (2015) (arguing that executions should be stayed whenever
necessary to afford the Justices “time to think” about whether to grant certiorari in a case).

101

See Bray Testimony, supra note 7, at 16-17; Swarns Testimony, supra note 78, at 5-6; see also Ali House
Testimony, supra note 100, at 5-6.

102

See Swarns Testimony, supra note 78, at 5-6. See also Geller & Mahoney testimony, supra note 47, at 28 (noting
that among a committee of experienced Supreme Court practitioners, “a majority of the Committee believes that
proposals for heightened standards of review for such applications warrant serious consideration,” although a
“significant number of members of the Committee oppose the proposal”).

103

See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 5:42:00 (June 30, 2021) (oral testimony
of Stephen Vladeck, University of Texas Law School) [hereinafter Vladeck Oral Testimony],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/public-meetings/june-30-2021 (describing an asymmetrical, statutorily
imposed standard of review as “clearly constitutional”); see also Ali House Testimony, supra note 100 , at 5-6
(proposing a statutory approach).

104

Swarns Testimony supra note 78, at 6. See also Id. at 7 (“While it may be unlikely for an execution to proceed
while a first-time habeas petition pends, the assurance of an automatic stay is nevertheless called for given the
gravity of what is at stake.”). Ms. Swarns agreed with Justice Stevens that “granting an automatic stay of
execution pending the completion of a full round of federal habeas review is consistent with the goals of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and would improve the balance between finality and justice in the
Court’s review of capital cases.” Id. See also AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL
CASES, Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, reprinted in 45 CRIM. L. REP. 3239 (1989); Emmett v. Kelly,
552 U.S. 942, 943 (2007) (statement of Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg J. respecting denial of certiorari).

105

See Vladeck Oral Testimony, supra note 103, at 5:44:22 (proposing a statutory bar on carrying out an execution
during the course of such a legal challenge to the method of execution, as well as arguing for mandatory review
at the Supreme Court of such a challenge). But see Mooppan Testimony, supra note 79, at 23 (noting practical
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problems with automatically allowing a full round of litigation on administration-of-execution challenges,
including potential incentives for capital inmates to raise weak claims).
106

See, e.g., Mooppan Testimony, supra note 79, at 3 (“[W]hen a claim is not likely to succeed—especially when it
does not even challenge the lawfulness of the sentence or the risk of material harm in how the sentence will be
carried out—the execution should not be postponed until the claim is finally rejected due merely to the existence
of doubts and questions held by some judges. Postponement for that reason alone would fail to give sufficient
weight to the compelling interest of the government and the public in timely executions.”).

107

See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 5:46:40 (June 30, 2021) (oral testimony
of Michael Dreeben, O’Melveny & Myers LLP), https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/public-meetings/june30-2021 (“I think a much better approach would be that if four Justices vote to hear a case, that there either be a
courtesy fifth or just a policy that four in that instance trumps five and that the Court hear the case on the merits.
I think that would be more consistent with the traditional rule of four and the underlying purposes that it
serves.”).

108

See Freedman, supra note 100, at 650 n.45 (describing proposals separately advanced over the years, most
explicitly by Justices Brennan and Marshall).

109

Adam Liptak, A Fitful Commitment to Halting Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2016, at A13.

110

See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 473 U.S. 928, 928–29 (1985) (mem.) (Powell, J., concurring in the granting of
the application for a stay) (“I find no merit whatever in any of the claims advanced in the petition for
certiorari . . . . But in view of the unusual situation in which four Justices have voted to grant certiorari . . . and in
view of the fact that this is a capital case with petitioner’s life at stake . . . I feel obligated to join in granting the
application for a stay.”). In practice, however, this norm has been difficult to discern and has not always been
applied consistently. See Freedman, supra note 100; Liptak, supra note 109 (describing the courtesy-fifth
practice as operating “in fits and starts” and as being “inconsistent”). The Court also often denies stays of
execution or vacates lower court stays over four dissents. See, e.g., Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (mem.)
(Kagan, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting); see also Freedman, supra note 100, at
651 n.50 (recounting “dozens of cases . . . denying stays over four dissents”). Some observers contend that these
votes might be consistent with the courtesy-fifth norm if the norm requires the four dissenting Justices to
actually vote to grant certiorari, and not merely to vote for a stay to permit more time to consider granting
certiorari. See Tom Goldstein, Death Penalty Stays, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 13, 2007, 12:06 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/2007/10/death-penalty-stays.

111

As one commentator notes, “the Court has chosen to reveal neither whether it is governed by a rule nor what the
contents of that rule might be,” while any potential pattern one might attempt to glean from the Court’s public
actions are consistent with “ad hoc negotiations by the Justices on a case-by-case basis.” Freedman, supra note
100, at 651.

112

Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 765-66 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

113

139 S. Ct. 1312 (2019) (mem.). In Dunn, Justice Breyer's request to consider the state’s application the following
morning would have carried the execution past its warrant date. As it turns out, the Court's majority did not
vacate the lower court's stay until after the warrant expired, which resulted in the execution being postponed. See
Adam Liptak, Dissent As Court Splits Over Execution¸ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2019, at A1.

114

Id. at 1313-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But cf. Price v. Dunn, 139 S. Ct. 1533, 1539 (2019) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (“Insofar as Justice Breyer was serious in suggesting that the Court simply ‘take
no action’ on the State's emergency motion to vacate until the following day, it should be obvious that emergency
applications ordinarily cannot be scheduled for discussion at weekly (or sometimes more infrequent)
Conferences.”).

115

As Chief Justice Roberts noted in voting for a stay as a “courtesy” when four other Justices had voted for a stay
(before deciding on certiorari): “I do not believe that this application meets our ordinary criteria for a stay. This
case does not merit the Court’s review: the claims set out in the application are purely fact-specific, dependent on
contested interpretations of state law, insulated from our review by alternative holdings below, or some
combination of the three. Four Justices have, however, voted to grant a stay. To afford them the opportunity to
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more fully consider the suitability of this case for review, including these circumstances, I vote to grant the stay
as a courtesy.” Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 14 (2016) (mem.) (statement of Roberts, C.J., respecting the grant of
the application for stay).
116

Mooppan Testimony, supra note 79, at 5 (“If the Supreme Court is to take such consequential action, it should be
done only if a majority of the Justices vested with the judicial power of the Court actually agrees with that
action.”).

117

Freedman, supra note 100, at 652 n.55 (quoting Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist, Supreme
Court of the U.S., on Darden v. Wainwright to the Conference 2 (Sept. 9, 1985)). At various points over the past
few decades, more than four Justices (albeit not all serving at the same time) have expressed their opposition to
the death penalty. Some but not all made a regular practice of voting in favor of every capital defendant seeking
relief at the Court. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); see also Green v. Zant, 469 U.S. 1143, 1143 (1985) (mem.) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would grant the application for a stay of
execution.”) (citation omitted); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he
imposition of the death penalty represents the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.”) (quotation omitted); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863,
909 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[M]y own 20 years of experience on this Court, that
lead me to believe that the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a legally prohibited cruel and
unusual punishment.”); see generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ch. 2 (2016).

118

Freedman, supra note 100, at 652 n.55.

119

Swarns Testimony, supra note 78, at 5.

120

2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 YEAR-END REPORT],
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf.

121

Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. (2019) (statements of Hons.
Samuel Alito & Elena Kagan, Associate Justices, U.S. Supreme Court),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-116hhrg38124/html/CHRG-116hhrg38124.htm.

122

In the past decade, observers have argued that Justices transgressed provisions of the Code by participating in
fundraising dinners for outside organizations or by overtly criticizing political candidates, to take two prominent
examples. See e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Step Right Up. Buy Dinner with a Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2011,
4:30 PM), https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/step-right-up-buy-dinner-with-a-justice; Editorial
Board, Justice Ginsburg’s Inappropriate Comments on Donald Trump, WASH. POST (July 12, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-ginsburgs-inappropriate-comments-on-donaldtrump/2016/07/12/981df404-4862-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html. Justice Ginsburg later apologized for
her comments and acknowledged that “[j]udges should avoid commenting on a candidate for public office.” Meg
Anderson, LISTEN: Justice Ginsburg Expands on Decision to Apologize for Trump Remarks, NPR (July 14,
2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/07/14/486080234/listen-justice-ginsburg-expands-on-decision-to-apologizefor-trump-remarks.

123

See, e.g., Ethics Handbook for On and Off-Duty Conduct, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/ethics-handbook; Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, AMAZON,
https://ir.aboutamazon.com/corporate-governance/documents-and-charters/code-of-business-conduct-andethics/default.aspx (last accessed Oct. 25, 2021); Code of Ethics, EXXONMOBIL,
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/About-us/Who-we-are/Corporate-governance/Code-of-ethics#Overview (last
accessed Oct. 25, 2021).

124

28 U.S.C. § 351(a).

125

Id. § 351(d).

126

See, e.g., Patrick M. Erwin, Corporate Codes of Conduct: The Effects of Code Content and Quality on Ethical
Performance, 99 J. BUS. ETHICS 535 (2011) (finding that quality codes of conduct can positively affect culture in
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the corporate context); Alan Doig & John Wilson, The Effectiveness Of Codes Of Conduct, 7 BUS. ETHICS,
ENV’T & RESPONSIBILITY 140 (1998) (finding that codes of conduct can positively affect ethical practices when
paired with practices that inculcate and reinforce values).
127

1991 SUPREME COURT INTERNAL ETHICS RESOLUTION 1 (1991),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/296686-1991-supreme-court-internal-ethics-resolution.html.

128

Although, as noted below, there might be reason to be cautious when considering the current Code’s provisions
on recusal because recused Justices cannot be replaced. Although the current statutory standards of recusal apply
equally to the Justices. 28 U.S.C. §455(a).

129

Alito & Kagan House Testimony, supra note 121.

130

Id.

131

Although the statutory standards for recusal are fixed, courts have developed doctrines that assist in their
application. For example, many circuits require timely filing of recusal motions so that waste of judicial
resources may be avoided. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We require
recusal motions to be lodged in a timely fashion because the absence of such a requirement would result in
increased instances of wasted judicial time and resources.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38
F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is well-settled that—for obvious reasons—one seeking disqualification
must do so at the earliest moment after knowledge of the facts demonstrating the basis for such
disqualification.”). The Supreme Court might similarly tailor the application of the statute to fit its institutional
concerns.

132

There has been an internal debate in the federal judiciary over to what extent judges should be limited in their
attendance at events and memberships in organizations. In 2020, the Code of Conduct Committee of the Judicial
Conference released a draft opinion concluding that the Code prohibits membership in the Federalist Society and
American Constitution Society. COMM. ON CODES OF CONDUCT, ADVISORY OPINION NO. 117 (EXPOSURE
DRAFT): JUDGES’ INVOLVEMENT WITH THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, AND
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2020). But the opinion was rescinded after widespread opposition from many
members of the judiciary.

133

See, e.g., Supreme Court Ethics Act of 2015, S. 1072, 114th Cong. (2015); Supreme Court Ethics Act, H.R.
1057, 116th Cong. (2019). As noted above, Congress has enacted such legislation with respect to other federal
courts. See Resnik Testimony, supra note 4, at 13 (“During the twentieth century, Congress built on
constitutional and common law understandings of judicial impartiality and due process to articulate norms for
most of the federal judiciary. . . . Congress elaborated methods for rulemaking, imposed standards for recusal,
mandated term limits on individuals serving as the chief judge of a district and or a circuit court, and instituted a
process for complaints to be filed against judges.”).

134

2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 120, at 4.

135

Amanda Frost, Judicial Ethics and Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 443, 460-61
(2013).

136

28 U.S.C. § 453.

137

Several observers have argued that Congress is limited in its capacity to regulate the ethical practices of the
Supreme Court when such regulation might intrude on the Court’s inherent constitutional powers. See Louis J.
Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535, 1562-75
(2012); Suzanne Levy, Your Honor, Please Explain: Why Congress Can, and Should, Require Justices to
Publish Reasons for Their Recusal Decisions, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1181-84 (2014); but see Frost, supra
note 135, at 463–75 (arguing against various constitutional objections to proposed ethics legislation governing
the Supreme Court, in part because ethics legislation might encroach on the Court’s decisionmaking function).

138

See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (Rules Enabling Act).

139

Circuit judicial councils are composed of a circuit’s chief judge sitting as chair and an equal number of other
circuit and district court judges. Circuit judicial councils perform various administrative roles within their
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circuits. See Governance & the Judicial Conference, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal
courts/governance-judicial-conference (last accessed Sept. 18, 2021).
140

The constitutionality of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act has been challenged at least once in the past, in a
case brought by a United States District Judge; there, the Act’s constitutionality was upheld. See McBryde v.
Comm. to Rev. Cir. Council Conduct and Disability Orders of Jud. Conf. of U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 64–70 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (upholding the constitutionality of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act against arguments based on
Article III and the impeachment clause).

141

Anthony J. Scirica, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Judicial Governance and
Judicial Independence, Madison Lecture, in 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 779, 788 (2015).

142

Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 8 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of
Russell Wheeler), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/R.-Wheeler-statement-6.30rev.7.12-on-SCOTUS_.pdf (noting that a “small bureaucracy” would be required to sift through the high number
of potential complaints against Supreme Court justices).

143

See 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2).

144

Such a sanction might also be unconstitutional as a de facto impeachment or impairment of the Court’s ability to
discharge its constitutionally mandated duties. See Lynn A. Baker, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117, 1133 (1985) (“By
authorizing the judicial councils and the Judicial Conference to order that no new cases be assigned [to] a judge,
the Act contravenes th[e] explicit decision of the Framers not to permit so much as the temporary removal of an
official, even if already impeached, until convicted by the Senate.”); but see McBryde v. Comm. to Rev. Cir.
Council Conduct and Disability Orders of Jud. Conf. of U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 64–70 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding
the facial constitutionality of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act on the theory that principles of judicial
independence established by the Constitution were designed to protect judges from interference by the other
branches, and not to prevent intrabranch organization and discipline).

145

A conduct oversight option frequently proposed by some members of Congress is the creation of an Inspector
General for the Federal Courts. Some variations of the proposal give the Inspector General the power to
investigate misconduct on the Supreme Court. This proposal has been around for decades and has been heavily
discussed. See, e.g., Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in the Federal Courts: Creating an Office of
Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 243 (1999); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics,
and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 301 (2010). Members of the
federal judiciary have criticized the proposal and noted the dangers such an office could pose to judicial
independence. See Scirica, supra note 141, at 789-97 (2015). Since 2018, the Judicial Conference has provided
for a “Judicial Integrity Officer” who oversees workplace conduct in the federal judiciary. The responsibilities of
the Judicial Integrity Office include “answering individuals’ questions, providing guidance on conflict
resolution, mediation, and formal complaint options.” Judicial Integrity Officer Named for Federal Judiciary,
U.S. COURTS (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/12/03/judicial-integrity-officer-namedfederal-judiciary.
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Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional
Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955 (2001) (arguing that where lawyers are given clear rules to follow,
informal social pressures from other members of the profession can serve the role of formal sanctions).
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28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

148

Id. § 455(1)-(4).

149

See Tuan Samahon, Rehnquist’s Recusals, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 205, 207 (2007); Memorandum of Justice Scalia,
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/03pdf/03-475scalia.pdf.

150

See Recent Times in Which a Justice Failed to Recuse Despite a Conflict of Interests, FIX THE COURT (June 13,
2021), https://fixthecourt.com/2021/06/recent-times-justice-failed-recuse-despite-clear-conflict-interest.
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This data was compiled with the help of Fix the Court’s regular reports on Supreme Court recusal. See, e.g., The
Supreme Court's Unexplained OT17 Cert.-Stage Recusals Explained, FIX THE COURT,
https://fixthecourt.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/OT17-cert.-stage-recusals-chart.pdf (last accessed Sept. 18,
2021).
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Even some who are skeptical of congressional regulation of the Court’s recusal practices have argued that
requiring statements explaining recusal decisions would be a permissible procedural reform. See Virelli, supra
note 137, at 1591-92.

153

In a 2015 appropriations hearing, Justice Kennedy voiced a concern that presenting reasons for recusal might
resemble lobbying. Justice Kennedy said: “In the rare cases when I recuse, I never tell my colleagues, oh, I’m
recusing because my son works for this company and it’s a very important case for my son. Why should I say
that? That’s almost like lobbying. So, in my view, the reason for recusal should never be discussed.” Rich
Gardella, Why Don’t Supreme Court Justices Have an Ethics Code, NBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2017, 2:26 PM)
(quoting Justice Kennedy), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/why-don-t-supreme-court-justices-haveethics-code-n745236.

154

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, all federal judges decide certain recusal motions in the first instance. However, for lower
court judges, the decision not to recuse may be appealed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, an affidavit alleging personal
bias or prejudice by a United States District Judge must be heard by another judge if the affidavit is timely and
sufficient.
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SUP. CT. R. 22(4).

156

Justice Black and Justice Jackson feuded over Black’s refusal to recuse himself in a case where the plaintiff’s
counsel was Black’s former law partner and personal lawyer. Jackson wrote a concurrence to an order denying
rehearing of the case that has been interpreted as critical of Black. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No.
6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Dennis J.
Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203 (covering the Black-Jackson feud in detail).

157

See RUSSELL WHEELER & MALIA REDDICK, JUDICIAL RECUSAL PROCEDURES: A REPORT ON THE IAALS
CONVENING 19-21 (2017) (listing state statutes and codes that allow or require a judge’s recusal decision to be
referred to another judge or the entire court, including some statutes and codes that create such a referral process
for the state’s highest court).
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James M. Anderson, Eric Helland & Merritt McAlister, Measuring How Stock Ownership Affects Which Judges
and Justices Hear Cases, 103 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1178 (2015).
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See 26 U.S.C. § 1043.
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For example, the divestment statute only allows for divestiture when doing so is “reasonably necessary” to avoid
a conflict. 26 U.S.C. § 1043(b)(2). Perhaps the Justices interpret this language as not permitting preemptive
divestments to avoid conflicts.

161

See Anderson, Helland & McAlister, supra note 158, at 1207-08 (proposing divestment requirements for judges
or Justices).

162

See, e.g., Anderson, Helland & McAlister, supra note 158 at 1207-08 (suggesting that Congress should require
divestment of stock ownership as a condition for confirmation, or require divestment when conflicts arise);
Adam Liptak, The Hazards Justices Face by Owning Individual Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/us/politics/the-hazards-justices-face-by-owning-individual-stocks.html;
Richard W. Painter, Stocks owned by Supreme Court justices tilt the scales of justice, MSNBC (Oct. 6, 2021,
1:39 PM), https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/stocks-owned-supreme-court-justices-tilt-scales-justice-n1280712.
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From our review, the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all allowed video recording of at least
some oral arguments in the past few years. The Ninth Circuit has been especially prolific in this regard; it posts
video recordings of most, if not all, of its oral arguments. See Audio and Video, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/ (last accessed Oct. 31, 2021). According to a 2019
report by the Congressional Research Service, all 50 state supreme courts allow video recording of proceedings
“under certain conditions.” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, VIDEO BROADCASTING FROM THE FEDERAL
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COURTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2019). Judges on lower federal courts and state courts have written articles
reflecting on the positive and negative effects of cameras in their courtrooms. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain,
Some Reflections on Cameras in the Appellate Courtroom, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 323 (2007); Robert L.
Brown, Just a Matter of Time? Video Cameras at the United States Supreme Court and the State Supreme
Courts, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 (2007). See also Nancy S. Marder, The Conundrum of Cameras in the
Courtroom, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1489 (2012) (collecting many of the competing arguments for and against
cameras).
164

See, e.g., Alito & Kagan House Testimony, supra note 121 (Justice Alito observing that “I recognize that most
people think that our arguments should be televised. Most of the members of my family think that arguments
should be televised. I used to think they should be televised. . . . But I came to see and I do believe that allowing
the arguments to be televised would undermine their value to us as a step in the decisionmaking process. I think
that lawyers would find it irresistible to try to put in a little sound bite in the hope of being that evening on CNN
or FOX or MSNBC or one of the broadcast networks, and that would detract from the value of the arguments in
the decisionmaking process”); Id. (Justice Kagan observing that “it is a principle of physics, I think, . . . [that]
when the observer comes in, the observed thing changes. And you commented on Congress, and if you all were
given truth serum, I think some of you might agree that hearings change when cameras are there”); Sonia
Sotomayor, “Just Ask” & Life as a Supreme Court Justice – Extended Interview, THE DAILY SHOW WITH
TREVOR NOAH (Sept. 16, 2019) (Justice Sotomayor arguing that “if our arguments were televised, it might
change the dynamic,” for instance, “you would have more studied questions rather than those questions which
are less studied and more inquisitive” and “the draw to play to TV affects every human being,” with the overall
result that “I think you would change our institution so dramatically that it would be for its worse, not for the
country’s better”), https://www.cc.com/video/hdash0/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah-sonia-sotomayor-justask-life-as-a-supreme-court-justice-extended-interview.
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Visitor’s Guide to Oral Argument, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/visiting/visitorsguidetooralargument.aspx (last accessed Sept. 18, 2021).

166

At the start of the 2015 Term, the Court announced: “Only Bar members who actually intend to attend argument
will be allowed in the line for the bar section; ‘line standers’ will not be permitted.” Robert Barnes, Supreme
Court Tells Lawyers: Stand in Line Yourselves. You Can’t Pay Others to Hold a Spot, WASH. POST (Oct. 6,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-bar-bans-line-standing-forhearings/2015/10/06/a309e0e6-6c15-11e5-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html; see Presidential Commission on the
Supreme Court of the United States 3 (June 30, 2021) (testimony of Amy Howe),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Testimony-of-Amy-Howe.pdf; Katie Bart, Courtroom
Access: Line-Standing Businesses Save Spots in the Public Line, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2020, 4:48 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/courtroom-access-line-standing-businesses-save-spots-in-the-public-line.
For data on the number of people waiting in the public line for seats at each argument session during the 2019
Term (until the courtroom closed due to the pandemic), the share of people in line who were eventually seated,
and when one would have needed to arrive in order to secure a seat, see Amy Howe, Courtroom Access: Let’s
Talk Data—The Public Line, SCOTUSBLOG (May 4, 2020, 6:47 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/courtroom-access-2020/.
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Appendix A: Executive Order 14023
Executive Order on the Establishment of the Presidential
Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Establishment.
There is established the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States
(Commission).
Sec. 2. Membership.
(a) The Commission shall be composed of not more than 36 members appointed by the
President.
(b) Members of the Commission shall be distinguished constitutional scholars, retired
members of the Federal judiciary, or other individuals having experience with and
knowledge of the Federal judiciary and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court).
(c) The President shall designate two members of the Commission to serve as Co-Chairs.
Sec. 3. Functions.
(a) The Commission shall produce a report for the President that includes the following:
(i) An account of the contemporary commentary and debate about the role and operation
of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system and about the functioning of the
constitutional process by which the President nominates and, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoints Justices to the Supreme Court;
(ii) The historical background of other periods in the Nation’s history when the Supreme
Court’s role and the nominations and advice-and-consent process were subject to critical
assessment and prompted proposals for reform; and
(iii) An analysis of the principal arguments in the contemporary public debate for and
against Supreme Court reform, including an appraisal of the merits and legality of
particular reform proposals.
(b) The Commission shall solicit public comment, including other expert views, to ensure
that its work is informed by a broad spectrum of ideas.
(c) The Commission shall submit its report to the President within 180 days of the date of the
Commission’s first public meeting.
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Sec. 4. Administration.
(a) The Office of Administration within the Executive Office of the President shall provide
funding and administrative support for the Commission to the extent permitted by law and
within existing appropriations. To the extent permitted by law, including the Economy Act
(31 U.S.C. 1535), and subject to the availability of appropriations, the General Services
Administration shall provide administrative services, including facilities, staff, equipment, and
other support services as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Commission.
(b) Members of the Commission shall serve without compensation for their work on the
Commission, but shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, to
the extent permitted by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government service (5
U.S.C. 5701-5707).
(c) Insofar as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.) (Act), may
apply to the Commission, any functions of the President under the Act, except for those in
section 6 of the Act, shall be performed by the Administrator of General Services.
Sec. 5. Termination.
The Commission shall terminate 30 days after it submits its report to the President.
Sec. 6. General Provisions.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof;
or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to
budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to
the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 9, 2021
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Appendix B: Commission Meetings, Expert
Testimony, and Public Comment
President Biden established this Commission on April 9, 2021, by Executive Order 14023.
Consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Public Law 92-463, 5 U.S.C.
App., the Commission held public meetings on May 19, June 30, July 20, October 15,
November 19, and December 7, 2021. Recordings and transcripts of those meetings, which
include deliberations and statements by Commissioners, are available here
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/public-meetings/).
Following its introductory meeting on May 19, the Commission scheduled public
hearings on June 30, 2021, and July 20, 2021. Over the course of these two days, the
Commission heard oral testimony from 44 experts. The materials circulated for each meeting,
the recordings and transcripts of the hearings, and witnesses’ written statements are available
for review at www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/public-meetings/. The Commission also solicited
and received additional written testimony from numerous academic experts and advocacy
organizations, available at www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/public-comments/.
In addition, the Commission received submissions from several members of Congress,
current and retired federal and state judges, and members of state government.
Fifteen days prior to each public meeting, the Commission called for public comments
through notices released in the Federal Register. The Commission also established a portal
through which members of the general public were able to provide commentary, at
regulations.gov, and maintained an email inbox for public commentary.
As discussed at the first public meeting, the Commission divided itself into
subcommittees, denominated as “Working Groups,” to consider testimony and comments
from outside experts, organizations, and the public, and to further research and analyze the
following topics:
• The Genesis of the Reform Debate; the Commission’s Mission; and the History of
Reforms
• Membership and Size of the Court
• Length of Service and Turnover of Justices on the Court
• The Court’s Role in the Constitutional System

• The Supreme Court’s Procedures and Practices
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The following individuals or organizations provided oral or
written submissions to the Commission:
Witnesses of June 30, 2021
Nikolas Bowie, Harvard Law School
Samuel Bray, Notre Dame Law School
Rosalind Dixon, University of New South Wales, Sydney
Michael Dreeben, O’Melveny and Myers, LLP
Noah Feldman, Harvard Law School
Charles Fried, Harvard Law School
Deepak Gupta, Gupta Wessler
Amy Howe, SCOTUSblog
Laura Kalman, University of California - Santa Barbara
Allison Orr Larsen, William & Mary Law School
Michael McConnell, Stanford Law School
Samuel Moyn, Yale Law School
Judith Resnik, Yale Law School
Kim Scheppele, Princeton University
Maya Sen, Harvard University
Christina Swarns, Innocence Project
Stephen Vladeck, University of Texas Austin School of Law
Russell Wheeler, Brookings Institution
Ilan Wurman, Arizona State University

Witnesses of July 20, 2021
Justice Rosalie Abella, Supreme Court of Canada
Akhil Amar, Yale Law School
Nan Aron, Alliance for Justice
Randy Barnett, Georgetown University Law Center
Craig Becker, AFL-CIO
Daniel Epps, Washington University in St. Louis
Kenneth Geller, Mayer Brown, LLP
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Tom Ginsburg, University of Chicago
Jamal Greene, Columbia Law School
Wade Henderson, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and The Leadership
Conference Education Fund
Vicki Jackson, Harvard Law School
Christopher Kang, Demand Justice
Michael Klarman, Harvard Law School
Larry Kramer, Harvard Law School
Curt Levey, Committee for Justice
Marin Levy, Duke University School of Law
Maureen Mahoney, Latham & Watkins
John Malcolm, Heritage Foundation
Justice Margaret Marshall, Choate, Hall & Stewart
Sharon McGowan, Lambda Legal
Dennis Parker, National Center for Law and Economic Justice
Jeff Peck, Tiber Creek Group
Gabe Roth, Fix the Court
Stephen Sachs, Harvard Law School
Ilya Shapiro, Cato Institute
Neil Siegel, Duke Law School
Benjamin Wittes, The Brookings Institution

Public Officials 1
Senator Richard Blumenthal
Senator Ted Cruz
Senator Mazie K. Hirono
Representative Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr.
Senator Charles Schumer
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
Jim Jones, former Attorney General and state Supreme Court Justice of Idaho
Champ Lyons, Supreme Court of Alabama
Ashley Moody, Attorney General of Florida
Paul Summers, Attorney General (retired), Tennessee
Samuel Thumma, Court of Appeals of Arizona
Galen Vaa, 7th Judicial District, Minnesota
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Academic and Legal Experts
Aaron Belkin, Take Back the Court
Philip Bobbitt, Columbia Law School
Barry Cushman, Notre Dame Law School
Erin Delaney, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law
Michael J. Gerhardt, University of North Carolina School of Law
Edward A. Hartnett, Seton Hall Law School
Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Pomona College
David Law, University of Virginia School of Law
Richard Lazarus, Professor, Harvard Law School
Hashim M. Mooppan, Jones Day (formerly U.S. Department of Justice)
Michael Stokes Paulsen, University of St. Thomas School of Law
William G. Ross, Samford University
Jeff Shesol, Author
Christopher Jon Sprigman, New York University School of Law
Julie Suk, Fordham University School of Law
Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School
G. Edward White, University of Virginia School of Law

Advocacy and Professional Organizations 2
American Academy of Arts & Sciences
American Bar Association
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
American Constitution Society
Appellate Courts Working Group
Brazil Comparative Law Institute
Business Roundtable
Center for American Progress
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
Coalition Against Judicial Fraud
Constitutional Accountability Center
Demos
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Federal Bar Association
Federal Capital Habeas Project
First Liberty Institute
FreedomWorks Foundation
Independent Women’s Forum
Judicial Discipline Reform
Keep Nine Coalition
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Madison Coalition
National Asian Pacific American Women's Forum
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund
National Center for Law and Economic Justice
National Council of Jewish Women
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)
New York County Lawyers Association
Our Children’s Trust
People For the American Way
Project on Government Oversight
Public Citizen Inc. and Public Citizen Foundation
Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
Stand Up America
Take Back the Court
The Constitution Project at POGO (Project on Government Oversight)
The Innocence Project
Unrig the Courts Coalition
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Public Comments Received by the Commission
The Commission established a public comment policy that set parameters for the
publication of comments received on regulations.gov. Public comments that met this policy
were published on regulations.gov (Docket: PCSCOTUS) and can be reviewed there. The
published comments expressed a broad array of opinions on the Commission’s work, its draft
discussion materials, reform proposals in the public debate, and other related topics.
Comments received by the Commission that did not meet the posted public comment
policy were not published. The bulk of unpublished comments fell into two categories:
duplicate submissions included in several mass mailing campaigns targeted at the Commission
and submissions on topics not within the Commission charge/not relevant.
The table below provides an overview of the public comments received in association
with a given public meeting. Deadlines were set out in each public meeting notice as a cut-off
for comments prior to each public meeting. The table below is complete up to and including
comments received for the 12/7 public meeting (cut-off 12/3). Comments received after this
date could not be included in the report due to printing timelines.
Number of comments received by status of publication and public meeting date: 3
COMMISSION PUBLIC MEETING DATE 4
5/19/21

6/30/21

7/20/21

Comments published
on Regulations.gov

46

221

163

3,556

Comments not
published due to
violations of policy

58

2,054

429

Total comments
received

104

2,275

592
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10/15/21 11/19/21

12/7/21

Total

186

1,118

5,290

367

502

50

3,460

3,923

688

1,168

8,750
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Endnotes: Appendix B

1

Individuals listed provided their title in their public comment or signed, with their name and title, a submission
filed by another individual. Additional comments from current or retired government officials may have been
received but are not listed here if submissions did not specify their title or office.

2

Published comments from these organizations can be found on
https://www.regulations.gov/document/PCSCOTUS-2021-0001-0003/comment

3

All published comments received by the Commission can be found on
https://www.regulations.gov/document/PCSCOTUS-2021-0001-0003/comment

4

Source: PCSCOTUS public comment tracker. This tracker contains a record of all received comments through
both Regulations.gov and the Commission’s general email inbox.
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Appendix C: The Confirmation Process
Executive Order 14023 directed the Commission on the Supreme Court of the United
States to produce a report that includes an “account of the contemporary commentary and
debate about . . . the functioning of the constitutional process by which the President nominates
and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints Justices to the Supreme Court.”
Several witnesses who testified before the Commission noted that recent debates over
Supreme Court reform have taken place amidst controversies surrounding the processes by
which Justices are nominated and confirmed. The evaluation of proposals for Court reform
may thus require both attention to existing problems with the confirmation process and
consideration of how a proposal, if implemented, might affect that process.
One witness, Jeffrey J. Peck, who previously served as General Counsel and the Majority
Staff Director of the Senate Judiciary Committee, proposed changes to Senate rules and norms
designed to improve the confirmation process. These proposals grew out of his examination
of the history of the Senate’s treatment of Supreme Court nominees over the last several
decades and numerous interviews he conducted with former Senators and senior staff—
thirteen Democrats and twelve Republicans. That group included individuals who had been
involved in seventeen Supreme Court nominations, from 1981 to the present.
In the Introduction to this Report, we have provided a brief account of contemporary
debates surrounding the confirmation process, consistent with our charge. But consideration
of proposed reforms to the confirmation process are beyond that charge, and we accordingly
do not analyze or endorse any of the recommendations offered to us. Nonetheless, we do wish
to highlight some of the analysis and recommendations in the Peck testimony.
In this Appendix, we have included excerpts from Mr. Peck’s testimony. The full
testimony is available at the Commission website at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/Peck-Testimony.pdf
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Excerpts of Testimony of Jeffrey J. Peck
The Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States
July 20, 2021
***
In calendar years, it was not too long ago – 1994, in fact – when Stephen Breyer was
confirmed, 87-9. When Ruth Bader Ginsburg was confirmed, 96-3, in 1993. When David
Souter was confirmed, 90-9, in 1990. When Anthony Kennedy was confirmed, 97-0, in 1988.
When Antonin Scalia was confirmed, 98-0, in 1986. And when Sandra Day O’Connor was
confirmed, 99-0, in 1981. Strong bipartisan majorities often prevailed.
In political years, these consensus confirmations reflect a bygone era akin to the locomotive,
the Model T and wired telephones. Will any nominee to the highest court in the land ever get
90 votes again? Doubtful, since at present there are likely to be at least 25 negative votes
before hearings begin, regardless of which party controls the White House and the Senate;
indeed, there may be that many automatic negative votes before a nomination is even
announced!
***
During the past few months, I conducted 25 interviews 1 -- 13 Republicans and 12 Democrats,
thereby ensuring that both sides of the political spectrum were fairly represented. 2 All
respondents served in the Senate as Senators or senior staff, typically as committee chief
counsels, staff directors, senior nomination counsels or senior leadership staff. Time
constraints and respondent availability limited the overall number…My objective was to speak
with individuals spanning as broad a range of nominations as possible to secure bipartisan
perspectives from multiple political eras. Accordingly, the responses discussed herein cover
17 nominations between Sandra Day O’Connor (1981) and Amy Coney Barrett (2020)…
As detailed therein, I covered eight areas with all interviewees.
1. Biographical Information
2. General Observations
3. The Senate’s Advice Function
4. Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee
5. Scope of Questioning
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6. The FBI Report
7. Third Party Witnesses
8. The Senate’s Consent Function: Filibuster, Margins and Presidential Election
Year Nominations

***
Most interviewees believe that the value of SCOTUS nomination hearings has
increasingly diminished over time. Common descriptions included “kabuki theater,” “farce,”
“charade,” “circus,” “a model of escape and evasion” and “insufferable.” Anyone who has
watched recent hearings would be hard pressed to disagree. Given the extreme reluctance of
nominees, questioning by Senators has become tedious and uninformative. One interviewee
noted that Senate questioning has become “air cover for some to justify a negative vote they
have already decided to make.”
There was consensus among all interviewees that it is not feasible to develop hard-andfast formal rules regarding the questioning of SCOTUS nominees. Among other problems,
such rules would turn the Judiciary Committee chair into a faux judge obligated to decide on
the relevance, materiality and scope of his or her colleagues’ questions – inevitably a “loselose” proposition for the Chair, as one interviewee put it. It would also, as another interviewee
noted, invade the “holy province of senatorial desire” to ask any questions he or she wants to
pose.
A small number of Democrat interviewees and one Republican interviewee supported the
view that nominees should answer questions about how they would have ruled in specific past
Supreme Court decisions. These interviewees dismissed the notion that outside groups would
use these answers to politicize the process even further, noting that the groups already assume
that nominees embrace particular views and act on those assumptions accordingly. The
Republican interviewee in this group supported this level of specificity based on his view that
future cases involved different facts and thereby do not compromise a nominee’s judicial
independence. Moreover, this interviewee believes that the public is entitled to know a
nominee’s views and that Senators, with such information, can then vote based on the totality
of the nominee’s record.
Two Democrat interviewees and one Republican interviewee support specific questioning
but stop short of asking about how a nominee would have voted in past cases. The Republican
interviewee noted the appropriateness of asking a nominee, “Had you been on the Court in
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1973 and had the Roe factual record before you, how would you have approached the case,”
distinguishing that question from a precise question about how the nominee would have voted.
Approximately 15 interviewees – both Democrats and Republicans – support questions
about the “general philosophy of judging.” They believe it is appropriate to ask questions about
what nominees have written but oppose questions regarding how nominees would have ruled
in specific past cases decided by the Court. For nominees who are or have previously been
judges, these interviewees also support asking them about their reasoning in cases they have
decided.
Several Republican interviewees referred approvingly to the so-called “Ginsburg Rule,”
noting that should be the model for all future nominees.
One issue that arose during my research was whether to allow each Member of the
Judiciary Committee to submit a defined number of written questions to the nominee before
the hearings commence, with answers due before the nominee appears in person. The
argument in favor of such an approach is that the nominee’s testimony would then follow an
enhanced record. The problem with such an approach is that if history is any guide, the answers
are likely to be written by White House Counsel lawyers, Department of Justice lawyers,
outside lawyers (such as former law clerks) supporting the nominee or some combination
thereof. While rules could require the nominee to attest to the accuracy of the answers and the
fact that they reflect the nominee’s actual views, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
police their actual preparation.
One GOP interviewee proposed limiting the questioning of nominees in open session to
one round, no longer than 30 minutes, with the remainder of the questioning occurred in closed
session to “produce less grandstanding.”
***
I offer the following recommendations to the Commission. 3
I. Time Frames: By Standing Rule of the Senate or Rule of Procedure of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the following time frames and procedures should be adopted and
implemented:
a) Hearings shall commence no sooner than 30 days and no later than 50 days after the
Senate receives the nomination. If the nomination is made during a Senate recess that
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is longer than three days, the minimum and maximum periods shall be extended by the
length of the recess.
b) The nominee’s complete written record shall be delivered to the Committee no later
than 10 days before hearings begin. Delays in the production of materials shall extend
the minimum and maximum periods by the length of the delay, thereby penalizing the
nominating Administration for dragging its feet. The White House Counsel shall certify
when production of materials has been completed.
c) The Committee shall vote on the nomination no sooner than 10 days and no later than
21 days after hearings conclude. The “official” conclusion of the hearings shall be
determined by the Chair and Ranking Member; any “gaming” of the hearings for the
sole purpose of extending the time frames should be avoided. The current ability of one
Senator to “hold over” a nomination shall be eliminated.
d) The Committee shall be required to report the nomination to the floor in all
circumstances – even with a negative recommendation or without recommendation.
The Constitution places the advice and consent obligation on the Senate, not a
committee of the Senate. The Judiciary Committee processes the nomination by
holding hearings, preparing a report and reporting the nomination to the Senate. It
should not determine the fate of the nominee.
e) The full Senate shall begin consideration of the nomination no sooner than 10 days and
no later than 21 days after the Committee formally files its report on the nomination.
The Senate can delay consideration only by unanimous consent.
f) The time frames in this new Rule could be shortened or lengthened “for cause” by joint
agreement of the Judiciary Committee’s Chair and Ranking Member. “Cause”
includes, but is not limited to, a voluminous record of the nominee due to extensive
writings, speeches or opinions, the need for investigation of new matters and/or if
additional relevant materials are uncovered.
g) These timeframes shall apply under all circumstances, including nominations in a
presidential election year up to August 1 of that year, as explained below.
h) These new Rules could be altered only by unanimous consent of the Senate in order to
eliminate the ability of the majority party to jettison the new policies for political
expediency by simple majority vote.
i) These new Rules are needed now and, ideally, should be adopted and implemented
immediately. Unfortunately, there is little or no chance of that occurring. Accordingly,
the new Rules proposed here shall not take effect until after the next presidential
election and not until the swearing in of the new Congress in January 2025. Postponing
the effective date of new rules should reduce the partisanship over their deliberation
and increase the likelihood of adoption because neither party would know who the rules
theoretically help, and who they theoretically hurt, by the time they go into effect.
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II. Scope of Questioning: While it is not feasible to establish a Senate or Committee Rule
defining the allowable scope of questioning, the appropriate norm for questioning SCOTUS
nominees – a “standard of responsiveness” – should be “philosophical particularity,” as
opposed to “pinpoint specificity seeking pledges or commitments” or the “extreme
reluctance” taken by more recent nominees. Procedurally, no Member of the Committee,
including the Chair or Ranking Member, should be allowed to instruct a nominee not to
answer a question. A Member or Members may dislike the questions posed by a colleague,
but it is up to the nominee to decide whether to answer.
a) To make an informed decision and fulfill their constitutional obligation and duty to
exercise “advice and consent” on judicial nominations, Senators must understand the
nominee’s judicial philosophy and views on core constitutional principles.
b) The so-called “Ginsburg Rule” cited by recent nominees is neither a rule nor an
appropriate tactic to utilize to deflect substantively appropriate questions. Indeed, then
Judge Ginsburg did not always follow it during her hearings.
c) When presidents campaign on promises regarding the justices they will appoint to the
Supreme Court, criticizing past rulings and individual Justices – as they increasingly
do – the Senate can hardly sit idly by during the hearings and not probe the judicial
philosophy of nominees selected to fulfill those promises and answer those critiques.
Indeed, the imperative to question nominees on judicial philosophy is even greater
under such circumstances.
III. The Role of the FBI: Processes pertaining to the FBI’s investigation of SCOTUS nominees
should be further clarified and memorialized in a Memorandum of Understanding that updates
and replaces the 2009 MOU executed by President Obama’s White House Counsel and the
then Senate Judiciary Committee Chair and Ranking Member. This MOU should be adopted
at the beginning of a new Congress so that it is done outside the context of any particular
nomination, and should:
a) Underscore and memorialize the independence of the FBI, stating specifically that the
FBI’s client is the American people. It is important to make clear, formally, that when
the FBI conducts its investigations neither the White House Counsel nor the Senate
Judiciary Committee majority or minority are the clients.
b) Create communication protocols governing the FBI’s dialogue with the White House
and the Chair/Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee so that each of those three
parties receives information simultaneously when the FBI has determined that a matter
warrants investigation. It is necessary to take steps ensuring neither receives
preferential treatment over the other.
c) Spell out the parameters of the FBI’s role in conducting the background investigation
before the hearings begin and any subsequent investigations that arise once the hearings
have started. Specifically, and working with FBI leadership, the MOU should require
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a more fulsome investigative process at the outset so matters that have historically come
to light later in the process are more likely to be uncovered on the front end.
d) Set an expected time frame for the delivery of the FBI report for the original
investigation and any subsequent investigations, with room for potential adjustments
depending on the precise nature of allegations that arise.
IV. Third Party Witnesses: Qualitative or quantitative limits on the live testimony of third-party
witnesses should not be established by rule.
a) The Supreme Court plays a vital role in our nation and third-party witnesses should
have the opportunity not only to submit written statements for the record but also testify
in person.
b) A norm should be established whereby the majority of outside witnesses should provide
well-informed assessments of the record of the nominee.
c) The Chair and Ranking Member should utilize their joint discretion, as they do in all
hearings, to manage the number of witnesses.
d) The American Bar Association should no longer play the dominant role it has in
reviewing nominees. The Committee should place equal weight on multiple bar
associations without affording a lead role to any single one.
V.

Senate Consideration and Vote on Confirmation: If we had the good fortune to write on a
blank slate, Senate Rules should require 60 votes to confirm a Supreme Court Justice in order
to force, at least in most circumstances, a bipartisan consensus not only on the back end, for
the final vote, but also on the front end, by necessitating more consultation by the president
with the minority party leadership in the Senate. But the slate is not blank; far from it. It is
inconceivable that Democrats will restore a 60-vote margin for SCOTUS nominees after a
Republican president and Republican Senate confirmed one-third of the Justices sitting today
by majority vote. Bipartisan consensus on this issue is simply not attainable. Accordingly, I
recommend:
a) The Senate should retain the current simple majority requirement for confirming
Supreme Court nominees.
b) The Senate should add a new Rule explicitly requiring that all nominees receive a
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, a Committee vote and an up-or-down vote on the
merits in the Senate. No nominee should be refused consideration unless the
nomination has been withdrawn.
c) The Senate should consider all nominations in a presidential election year except for
those made after August 1. Nominations before August 1 are likely to be completed
prior to Election Day in a balanced and orderly manner. Given the time frames
proposed for new Rules guiding the Judiciary Committee’s consideration, nominations
after August 1 are not likely to be considered thoroughly and fairly before the American
people select the next president. Key steps by the Administration and the Senate –
including document production, requests for more investigative work by the FBI,
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number of third-party witnesses and the like – are more likely to be colored by politics
and game-playing when taking place within 90 days of a presidential election. Fairness
and responsible decision-making will ensue when presidential politics is not the main
driver.
d) Using August 1 as a cut-off date in a presidential election year also takes into account
the early voting – either by mail or in-person – that many states now allow. There are
few more consequential decisions made in in our nation than placing one of nine
Justices with life tenure on the Supreme Court. Doing so while tens of millions of
Americans are voicing their preference about the next president is
anti-democratic.
e) Despite the August 1 cut-off date, any Senator who believes nominations made before
that date in a presidential election year are still too close to Election Day can vote
against the nomination solely for that reason.
f) While not likely feasible to implement by Senate rule, the two parties should share an
understanding that nominations made by a lame duck president after his or her defeat
on Election Day will not be considered.
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Endnotes: Appendix C

1

I am not presenting my findings as empirical research or necessarily consistent with scientifically accepted
statistical methodology. The goal was to solicit opinions through a standardized set of questions, with answers
informed by personal experience, which, in all cases, was extensive.

2

Since my views as a Democrat are also included in this report, the total number of interviewees was, in effect,
equally split.

3

Each potential reform area is discussed later in detail, and organized and presented in three sections: Relevant
Historical Background and Context; Results of Research; and Policy Recommendations. The relevant historical
background sections are not intended to be exhaustive.
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Appendix D: Advocacy Before the Court
The Commission received testimony from several witnesses about the sources of
advocacy and information provided to the Supreme Court as it selects and decides cases. Their
testimony addressed patterns in advocacy before the Court, including the fact that a small
group of specialized lawyers appears in a large proportion of cases. It also addressed the role
of interested non-parties, called amici curiae, in providing information to the Court beyond
the parties’ briefs and the record in a given case. These analyses focused on the conduct and
characteristics of advocates and amici rather than of the Court itself. We do not endorse this
testimony or the proposals contained within it. But we believe it would be informative for the
public discourse for this Report to highlight portions of the testimony.
The witnesses whose statements are excerpted here are Deepak Gupta; the Supreme Court
Practitioners’ Committee, chaired by Kenneth Geller and Maureen Mahoney; Richard
Lazarus; and Allison Orr Larsen. Their full testimony, respectively, is available on the
Commission website at the links noted below. 1
Excerpts from Testimony of Deepak Gupta, Gupta Wessler PLLC
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Gupta-SCOTUS-CommissionTestimony-Final.pdf

***
The Diversity of the Supreme Court Bar
***
Today, roughly 70 lawyers are considered part of the elite Supreme Court bar, filing less
than 1% of the petitions for certiorari before the Court but participating in nearly half the cases
the Court selects.
The demographics of these elite few are telling. From 2012 to 2018, women appearing
before the Court constituted only 12 to 21% of advocates. In the 2019 term, 155 oral argument
appearances were made before the Court, only twenty of which were made by women and
only twenty-seven of which were made by advocates of color. In the entire 2019 term, only
one woman of color appeared before the Court.
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***
In other words, the entire ecosystem surrounding the Court looks a lot less like the
American public than we might hope. For the development of the law, this limited diversity
can make the Court “woefully inattentive to its impact on underrepresented groups.” And on
the most basic level, as this small and elite institution makes laws for a large and diverse
country, many Americans do not see people like them regularly participate in the process.
Docket Capture
Homogeneity among Supreme Court advocates is by no means limited to race and gender.
The small handful of elite appellate lawyers who argue most cases before the Supreme Court
are not only overwhelmingly white and male—they also tend to represent the largest
corporations in the world. Attorneys at corporate-defense firms are often conflicted out of
representing plaintiffs, even if they would be inclined to do so otherwise.
This imbalance in the small group of advocates who have the ear of the Court has serious
consequences for the Court’s agenda and the public’s perception that the Court gives each
party before it an equal hearing. In turn, the stakes for the country are high: not just the rights
of workers, consumers, and other plaintiffs, but also the credibility and legitimacy of the Court
in the eyes of a public that already believes their government is overly aligned with the
interests of large corporations.
***
. . . The influence of corporate America in the Supreme Court is borne out by the dominance
of specialized “repeat players.” As Professor Richard Lazarus has written, the 1980 term saw
5.8% of cases argued by attorneys who have presented at least five cases before the Supreme
Court, or who were affiliated with law firms whose members had argued at least ten. By 2007,
the percentage of Supreme Court cases argued by such “expert advocates” had passed 50%.
For the past several years, it has hovered around 70%. Hiring one of these advocates is
especially useful at the cert stage, and, since the 1980’s, the success of cert petitions filed by
specialized private appellate practices has skyrocketed. In 1980, 5% of successful petitions
(excluding the Solicitor General’s) were filed by repeat player advocates. By 2007, that rate
had increased to more than 50%. Unsurprisingly, these advocates’ corporate clients benefit
from their success. The past few decades are replete with examples of the Court granting
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review to corporate-friendly petitions that it would have likely passed over if not for an expert
advocate’s name on the industry-side brief.
***
These elite lawyers’ “capture” of the Supreme Court docket, as Professor Lazarus has put
it, has real consequences for workers, consumers, and other plaintiffs who have been hurt by
corporations, as well as for criminal defendants. For one, judges and attorneys widely agree
that hiring specialized appellate counsel—especially one particularly familiar with the
Court—matters for a favorable outcome. In a 2004 survey of former Supreme Court clerks,
88% said they “len[t] additional consideration” to amicus briefs signed by an eminent repeat
player. Empirical studies have linked attorney experience with case outcomes as well. A study
by Professor Jeffrey Fisher, for example, found that a party represented in the Supreme Court
is almost 20% more likely to win on the merits than one represented by a nonspecialist—and
that the advantage at the certiorari stage is likely even larger. A 2014 investigation found that
over a decade, just 66 of the 17,000 attorneys who filed petitions at the Supreme Court
accounted for 43% of the cases the Court took up, and 51 of those lawyers represented
corporate interests. An increase in cert petitions, combined with a shrinking merits docket, has
made
the
involvement
of
repeat
players
in
petitioning
the
Court
especially valuable. . .
The access that plaintiffs, criminal defendants, and other public-interest clients have to
this specialized group of repeat players is severely limited. For one, corporate-defense firms
routinely charge more than $1,000 per hour for their services, and a single cert petition can
cost a client hundreds of thousands of dollars. Even if attorneys at high-powered appellate
practices have some inclination to take on plaintiff-side work, they often will not due to the
fact that their firms represent the corporations, or at least the antiplaintiff positions, on the
other side of the case. The Chamber of Commerce and other influential industry groups—not
to mention many of the largest corporations in the country themselves—have hired most of
the firms with elite appellate practices, making it difficult or impossible for attorneys at those
firms to represent contrary interests and positions. Some might reasonably suggest that the rise
of excellent law school supreme court clinics mitigates this problem, but, unfortunately, that
is not the case. Virtually all of those clinics are affiliated with the very same corporate-defense
law firms that employ the expert Supreme Court advocates, making it difficult for the clinics
to take a position against, for example, a major bank in a case concerning financial services
regulation.
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***
Mitigating Corporate Skew in the Supreme Court Bar
Given this landscape, the government, starting with this Commission and this White
House, can and should encourage the development of specialized public-interest and plaintiffs’
lawyers—first and foremost by advocating for increased funding to organizations that do this
appellate work. To start, Legal Aid organizations around the country provide invaluable
services to low-income people in the areas of housing, employment, immigration, criminal
justice, public benefits, and more. A few Legal Aid offices—but only a few—have developed
small appellate practices. Similarly, some public defender offices have small appellate
divisions. More funding for these offices would strengthen the legal representation of lowincome and other marginalized people in general—a worthy goal in its own right—but it could
also facilitate the development of a larger, more experienced public-interest appellate bar. Just
as corporate law firms and the Solicitor General’s office do for most prominent appellate
lawyers now, better-funded Legal Aid and Public Defender offices could create the kinds of
opportunities for training, specialization, and, eventually, repeat advocacy for career publicinterest lawyers.
***
Excerpts from Testimony of Supreme Court Practitioners’ Committee (Co-Chairs
Kenneth Geller, Mayer Brown LLP; Maureen Mahoney, Latham & Watkins LLP)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Geller-Mahoney-Testimony.pdf

Diversifying the Group of Appointed Amicus Counsel
Since 1926, the Supreme Court has appointed counsel as amicus curiae approximately 70
times, with an average of one or two per year. Unlike traditional amici, appointed amici are
instructed by the Court to take a particular position and to present oral argument. Of the
approximately 70 amicus counsel appointments to date, it appears that only seven advocates
have been women and only four have been people of color. Appointments have been heavily
skewed toward former law clerks.
Commentators have suggested various means of broadening the group of attorneys
considered for appointment by creating an application process, promulgating qualification
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criteria, or issuing general invitations for amicus briefing on issues and selecting one
responding amicus to argue.
The Committee does not endorse prescribing a public standard for appointments, but we
support continued expansion of the group to which the Court looks for appointments. In
particular, greater diversity likely would result if consideration were given to more attorneys
who are not former law clerks, especially advocates in the specialized appellate bars of state
courts and other federal courts and law professors.
Criminal Defense Cases
Some of the best advocates before the Supreme Court are criminal defense attorneys,
especially in the specialized capital defense bar. But the attorneys in the criminal defense bar
generally have fewer resources to support specialized Supreme Court litigation than do their
prosecutor counterparts. Government prosecutors also have more strategic flexibility about
which issues to litigate in a case, whereas criminal defense attorneys have an ethical duty to
zealously represent the interests of their individual client whose personal liberty is at stake.
And prosecutors collaborate extensively with each other through organizations like the
National Association of Attorneys General, and often support each other as amicus curiae, but
such resources are much more limited on the criminal defense side.
***
The imbalance would be better addressed through federal and state legislative
appropriation of increased resources to develop more Supreme Court specialization within the
criminal defense bar in state and federal public defender offices and through greater
collaboration with Supreme Court specialists in clinics and pro bono partnerships.
***
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Excerpts from Written Statement of Richard Lazarus, Harvard Law School
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Professor-Richard-Lazarus.pdf

***
The Distinct Importance of the Court’s Jurisdictional Determination
. . . The Court’s decision at the jurisdictional stage that a particular case warrants plenary
review is . . . one of the most consequential rulings that the Court makes. Yet, as the number
of petitions has significantly increased over time, the Court’s resources to identify which cases
warrant full briefing and argument have necessarily been stretched increasingly thin and, as a
result, increasingly susceptible to be unduly influenced by expert members of the Supreme
Court Bar.
I have no comparable concern relating to the Court’s decision-making process for those
cases granted plenary review. Especially now that the Court decides only sixty to eighty cases
a year, the Justices and their chambers have ample time to immerse themselves fully into those
cases and potentially make up for any possible deficits in the advocacy in any specific case.
Advocacy deficits are also effectively addressed in most cases that the Court has decided to
review with full briefing and oral argument by the sheer number of amicus briefs filed these
days in those merits cases, many of which are crafted by outstanding lawyers on all sides of a
case. My concern is instead limited to the jurisdictional stage, where mismatches in the
advocacy skills of the competing parties favoring and opposing review are likely to be present
and the Court lacks the time and resources to make up for the difference. It is at the
jurisdictional stage, not the merits stage, that the Court is most vulnerable.
The Deficiencies in the Court’s Current Internal Processes at the Jurisdictional Stage
The Court currently considers between five and six thousand petitions each year and, as
described above, grants review in about sixty to eighty cases. Although the Justices themselves
plainly commit significant time to deciding—based on full briefing and the merits, oral
argument, and circulation of draft opinions—those cases in which review is granted, it is an
open secret that the individual Justices spend relatively little time reviewing individual
petitions at the jurisdictional stage. To be sure, the Justices are the ones who formally vote on
the question whether review is warranted but given the thousands of petitions to be considered
and all of their other responsibilities, especially deciding the cases granted review, the Justices
themselves spend no time at all on the vast majority of cert petitions and only minutes even
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on those relatively few petitions in which review is seriously considered. The Justices instead
must, as they do, depend heavily on their law clerks to identify which cases warrant the Court’s
attention.
***
As a result, the law clerks and, accordingly, the Justices, are highly dependent at the
jurisdictional stage on the quality of the advocacy reflected in the petition for a writ of
certiorari seeking review, amicus briefs filed in support of the petition, and those in any briefs
opposed to review. And, most simply put, as good as those law clerks are, they are no match
at the jurisdictional stage when time is so limited for the nation’s most skilled Supreme Court
advocates. The latter, many of whom were once themselves Supreme Court law clerks but are
now seasoned Supreme Court lawyers with years and decades of experience, know precisely
how to pitch cases both to persuade a law clerk that a case is worthy of the Court’s review
when it is not, and to persuade the clerks that a case is not worthy of review, when
it is.
***
Were the assistance of the most skilled Supreme Court advocates equally available to all
persons, especially our society’s most vulnerable, their potential for outsized influence would
neither be realized nor a problem. The Justices and their chambers would always have the
advantage of exceedingly able lawyers on all sides of a case. In many cases, with the modern
rise of the expert Supreme Court Bar during the past four decades, that is now true for the
cases the Court decides after full briefing and oral argument. That development is very much
a good thing. But it is not true at the jurisdictional stage which is both why the Court remains
particularly vulnerable to undue influence by certain advocates and reform of the Court’s
procedures is warranted.
Until relatively recently, the problem of skewed advocacy expertise was less concerning
because so few attorneys possessed it outside of the Office of the Solicitor General of the U.S.
Department of Justice. . .
Until the late 1980s, the Office of the Solicitor General enjoyed the equivalent of a
monopoly on such expertise, but the emergence of a modern Supreme Court Bar has since
dramatically changed that dynamic, and a handful of national law firms now fairly boast of
highly skilled and successful Supreme Court practices frequently staffed by veterans of the
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Solicitor General’s Office and former Supreme Court law clerks. They match, and sometimes
even best the Solicitor General’s Office in the depth and breadth of their advocacy expertise.
Year after year, they now dominate the cases the Court decides to hear at the jurisdictional
stage and disproportionately employ the attorneys who file the briefs and present oral
argument on the merits.
Nor does the significant pro bono work many of those same law firms commendably
engage in effectively close the advocacy gap. Such work is necessarily both secondary to their
need to earn profits and limited by the professional requirement that they avoid any formal
conflicts of interests with their paying clients as well as by the practical need to avoid taking
on pro bono causes that might upset their business clients that pay full freight for legal
representation. Consequently, it is the business interests that can afford to pay their high
billable rates that have greatest access to their expertise.
To be sure, a few public interest organizations, such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
Public Citizen, and the American Civil Liberties Union, can fairly boast of impressive
Supreme Court expertise. Their representation, however, is as a practical matter still very
limited in its reach at the Court’s jurisdictional stage and many parties, such as non-whitecollar defendants in federal and state criminal defendants, lack the distinct advantage of their
assistance. As a result, potentially successful cert petitions representing those parties are either
not filed at all or, if filed, poorly executed. And petitions filed by government prosecutors
drafted by expert Supreme Court counsel in the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office, or their
counterparts in many States, are granted, even though an effective opposition to the petition
might well have resulted in a denial of review instead.
The Proposed Addition of a Career Staff Attorney Office at the Court
My reform proposal for the Commission’s consideration is a modest one that does not
purport to address the more serious and pervasive underlying problem of the profound lack of
effective legal representation of the nation’s most vulnerable populations. Consistent with the
Commission’s charge, my proposal is instead narrowly aimed at improving the internal
decisionmaking process that the Supreme Court uses to identify the cases it determines warrant
its plenary review. Although a significant problem, it is also one that I believe can be
effectively addressed in a relatively simple way and at relatively little cost.
The Court should hire a staff of career attorneys whose exclusive responsibility would be
to provide the Court with assistance in deciding which cases warrant the Court’s review. The
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office would be staffed by seasoned, highly accomplished attorneys with significant
experience in appellate and Supreme Court advocacy. Following general guidance provided
by the Justices, these staff attorneys would review the petitions in the first instance, identify
those petitions warranting closer attention by the Justices and their law clerks, and write up
memoranda for their consideration in deciding whether review should be granted. The staff
attorneys would possess both the time and the years of professional experience that the law
clerks currently lack in evaluating the cert petitions. That would include, when needed, reading
closely the briefs, the cited authorities, the lower court opinions, identifying how expert
counsel may be overreaching in their framing of the case, and otherwise making up for gaps
in advocacy. But also important, the staff attorneys would, as now, leave the final decisions to
the Justices, assisted by their clerks as each Justice sees fit.
***
Testimony of Allison Orr Larsen, William & Mary Law School
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Larsen-Testimony-PresidentialCommission-on-the-Supreme-Court.pdf.

An Amicus Boom
Amicus briefs are on the rise. Ninety-eight percent of Supreme Court cases now have
amicus filings; over 800 briefs are filed each term and the marquee cases attract briefs in the
triple digits. This is an 800% increase from the 1950s and a 95% increase from 1995. To put
things in perspective historically, amici averaged roughly one brief per case in the 1950s and
about five briefs per case in the 1990s. By contrast, in the 2015 Obergefell case the number of
amicus briefs reached 147 (a record-breaker) and the health care case two years earlier (NFIB
v. Sebelius) had 136 amicus briefs on the docket. For the sake of comparison, consider that
Roe v. Wade had twenty-three amicus briefs. In Brown v. Board of Education, there were only
six. In Lochner v. New York that number was zero.
***
Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that the Justices cite these briefs to support their
factual claims . . . increasingly regularly. In my 2014 study on the subject I found that one in
every five citations to amicus briefs by the Justices were used to support a factual assertion.
The Justices seem to have only picked up the pace since then. A 2020 study of amicus citations
found citations to amici in 65 percent of the Court’s cases (a record), and “most of all” the
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justices relied on briefs that “provided real world information.” Of the citations I studied,
several surprising patterns emerge. Less than a third of the factual claims presented by amici
and credited by the Court were contested by the party briefs. And more than two-thirds of the
time, the Justice citing the amicus brief for a fact cites only the amicus brief as authority—not
any accompanying study or journal citation from within the brief. The implication from this
omission is telling: the Justices are using these briefs as more than a research tool. The briefs
themselves are the factual authorities, and the amici are the experts.
***
The Trouble with Amicus Facts
Nowhere outside the Supreme Court do we see this widespread eleventh-hour
supplementation of the factual record from sources that are not subject to cross-examination
or other checks on reliability. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court is unique in educating
itself about the world in this way should give us significant pause. Unlike other legal decision
makers (i.e., administrative agencies and trial courts), the U.S. Supreme Court is not set up to
sort through what is now a sea of factual claims coming from a variety of actors who all claim
to be experts. Mistakes are almost inevitable.
The studies, statistics, and articles marshaled by these groups to support factual assertions
are selected by those with a “dog in the fight.” The factual sources are chosen by amici, in
other words, for reasons other than that they are the industry standard, the most peer-reviewed,
or the most accurate state of our knowledge today. Rather they are chosen as part of a
coordinated plan to win the day. And with the vast amount of information and studies available
online now, it is not hard to assemble evidence – whether of dubious or strong reliability – to
support a pre-existing point of view. Because the secret is out that the Justices value briefs that
supplement their technical knowledge, many amicus briefs stretch to make factual claims –
even if it is beyond their institutional capacity to do so.
***
To date, the standard response to questions about “junk science” ending up in Supreme
Court opinions is to resort to the adversary process. While that may have been enough in a
pre-Internet universe, it is insufficient today. My research shows that the check from the
adversary system at the Court is very feeble to the point of being almost non-existent. In both
my 2014 published study and my 2018 update I went through each of the factual claims
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supported by an amicus and cross-referenced the party briefs to see if they were contested by
the parties. Such a check existed in less than a third of the citations for the 2014 study and less
than 10% of the citations for the more modern time period. The number of amicus briefs filed
and the amount of seemingly legitimate information available to present makes it very unlikely
that a litigant can adequately respond to amici-presented factual claims.
***
One possible reform involves increased disclosure rules on amici so that the Justices are
fully aware of the source of the information they are digesting. . . If the Justices are blind to
the actual funders of the amici then they have no way to evaluate critically the factual
submissions coming from them. Current Supreme Court rules on amicus briefs require a
statement of interest of the amicus and disclosure only as to whether the party contributed
financially or otherwise to the brief. The rules do not bar anonymously-funded amicus briefs
and they do little to shed light on briefs filed by neutral-sounding organizations that are in
reality funded by those with an interest in the case (even if not the party).
***
Disclosure rules on amicus briefs can take many forms and still be effective. One
possibility (borrowed from Daubert and the rules of evidence) is for the Court to require any
amicus brief filed with factual claims to include an explanation of the methods used to discover
them. . . The Court could easily impose even minor variations of this reform. It could, for
example, require that any statement of fact in an amicus brief be supported by data that is
publicly available (not “on file with” the author). Or, the Court could require disclosure when
an amicus (or a related group) funds or authors a study purporting to establish a factual claim.
. . Alternatively, the Supreme Court Rules could create a limited way for the parties to respond
to unreliability in factual claims. The Court could permit a limited letter at the end of the
amicus submissions in which the parties can respond—not to legal arguments—but only to
instances where they think the amicus has relied on a shaky authority for a claim of fact.
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Endnotes: Appendix D

1

All citations are omitted from the excerpts but are included in the full testimony available on the website.
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Appendix E: Commission Members
Michelle Adams
Michelle Adams is a Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, where she
teaches Constitutional Law, Federal Courts, and Federal Civil Rights. At Cardozo, she is a
Director of the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy and was a Board Member
of the Innocence Project. Adams has published in the Yale Law Journal, the California Law
Review, and the Texas Law Review. She recently appeared in “Amend: The Fight for
America,” a 2021 Netflix documentary about the 14th Amendment. She is the author of The
Containment: Detroit, The Supreme Court, and the Battle for Racial Justice in the North,
forthcoming from Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Previously, she was a Law Professor at Seton Hall
Law School, practiced law at the Legal Aid Society, and served as a Law Clerk for Magistrate
Judge James C. Francis IV in the Southern District of New York. Adams holds a B.A. from
Brown University, a J.D. from City University of New York Law School, and an LL.M. from
Harvard Law School, where she was the first Charles Hamilton Houston Scholar. She is a twotime recipient of Cardozo’s Faculty Inspire Award.

Kate Andrias (Rapporteur)
Kate Andrias is a Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. She teaches and writes about
constitutional law, labor and employment law, and administrative law, with a focus on problems
of economic and political inequality. Her work has been published in numerous books and
journals, including the Harvard Law Review, the NYU Law Review, the Supreme Court
Review, and the Yale Law Journal. In 2016, Andrias was the recipient of Michigan Law
School’s L. Hart Wright Award for Excellence in Teaching. Andrias previously served as
special assistant and associate counsel to President Obama, and as chief of staff of the White
House Counsel’s Office. A graduate of Yale Law School, she clerked for Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Hon. Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Jack M. Balkin
Jack M. Balkin is Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale
Law School. He is the founder and director of Yale’s Information Society Project, an
interdisciplinary center that studies law and new information technologies. He also directs the
Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, and the Knight Law and Media Program at Yale.
Balkin is a member of the American Law Institute and the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, and founded and edits the group blog Balkinization. His most recent books include
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The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Democracy and Dysfunction (with Sanford Levinson),
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking (7th ed. with Brest, Levinson, Amar, and Siegel),
Living Originalism, and Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World.

Bob Bauer (Co-Chair)
Bob Bauer is Professor of Practice and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the New York
University School of Law and Co-Director of NYU Law’s Legislative and Regulatory Process
Clinic. Bauer served as White House Counsel to President Obama from 2009 to 2011. In 2013,
the President named him to be Co-Chair of the Presidential Commission on Election
Administration. He is co-author with Jack Goldsmith of After Trump: Reconstructing the
Presidency (2020), books on federal campaign finance and numerous articles on law and
politics for legal periodicals. He has co-authored numerous bipartisan reports on policy and
legal reform, including “The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of
the Presidential Commission on Election Administration” (Presidential Commission on
Election Administration, 2014); “The State of Campaign Finance in the United States”
(Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018); and “Democratizing the Debates” (Annenberg Working
Group on Presidential Campaign Debate Reform, 2015); ; He is a Contributing Editor of
Lawfare and has published opinion pieces on constitutional and political law issues in The New
York Times, The Washington Post, and The Atlantic, among other publications.

William Baude
William Baude is a Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Constitutional Law Institute
at the University of Chicago Law School, where he teaches federal courts, constitutional law,
conflicts of law, and elements of the law. His most recent articles include Adjudication Outside
Article III, and Is Quasi-Judicial Immunity Qualified Immunity? He is also the co-editor of the
textbook, The Constitution of the United States, and an Affiliated Scholar at the Center for the
Study of Constitutional Originalism. He is a graduate of the University of Chicago and the Yale
Law School, and a former clerk for then-Judge Michael McConnell and Chief Justice John
Roberts.

Elise Boddie
Elise Boddie is a Professor of Law, Henry Rutgers Professor, and Judge Robert L. Carter
Scholar at Rutgers University. An award-winning scholar, Boddie teaches and writes about
constitutional law and civil rights and has published in leading law reviews. Her commentary
has appeared multiple times in The New York Times, as well as in The Washington Post, among
other national news outlets. Boddie has served on the national board of the American
Constitution Society and the board of the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice and is the
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founder and director of The Inclusion Project at Rutgers. Before joining the Rutgers faculty,
Boddie was Director of Litigation for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. and
supervised its nationwide litigation program, including its advocacy in several major U.S.
Supreme Court cases. An honors graduate of Harvard Law School and Yale, she also holds a
master’s degree in public policy from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Boddie
clerked for Judge Robert L. Carter in the Southern District of New York. She is a member of
the American Law Institute and an American Bar Foundation Fellow. In 2016, Rutgers
University President Barchi appointed Boddie a Henry Rutgers Professor in recognition of her
scholarship, teaching, and service. In 2021, Boddie was named the founding Newark Director
of Rutgers University’s Institute for the Study of Global Racial Justice.

Guy-Uriel E. Charles
Guy-Uriel E. Charles is the inaugural Charles J. Ogletree Jr. Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School. He writes about the relationship between law and political power and law’s role in
addressing racial subordination. He teaches courses on civil procedure; election law;
constitutional law; race and law; legislation and statutory interpretation; law, economics, and
politics; and law, identity, and politics. He is currently working on a book, with Luis FuentesRohwer, on the past and future of voting rights, under contract with Cambridge University
Press. He is also co-editing, with Aziza Ahmed, a handbook entitled Race, Racism, and the
Law, under contract with Edward Elgar Publishing. This book will survey the current state of
research on race and the law in the United States and aims to influence the intellectual agenda
of the field. He clerked on the Sixth Circuit for the late Judge Damon J. Keith. He has published
numerous articles in top law journals. He is the co-author of two leading casebooks and two
edited volumes. He is also a member of the American Law Institute.

Andrew Manuel Crespo
Andrew Manuel Crespo is the Morris Wasserstein Public Interest Professor of Law at Harvard
University where he directs the Institute to End Mass Incarceration. Professor Crespo’s
scholarship has been published in multiple leading academic journals including the Harvard
Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, and the Columbia Law Review. Prior to beginning his
academic career, Professor Crespo served as a Staff Attorney with the Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia, where he represented over one hundred people accused of crimes
who could not afford a lawyer. Professor Crespo graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School, where he served as president of the Harvard Law Review and was the first Latino
to hold that position. Following law school, he served as a law clerk to Judge Stephen Reinhardt
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit before going on to serve for two years as a
law clerk at the United States Supreme Court, first to Associate Justice Stephen Breyer and
then to Associate Justice Elena Kagan during her inaugural term on the Court.
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Walter Dellinger
Walter Dellinger is the Douglas Maggs Emeritus Professor of Law at Duke University and a
Partner in the firm of O’Melveny & Myers. He was named one of the 100 Most Influential
Lawyers in America by the National Law Journal and is the recipient of Lifetime Achievement
Awards from the American Lawyer, the American Constitution Society and the Mississippi
Center for Justice. Dellinger served in the White House and as Assistant Attorney General and
head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 1993 to 1996. He was acting Solicitor General
for the 1996-97 Term of the US Supreme Court, He has argued 25 cases before the United
States Supreme Court and has testified more than 30 times before committees of Congress. He
has published in academic journals including the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law Journal
and the Duke Law Journal, and has written extensively for the Washington Post, The New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, Slate, and other publications. In 1987-88 he was a scholar at
the National Humanities Center and has lectured at universities throughout the United States
and other countries including China, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Mexico, Italy, Brazil,
and Denmark. He graduated from University of North Carolina and Yale Law School and
served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black.

Justin Driver
Justin Driver is the Robert R. Slaughter Professor of Law at Yale Law School. He teaches and
writes in the areas of constitutional law, education law, and prison law. His prize-winning book,
The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American
Mind, was selected as a Washington Post Notable Book of the Year, an Editors’ Choice of the
New York Times Book Review, and received several other accolades. A recipient of the
American Society for Legal History’s William Nelson Cromwell Article Prize, he has published
widely in the nation’s leading law reviews and has also written extensively for general
audiences. He is an editor of the Supreme Court Review and an elected member of the American
Law Institute. He holds degrees from Brown, Oxford (where he was a Marshall Scholar), Duke
(where he received certification to teach public school), and Harvard Law School (where he
was an editor of the Harvard Law Review). After graduating from Harvard, he clerked for Judge
Merrick Garland, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Ret.), and Justice Stephen Breyer.

Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., joined the Harvard Law School faculty as an assistant professor in 1982
and is currently Story Professor of Law. He is also an Affiliate Professor in the Harvard
University Government Department. Fallon is a graduate of Yale University and Yale Law
School. He also earned a B.A. degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Oxford
University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar. Before entering teaching, Fallon served as
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a law clerk to Judge J. Skelly Wright and to Justice Lewis F. Powell of the United States
Supreme Court. Fallon has written extensively about Constitutional Law and Federal Courts
Law. He is the author of The Nature of Constitutional Rights: The Invention and Logic of Strict
Judicial Scrutiny (Cambridge University Press, 2019); Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme
Court (Harvard University Press, 2018), The Dynamic Constitution (Cambridge University
Press, 2d ed. 2013), and Implementing the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2001) and
a co-editor of Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (7th ed. 2015).
Fallon is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the
American Law Institute. He is a two-time winner of Harvard Law School’s Sacks-Freund
Award, which is voted annually by the School’s graduating class to honor excellence in
teaching. In 2021, the Federal Courts Section of the American Association of Law Schools
honored Fallon with its lifetime achievement award.

Caroline Fredrickson
Caroline Fredrickson is a Distinguished Visiting Professor from Practice at Georgetown Law
and a Senior Fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice. Caroline Fredrickson served as the
President of the American Constitution Society from 2009-2019. Fredrickson has published
works on many legal and constitutional issues and is a frequent guest on television and radio,
including serving as a regular on-air commentator on impeachment. Before joining ACS,
Fredrickson served as the Director of the ACLU’s Washington Legislative Office and as
General Counsel and Legal Director of NARAL Pro-Choice America. In addition, she served
as the Chief of Staff to Senator Maria Cantwell, of Washington, and Deputy Chief of Staff to
then-Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle, of South Dakota. During the Clinton
Administration, she served as Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs.
Fredrickson is currently an elected member of the American Law Institute, co-chair of the
National Constitution Center’s Coalition of Freedom Advisory Board, a member of
If/When/How’s Advisory Board, and on the boards of American Oversight and the National
Institute of Money and Politics. In 2015 Fredrickson was appointed a member of the Yale Les
Aspin Fellowship Committee. Fredrickson received her J.D. from Columbia Law School with
honors and her B.A. from Yale University in Russian and East European Studies summa cum
laude, phi beta kappa. She clerked for the Hon. James L. Oakes of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Heather Gerken
Heather Gerken is the Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law at Yale Law School
and one of the country’s leading experts on constitutional law and election law. A founder of
the “nationalist school” of federalism, her work focuses on federalism, diversity, and dissent.
Gerken’s work has been featured in the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, and the
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Stanford Law Review as well as The Atlantic, TheBoston Globe, NPR, and TheNew York
Times. In 2017, Politico Magazine named Gerken one of The Politico 50, a list of idea makers
in American politics. At Yale, she founded and runs the country’s most innovative clinic in
local government law, the San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project (SFALP). Gerken is
also a renowned teacher who has won awards at both Yale and Harvard. She was named one of
the nation’s “twenty-six best law teachers” in a book published by the Harvard University Press.
She became dean of Yale Law School on July 1, 2017.

Nancy Gertner
Nancy Gertner was United States District Court Judge (D. Mass.) from 1994-2011. She retired
to join the faculty at Harvard Law School and has been a Visiting Lecturer at Yale Law School.
Prior to 1994, Gertner was a civil rights and criminal defense lawyer. Named one of “The Most
Influential Lawyers of the Past 25 Years” by Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, she has published
widely on sentencing, discrimination, forensic evidence, women’s rights, and the jury system.
Her autobiography, “In Defense of Women: Memoirs of an Unrepentant Advocate,” (Beacon
Press) was published in 2011. She is coauthor of “The Law of Juries” (Thomson Reuters, 2021).
She is the author of an edited volume of the dissenting and majority opinions of Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg (Talbot, forthcoming). She is writing a memoir, “Incomplete Sentences”
(Beacon, forthcoming) about the men she has sentenced. A graduate of Barnard College, with
a M.A in Political Science and J.D. from Yale, she clerked for Justice Luther Swygert, Chief
Judge, 7th Circuit. She has received numerous awards, including the ABA’s Margaret Brent
Award, the National Association of Women Lawyers’ Arabella Babb Mansfield Award, and
the Thurgood Marshall Award from the American Bar Association. In October 2014, she was
a resident scholar at the Rockefeller Foundation in Bellagio, Italy.

Thomas B. Griffith
Thomas B. Griffith served on the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit from 2005 –
2020. He is now Special Counsel at Hunton Andrews Kurth, a Senior Advisor to the National
Institute for Civil Discourse, and a Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School. During his tenure
on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Griffith served on the Judicial Conference’s Committee on the
Judicial Branch, which is concerned with the federal judiciary’s relationship to the Executive
Branch and Congress, and the Code of Conduct Committee, which sets the ethical standards
that govern the federal judiciary. Prior to his appointment to the D.C. Circuit, Judge Griffith
was the General Counsel of Brigham Young University. Previously he served as Senate Legal
Counsel, the nonpartisan chief legal officer of the U.S. Senate, and before that was a partner at
Wiley, Rein & Fielding. Judge Griffith has long been active in the American Bar Association’s
rule of law projects in Eastern Europe and Eurasia and is currently a member of the International
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Advisory Board of the CEELI Institute in Prague. He is a graduate of Brigham Young
University and the University of Virginia School of Law.

Tara Leigh Grove
Tara Leigh Grove is the Charles E. Tweedy, Jr., Endowed Chairholder of Law and Director of
the Program in Constitutional Studies at the University of Alabama School of Law. After
graduating summa cum laude from Duke University and magna cum laude from Harvard Law
School, Grove clerked for Judge Emilio Garza of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
She then spent four years as an appellate attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice, arguing
fifteen cases in the courts of appeals. Grove has written extensively about the federal judiciary,
exploring issues related to judicial legitimacy and judicial independence. Grove’s work has
been published in prestigious law journals, such as the Harvard Law Review, the Columbia
Law Review, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, the New York University Law
Review, the Cornell Law Review, and the Vanderbilt Law Review. Grove has served as a
visiting professor at Harvard Law School and Northwestern Pritzker School of Law.

Bert I. Huang
Bert I. Huang is the Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law at Columbia University, where he
received the Reese Prize for Excellence in Teaching from the law school’s graduating class.
The university has also recognized him with its Presidential Award for Outstanding Teaching.
At Columbia, he created the Courts & Legal Process colloquium to bring judges, students, and
faculty together to discuss new academic research about the judiciary; and he previously served
as a vice dean. He has also taught at Harvard. He served as the president of the Harvard Law
Review and as a law clerk for Justice David H. Souter of the U.S. Supreme Court. He also
clerked for Judge Michael Boudin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. He
completed his J.D. and Ph.D. at Harvard University, where he was a Paul & Daisy Soros Fellow.
After receiving his A.B. from Harvard, he was a Marshall Scholar at the University of Oxford
and worked for the White House Council of Economic Advisers.

Sherrilyn Ifill
Sherrilyn Ifill is the President & Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, Inc. (LDF), the nation’s oldest and premier civil rights law organization fighting for racial
justice and equality. Ifill began her career as a Fellow at the American Civil Liberties Union,
and then as an Assistant Counsel at LDF where she litigated voting rights cases in the South.
In 1993 Ifill joined the faculty at University of Maryland School of Law, where she taught civil
procedure, constitutional law, and a broad range of civil rights and clinical offerings. Her
scholarship focused on the critical importance of a racially diverse judiciary to the integrity of
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judicial decision-making. Ifill also studies and writes about racial violence. Her critically
acclaimed book, On The Courthouse Lawn: Confronting The Legacy Of Lynching In The 21st
Century, is credited with inspiring contemporary conversations about lynching and
reconciliation. Since returning to LDF as its 7th President & Director-Counsel in 2013, Ifill has
led the organization’s bold advocacy in the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court,
on behalf of clients fighting voter suppression, racial discrimination in the criminal justice
system, and a broad array of other urgent civil rights issues. Ifill is a member of the American
Law Institute and the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. She holds an undergraduate
degree from Vassar College, a J.D. from New York University School of Law, and numerous
honorary doctorates.

Olatunde Johnson
Olatunde Johnson is the Jerome B. Sherman Professor of Law at Columbia Law School where
she teaches and writes about legislation, administrative law, antidiscrimination law, litigation,
and inequality in the United States. In February 2020, she was appointed by the United States
Department of Justice to the Resolutions Committee honoring Justice John Paul Stevens. In
2016, she was awarded Columbia University’s Presidential Award for Outstanding Teaching,
and Columbia Law School’s Willis L.M. Reese Prize for Excellence in Teaching. Previously,
Professor Johnson served as constitutional and civil rights counsel to Senator Edward M.
Kennedy on the Senate Judiciary Committee and as an attorney at the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund. Professor Johnson graduated from Yale University and from Stanford Law School. After
law school, she clerked for Judge David Tatel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
and for Justice John Paul Stevens on the United States Supreme Court.

Michael S. Kang
Michael S. Kang is the William G. and Virginia K. Karnes Research Professor at Northwestern
Pritzker School of Law and nationally recognized expert on campaign finance, voting rights,
redistricting, judicial elections, and corporate governance. His research has been published
widely in leading law journals and featured in TheNew York Times, The Washington Post, and
Forbes, among others. His recent work focuses on partisan gerrymandering; the influence of
party and campaign finance on elected judges; the de-regulation of campaign finance after
Citizens United; and so-called “sore loser laws” that restrict losing primary candidates from
running in the general election. Kang previously served as the Thomas Simmons Professor of
Law at Emory University School of Law. He received his BA and JD from the University of
Chicago, where he served as technical editor of the Law Review and graduated Order of the
Coif. He also received a PhD in government from Harvard University and an MA from the
University of Illinois. After law school, he clerked for Judge Kanne on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and worked in private practice at Ropes & Gray in Boston.
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Alison L. LaCroix
Alison L. LaCroix is the Robert Newton Reid Professor of Law at the University of Chicago
Law School. She is also an Associate Member of the University of Chicago Department of
History. Professor LaCroix is the author of The Ideological Origins of American Federalism
(Harvard University Press, 2010), and in 2018 she was awarded a National Endowment for the
Humanities Fellowship for her current book project, titled The Interbellum Constitution: Union,
Commerce, and Slavery From the Long Founding Moment to the Civil War (Yale University
Press, forthcoming). Before joining the University of Chicago faculty in 2006, she practiced in
the litigation department at Debevoise & Plimpton in New York. Professor LaCroix received
her B.A. and J.D. from Yale University, and her A.M. and Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Margaret H. Lemos
Maggie Lemos is the Robert G. Seaks LL.B. ’34 Professor of Law, Senior Associate Dean for
Faculty and Research, and faculty co-advisor for the Bolch Judicial Institute at Duke Law
School. She is a scholar of constitutional law, legal institutions, and procedure. Her current
research focuses on the institutions of law interpretation and enforcement, including both public
and private lawyers, and their effects on substantive rights. Lemos is also a co-author of a new
multidisciplinary coursebook on judicial decision making. She teaches courses on civil
procedure, legislation, and judicial process, and was awarded Duke’s Distinguished Teaching
Award in 2013. Prior to joining the Duke Law faculty, Lemos was an associate professor at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; a Bristow Fellow at the Office of the Solicitor General;
and a law clerk for Judge Kermit V. Lipez of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
and for U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens. She received her J.D. from New York
University School of Law and her B.A. from Brown University.

David F. Levi
David F. Levi is the Levi Family Professor of Law and Judicial Studies and Director of the
Bolch Judicial Institute at Duke Law School. Levi was previously the James B. Duke and
Benjamin N. Duke Dean of the Duke Law School. He served as dean for 11 years from 20072018. Prior to his appointment at Duke, Levi was the Chief United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of California with chambers in Sacramento. He was appointed to the district
court in 1990. From 1986-1990 he was the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
California. Following graduation from Stanford Law School in 1980, Levi served as a law clerk
to Judge Ben C. Duniway of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and then to Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of the U.S. Supreme Court. Levi has served as member and chair of two
U.S. Judicial Conference committees — the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules and the
Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure. He was chair of the American Bar
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Association’s Standing Committee on the American Judicial System (2014-2016). He is an
elected fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author or co-author of
several books, articles, and published speeches mostly on the judiciary, judicial independence,
and judicial decision-making. He is President of the American Law Institute.

Trevor W. Morrison
Trevor Morrison serves as Dean of New York University School of Law, where he is also the
Eric M. & Laurie B. Roth Professor of Law. He previously held faculty appointments at Cornell
Law School and Columbia Law School. Morrison’s research and teaching interests are in
constitutional law (especially separation of powers), federal courts, and the law of the executive
branch. After graduating from Columbia Law School, he served as a law clerk to Judge Betty
Fletcher of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Between those clerkships, he was a Bristow Fellow in the U.S.
Justice Department’s Office of the Solicitor General, an attorney-adviser in the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, and an associate at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (now
WilmerHale). Morrison also served as associate counsel to President Barack Obama. He is a
fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and a member of the American Law
Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Richard H. Pildes
Professor Richard H. Pildes is Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at New York
University School of Law and one of the country’s leading experts on the legal aspects of
American democracy and government. His academic work focuses on all aspects of the political
process, as well as legal issues concerning the structure of American government, including the
powers of the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. His two casebooks, The Law of
Democracy and When Elections Go Bad, created the law of democracy as a field of study in
the law schools. In addition to editing the book, The Future of the Voting Rights Act, he has
published more than seventy academic articles. Pildes has represented numerous clients before
the Supreme Court. He served as a law clerk at the Court to Justice Thurgood Marshall and to
Judge Abner J. Mikva of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. He has
testified several times before the United States Senate and House of Representatives. Born in
Chicago, he began his teaching career at the University of Michigan Law School, before
moving to NYU. He is an elected member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and
the American Law Institute, as well as a Guggenheim Fellow.
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Michael D. Ramsey
Michael D. Ramsey is Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law at the University
of San Diego School of Law, where he teaches and writes in the areas of constitutional law,
foreign relations law, and international law. He is the author of The Constitution’s Text in
Foreign Affairs (Harvard University Press 2007), co-editor of International Law in the U.S.
Supreme Court: Continuity and Change (Cambridge University Press 2011), and co-author of
two casebooks, Transnational Law and Practice (Aspen 2015) and International Business
Transactions: A Problem-Oriented Coursebook (12th ed., West 2015). His scholarly articles
have appeared in publications such as the Yale Law Journal, the University of Chicago Law
Review, the Georgetown Law Journal and the American Journal of International Law. He
received his B.A. magna cum laude from Dartmouth College and his J.D. summa cum laude
from Stanford Law School. Prior to teaching, he served as a judicial clerk for Judge J. Clifford
Wallace of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Justice Antonin Scalia
of the United States Supreme Court, and practiced law with the law firm of Latham & Watkins.
He has taught as a visiting professor at the University of California, San Diego, in the
Department of Political Science and at the University of Paris – Sorbonne, in the Department
of Comparative Law.

Cristina M. Rodríguez (Co-Chair)
Cristina M. Rodríguez is the Leighton Homer Surbeck Professor of Law at Yale Law School.
Her fields of research and teaching include constitutional law and theory, immigration law and
policy, and administrative law and process. Her new book, The President and Immigration Law
(with Adam B. Cox) was published by Oxford University Press in September 2020, and
explores the long history of presidential control over immigration policy and its implications
for the future of immigration law and the presidency itself. Rodríguez joined Yale Law School
in 2013 after serving for two years as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal
Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice. She was on the faculty at the New York University
School of Law from 2004–2012 and has been Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford, Harvard,
and Columbia Law Schools. She is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
and the American Law Institute, a non-resident fellow at the Migration Policy Institute in
Washington, D.C., and a past member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She is also a past
recipient of the Yale Law Women Award for Excellence in Teaching. She earned her B.A. and
J.D. degrees from Yale and attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, where she
received a Master of Letters in Modern History. Following law school, Rodríguez clerked for
Judge David S. Tatel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor of the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Kermit Roosevelt
Kermit Roosevelt is a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School,
where he teaches constitutional law and conflict of laws. He is a graduate of Harvard College
and Yale Law School. Before joining the Penn faculty, he practiced appellate litigation with
Mayer Brown in Chicago and clerked for D.C. Circuit Judge Stephen F. Williams and Supreme
Court Justice David H. Souter. He is the Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Third
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. His most recent book, The Nation that Never Was:
Reconstructing America’s Story (University of Chicago Press, 2022), explores the source of
American values of liberty and equality.

Bertrall Ross
Bertrall Ross is the Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law at the University
of Virginia, School of Law. He teaches and writes in the areas of constitutional law, election
law, administrative law, and statutory interpretation. Ross’s research is driven by a concern
about democratic responsiveness and accountability, as well as the inclusion of marginalized
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